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Business, workers, and the class politics of labor reforms in Chile, 1973 – 2016 
 
by 
 
 
Pablo Pérez Ahumada 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology 
 
 
University of California, San Diego, 2017 
Professor Carlos H. Waisman, Chair 
 
This dissertation analyzes labor policy in Chile, and aims to explain why the 
labor laws enacted during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) and systematized in the 
1979 Labor Plan have still not been repealed. Conceived as a pro-business plan, the 
Labor Plan regulations decentralized bargaining to the firm level, undermined 
significantly the right to strike, and weakened unions through several clauses 
promoting, among other things, the coexistence of multiple unions in the firm. Despite 
		 xiv	
these regulations have been defined as one of the main factors explaining the weakness 
of organized labor throughout the democratic period (1990 – present), none of the labor 
reforms carried out since the return to democracy has dismantled them. In this 
dissertation I explain why this is so. Based on archival, historical, and qualitative 
evidence, in the first part of this dissertation I analyze all the labor reforms carried out 
between 1990 and 2016, and the role organized business and labor played in them. I 
show that the persistence of the 1979 Labor Plan is explained largely by the power 
imbalances between employers and workers and, particularly, by employers’ stronger 
capacity influence the policy-making process. This imbalance explains why the last 
reform process (2015-2016) did not succeed in dismantling the Labor Plan regulations 
even though most of the politico-institutional constraints derived from the dictatorship 
and observed in the past reform processes of 1990-1993 and 2000-2001 (e.g. unelected 
Senators that strengthened the veto power of right parties) did not exist anymore. In the 
second part of this dissertation I switch the focus from labor law to worker and 
employer collective action, and examine the processes that led to the revival and 
consolidation of the business encompassing association Confederación de la 
Producción y del Comercio (CPC) and to the formation and weakening of the labor 
confederation Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT). In addition to showing how 
these processes explain employers’ stronger power to influence the policy-making 
process, the evidence I present allows me to nuance some explanations for policy 
continuity in Chile, which in emphasizing the effects of institutional and political 
constraints tend to assign a secondary role to explanations centered on the interactions 
between organized business, labor, and the state.
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1. Class politics and the continuity of labor policy in Chile 
 
“In sum, with the Labor Plan the monopolistic Chilean 
bourgeoisie aims to atomize, fragment, and destroy the 
labor movement in order to consolidate the economic 
regime and provide foreign multinational corporations 
with cheap labor force”   
Central Única de Trabajadores Exterior Committee’s 
(CEXCUT) Boletín Informativo,  
February 1980 (Araya, 2015, p. 72).    
 
“The unions, political, and social organizations that 
endorse this declaration express our strongest rejection of 
the labor reform bill that will be passed in Congress in 
the next weeks… [This] is a neoliberal labor reform that 
does not even recognize few advances that would allow 
us to recover the rights the Labor Plan took away from 
us… 
We hoped that this labor reform project would contain 
substantial advances. However, we now know that 
nothing like this will happen. Our Parliament is 
kidnapped by business through corruption and conflict of 
interests…” 
Declaración Pública en rechazo a la Reforma Laboral,  
March 24, 2016  
 
 
 More than 35 years have passed between the first and the second quote. Yet 
their content is very similar. In the first case, the leaders of main labor confederation 
(the then banned Central Única de Trabajadores) strongly rejected the pro-business 
orientation of the Pinochet dictatorship’s labor code established in 1979 and commonly 
known as the Labor Plan. In the second quote, a hundred of labor confederations, social 
movements, and political organizations decried the last labor reform initiative (passed in 
2016) for failing to reinstate the labor rights the dictatorship took away by enacting the 
Labor Plan. This second quote tells much more than the story of a failed reform 
initiative, though: it is, as I will show throughout this dissertation, the most recent 
expression of several other failed attempts to change the labor code. Regardless of 
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whether these reform attempts aimed to dismantle or make substantial modifications to 
the 1979 Labor Plan, in no case did they meet workers’ aspirations.  
This dissertation aims to explain the persistence of the labor laws inherited from 
Pinochet’s regime. More specifically, it seeks to explain why the provisions governing 
collective relations between employers and workers, established during the military 
dictatorship (1973-1990) and articulated in the 1979 Labor Plan, have persisted even 
after nearly 30 years of democratic, center-left rule. With the exception of Sebastián 
Piñera’s administration (2010 – 2014), center-left coalitions have ruled Chile since the 
return to democracy in 1990. In different periods, these coalitions—first the 
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (1990 – 2010), then the Nueva Mayoría 
(2014 – present day)—have tried to either dismantle or substantially reform the 1979 
labor code. However, no matter the different political contexts and conditions, all these 
reform attempts have failed.  
The literature on policy change suggests that the persistence of the 1979 Labor 
Plan was somehow expected in the early 1990s and 2000s. As I show in Chapter 2 and 
3, this literature has rightly noted that in the first decades of the post-dictatorial 
democratic regime there were several factors—from the consensual and pro-business 
orientation of center-left policymakers to politico-institutional dictatorial legacies that 
increased the veto power of right parties—which reduced the chances for significant 
reforms. Nevertheless, as Chapter 4 and 5 will show, most of these politico-institutional 
constraints were no longer present or played a significantly less important role during 
the last reform attempt of 2015 – 2016. This last labor reform took place in a context 
where the Nueva Mayoría government worked hard to get rid of the Concertación 
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governments’ excessive pro-business orientation. To do so, President Bachelet proposed 
an ambitious reformist agenda that was endorsed by a coalition that gathered together 
the most important progressive parties of Chile’s political system (including the 
Communist Party). Also by the mid 2010s the labor movement was in many respects 
stronger than in the early 1990s and 2000s. Large and successful strikes occurred 
between 2007 and 2014 in mining and forestry and port industries showed that 
organized labor continued to have—at least in these sectors—a disruptive power that 
even some union leaders were not aware of. Yet despite these favorable conditions, the 
2015–2015 did not meet workers’ demands for the end of the Labor Plan.  
Drawing upon a class-based approach that emphasizes how capitalists and 
workers organize to defend their interests and influence (with different degrees of 
success) policy making, this dissertation explains why the main aspects of the 1979 
Labor Plan have remained intact. To do so, it focuses on the two main organizations 
representing the interests of business and labor: the Confederación de la Producción y 
del Comercio (Confederation of Production and Commerce, CPC), and the Central 
Unitaria de Trabajadores (Workers Unitary Central, CUT). 
 
1.1. Labor law as an outcome and a mechanism for collective action 
The study of labor reforms has implications that lie way beyond law itself. 
Labor law is much more than a simple legislative output designed to solve technical 
problems (Carnes, 2014, pp. 5-6). Rather, it is a political outcome resulting from the 
struggle between different actors—particularly workers, employers, and government 
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officials—trying to exert their influence over policymaking. As an outcome, and 
perhaps as the clearest expression of the balance of power between these actors, labor 
law provides thus a valuable “point of reference” for analyzing larger political processes 
(Collier & Collier, 1979, p. 971). Nevertheless, labor law is also an explanatory factor, a 
mechanism, in its own right. Labor law has “feedback effects” because it produces, such 
as any other policy, resources and incentives that shape the alternatives available for 
actors to pursue their interests (Carnes, 2014, p. 45; Pierson, 1993, p. 598).  
In the first part of this dissertation I examine labor law as outcome. Yet in the 
second part I also consider it as a mechanism for collective action, especially when 
analyzing how employers and workers organize in business associations and unions to 
advance their class interests. Following the literature on labor reform, in this 
dissertation I distinguish between individual employment law and collective labor law 
(cf. Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Carnes, 2014; 
Cook, 2007; Murillo, 2005). While the former denote provisions on individual workers’ 
right (e.g. working conditions, contract termination, severance pay, leave policies, etc.), 
the latter refer to norms governing the collective action of labor organizations, i.e. the 
organization of labor unions, federations, and confederations, the rules for collective 
bargaining and strike, the standards for dialogue between employers and workers, etc. 
The two areas of the legislation are interrelated, but may sometimes reflect different 
tendencies: some reforms may flexibilize individual labor law but at the same time 
retain controls in collective labor law, or vice versa (Cook, 2007, p. 39).    
As I will show in the next section, the 1979 Labor Plan was a “syndical plan” 
that replaced the collective labor laws existing until then with new regulations on 
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unions, collective bargaining, and strike. Strictly speaking, the labor plan did not touch 
the individual labor laws—they had already been changed a year earlier, in 1978. 
Therefore, when examining labor reforms in the democratic period (chapters 3 through 
5), I focus mostly (but not exclusively) on the changes to collective labor laws. Based 
on this, in this dissertation I focus on the labor reforms of 1990–1993, the failed reform 
of 1994–2000, and well as legal changes of 2000–2001 and 2015–2016.  
This focus on collective labor laws is worth it considering the characteristics of 
labor reforms in Chile. In all the reform processes I analyze, policymakers proposed 
changes to both individual and collective laws, and in some cases the debate on 
individual employment provisions—e.g. the debate on the “incomplete” modification of 
article 155(f) that allowed employers to dismiss workers at will—was key for 
understanding the real scope of the reform process. However, in previous analyses 
scholars have noted that unlike collective labor laws since 1990 individual labor laws 
have been changed in several important ways. Along with increasing maximum 
severance payment from five to eleven months’ salary, the reforms have reduced 
weekly labor hours from 48 to 45, and given birth to the first unemployment insurance 
system (whose coverage was expanded in the late 2000s) (cf. Carnes, 2014; Gamonal, 
2011; Murillo, Ronconi, & Schrank, 2011; Rojas, 2007). Despite these improvements, 
the reforms processes failed utterly to modify the central aspects of the 1979 Labor 
Plan. Against workers’ demands, laws still encourage firm-level collective bargaining 
and undermine significantly the right to strike through several clauses that prevent 
workers from using it as an effective tool during the bargaining process (cf. Durán & 
Kremerman, 2015; Feres, 2007, 2009; Gamonal & Ugarte, 2015; Narbona, 2014; Rojas, 
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2007). Since 1990, Chile’s labor legislation has thus become what researchers have 
defined as a particular combination of protected individual employment rights and 
restricted workers’ collective rights (Carnes, 2014; Gamonal, 2011). According to 
recent research, the legal constraints on workers’ collective rights have been one of the 
main causes of the huge inequality and power imbalance between capital and labor 
observed in current Chilean society (Barrett, 2001; Feres, 2009; Frank, 2004; Haagh, 
2002; Posner, 2017; Winn, 2004).  
 
1.2. Labor law in Chile. Changes and continuities  
The 1931 labor code 
 In Chile, the first comprehensive labor code was enacted in 1931. Although it 
had been originally devised in the 1924 social laws, the 1931 code was the first 
systematic response of the elite to the radicalism of the working class (Angell, 1972, p. 
59). Pretty much like Brazil, the formulation of the labor code represented, as (Collier 
& Collier, 2002 [1991], p. 163) note, a state- and elite-driven process, which aimed to 
create an institutionalized labor movement that was depoliticized, controlled, and 
penetrated by the state. Consequently Chile differed from other Latin American 
countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, where working class 
incorporation took place through radical or populist parties promoting labor 
mobilization. As a result, the 1931 legislation was in many respects less protective than 
that of other countries. Although it provided significant protections for individual 
workers, it promoted the development of weak and fragmented workers’ organizations. 
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Chilean unions had little or no power over the terms of employment of their members. 
Nor did they have power to prevent dismissal of employees (Angell, 1972, p. 63; 
Carnes, 2014, p. 105). Also, the 1931 Labor Code (article 365) prohibited public 
employees from joining unions, and its regulations aiming to increase union 
membership (e.g. mandatory union membership) were weaker than in Argentina or 
México. In a similar way, despite the Chilean legislation did not prohibit industry-wide 
collective bargaining, most of the regulations encouraged firm-level agreements 
(Marshall, 2005, p. 10). Hence unlike Argentine unions—which were organized in 
strong federations able to bargaining at the industry-wide level, Chilean unions were 
more fragmented and weak. In Chile, firm-level unions were the main actors of 
collective bargaining and, as a result, the backbone of the labor movement.    
The fragmentation of the working class was also fostered through legal divisions 
such as that between white-collar and blue-collar workers, which brought about 
important differences in terms of union organization and collective bargaining. Most 
blue-collar workers were organized in firm-level unions (sindicatos industriales), where 
membership was mandatory if in any establishment of 25 workers or more employees 
there was an affirmative vote of at least 55% of them to establish a union. Only one 
union per establishment was allowed, and the unions were forbidden from forming 
federations with other unions for collective bargaining purposes (Angell, 1972, p. 6).   
On the other hand, white-collar workers and skilled workers were mostly 
organized in craft or professional unions (sindicatos profesionales). Despite 
membership was not mandatory in sindicatos profesionales, these unions were not 
confined to a single establishment as they could engage in multi-firm collective 
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bargaining. Yet craft or professional unions had no right to share in profit (as plant 
unions did), and the law limited substantially the scope of action of the federations they 
could form. Thus, strong federations involved in national-level collective bargaining 
were rare in Chile. As noted by Angell (1972, p. 7), strong national federations existed 
in spite of, not because of, the legal code. 
This does not mean that supra-firm bargaining did never take place in Chile 
before the dictatorship. The 1931 code allowed industry-wide tripartite agreements 
(tarifados nacionales) through which white- or blue-collar workers and employers 
could define, under the supervision of government’s representatives, minimum wage for 
their respective industry (Rojas, 2009, p. 88). These agreements became the norm in 
sectors with strong labor federations, such as the mining and shoe and leather industries. 
In the latter, for example, minimum wage industry-wide agreements were usual since 
the 1950s, after the powerful FONACC (Federación Obrera Nacional del Cuero y del 
Calzado) pushed the sectoral employers’ association to adopt them (Angell, 1972, p. 
69). The tarifados nacionales turned into law in 1969, when the Christian Democratic 
government headed by President Eduardo Frei enacted the Law 17,074 as a way to 
ameliorate industrial conflict, uniform wage levels and working conditions, and 
eliminate unfair competition between companies belonging to the same industries 
(Rojas, 2009, p. 89)1. This law was short-lived though. Two weeks after the coup d’état, 
on September 29th 1973, the Decree Law 43 repealed collective bargaining and the 
tripartite commissions. They and the 1931 Labor Code were repealed permanently with 																																																								
1 Another important legal change occurred in this period was the law on agricultural workers’ 
unionization (Ley de sindicalización campesina) of 1967, which recognized for the first time the right of 
these workers to form unions.   
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the changes to the labor laws started in 1978 and consolidated in 1979 with the 
enactment of the Labor Plan.   
 
Labor law during the dictatorship: the 1979 Labor Plan  
Following Campero and Valenzuela (1984), it is possible to distinguish two 
phases in the dictatorship’s changes to the labor laws. During the first one (1973-1978), 
the government did not have a clear orientation toward labor, other than the repression 
of its most politicized segments. Hence during this period the changes in labor policy 
were scattered and in many respects incoherent. They started with the “emergency 
laws”, which among other things suspended the norms protecting workers’ right to 
bargain on salary and, consequently, their right to strike (Decree Law 43 of September 
29th,1973), repealed the legal personhood of the labor confederation Central Única de 
Trabajadores, CUT (Decree Law 133 of November 13th, 1973), and prohibited the 
election of union leaders (Decree Law 198 of December 10th, 1973) (Campero & 
Valenzuela, 1984, pp. 118-121). While of these norms stopped being in force with the 
enactment of the Decree Law 2,200 of 1978, the DL 198 on collective bargaining did so 
only after the enactment of the Labor Plan of 1979 (particularly after the Decree Laws 
2,756 and 2,758).  
This phase also witnessed the first attempt to completely reform the labor code. 
It came from minister of labor Nicanor Díaz Estrada, who elaborated several draft bills 
on individual and collective labor rights in 1975. The corporatist orientation of Díaz and 
his main supporter in the Military Junta, general Gustavo Leigh, was clear. The bills 
recognized the right to engage in industry-wide collective bargaining, and allowed 
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union leaders to participate in government-sponsored initiatives of economic 
development and social dialogue (Campero & Valenzuela, 1984, pp. 122-123). Díaz 
and Leigh wanted to get workers’ support to strengthen their nationalist and corporatist 
project vis-à-vis the neoliberal sectors of the government. They succeeded somehow 
with the enactment of the “Social Projects” of January 1975, which included regulations 
on workers training (Estatuto Nacional de Capacitación Laboral), and enterprise-level 
agreements between workers and employers (Estatuto Social de la Empresa) (Campero 
& Valenzuela, 1984, pp. 207-214). However, despite having initial support from 
Pinochet, the 1975 draft bills did not turn into law. Once the neoliberal sectors became 
more influential throughout 1975, Pinochet stopped endorsing the corporatist-populist 
measures proposed by the Department of Labor and Nicanor Díaz finally resigned from 
his position in February 1976.   
The second phase of labor law reform (1979-1981) corresponded to the period in 
which a new set of regulations, the Labor Plan, was established to replace the 1931 
Labor Code. With the Labor Plan the dictatorship could finally resolve the lag existing 
between the rapid liberalization of country’s economy, which had been consolidated in 
1975, and the laws regulating labor. Before the Labor Plan, a first and very important 
legal change had already taken place: the enactment, in May 1978, of the Decree Law 
2,200 on labor contracts and other individual labor regulations. Among other things, the 
DL 2,200 removed the “principle of immobility” established in the Law 16,455 of 1966, 
which allowed workers to be hired back should the judge define contract termination as 
“unjustified. To do so, the DL 2,200 eliminated the phrase that prevented employers 
from dismissing workers “without express cause”, permitting employers to adjust 
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unilaterally contracts and dismiss workers at will. In changing the regulations on 
contract, the decree law also erased the distinction between with-collar workers 
(empleados) and blue-collar workers (obreros) (Narbona, 2014).  
The changes stemming from the DL 2,200 are key for understanding the content 
and orientations of the 1979 Labor Plan. Rather than a comprehensive system of 
regulations, the 1979 Labor Plan had clear goals: it focused exclusively on collective 
labor relations. In the words of its architect, minister of labor José Piñera, the labor plan 
was “only and exclusively a syndical plan” (Piñera, 1992, p. 23) aiming to dismantle the 
old regulations on labor unions, collective bargaining, and strike of the 1931 Labor 
Code.  
The design of the Labor Plan was based on five key ideas established by José 
Piñera himself and the minister of finance Sergio de Castro. These key ideas were: 1) 
union freedom to both create and join a union (libertad sindical); 2) democracy in 
union’s decisions (i.e. democracy to elect leaders, to affiliate to federations, to call on 
strikes, etc.); 3) right to collective bargaining restricted only at the level of the firm; 4) 
right to strike subjected to “market discipline” and without monopoly control of job 
positions (puestos de trabajo); 5) rejection to state intervention in unions and collective 
bargaining (Piñera, 1992, p. 15).  
The framework of the labor plan was based on an extremely liberal and 
deregulatory conception of labor that coexisted with strong legal limitations to union 
activity (Rojas, 2007). According to it, collective bargaining should in no way be seen 
as a mechanism to redistribute income or wealth, and industrial relations should not be 
based on “corporatist models” promoting tripartism and social concertation. For Piñera, 
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this “corporatist model” that distrusted markets, and were against the “natural 
equivalence” existing between salary and labor productivity. Similarly, this liberal 
approach emphasized the need to “democratize” labor organizations, granting the 
individual worker power to decide whether to join a union and dismantling political 
interference in union activities. That explains why the 1979 Labor Plan explicitly aimed 
to “de-politicize” union organizations (Piñera, 1992, pp. 27-29).  
These ideological orientations were consolidated in several legal changes. The 
first decrees laws that initiated the reform process, named by Piñera “appetizer laws”, 
were enacted in February 1979. These decrees were DL 2,544 and 2,545, which aimed 
to recognize freedom of association and regulate union dues and funding. Yet the two 
more important decrees of the Labor Plan referred to union organization (DL 2,756) and 
collective bargaining and strikes (DL Decree Law 2,758).  
Regarding the provisions on union organizations, the DL 2,756 distinguished 
four types of labor unions: firm-level, multi-company, construction workers’, and 
independent workers’ unions. Although all of them could form federations and 
confederations, only firm-level unions (sindicato de empresa) were allowed to bargain. 
Any other type of labor organization (e.g. central confederations such as the CUT) was 
prohibited. The decree law also aimed to promote small and fragmented unions by 
allowing “syndical parallelism”—e.g. the existence of multiple unions within firms—
and lowering the representation requirements to form unions. In firms with 25 
employees or more, only 10 percent of workers were required to form union. In firms 
with less than 25 employees, only 8 workers (representing at least 50% of the firm’s 
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employees) could form a union2. Similarly, the DL 2,756 removed the norms requiring 
employers to be responsible for collective union dues (the responsibility was transferred 
to the individual worker), allowed nonunionized workers to obtain the benefits of 
collective bargaining without having to pay union dues, and explicitly outlawed close 
shop union contacts (Piñera, 1992; Rojas, 2007).   
In relation to the DL 2,758, it restricted collective bargaining to the level of the 
firm (supra-firm bargaining was explicitly prohibited). With the prohibition of any type 
of supra-firm agreement, the decree law replaced some regulations included in the 
article 6th of the DL 2,200 of 1978. These regulations permitted collective bargaining 
between an employer or an “association or employers” and a union or an “association of 
unions”. As pointed out by Campero and Valenzuela (1984, p. 139), this suggested not 
only that the DL 2,200 of 1978 still permitted supra-firm collective bargaining, but also 
that the Chilean rulers’ definition of collective bargaining of May 1978 (when the DL 
2,200 was enacted) was much less restrictive than that July 1979, when the DL 2,758 
was enacted.  
 Among other things, the DL 2,758 also restricted state intervention in the 
bargaining processes; limited the length of strike to 60 days (after that the striker could 
be dismissed); permitted employers to hire strike replacements and begin lockout (with 
a maximum duration of 30 days); allowed the individual worker to negotiate his/her 
individual reincorporation to work since the 30th day of strike (descuelgue). As a 
conceptual innovation, the Decree Law 2,758 defined the strike as a resource that 
																																																								
2 The norm also established that in larger companies 250 workers could form a union, no matter the 
percentage of employees they represent.  
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workers could use only to demonstrate their contribution to productivity—i.e. a 
resource that might lead to salary improvements only if market forces allowed 
employers to pay more for the work possessed by the strikers. This implied that the 
strike was not conceived as an “expropriation resource” that would empower workers to 
prevent employers from managing firms (Piñera, 1992, p. 52). In contrast, both the 
strike and the collective bargaining process were restricted to wage-related issues. Other 
working conditions were not permitted to be the subject of collective agreement, and 
any negotiation on matters that might affect employers’ ability to organize, run, and 
manage the firm was strictly prohibited (Feres, 2009; Narbona, 2014; Rojas, 2007). The 
decree also gave birth to a “double entitlement” system (doble titularidad) during 
collective bargaining. “Negotiating groups” formed by workers with the only purpose of 
bargaining (grupos negociadores) were entitled to the same bargaining rights as unions, 
and could exist regardless of whether the firm already had a union (or several unions).   
The decrees laws 2,756 and 2,758 were enacted in the first days of July of 1979, 
and became the bulk of what was known as the 1979 Labor Plan3. The new regulations 
on collective bargaining and union organization had a huge impact on labor. They 
fragmented and weakened workers’ collective strength. Similarly, the changes in the 
arena of individual rights stemming from the DL 2,200 of 1978 seriously undermined 
the legal protections existing until 1973 (e.g. the immobility principle). As several times 
noted, this radical transformation of the labor law in Chile differed substantially from 
the rest of Latin America. In the majority of the countries of the region, deregulatory 																																																								
3 Both decrees were slightly modified in May 1980 through the Decree Law 3,355. State officers deemed 
necessary to make some minor amendments to the decrees after analyzing the first bargaining processes 
that took place since August 1979.   
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labor reforms occurred later (in the 1990s) and in democratic or semi-democratic 
conditions that provided workers with more political resources to oppose them. The 
particular timing and the depth of the dictatorship’s labor law reform shaped to a large 
extent the orientation of the reforms implemented during the democratic governments. 
In fact, unlike other countries where deregulatory labor reform took place after 
democratization, the post-dictatorial governments in Chile inherited a particularly 
flexible, labor-repressive, and business-friendly legislation (Cook, 2007; Huber & 
Stephens, 2012).   
 
Reforms to the 1979 Labor Plan 
Since the very beginning of the democratic period in 1990, Chilean governments 
implemented reforms whose pro-flexibility orientation was less pronounced than in 
other countries of Latin America. Instead of promoting deregulation of labor markets, 
they aimed to correct the extremely liberal approach of the dictatorship’s laws. For 
example, regarding individual labor laws, the legislative changes regulated contract 
termination and partially limited employers’ ability to dismiss workers at will (Law 
19,010 of 1990). They also reduced weekly work-hours from 48 to 45 (Law 19,759 of 
2001), and established new regulations on subcontracting and temporary work (Law 
20,123 of 2006). Similarly, the reforms to collective relations laws legalized labor 
confederations (Law 19,049 of 1991), and tried (unsuccessfully) to strengthen the rights 
to collective bargaining and strike (Law 19,069 of 1990, and Law 19,759 of 2001) 
(Rojas, 2007, pp. 23-27).  
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Despite these changes, scholars contend that these reforms failed to strengthen 
workers’ collective rights because the pillars of the Labor Plan have remained intact (cf. 
Barrett, 2001; Doniez & Kremerman, 2015; Feres, 2009; Frank, 2004; Gamonal, 2011; 
Gamonal & Ugarte, 2015). Since 1990 Chilean labor law does not forbid multi-
company collective bargaining (negociación interempresa) such the Labor Plan did. 
However, the law still does not recognize industry-wide collective bargaining 
(negociación por rama de actividad), and defines multi-employer bargaining only as 
“voluntary” for employers. Thus collective bargaining continues to take place at the 
level of the firm, and the few cases of multi-employer agreement—e.g. those occurring 
regularly in the public sector, and in some particular cases in the port, forestry, and 
mining industries—are developed outside the law through de facto negotiations. As a 
result, during the last two decades collective bargaining coverage and unionization rates 
have remained consistently low. As Figure 1 suggests, by 2013 Chile was a OECD 
country that showed one of the lowest numbers in both indicators (in Chile 18% of 
salaried workers were covered by some type of collective agreement and only 14% of 
them was unionized), and in both areas the numbers are far below those of similar, non-
OECD Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (in this last 
country unionization rate was 30% and collective bargaining covered 95% of salaried 
workers).  					
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Figure 1. Collective bargaining coverage and trade union density (%). OECD countries plus 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (2013) 
Source: Data obtained from OECD, ILO, and ICTWSS Database, version 5, AIAS (Visser, 2015). When 
2013 were no available, data for 2012 were shown.   
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instruments: semi-regulated convenios colectivos (collective agreements) and legally 
regulated contratos colectivos (collective contracts). The main difference between them 
is that unlike collective contracts, collective agreements do not grant workers the right 
to strike or legal protections if they decide to go on strike in the course of the bargaining 
process. According to (Durán & Kremerman, 2015, pp. 7-12), the proportion of 
collective agreements vis-à-vis collective contract has steadily grown over time, and in 
2013 only 8% of salaried workers was covered by collective contracts (i.e. by a 
bargaining instrument with right to strike). Along with this, these investigators contend 
that collective bargaining instruments have become largely useless to obtain economic 
gains, as the average real salary readjustment obtained by workers through collective 
bargaining decreased from 4% in 1990 to 1% 2012. In a similar way, researchers have 
argued that workers’ collective action is strongly limited by legal restrictions. For 
instance, the right to strike is subjected to numerous legal requirements (i.e. it can only 
be exercised as part of the bargaining process) and continues to be undermined by 
employers’ ability to replace striking workers. This has turned strike activity into an 
“illusory” form of pressure for workers (Gamonal, 2011, p. 93) or, as noted by a 
Chilean labor leader, a “dead-end that neither rank-and-file workers nor union leaders 
want to enter”4.  
In light of these outcomes, it is clear that neither the reforms of the early 1990s 
nor those of the 2000s have succeeded in altering the foundations of the 1979 Labor 
Plan. Several analysts have noted that the last (2015 – 2016) reform process will not 																																																								
4 Interview with Luis Mesina, leader of the bank workers confederation Confederación de Sindicatos 
Bancarios y Afines, October 13, 2015. Several labor leaders repeated the same idea during interviews 
conducted between February and December 2015.    
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improve these outcomes either, as none of the transformations included in it implied 
“pro-workers” changes in the regulations on union activity, collective bargaining, and 
strike activity. Moreover, analysts have even defined many of these transformations as 
“setbacks” for workers’ collective rights (Doniez & Kremerman, 2015; Gamonal & 
Ugarte, 2015; Vergara, 2016).  
What explains this persistence of the Labor Plan? Why the norms that regulate 
collective labor relations since the dictatorship have not been repealed, even after more 
than two decades of democratic, center-left rule? As I show in the next chapter, 
different approaches have emphasized distinctive mechanisms to explain policy change 
and the conditions under which reform attempts are more likely to succeed. For the 
Chilean case, these approaches usually emphasize the role of state actors (e.g. the pro-
business orientation of the post-dictatorial democratic administrations) and especially 
the impact of sociopolitical and institutional legacies inherited from Pinochet’s 
dictatorship. In this dissertation, I draw upon a class-based approach and examine how 
employers and workers organize collectively to advance their class interests and 
influence policymaking. Such examination is based on the study of the Chilean 
employers’ peak association (Confederation of Production and Commerce, CPC) and 
workers’ main labor confederation, the Workers Unitary Central (Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores, CUT). As will show throughout this dissertation, the imbalance between 
the CPC’s and the CUT’s power to influence labor policy is key for explaining the 
persistence of the dictatorial labor code in Chile. The imbalance of power between 
capitalists and workers is also key for understanding why the 1979 Labor Plan has 
persisted even after the 2015 – 2016 reform process, in which the “pro-business” 
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orientation of state actors and most of the authoritarian legacies existing in the 1990s 
and 2000s were no longer present.  
 
1.3. Working class and capitalist collective action in Chile: the CUT and the CPC 
 The CUT and the CPC are the main organizations representing the interests of 
workers capitalists in Chile. Therefore, their foundation and development represent well 
how workers and employers have built collective organizations to defend their class 
interests vis-à-vis each other’s and the state.  
 In the case of labor, the CUT embodies the most recent attempt through which 
Chilean workers have aimed to achieve class-wide unity. In this sense, it represents the 
“historical continuity” of previous organizations such as the Federación Obrera de 
Chile, FOCh (1909-1926), the Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile, CTCh (1936-
1946), and the old CUT (Central Única de Trabajadores) which was formed in 1953 
and existed until it was banned by the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) in 1973. 
Similar to the contemporary CUT, all these organizations were founded to overcome 
political and ideological splits existing among workers. These divisions have been 
persistent throughout the twentieth century (Angell, 1972; Barría, 1971; Garcés & 
Milos, 1988). In 1936, for example, the CTCh came out as a unity initiative put together 
by communists, socialists, and anarcho-syndicalists who sought to build a big 
confederation able to transcend the political alignments that until then had materialized 
in three different confederations: the pro-Communist FOCh, the pro-Socialist 
Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos (CNS), and the anarcho-syndicalist 
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Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT). Likewise, after the CTCh collapsed due to 
political conflicts between communists and socialists, in 1953 workers decided to found 
the old CUT with the overt goal of unifying the working class by avoiding “excessive” 
subordination to parties, which according to them had been the main causes of the 
CTCh’s breakdown. Based on this, in its first declaration principles the old CUT 
claimed to work for the political independence of the labor movement, and while 
emphasizing the need to keep “friendly relations” with all international labor 
federations no matter their particular ideologies, it denied being an “apolitical central 
confederation” (Garcés & Milos, 1988, pp. 102-103).  
Despite its emphasis on working class autonomy, the CUT’s politicization was 
usually a source of tensions, especially between communists and socialists, and then 
between these and the Christian democrats who since the 1960s achieved influence 
among white-collar and agricultural workers’ unions. Political conflicts could be seen, 
for example, when the anarcho-syndicalist sector rejected the CUT’s lack of autonomy 
from parties and disaffiliated with it after the Second National Conference of February 
1957 (Barría, 1971, p. 89). They could also be observed in Christian democrat workers’ 
complaints about the “Marxist” inspiration of the declaration of principles, and in the 
way in which the CUT’s officialdom tried to prevent them from leaving by changing 
several times the rhetoric of such a declaration (Angell, 1972, p. 213). Although 
recurrent, these political tensions did not lead to the fragmentation of the labor 
movement. Working class unity was an ideal highly valued by labor leaders, and despite 
their high levels of politicization these union leaders were much more than simple 
“agents of parties”. In fact, even among the most politicized union leaders there was a 
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strong tendency to act “primarily as unionists and secondarily as party members” 
(Angell, 1972, p. 232).  
 For most of its existence the CUT functioned as a de facto organization that kept 
strained relations with the center and right governments. That changed substantially 
with Salvador Allende’s Socialist administration (1970–1973). The CUT a key actor in 
the Unidad Popular’s government, it was for the first time legally recognized through 
the Decree Law 17,594 of 1972, the same year its president Luis Figueroa even became 
minister of labor. Unsurprisingly, the CUT’s affiliation with the Allende administration 
and its parties made it a central target of the Pinochet dictatorship. In addition to 
banning the CUT, the dictatorial regime repressed unions and left parties, and for a 
decade tried to cut off the linkages existing between them (Drake, 1996). In this hostile 
context, workers organized through de facto coalitions such as the Coordinadora 
Nacional Sindical (CNS) and the Comando Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT). They 
would become the predecessors of the contemporary CUT, which was officially 
founded in the Congress of August 21st – 22nd of 1988 under the name of Central 
Unitaria de Trabajadores (Workers’ Unitary Central). Like the CTCh and the old CUT, 
since its foundation the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores has claimed to work for a 
“unitary labor movement” able to integrate all the ideologies and political orientations 
of workers into a single organizational structure (Araya, 2014; Frías, 2008).   
The story of the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC) represents 
in many respects the same aspirations of unity on the part of employers. Officially 
formed in 1935 after a period of intense popular uprising (which included a 100 day-
socialist government), the CPC sought to coordinate the then four major sectoral 
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associations5: the Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (National Agricultural Society, 
SNA), the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Society for Manufacturing Promotion, 
SOFOFA), the Cámara Nacional de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo (National Chamber 
of Commerce, Services, and Tourism or CNC6), and the Sociedad Nacional de Minería 
(National Mining Society, SONAMI). Funded in 1838, the SNA is the oldest sectoral 
association affiliated to the CPC. The CNC dates from 1858 but only in 1925 it 
officially became known as the main national association of employers in commerce. 
The National Mining Society was founded in 1883, the same year in which the SNA 
formed SOFOFA at the suggestion of the Minister of Finance who did so aiming to 
promote industrialization (Menges, 1966).  
 Despite the early foundation of the CPC—it was one of the first “peak” 
encompassing association of Latin America, its significance diminished notoriously 
once the threats (particularly labor mobilization) that had led employers to form it 
disappeared (Silva, 1998).  
Another important factor that undermined the role of the CPC was the frequent inter-
sectoral rivalries over economic policy observed throughout most of the period of 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). SOFOFA, for example, supported trade 
protection, while the CNC strongly opposed protectionist measures. So did export-
oriented mine owners who, like the CNC, complained that import policy favored the 
industrial sector due to protective tariffs (Arriagada, 2004; Silva, 1998). Similarly, 																																																								
5 Decades later, two other sectoral associations joined the CPC: the Cámara Chilena de la Construcción 
(Chilean Chamber of Construction, CChC) joined it in 1967, while the Asociación de Bancos e 
Instituciones Financieras (Association of Banks and Financial Institutions, ABIF) did so in 1979.  
6 The CNC was originally named Central Chamber of Commerce. It was renamed National Chamber of 
Commerce, Services, and Tourism in 1991.  
	 
25 
while in the 1930s SOFOFA and SONAMI employers supported the establishment of 
the minimum wage policies, the SNA landowners did not accept them—they did it only 
in 1954 when the congress issued the first law of rural minimum wage. Also in contrast 
to the positions of the SNA, SOFOFA industrialists supported collaboration with parties 
from the right to the center-left as a way to ensure their participation in national 
development programs. After the 1930 crisis, manufacturing employers were one of the 
main supporters of the industrial development projects devised by center-left 
governments in the late 1930s and 1940s. SOFOFA employers had not only several 
seats in the initials directories of the government organization CORFO (Production 
Development Corporation), but also they were important promoters of the development 
of state-owned companies such as ENDESA (Arriagada, 2004). 
In times when class-wide or cross-sectoral unity was difficult to achieve, the 
CPC became a “dormant” organization focused on mostly symbolic activities. It was 
largely irrelevant vis-à-vis the state, labor, and its own affiliates, which at least in the 
1950s and 1960s enjoyed direct contacts with the government and influenced 
policymaking through the four major sectoral associations (Arriagada, 2004; Schneider, 
2004; Silva, 1998). In effect, these associations were voting members in government 
organizations such as “semi-autonomous” financial institutions (Central Bank, State 
Bank, and the Corporation for Development CORFO) and specialized committees 
concerned with particular sectors (e.g. the SNA participated in the agrarian reform 
agency CORA) without needing the intermediation of the CPC at all.  
The dormant CPC revived only in the late 1960s with the reformist agenda of 
Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, and later after the election of Socialist President 
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Salvador Allende. Yet even during the socialist administration of Allende the CPC was 
unable to unify the position of its associations: pushed by SOFOFA and SNA, the CPC 
adopted highly confrontational postures against the socialist government, although the 
SONAMI never endorse them (Silva, 1998, p. 222). According to business leaders, this 
lack of class-wide unity was one of the main causes that empowered socialist ideologies 
and movements opposed to business interests. This explains, as Chapter 8 shows, why 
since the very beginning of the dictatorship business leaders worked hard to achieve 
such unity by “reviving” the CPC. 
 
1.4. Structure of the dissertation and methodology 
The evidence I present throughout this dissertation is based on one year of 
fieldwork conducted in Chile between January and December 2015. In the course of the 
fieldwork, I collected information on labor reforms, unions, and business associations 
from national newspapers and magazines (El Mercurio, La Tercera, La Nación, Diario 
La Época, Revista Hoy, Qué Pasa, among others), business-oriented magazines and 
business associations’ institutional reports (for example, Revista Capital, Diario 
Financiero, Anuarios ENADE, Anuarios CPC, Anuarios SOFOFA), a well as from 
newspapers ideologically closer to the labor movement (El Siglo, Fortín Mapocho, 
CUT’s Boletines Informativos, among others). Most of the 1973 – 1999 data were 
obtained from Chile’s Ex-Congress Building Archive Office (Oficina de Archivos del 
Ex Congreso Nacional), while the remaining information (especially that for the 2000 – 
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2016 period) was obtained from Chile’s National Archive (Archivo Nacional de Chile) 
and the websites of national newspapers.  
Along with this information, I conducted more than 50 in depth interviews with 
key informants. I interviewed 30 union leaders from plant-level leaders to the CUT’s 
main officers. I chose these leaders trying to represent as many economic sectors as 
possible (I interviewed leaders from the main industries) and, especially, trying to 
obtain a sample as representative as possible in terms of their political affiliations. Thus 
I interviewed workers affiliated and unaffiliated to the CUT—including officers from 
the other two labor confederations, the Central Autónoma de Trabajadores (CAT), and 
the Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT)—as well as workers affiliated and 
unaffiliated to political parties. I also conducted in depth interview with 13 businessmen 
and 5 staff members of business associations. Most of these employers were affiliated to 
business associations, although their degrees of involvement varied widely. In effect, 
my sample included from high-rank leaders such as a former CPC president to 
employers formally affiliated to but less active members of associations such as 
SOFOFA, CChC, and SNA. Finally, I conducted 5 interviews with former state officers 
related to the Ministry of Labor (ministers, sub-secretaries, and heads of the Labor 
Directorate office) and 3 interviews with labor lawyers and experts. In total, I 
interviewed 56 people. 
The information obtained through the interviews and the archival research was 
supplemented by my attendance at forums and seminars where the government 
presented the 2015 labor reform project. I also attended events, meetings, and massive 
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demonstrations organized by different sectors of the labor movement in response to the 
government’s reform. In total I spent around 100 hours of non-obtrusive observation.  
This dissertation draws upon this evidence and presents my argument in two 
parts. Part I focuses on labor reform and starts with Chapter 2, where I present different 
approaches to policy change and lay out my own approach. Then I describe the labor 
reform process carried out throughout the Concertación administrations between 1990 
and 2001 (Chapter 3), and during the Nueva Mayoría government between 2015 and 
2016 (Chapter 4). Based on this description, Chapter 5 offers an explanation for the 
persistence of the Labor Plan. After this explanation, Part II shifts the focus from labor 
reform to collective action. While Chapter 6 shows different theories of worker and 
capitalist collective action, Chapters 7 and 8 focus on the story of the CUT and the 
CPC. These chapters analyze a longer period of time (1973 – 2016) in order to show the 
factors that explain why capitalists have been more successful than workers in 
advancing their class interests regarding labor policy (e.g. in defending the persistence 
of the Labor Plan). Finally, Chapter 9 presents the main conclusions and implications of 
this research.    
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2. Approaches to labor reform in Chile, Latin America, and beyond 
Since its establishment in the first decades of the twentieth century, labor law in 
Latin America was rather protective by international standards (Carnes, 2014). Both in 
terms of individual employment law (provisions covering contract termination, hiring, 
leave policies, etc.) and, to a lesser extent, collective labor law (e.g. protections to the 
rights to unionize, to collective bargaining, and to strike), Latin American countries 
stood out due to the pro-worker orientation of their labor codes. Despite important 
cross-national variations, Latin American countries based their Import Substitution 
Industrialization project on openly labor-friendly policies. Regardless of the specific 
characteristics of the country, until the enactment of the 1979 Labor Plan Chile was not 
the exception to the protective orientation of labor laws (A. Marshall, 2005; Sáez, 
2009).   
 By the end of the twentieth century international agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
demanded Latin American countries to face economic deficits through Washington 
Consensus-inspired policies (cf. Williamson, 1990). In most of the countries, this led 
governments to deregulate labor markets and implement several other deregulatory 
policies (Centeno & Cohen, 2012; Cook, 2007, p. 32; Kingstone, 2011; Vega Ruiz, 
2005, p. 22). Regarding labor market, governments increased labor flexibility through 
reforms to the labor codes (especially reforms to individual labor regulations) aiming to 
promote “atypical” (temporary) labor contracts, reduce severance pay, and sometimes 
make workdays and work schedules more flexible (Cook, 2007, p. 32; Fraile, 2009; 
Murillo, 2005, p. 443; Vega Ruiz, 2005, p. 23; Weller, 1998, pp. 32-37). Thus since the
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early 1990s the predominant policy of reform to individual labor laws was flexibility. In 
her review of labor reforms in Latin America, Vega Ruiz (2005) contended that 
Argentina and Peru in the early 1990s were prototypical examples of reforms led by a 
pro-flexibility approach, whereas the cases of Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama 
were more nuanced as the reforms alternated protective and pro-flexibility approaches.  
Nevertheless, the implementation of flexibility reforms was not linear, as the 
liberalization of labor law did not occur at the same pace and timing. Nor did these 
reforms have a totally clear orientation. In Chile, the deregulatory labor policies had 
taken place ten years earlier than in the rest of Latin America, and in several countries 
many of the labor-weakening provisions passed in the 1990s were quickly revoked by 
the end of the decade. Moreover, numerous reforms undertaken in that decade made 
individual labor regulations more flexible, but actually enhanced (at least nominally) 
workers’ collective rights. The reforms facilitated the formation of unions and in some 
cases even extended collective bargaining (Carnes, 2014; Murillo, Ronconi, & Schrank, 
2011; Vega Ruiz, 2005). In considering recent developments of collective labor law, 
Anner (2008, pp. 35-36) concluded that by the end of the 2000s labor regulations in 
Latin America continued to be “union-friendly” when compared to other legislations.  
 In this context, by the early twenty first century Chile has stood out in Latin 
America as a country whose laws presented a particular combination of protected 
individual employment rights and restricted workers’ collective rights (Gamonal, 2011). 
This particular combination differs from the corporatist regulations of countries such as 
Argentina and Mexico, whose laws involve significant protections to both individual 
and collective labor relations (Carnes, 2014). Chilean employers, for example, have 
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more freedom to dismiss workers than their Argentine or Mexican counterparts. In a 
similar way collective bargaining in Chile takes place at the level of the firm, whereas 
while it develops at inter-enterprise or industry-wide levels in Argentina and Mexico 
(A. Marshall, 2005; Sáez, 2009).  
The particularities of Chile’s labor law are largely the result of the 
“foundational” orientation of Pinochet’s capitalist dictatorship (1973-1989), and the 
way the subsequent democratic governments dealt with its institutional legacies. The 
military government carried out a deep restructuring of the economy and the labor laws, 
which was more ambitious and durable than the attempts by its counterparts in the 
southern cone of Latin America (Cook, 2007; Drake, 1996). In many respects, these 
changes anticipated the free market reforms undertaken by Latin America in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The Pinochet reforms included the enactment of a new business-
friendly labor code based on several policy changes formulated in the late 1970s. These 
changes were articulated in what became known as the 1979 Labor Plan. The central 
aspects of the 1979 labor plan—e.g. bargaining restricted to the firm level and right to 
strike undermined by employers’ ability to replace striking workers—continue to be the 
basis of the laws regulating collective labor relations in Chile. They continue to do so, 
even though the dismantling or at least the substantial transformation of the 1979 Labor 
Plan has been a goal of all the democratic governments that have carried out labor 
reforms.  What explains this persistence? Different approaches to labor reform and 
policy change in Latin America have offered dissimilar, but sometimes complementary 
answers to this question.   
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2.1. Contesting approaches to labor reform and policy change  
 Current research on policy change and labor reform can be grouped into five 
categories, depending on the emphasis they put on different explanations and groups of 
variables. These explanations emphasized by each approach usually overlap to each 
other, yet it is possible to present them separately according to the mechanisms they 
stressed as the main factors accounting for the change or persistence of labor policies, 
laws, and regimes.  
 
2.1.1. Globalization and international economic pressures 
The first approach focuses on the way that international, economic factors (e.g. 
globalization) affect changes in labor regulations. Similar to the analysts of welfare 
state change (Brady, Beckfield, & Zhao, 2007; Garrett, 1998; Haggard & Kaufman, 
2008; Huber & Stephens, 2005), scholars have noted that globalization pressures have 
certainly influenced changes in labor law, but that the impact has not been linear, as it 
has not necessarily led to deregulation of labor markets. In Europe, economic pressures 
associated with globalization—e.g. volatility and uncertainty in the economic 
environment and shift from mass to specialized product markets—have been found to 
be a central factor behind the decentralization of collective bargaining, expressed in the 
increasing adoption of firm-level agreements at the expenses of nation- or industry-wide 
ones (Boni, 2009; Katz, 1993; Van Gyes & Schulten, 2015). Yet some scholars have 
argued that the changes usually ascribed to globalization, in particular the dismantling 
of “corporatist” wage-settings institutions, have been highly dependent on the national 
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political economies where they take place (cf. Hassel, 2015; Wallerstein, Golden, & 
Lange, 1997). By the end of the 1990s, for example, Wallerstein et al. (1997) showed 
collective bargaining decentralization had not occurred in most of the countries with 
strong corporatist industrial relation systems (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Finland, among 
others).   
In a similar way, Mosley and Uno (2007) analyzed the impact of economic 
globalization—understood as foreign direct investment and trade openness—on 
collective labor rights in 90 developing nations. They found that the effect of 
globalization is contingent to the particular aspect of labor rights considered—while 
inflows of direct investments were associated with better collective labor rights, trade 
openness were negatively related to them (pp. 940-941). Likewise, Vadlamannati 
(2015) distinguished three aspects globalization—economic, social, and political 
globalization—and studied how each of them affected workers collective rights. Based 
on data for 142 developing countries, she suggested that only social globalization (e.g. 
interactions, information, and cultural proximity among people from different countries) 
was systematically associated with both more protective labor regulations and better 
mechanisms to enforce them.    
In Latin America scholars have contented that the impact of globalization 
pressures depends largely on regional- or national-level political processes that mediate 
it. Haggard and Kaufman (2008) argued that globalization’s adverse effects for social 
spending in Latin America were higher than in other regions (e.g. East Asia and Eastern 
Europe). According to them, Latin America’s weaker democratic institutions did not 
allow citizens to oppose the pressure from international institutions such as the IMF and 
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IDB. Likewise, different from other regions of the world, economic deficit made the 
neoliberal agenda the only “viable alternative” for Latin American countries (Centeno 
& Cohen, 2012; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Kingstone, 2011).   
Regarding labor law, globalization’s effects were also visible in the way that 
international agencies pushed for deregulation of labor markets. Based on the idea that 
globalization required flexible labor markets, these agencies demanded governments to 
get rid of the “rigidities” existing in the national legislations (Cook, 2007; Fraile, 2009). 
However, the implementation of flexibility policies was not uniform in the 1990s. In 
Chile extreme deregulatory measures had been implemented in the late 1970s, so the 
1990s reforms did not increase deregulation in the already flexible Chilean labor market 
(Cook, 2007). The timing and the political conditions of these changes differed 
substantially from the other countries of the regions. This explains in part why 
globalization arguments have not been widely used to analyze the Chilean case.  
However, during the 1990s globalization and international pressures did bring 
about changes in the rest of Latin America. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, and Peru, they gave rise to reforms aiming to deregulate labor markets. In 
other countries (Bolivia, Uruguay, and Mexico) no substantial labor reforms were 
carried out, although de facto flexibility predominated (Vega Ruiz, 2005, p. 23). In 
Uruguay, for instance, flexibility was achieved through the government’s decision to 
stop convening the tripartite wage councils in 1992, after consultation with unions and 
business associations failed to produce a consensus regarding the orientation of the 
reforms (Fraile, 2009, p. 219).   
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2.1.2. Tradition and legacies from the past: the “historical” approach 
The second approach centers on the impact of history and “past events” in the 
shaping of labor law. This perspective has two different versions. The first one can be 
termed the “legal thesis”, as it focuses on the way that countries’ legal traditions create 
different types of economic regulations (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
& Shleifer, 2004; Deakin, Lele, & Siems, 2007; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1998). The legal thesis emphasizes the existence of two distinct legal traditions 
in Western societies: common law (emerged in England and dominant in Anglo-Saxon 
countries), and civil law, which evolved from Roman law and was later incorporated 
into the French civil code (Botero et al., 2004, p. 1344). Based on this distinction, 
Botero and his collaborators analyzed the determinants of the institutions and laws that 
protect workers’ rights in 85 countries. After refining the common law/civil law 
division with the inclusion of tree other legal traditions—which they define as German, 
Socialist, and Nordic traditions, they concluded that the country’s legal origin is the 
main determinant of the variation in the labor laws. They contended, for instance, that 
countries with a French or socialist legal origin had regulations that ensured protections 
for workers significantly higher than those of the countries with a common law origin 
(Anglo-Saxon countries). According to Botero and his collaborators, the effects of legal 
origin on labor laws were even higher than those associated with politics (e.g. union 
density or the country’s degree of democratic).  
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Other researchers have recently presented evidence indicating that the effect of 
legal origin might be softer than Botero et al.’s data suggested. Drawing upon 
longitudinal data on labor laws in France, Germany, India, the UK, and the USA Deakin 
et al. (2007) asserted the existence of what they call a “soft” legal origin effect. 
According to them, this effect does exist, but it is “time-variant” because it depends on 
a variety of historical factors (e.g. national-level and supra-national institutional 
differences such as the EU) that lead to the “endogenization” of law to the particular 
local conditions of each nation. This explains Deakin et al. why despite the same legal 
origin the U.K. presents more centralized regulations than the U.S. (unlike the latter, 
labor laws in the former are influenced by EU-level regulations).   
The second version of this historical approach centers on the way in which 
sociopolitical, institutional, and ideological legacies shape both labor law and the actors 
that struggle to change it. In doing so, it emphasizes path dependency as a way to 
examine how critical junctures—e.g. differences in labor incorporation before or during 
authoritarian periods—have lasting effects that shape the possibilities for further 
changes (e.g. labor reforms in post authoritarian periods). As good example of this is 
the work by Caraway, Cook, and Crowley (2015), which has shown that these legacies 
are key for understanding the role of labor unions in post-authoritarian regimes. They 
enumerate three types of authoritarian legacies: 1) legacy unions, referred to the 
survival of unions allied with the previous authoritarian regime, such as observed in the 
cases of Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan; 2) labor laws inherited from 
the authoritarian period, which define the “strategic terrain” in which actors operate 
when trying to influence further reforms; and 3) the ideological legacies stemming from 
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the old regime, which affect labor unions by denying their importance through 
mechanisms as diverse as the anti-communist ideological backlash of Polish workers or 
the neoliberal ideology on Chileans policymakers (2015, p. 17).   
Based on this framework, Collier and Schipani (2015) have argued that there is 
no consistent pattern of either continuity or change in labor law of post-authoritarian 
societies. In their review of recent research on Latin America and East Asia, they 
suggest that some provisions concerning distribution of power have shown substantial 
continuity as collective bargaining has remained at either the firm level (in Chile, for 
example) or at the municipal (Brazil) or sectoral level (Argentina) (pp. 222-223). In 
contrast, they note that none of the most outright bans on strikes established during 
authoritarian governments survived the democratic period, even though in some 
countries—e.g. Chile, Indonesia, the Philippines, Russia—democratic governments 
have been unable to get rid of the “numerous hurdles” that impede workers to freely 
exercise their right to strike (p. 224). 
This approach has also been used to explain variations in reform outcomes in 
Latin America. Cook (2007) studied labor reform processes in six Latin American 
countries in the 1990s. According to her, Latin American countries have followed 
different historical trajectories regarding labor law reform, defined by a particular 
combination of labor relations and political regime established during critical junctures. 
These trajectories, in turn, generated their own legacy, which ended up in very different 
legal and institutional frameworks in the contemporary period. Thus, for example, the 
cases of Argentina and Brazil show the continuity of an institutional framework 
characterized by strong corporatist provisions to labor, while the cases of Chile and 
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Peru are examples of how short-lived radical pro-worker policies were replaced by 
flexible, pro-employers legislations. Finally, Bolivia and Mexico are cases in which 
foundational pro-worker labor legislation was enacted under regimes that assumed the 
role of “revolutionary governments” that ruled in the name of popular classes and 
counted on the support of a labor movement allied with the ruling party.  
In light of this, Cook suggests that there are important levels of path dependency 
in determining labor reform outcomes. In all of the cases she analyzed, initial labor 
incorporation and accompanying labor legislation produced a lasting legacy, “defining 
institutions and practices and shaping actors’ strengths and weaknesses for years to 
come” (2007, p. 198). Thus, for example, labor’s ability to resist labor flexibility 
policies in the 1990s largely depended on whether these initial events provided them 
with resources, such as observed in the successful cases that followed the state 
corporatist pattern.   
In his analysis of the Chilean case, Frank (2015) has explained the persistence of 
the 1979 Labor Code as an effect of ideological legacies inherited from the Pinochet 
dictatorship. These legacies were embodied in the ideologies endorsed by policymakers 
of the ruling center-left coalition Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, and 
were expressed in their “minimalist” conceptions of industrial relations and social 
concertation (i.e. one that did not saw active participation of labor as important), in their 
emphasis on “supra-party governments” and technocratic decision-making, as well as in 
their “excessive” concern for consensus. According to Frank, Concertación state 
officers drew upon these ideological legacies to defend their moderated stances and to 
avoid risks of a potential authoritarian regression.   
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Some scholars have also noted the role of politico-institutional legacies, which 
during the first fifteen years of democratic regime worked as “constraints” to the action 
of the new civilian rulers. These politico-institutional legacies were expressed, for 
example, in the existence of an electoral binomial majoritarian system and in the 
presence of constitutionally designated Senators. They gave the right and conservative 
sectors a veto power that would not have had otherwise, and limited the chances of 
pursuing significant reforms to dictatorship’s laws (Frank, 2002; Garretón, 2000; 
Siavelis, 2000). In similar way, other scholars have argued that significant reforms to 
the Pinochet’s legislation were difficult to pass due to the power imbalance between 
labor and business inherited from the authoritarian period. This sociopolitical legacy 
was expressed, according to this argument, in the imbalance of power between business 
and labor—particularly in labor unions’ weakness resulting from the political repression 
and the economic restructuring carried out by the dictatorship (Barrett, 2001; Drake, 
1996; Frank, 2004; Garretón, 2000). 
 
2.1.3. The state-centered approach 
 Unlike the power resource theory, which in several respects emphasizes the 
Marxist focus on class struggle, state-centered analysts tend to view states pretty much 
like Weber. In other words, they define it as a set of organizations with particular 
functions and missions, which works as a key independent variable in the explanation of 
political processes (Amenta, 2005, p. 96). In her renowned introduction to Bringing the 
state back in (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985), Skocpol (1985) contends that 
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“society-centered theories” (e.g. structural functionalism, pluralism, or Marxism) define 
the state as outcome, i.e. as a “government” that is always influenced by social forces. 
In so doing, they fail to see the state an actor with autonomy and its own capacities—
i.e. an actor with its own financial and organizational resources, and with a class of civil 
service administrators who respond to their own interests. Similarly, they fail to 
conceive the state as an institution that shapes the contents and the working of politics, 
encouraging certain types of group formation and collective action (but not others), and 
making possible the emergence of certain (but not other) political issues (1985, p. 21).  
 Based on the state-centered research program, scholars have examined cross-
national differences in welfare state extension, public spending, and taxation (cf. Orloff 
& Skocpol, 1984; Skocpol & Amenta, 1986; Steinmo, 1993). They have argued that 
states are the source important autonomous inputs into social policymaking, because 
they create social groups (for example, civil servants and bureaucrats) interested in 
determined policy outcomes (e.g. welfare state expansion). States also provide these 
actors with resources (e.g. organizational resources) or favor different administrative 
structures—centralized or decentralized decision-making structures—that put them in 
better position vis-à-vis other actors (Skocpol & Amenta, 1986).   
 Recently, Amable (2016) has drawn upon a state-centered argument to analyze 
the way in which the strategies adopted by French state actors have shaped the 
decentralization of collective bargaining. According to him, the strategies pursued by 
left- and right-wing backed governments have defined, since the 1950s, not only the 
pace of collective bargaining decentralization but also the response from business and 
labor. This explains, for example, why the main employers confederation CNPF 
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(renamed Medef in 1997) alternately favored industry-, firm-, or national-level 
bargaining, depending on the sociopolitical context. Under left rule, the Medef avoided 
possible government-labor alliances by favoring firm-level bargaining or, after the mid-
1990s, national-level bargaining as long as it did not mean stronger state intervention. 
In contrast, in periods of right rule the Medef tended to endorse national-level collective 
bargaining as a way to reinforce the flexibility reforms proposed by the government, 
such as happened during the Sarkozy presidency with the National Interprofessional 
Accord of 2008 (Amable, 2016, p. 547).   
 In Latin America and Chile, scholars have not explicitly developed a state-
centered approach to labor law reform. Yet many of them have noted that state actors 
play a key role in both policy changes (i.e. formulation of reform proposals, the pace of 
the legislative process, etc.) and de facto modifications to the labor codes. For instance, 
analysts of the Uruguayan case have suggested that state officers have played a key role 
in the “hybrid” pattern followed by the country in the last decades, which for years 
combined labor flexibility and some “statist” provisions in policy areas such as 
education and pensions (Alegre & Filgueira, 2009). According to some analysts, the 
case of labor law was telling in this regard: although no official reform was carried out, 
economic liberalization propelled by the liberal leadership of Luis Alberto Lacalle, led 
to the de facto decentralization of industrial relations. This was achieved in 1992, when 
government decided to stop convening the tripartite wage councils and decentralized 
wage bargaining to the company level. However, this bargaining decentralization was 
reversed in the mid 2000s, when the left coalition Frente Amplio won the presidential 
election and its leader, President Tabaré Vázquez, revived the tripartite wage councils 
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and extended them to domestic and agricultural workers (Alegre & Filgueira, 2009; 
Vega Ruiz, 2005).  
 In Chile, arguments centered on the role of state officers have been widely used 
in the analyses of the labor reforms carried out since 1990s. Some scholars, for 
example, have explained the continuity of the 1979 Labor Plan’s regulations as the 
result of the Concertación officials’ unwillingness to get rid of Pinochet’s institutions 
(cf. Feres, 2009b; Narbona, 2014; Taylor, 2004). According to some analysts, this lack 
of “political will” derived from the ideological transformation of the some left parties 
(particularly the Socialist Party). This explains why Concertación policymakers pursued 
a neoliberal developmental strategy, which privileged friendly relations with business 
and saw the strengthening of labor unions as a threat to economy efficiency (cf. Barrett, 
2001; Taylor, 2004).   
 Other accounts have also emphasized the role of the state, noting that the 
passage of some reform projects depended to a large extent on successful strategies 
adopted by high-level state officials. Campero (2007), for example, contented that the 
passage of the 1990-1993 labor reforms was the result of the successful “innovation 
approach” proposed by the Aylwin administration’s key policymakers. This approach 
was the middle ground between the two other approaches defended by the parties 
involved in the labor reform process (labor and business associations, political parties, 
etc.) One of these, the “restoration approach”, was defended by labor and the left and 
stated the restoration of the pre-dictatorial labor code. The other one (what Campero 
calls “continuity approach”) was endorsed by business and the right and contended that 
the 1979 Labor Code should not be modified at all. For Campero, the government 
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succeeded in its reform attempt because, among other things, most of the ruling 
coalition’s policymakers agreed on the basic principles of “innovation approach”. Based 
on this, Concertación policymakers agreed to make some modifications to the 1979 
code, without altering its most “positive” aspects (i.e. those that ensured economic 
growth). This intra-coalition agreement did not exist anymore in the next Concertación 
government (1994-1999), as strategic and ideological divergences took over the ruling 
coalition. According to several analysts, this was a key factor that determined the failure 
of the reform project proposed by President Eduardo Frei (cf. Campero, 2007; Feres, 
2009b; Narbona, 2014).  
  
2.1.4. Sociopolitical and class struggle explanations: the role of labor, business, and 
parties  
 Rather than a single approach, this last framework includes a diverse set of 
explanations or theories that emphasize political and dynamics factors (e.g. conflict and 
balance of power) derived from the collective action of social classes and political 
parties. These accounts can be grouped into two big approaches: while the first puts the 
emphasis on the power of the working class and leftist parties, the second emphasizes 
“business-centered” explanations of labor reform and regime change.   
 
Working class power and leftist parties  
As it names indicates, this approach understands regime change as reflection of 
the balance of power between different class-based actors, and particularly as a result of 
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the action of labor and left parties, and their interaction with state elites. Collier and 
Collier (1979), for example, analyzed corporatist institutions since the early 1900s in 
Latin America, and argued that labor regulations offering higher inducements for and 
lower constraints on workers’ collective organization occurred in contexts where 
governments sought to gain or retain political support of labor, and where unions were 
relatively powerful or autonomous (e.g. Argentina in 1945 and Mexico in 1931). On the 
other hand, regulations offering simultaneously strong inducements and constraints 
emerged in contexts where governments were less concerned with gaining labor 
support’s and more concerned with controlling labor through unions that were 
dependent on the state (e.g. Chile and Brazil in the mid twentieth century). Finally, 
higher constraints and lower inducements tended to appear in contexts in which the 
primary concern of the government was control, to the extent that it did not seek even 
the passive support from organized labor (e.g. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela 
in the 1920s and 1930s) (pp. 976-979).  
The impact of labor power and left parties on policy change has also been noted 
in the literature on welfare regimes (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990; Huber & 
Stephens, 2005; Korpi, 2008). In his analysis of the origins of the welfare state, Korpi 
(2006) developed his “Power Resources Approach” (also known as class struggle 
approach) to emphasize the importance of distributive conflicts reflecting basic class-
based splits in employment relations and labor markets. Based on this, Korpi argues that 
left parties representing disadvantaged classes or relying on labor power are expected to 
be protagonists of policy changes aiming at improving the conditions and market 
outcomes of labor and lower classes (2006, p. 168). For Korpi this is a key difference 
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between left and right/conservative parties: while the former were the “protagonists” of 
welfare state expansion, the latter acted as “consenters” and “pacifiers” in a context of 
party competition and growing working class mobilization (Korpi, 2008, p. 22).  
Following similar ideas, Huber and Stephens (2012) analyzed welfare state 
development in Latin America and the Caribbean and concluded that democracy is key 
because it creates better conditions for labor and left parties to pursue redistributive 
agendas. The linkages between unions and labor parties have been used to explain why 
neoliberal reforms were adopted in policy areas (e.g. trade and taxes) but not in others 
(e.g. pensions and labor regulations). Madrid (2003) examined the cases of Argentina 
under Carlos Menem and Mexico under Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo, and the 
pattern of the reforms tended to follow differences in labor’s opposition to them. He 
contends that in both countries labor and pension reforms were more difficult to pass 
than other reforms—the original propositions were substantially modified and 
sometimes even withdrawn by the government, because of the more vigorous 
opposition from workers. Similarly, in both countries labor’s resistance was successful 
because the main labor confederations enjoyed linkages with the ruling parties. 
Like Madrid, Murillo (2001) examined the cases of Argentina, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, and noted that partisan linkages depend on three factors: union leaders’ 
loyalty to parties, the existence of leadership competition (parties’ competition for 
unions’ leadership), and union competition (i.e. rivalry among unions for the 
representation of workers in the same sector). The combination of these factors explains 
for Murillo why workers’ reactions to neoliberal reforms (e.g. union militancy or 
restraint) varied across countries. It also explains why in some circumstances labor 
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confederations succeeded in achieving concessions from the government, such as in the 
cases of the “effective militancy” adopted by Venezuelan workers grouped in the CTV 
during President Pérez’s administration, and the “effective restraint” adopted by 
Argentine workers after the reunification of the CGT during Carlos Menem’s 
presidency (Murillo, 2001, p. 176).  
Regarding labor law, Murillo and Schrank (2005) analyzed policy change Latin 
America and demonstrated that somewhat unexpected growth of union-friendly reforms 
during the 1990s was explained by the interaction between trade unions, their domestic 
political allies (i.e. labor parties), and international actors such as labor and human 
rights activists. In line with this, Murillo (2005) has suggested that labor reform 
outcomes depend largely on the partisan links between labor confederations and ruling 
political parties. In her analysis of Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela, she showed that 
these links reduced the incentives for governments to deregulate individual labor laws. 
In the three cases, protective pro-labor reforms were passed when incumbents from 
labor-based parties or coalitions where uncertain of labor support (e.g. in Chile during 
the administrations of Patricio Aylwin in 1990-1994 and Ricardo Lagos in 2000-2006).  
More recently, Carnes (2014) has argued that the organizational capacity of 
labor—understood as its ability to influence political outcomes—shapes how and when 
labor law reforms (particularly those regarding collective labor law) can be proposed 
and passed. According to Carnes, the effect of labor’s organizational capacity is not 
isolated; it always interacts with other political factors such as government partisanship 
and legacies from previous governments or regimes. Labor power also interacts with 
economic-structural factors, in particular with workforce skill levels, which serve as a 
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foundation for and a constraint on labor law demands (especially those regarding 
individual labor laws). Thus, for example, Carnes contends that in contexts where high 
skill levels are widespread (e.g. Argentina throughout the twentieth century), laws 
governing individual contracting usually favor job stability and provide significant 
protection to skilled workers, while where low-skilled labor predominates (e.g. Peru), 
labor law tends to be extensive and encourage job rotation during periods of 
unemployment (Carnes, 2014, p. 35). 
Although not explicitly stated, the main ideas of power resources approach have 
been used to explain labor law reform in Chile, and particularly the persistence of the 
1979 Labor Plan. An extensive research has demonstrated that the repression of labor, 
leftist parties, and the destruction of party-labor linkages had a huge impact on workers 
collective action (Barrett, 2001; Campero & Valenzuela, 1984; Drake, 1996; Feres, 
2009b; Winn, 2004). Researchers have also pointed out the particular sequence of labor 
reform and democratization observed Chile, noting that unlike other Latin American 
countries, in Chile the neoliberal restructuring occurred before the democratic transition 
(Cook, 2007, p. 56; see also Huber & Stephens, 2012). Thus, they have defined labor 
weakness (and in general the power imbalance between business and labor) not as an 
ultimate cause, but rather as a mechanism—indeed, a very important one—through 
which authoritarian legacies have shaped labor reforms during the democratic period. In 
other words, the weakness of labor unions has been conceived more as an outcome of 
authoritarian legacies than as a factor explaining by itself the persistence of the 
regulations Pinochet’s labor law (Barrett, 2001; Cook, 2007; Frank, 2002).  
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Employer-centered approaches 
In the last decades, the most systematic research espousing this employer-
centered framework has stemmed from Hall and Soskice’s (2001) Variety of Capitalism 
(VoC) approach. Hall and Soskice developed the VoC approach as a way to explain 
institutional variations in capitalist society. To do so, they placed the firm at the center 
of the analysis and examined the way in which firms resolve what they call 
“coordination problems”—i.e. problems related to industrial relations, workers’ 
vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, etc.  
Based on this, they identified two basic types of political economies, which 
represent two ideal ways in which firms address coordination problems and: 1) liberal 
market economies, LMEs (Australia, the US, the UK, and Canada), and 2) coordinated 
market economies, CMEs (Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Norway, Finland, among others). In the first type of political economy, firms coordinate 
their activities primarily via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements. In 
coordinated market economies, on the other hand, firms depend more heavily on non-
market relationships to coordinate their endeavors with other actors and to construct 
their core competences (2001, p. 8). In between of these two clusters, they identified a 
third one, which groups countries with ambiguous systems of coordination—in some 
aspects they are liberal market economies but in others they are coordinated market 
economies. These are Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, 
and Turkey.   
 According to Hall and Soskice P. A. Hall and Soskice (2001, pp. 19-20), this 
type of differences is reinforced by the existence of institutional complementarities. 
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Regarding labor regulation, for example, they contend that long-term employment is 
more feasible where the financial system provides capital in terms that are not sensitive 
to current profitability, such as in CMEs (e.g. Germany). By contrast, liberalized labor 
markets are more effective at sustaining employment where financial markets transfer 
resources according to the firms’ profitability, such as observed in LME (e.g. in Britain 
or the US). In line with this, they show that market modes of coordination, expressed in 
more developed stock markets, are more prevalent in LMEs, whereas non-market 
coordination, expressed in higher employment protections, are more likely to be found 
in CMEs.   
In an attempt to extend the VoC approach, Schneider (2013) has argued that 
Latin American societies should be described as Hierarchical Market Economies 
(HMEs). In HMEs labor markets are segmented, education is at a low level, and 
multinational companies and large, domestic diversified business groups—family-
owned economic groups, grupos económicos—dominate big business. According to 
Schneider (2013), this political economy arrangement coexists with particular labor 
market institutions, characterized by weak vocational training systems, low collective 
bargaining coverage, weak unions, large informal sector, and an overall fragmented 
system of labor relations. Among other consequences, the fragmentation of labor 
relations reduces the potential gains from institutionalized labor-business negotiations 
observed, for example, in work councils or factory committees. Consequently, it 
increases the incentives of employers to perpetuate hierarchical employment relations. 
Drawing upon the idea of “institutional complementarities”, Schneider (2013) also 
contends that the particular type of political institutions that exist in HME reinforces 
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these labor market features. For example, unlike CMEs where consensus-based 
(proportional) systems of representation make unions and labor parties stronger, in 
HMEs political systems are sustained by majoritarian presidentialism and, with some 
exceptions, proportional representation systems based on the de facto exclusion of poor 
voters. This strengthens, in turn, the political influence of middle-class voters and 
makes business power particularly strong.   
Like Schneider, Hassel (2015) has used the VoC approach to study the changes 
in union density, employers’ associability, and collective bargaining in Europe. Hassel’s 
quantitative evidence indicates that employers’ associability is highly correlated with 
bargaining coverage, bargaining coordination, and centralization. Considering the 
ongoing decline of union membership in CMEs and the persistent correlation between 
collective bargaining coordination and employers’ associability, Hassel suggests that 
collective bargaining coordination might not depend on trade unions’ power resources; 
rather it might be due to “employers’ preferences for coordination” as it is a “function 
of the fabric of political-economist coordination as a whole”. Based on this, Hassel 
points out that, in contrast to the power resource theory’s expectation, the decline of 
trade unions in CMEs should not be seen an indicator of the decline in bargaining 
coordination (Hassel, 2015, p. 253).  
 Like Hassel, some scholars have attempted to overcome the “laborist” emphasis 
of the power resources approach by noting the active role of classes other than labor in 
the formulation, change, or expansion of social policies (cf. Baldwin, 1990; Swenson, 
2002). Swenson (2002), for example, argued that the variations between the American 
and Swedish systems of social provision were the result of the way that employers in 
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Sweden and the U.S. had different interests regarding labor market governance. These 
interests were expressed in the use of distinctive means to control the labor market—
cartelism and segmentalism in the U.S., and solidarism in Sweden (pp. 21-35). More 
importantly for Swenson, they defined the shape and the timing of the expansion of the 
welfare state, as well as the type capital-labor coalitions that in each country supported 
it. 
 Research on labor law reform in Chile has not drawn upon employer-centered 
arguments as extensively as it has emphasized the role of labor and leftist parties. 
Investigations have depicted business either as opponents of any attempt to change the 
1979 Labor Code (cf. Barrett, 2001; Feres, 2009b; Frank, 2004; Frías, 2002; Haagh, 
2002; Narbona, 2014; Taylor, 2004) or as a powerful actor willing to make minor but 
important concessions (Campero, 2007). Perhaps with the only exception of Haagh’s 
(2002)—which explicitly locates business collective action at the center of her 
explanation—these investigations resemble the literature on working class power 
resources and policy change in Chile in that business power is defined not as the main 
cause of the persistence of Pinochet’s legislation, but rather as an important mechanism 
that is however dependent on authoritarian legacies and state action. Particularly, an 
extensive literature has pointed out that during the democratic period business influence 
over policymaking depended largely on politico-institutional legacies—e.g. binomial 
electoral system and designated senators—that granted veto power to its main political 
allies (right parties), as well as legal legacies such as the 1979 Labor Plan, which gave 
business extensive guarantees to deal with labor. According to this literature, 
employers’ power was also reinforced by the pro-business or “neoliberal” orientation of 
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the Concertación’s officials, which provided business associations with direct contact 
with policymakers located in key ministers, and a privileged access in policymaking 
councils (cf. Barrett, 2001; Feres, 2009b; Frías, 2002; Ljubetic, 2008; Narbona, 2014; 
E. Silva, 1996; Undurraga, 2012). 
 
2.2. Approach of the dissertation  
 As the previous sections show, the research on labor reform in Chile has drawn 
on approaches centered mostly on authoritarian legacies and the role of state actors. 
Based on them, scholars have analyzed the continuity of the dictatorial labor regulations 
and explained why business has been more successful than labor in influencing 
policymaking. Yet in conceiving imbalance of power between labor and business as a 
sociopolitical legacy inherited from the dictatorship and reinforced by the Concertación 
governments, researchers have assigned a secondary role to class-based explanations. In 
other words, class-based power and class relations have been seen only as a mechanism 
through which legacies and state actions have shaped labor reform.  
This is the reason why some fundamental questions of class relations and policy 
change in Chile have been understudied. This explains, for example, why the analyses 
of the role of business during the formulation of labor reforms have mostly consisted on 
general descriptions of employers’ obstructionist and uncompromising positions. This 
also explains why the role of labor has been simply depicted as weak, structurally 
unable to influence policymaking, and extremely aligned to its allies in the state. To be 
sure, these analyses have rightly described the stances of workers’ and employers’ 
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organizations throughout the reforms carried out during the 1990s and the early 2000s. 
However, in assigning a secondary role to class-based explanations, research on policy 
reform has disregarded the study of the processes through which class organization such 
as the CPC and the CUT have represented and shaped class identities and interests, 
while defining strategies to defend them vis-à-vis the government and the other class. 
Thus recent research has not explained why during the reform processes the CUT and 
the CPC adopted particular political orientations and strategies vis-à-vis the state, while 
disregarding others, and why capitalists have been more successful than workers in 
pursuing their class interests regarding labor policy. The existing literature has barely 
explained, for example, why business unity—promoted and protected by the CPC—has 
been so persistent throughout and why, on the other hand, workers’ unity has been so 
affected by political and strategic disputes within the CUT.  
In addition, research has not explained why the CPC has been so reluctant to 
make concessions regarding the establishment of industry-wide collective bargaining, 
and why employers’ stances toward the regulations of labor unions, collective 
bargaining, and strikes have been so unified. Nor have scholars studied how employers 
managed to defend the 1979 Labor Plan even during the last reform process (2015-
2016), in which the conditions for business to succeed were in many respects more 
hostile than in the 1990s and 2000s. As the following chapters will show, during this 
last reform process the relation between business and the Bachelet government was 
more strained and the power of the CPC seemed to be weaker or at least less unified 
(unlike the previous periods, this time the CPC was not the only representative of 
business vis-à-vis the government). Also, by the mid 2010s even business “hegemonic 
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power” was weaker than ever due to several corruption scandals that since 2010 
significantly undermined Chileans’ trust in employers.   
In relation to the working class, recent research has not explained why in the 
mid 2010s the CUT officialdom insisted in adopting the same strategies of the early 
1990s and 2000s, even though these strategies—based on restraint and the close 
collaboration with the reformist governments—proved to be a failure. Despite CUT’s 
leaders recognized that restraint was an ineffective strategy during the reforms carried 
out by the Concertación administrations, in the 2015-2016 reform process the strategy 
of the CUT was essentially the same. Although somehow reasonable in the early 1990s, 
the CUT’s insistence on restraint was puzzling throughout the Bachelet labor reform. 
During the 2015 – 2016 reform Communist workers controlled the CUT. In the 1990s 
these workers had strongly criticized Concertación leaders (especially Christian 
Democrats) for being too subordinated to the Concertación parties and for being unable 
to adopt more confrontational strategies vis-à-vis the government’s pro-business 
orientations. Despite these critiques, even these Communist leaders did not adopt the 
mass mobilization strategies they demanded in the 1990s, even though the 2015 – 2016 
legislative process took place in political context much more favorable to that type of 
strategies. Since 2011 the country was shaken by massive mobilizations and protests 
that suddenly became the most important political event since the return to democracy. 
These protests were indeed were the basis of the reformist agenda that would bring 
Michelle Bachelet to power in 2014. As Chapter 4 will show, President Bachelet took 
office with the support of a center-left coalition (Nueva Mayoría), which in an attempt 
to abandon the consensual and pro-business orientations of the Concertación 
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administrations proposed an ambitious reformist agenda. This agenda included tax, 
education, labor, and constitutional reforms, and sought to address the demands from 
the social movements that were leading the 2011 protests. These protests also included 
important segments of the working class, which since the late 2010s had led important 
nation-wide strikes in key economic sectors of Chilean economy such as mining and the 
forestry and dock industries. The political significance of these strikes was enormous. 
Not only did they represent what some analysts called the renaissance of Chile’ labor 
movement (Aravena & Núñez, 2009), but they also demonstrated that, in contrast to 
what the CUT leaders argued in the early 1990s, the disruptive power of some labor 
confederations was still vey strong. However, despite these confederations tried to 
influence the 2015 – 2016 reform process by making two calls for a general strike, the 
CUT’s Communist leadership largely ignored them and essentially replicated the 
restraint strategies observed in previous reform process.  
In this dissertation I examine all these questions by focusing on the internal, 
organizational processes through which the CPC and the CUT have shaped the interests 
and collective action capacities of employers and workers. In doing so, I also examine 
how both class organizations define the strategies vis-à-vis the government and the 
other class during the reform processes. To fulfill this goal, I draw upon literature on 
class formation and collective action. Without denying the importance of legacies and 
state actions noted in recent analyses of labor reform, in this dissertation I aim to show 
that the study of class formation and collective action is key for explaining the 
persistence of the dictatorial labor code in Chile. To this end, I examine how the CPC 
and the CUT exercise power through their influence on the policy-making process. 
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Although emphasized in the classical pluralist research (Dahl, 1958; Polsby, 1960), 
influence over policy-making is in no way the only face of power. As noted by Lukes 
(2005 [1974]), the exercise of power embraces both a ruling groups’ actual influence 
over decision-making and its “hegemonic” capacity to shape the preferences of others 
and exclude relevant issues from the decision-making process. Therefore, in analyzing 
the debates on labor policy, I follow Lukes and assume that the actual influence over 
policy-making by, for example, capitalists, is only one aspect of power that can be (and 
usually is) supplemented by other mechanisms not directly observed through empirical 
research.   
In addition, in focusing on the interactions between business, labor, and the 
state, I aim to analyze how capitalist and worker collective action shapes simultaneously 
labor policy. To do so, I follow recent research that emphasizes the analytical 
importance of class relations, and, consequently, the relational character of power 
(Korpi, 2006, p. 206; Lawrence, 2014, pp. 13-14). In the argument I develop here, the 
relational character of power is observed in the way in which the capacity of one class 
(say, the working class) to act collectively and advance its interests shapes and is 
shaped by the capacity of other classes (say, capitalists) to act and pursue their own 
interests regarding labor policy—e.g. employers’ capacity to defend the Labor Plan’s 
regulations and, in doing so, limit workers’ bargaining power. Based on this, I seek to 
overcome the sometimes-overemphasized divide between the arguments derived from 
the Power Resource and the Employer-centered approaches (including the Variety of 
Capitalism approach). These arguments analyze policymaking by privileging only one 
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side of influence—the side of either workers or employers—without theorizing the 
ways in which each side’s power affects and is affected by the actions of the other. 
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3. The 1990-2001 labor reforms: transition to democracy, authoritarian legacies, 
and power imbalances  
A month before the first democratic President Aylwin took office in March 
1990, the leaders of the CUT and the CPC, Manuel Bustos and Manuel Feliú, signed a 
pre-accord that was the basis of the labor-business negotiations that ended up in the first 
Framework Agreement of April 27th, 1991. The April agreement was signed by the 
government, the CUT, and the CPC, and was meant to be the foundation of the further 
labor reforms undertook between 1990 and 1993. This agreement was the first of four 
successive accords signed in 1991, 1992, and 1993, through which business, workers, 
and the government agreed to set, among other things, minimum wage readjustments, 
family and housing subsidies, as well as special sectoral arrangements for public 
employees, port and longshore workers, and other particular types of workers (Narbona, 
2014, p. 23).  
 Since the January pre-accord, both the media and government authorities 
defined the CUT-CPC negotiations as “auspicious” and “historical”, and as the 
foundation of the “social concertation” that would guarantee the stability of the 
transition to democracy. After all, this was the first time the representatives of the 
employers and workers openly defended class compromise as the best way to help the 
consolidation of the new democratic regime. This new stance was especially clear for 
the case of the CUT. Several times its president asserted that “all demands” of workers 
“might be negotiable”, and that the CUT leaders would favor a “responsible” unionism,
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“totally committed to the democratic regime”1. President Aylwin himself asked workers 
to moderate their demands in order to be “loyal” to the transitional government2. The 
CPC also showed signs of moderation. In contrast to the hardline stance of the 
SOFOFA—the most powerful member of the CPC, Manuel Feliú and the presidents of 
the other sectoral associations affiliated to the CPC openly supported the Framework 
Agreements (Barrett, 2001, pp. 583-584). Stances like these were, according to Feliú, 
the “vivid proof” of the “displacement of class struggle in Chile”. However, unlike 
Bustos, Feliú noted that business saw the Framework Agreements only an instance of 
“conversation” and not as the basis for a “tripartite” system of industrial relations. In 
doing so, he insisted that the CPC would never endorse policy changes—for example, 
the extension of collective bargaining to industry-wide levels—that might endanger the 
foundations of market economy3.  
These marked differences in the stances of workers and employers were a 
central feature of the reforms undertaken between 1990 and 2001. As I show in this 
chapter, these dissimilar stances, the “business friendly” and “consensual” approaches 
endorsed by the government, and especially the huge power imbalances between labor 
and employers, were key factors that defined the final outcomes of these legislative 
processes.   
 
																																																								
1 “Manuel Bustos: ‘lo mejor es sacarnos el odio’”, Qué Pasa, January 4, 1990; “Manuel Bustos, 
presidente de la CUT: ‘Se nota el cambio de con el gobierno democrático”, La Nación, April 1, 1990.        
2 “Diálogos políticos. Conversaciones mixtas”, Revista Análisis, March 26, 1990.   
3 “Acuerdo en desacuerdos”, Ercilla, February 14, 1990; “Primera cita gobierno-CUT-empresarios”, La 
Nación, March 22, 1990; “Manuel Feilú, presidente de la CPC: ‘Debemos probar con hechos que somos 
capaces de entendernos de Buena fe’”, La Segunda, February 2, 1990.  
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3.1. The 1990-1993 labor reforms and the failure of social concertation  
The first official Framework Agreement of 1990s was compiled in a document 
entitled “Chile: an historical opportunity”, which essentially replicated the pre-accord 
signed by the CPC and the CUT in January. Reflecting concessions from the CUT, the 
document pointed out the importance of free markets and entrepreneurism as the “main 
agents” of development. Similarly, echoing concessions from business it highlighted the 
need to promote economic growth with a “fair redistribution of wealth”. The document 
also asserted that business associations and labor confederations were the bases of 
social dialogue, and while noting that labor reforms should be implemented in the years 
to come, it did not specify concrete measures. Instead, the document only stated the 
need to work on “further agreements” that could facilitate modifications to the labor 
code4.  
Workers hoped that by signing of the agreement, the government would fulfill 
the pledges the Concertación had made during its electoral campaign. The 
Concertación’s program was formulated between 1988 and 1989, and CUT leaders such 
as the Christian Democrat Manuel Bustos and the Socialist Arturo Martinez played an 
important role in it. Thanks to their party affiliations they could make proposals and 
participate in the formulation of the chapter on labor reform5. To do so, they worked 
along with union advisors such as René Cortázar and Eduardo Loyola who would later 
become minister and subsecretary of labor respectively. Aylwin’s presidential program 
																																																								
4 “Gobierno, CUT y CPC firmaron un acuerdo marco”, La Época, April 28, 1990.  
5 See, for example, “La CUT dio a conocer su ‘Propuesta para la Transición a la democracia’ en el país”, 
La Época, April 15, 1989; “Ochenta medidas inmediatas propuso la CUT para el futuro gobierno 
democrático”, La Época, November 11, 1989.  
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acknowledged not only the need to strengthen unions and labor confederation (which 
were illegal during the dictatorship), but also the need to undertake “deep changes in the 
labor legislation” in order to protect workers’ right to strike and establish a system of 
collective bargaining that would permit negotiations at the firm- and the industry-wide 
level6. Based on this, workers had good reasons to believe in the positive prospects of 
the Aylwin administration.  
However, workers’ optimism turned into disappointment when the government 
decided not to include the most “pro-labor” measures of the Concertación’s program 
into the draft bill. More specifically, the government decided not to include 
amendments that would extend collective bargaining to supra-firm levels, and protect 
the right to strike through the revocation of the decrees that limited the length of the 
strikes to sixty days and allowed employers to hire replacement workers (Frank, 2015, 
pp. 186-187). Workers found out the bad news was days before Mayday, in late April 
1990, when minister Cortázar let them know that the government’s proposal would only 
imply “technical adjustments” to the existing labor code7. According to Arturo 
Martínez—CUT vice-president in 1990 and participant in that meeting, Cortázar told 
workers that it would be “impossible” to carry out labor reforms such as established in 
the Concertación’s program because that might affect unemployment rates, create 
hostility among businessmen, and political tensions with the right8.  
After the meeting the CUT temporarily cut off its relations with the government, 
while the political and strategic divisions that had coexisted since the CUT’s foundation 																																																								
6 Programa de Gobierno Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, 1989, pp. 25-29.  
7 “¿Qué fue de los buenos muchachos?”, El Mercurio, August 23, 1992.   
8 Interview with Arturo Martínez, September 25, 2015. 
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(late 1980s) started to become more and more notorious within the labor confederation. 
The leftist sector affiliated to the PC and other parties criticized the moderate one 
aligned with the Concertación for trusting “too much” in the government’s pledges. 
They also decried the signing of the Framework Agreement, arguing that social 
concertation was nothing more than an expression of a negotiation in which labor was 
the only side that compromised9. In relation to this, Arturo Martínez recalled: “In April 
1990 they (Concertación officers) said they would not make substantial changes (to the 
1979 Labor Plan). By doing so they brought the crisis into the CUT because the more 
radicalized sectors said: ‘no, this is your fault. You’re the ones who are defending the 
government. We have to fight them, let’s barricade everywhere. The struggle hasn’t 
finished’. On the other hand, the Concertación sectors… defended de idea that 
democracy and stability was the most important thing, and they were right is some 
sense. But there was no equilibrium (between these positions)”10. 
 Despite Cortázar’s notification, the CUT leadership opted not to break its formal 
relations with the government. Thus President Aylwin was the main guest of the CUT’s 
1990 Mayday commemoration, where he announced the government would introduce 
the first package of labor reforms to the parliament. His promises came true a month 
later, when the government made its labor reform proposal public. The government’s 
proposal established reforms in areas of the labor code as diverse as contract 
termination and job stability, labor central confederations, unions, collective bargaining, 
and strikes, and public employees unions (asociaciones de funcionarios). In general 
																																																								
9 “Gobierno, CUT y CPC firmaron un acuerdo marco”, La Época, April 28, 1990.  
10 Interview with Arturo Martínez, September 25, 2015. 
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terms, the government proposal aimed to remove the most repressive norms of the 
dictatorship (e.g. those that banned labor central confederations), increase legal 
protections to union leaders (fueros sindicales), and broaden the subject matters of 
collective bargaining by allowing unions to bargain over labor and employment 
conditions. It also sought to revoke the clauses that enabled employers to dismiss 
workers “without express cause” (contained in the article 155[f]), and recognize the 
existence of public employees’ unions—although without granting them the right to 
strike (Campero, 2007, pp. 17-18). All the reforms suggested in the government 
proposal turned into draft laws discussed between 1990 and 1993.  
The CUT leaders viewed the announcement with a mix of hope and skepticism. 
They considered the draft bill far from ideal as the “most important” proposals included 
in the Concertación’s program had been removed from it11. Strictly speaking, with the 
exception of industry-wide collective bargaining, most of workers’ demands were not 
“removed” from the government’s bill, yet they were modified in such a way that even 
if passed in its “purest form” (without modifications in Congress), they would not bring 
about substantial changes for workers. For example, instead of industry-wide collective 
bargaining, the reform project proposed a system of “multi-company” or “multi-
employer” collective bargaining (negociación interempresas) that was nonetheless 
“voluntary” for employers12. Similarly, despite the proposal aimed to revoke the article 
155 (f) which granted employers the right to dismiss workers without “express cause”, 
																																																								
11 “Proyectos de reformas laborales”, Unión y Trabajo, Boletín Informativo de la CUT, No 1, July 1990.  
12 Workers contended that the voluntary character of multi-employer collective bargaining would not 
produce practical changes because, as observed until the present day, employers would never agree to 
engage in collective bargaining beyond the firm level.  
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it recognized the right of employers to dismiss workers when the firm’s “necessities” 
require it13. As for strike activity, workers criticized that the government original project 
did not eliminate the limits on the sixty-days maximum length, and did not substantially 
weaken employers’ ability to hire replacement workers during strikes14. These three 
issues—collective bargaining, workers’ dismissals, and right to strike—became the 
main source of tensions between the CUT and the government in 1990.  
The CUT leaders were sure that despite the limitations of the labor reform 
proposal, business and right parties would work hard to block the few pro-labor 
measures contained in it. Therefore, they demanded the government to make the 
legislative process “as quickly as possible”. In practical terms this meant not to delay 
the legislative process in the search of cross-coalition agreements. The CUT demanded 
this under the assumption that the project would first be discussed in the Chamber of 
Deputies (Cámara de Diputados), where the Concertación had the majority of seats and 
the Concertación representatives had more room to draft a “strong” bill15.  According to 
the CUT labor leaders, a “strong” bill would be key for protecting the pro-labor 
components of the project in Senate, where the government coalition did not have a 
majority. In Senate the conservative forces were over-represented due to both the 
binomial electoral system—which guaranteed political equilibriums between the 
																																																								
13 For labor, article 155(f) was an especially sensitive issue because workers saw it as a threat to 
collective organization. “Whenever there’s a strike, the employer fires workers to punish them”, said 
Manuel Bustos two years later, in reference to the prerogatives derived from that article. See “CUT: 
‘Retomaremos relación con el Ministerio del Trabajo’”, La Nación, September 2, 1992.  
14 “CUT-gobierno. La cuerda se cortó”, Revista Hoy, July 2, 1990; “CUT-gobierno. Se acabaron las 
sonrisas”, Revista Análisis, July 2, 1990.   
15 “El código que tenía que reformarse”, Unión y Trabajo, Boletín Informativo de la CUT, No 1, July 
1990.  
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Concertación and the right—and the presence of nine unelected, “designated” Senators 
established by the 1980 constitution.  
By early July 1990, the CUT leaders criticized the government for taking “too 
long” to introduce the reform proposal into the Chamber of Deputies. The criticisms 
were directed against Ministers René Cortázar and Alejandro Foxley, who were labeled 
as the spokesmen of a “technocratic government” that privileged agreements with 
business at the expenses of labor16. The CUT’s critiques differed substantially from the 
attitude of business leaders, who had several times acknowledged the “reasonableness” 
and the right “technical orientation” of both Cortázar and Foxley17.  
Once again, the government did not listen to CUT’s demands, and in mid July, 
the executive introduced the first package of bills (Law 19,010 on contract termination) 
directly into the Senate, such as demanded by the CPC. In line with business’ strategy—
which the CPC had presented to the Christian Democracy in early July18, the executive 
tried to “slow down” the legislative process in Senate, reach political agreements with 
the opposition, and only later pass the bill through the Chamber of Deputies. In 
introducing the bills into the Senate, the government aimed to show the “consensual” 
orientation of the Aylwin administration. Although the CUT criticized the governments’ 
move— Manuel Bustos himself claimed to be “surprised” with the announcement19, the 
CPC did not soften its stance towards the reform process, and warned that the 
introduction of the labor reform bill could have disastrous effects for the country: 
																																																								
16 “CUT-gobierno. La cuerda se cortó”, Revista Hoy, July 2, 1990.  
17 See, for example, “Acuerdo en desacuerdos”, Ercilla, February 14, 1990.  
18 “Empresarios plantean a DC necesidad de consenso en reformas laborales”, La Época, July 6, 1990.  
19 “CUT sorprendida por envío de los proyectos”, Revista Análisis, July 18, 1990.  
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“What’s at stake (with the reform) is whether we go back to be a mediocre Latin 
American country or not”, said Manuel Feilú20.   
 Labor fears became reality, as the government’s amendments in Senate did not 
reinforce the pro-labor measures of the bills. For instance, workers demanded the 
statutory severance pay to be “indefinite”, i.e. dependent only on the numbers of years 
worked, such as recognized in the pre-Labor Plan legislation. Yet the Senate’s 
commission of Labor, Legislation, and Justice turned down the CUT’s proposal and 
only increased it from five to ten or twelve months, depending on the size of the firm21. 
Something similar happened with workers’ demand for the repeal of the article 155(f), 
which was replaced by article 161. Despite this change made more expensive the 
dismissal of workers employed for more than five years, it had no effect on employers’ 
freedom to dismiss workers. Similar to its predecessor, article 161 did not protect labor 
security as it allowed employers to fire employees based on justifications as broad as 
the “necessities of the firm”.  
In light of this unpromising start, the CUT asked the government to withdraw 
from Senate the other two pending bills on collective bargaining and union 
organizations. Despite the executive did not listen to workers’ petition, Manuel Bustos 
and the other Concertación-affiliated CUT leaders refused to take oppositional stances 
towards the government by insisting on the need to “protect” the fragile democracy. In 
spite of this, CUT leaders started to threaten to call for general strikes “beyond the 																																																								
20 “Se está metiendo la pata”, Qué Pasa, July 19, 1990.  
21 The severance pays law was eventually passed in December 1990, along with laws on contract 
termination and job stability. Although it did not include the CUT’s demand, and establish an eleven-
month maximum compensation, Manuel Bustos defined it as “an advance”. See “Bustos destacó logros 
de la reforma laboral”, La Tercera, December 12, 1990.   
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margins of the law”22 to push the government to listened to their demands. These dual 
stances were evident not only in the disputes between the Communists and the 
Concertación leaders, but also in Manuel Bustos’ own statements. In a 3,000 workers 
assembly that was held in mid August 1990 in the city of Valparaíso, the CUT president 
stated: “We want this government to do well, because this is a transitional government”. 
Later, in the same speech, he analyzed the role of the Concertación and pointed out: 
“we fight to seize power… But it seems that some are afraid to exert it; it seems that 
they are only administrators of the past, and we are opposed to that, comrades”23.  
 In late 1990 the government introduced a new draft bill on labor central 
confederations (Proyecto de Ley sobre centrales sindicales). After a few months of 
debate, the bill was passed in Senate (Law 19,049), thanks to a political accord between 
the Concertación and one of the right parties, Renovación Nacional (RN)—the other 
party, the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) vetoed the bill. Again, the new law 
did not meet most of the CUT’s demands. It allowed workers to form central 
confederations without government’s approval, while permitting for the first time in the 
Chilean labor history public employees’ unions (asociaciones de empleados) to join 
them. However, the law did not include the 15% of labor force representation demanded 
by the CUT as requirement to form central confederations. Instead it established that a 
central confederation could be formed if it represented only 5% of workers affiliated to 
unions. This percentage was dropped to 3% until June 30th, 1992, in order to allow the 
legalization of other labor central confederations—in particular the CDT and the 																																																								
22 “CUT advierte que éste será un año de conflictos sociales”, La Nación, July 27, 1990; “La CUT pedirá 
al gobierno que retire proyectos del Senado”, La Época, August 16, 1990.     
23 “La CUT pelea con su sombra”, El Mercurio, August 12, 1990.   
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CTCh—that business and the right usually saw as “less confrontational” than the CUT. 
The CUT protested this particular regulation, saying that it would “atomize” the labor 
movement and only benefit “business and the right”24. In effect, these norms followed 
largely what the CPC demanded several times before, namely: a law on central 
confederations able to ensure a “democratic” and “free labor movement” to prevent the 
emergence of “Argentinian-style [i.e. corporatist] labor confederations”25. 
 Something similar occurred in early 1991, when the draft law on collective 
bargaining, unions, and strikes was introduced in the Senate. The bill eventually passed 
in the last days of April, and was enacted on July 22nd, 1991 (Law 19,069). The new 
regulations defined multi-employer collective bargaining as “voluntary” for employers, 
and prohibited any type of “over-the-firm” (industry-wide) collective bargaining (Rojas, 
2007, p. 211). In a similar way, they allowed the union to “extend” collective 
bargaining benefits to unaffiliated workers, having these paid a membership fee. 
Despite these changes, the new norms did not modify the Labor Plan’s measures that 
defined both unions and negotiating groups (grupos negociadores) as equal “subjects” 
entitled with the right to collective bargaining26. Also, the new laws changed neither the 
																																																								
24 Throughout the 1980s, the leaders of the Comando Nacional de Trabajadores (then CUT) defined the 
CDT and the CTCh as “pro-dictatorship” confederations. Along with the CTCh, the CDT signed accords 
with the CPC and the dictatorial government between 1985 and 1990, in the tripartite initiative known as 
the Consejo Económico Social. See, for example: “Empresarios y trabajadores acuerdan procedimiento 
para trabajar en la ‘integración social’”, La Segunda, January 9, 1989; “Empresarios-CTCh resaltan 
avances en acuerdo social”, El Mercurio, December 30, 1989. These accords were used by the CPC to 
show that the Framework Agreements were not “that original” as the Concertación claimed. See: “CUT 
advierte que seguirá funcionando de hecho”, El Mercurio, November 1, 1990; “Centrales sindicales 
velarán por el derecho de los trabajadores”, La Tercera, January 2, 1991; “CUT reitera disconformidad”, 
La Nación, February 22, 1991.   
25 “No queremos centrales sindicales al estilo argentino”, La Época, November 6, 1990.  
26 According to Rojas (2007, p. 213) the main modification in this regard was the inclusion of norms that 
consolidated the differences between regulated and the semi-regulated bargaining carried out by unions 
and grupos negociadores respectively. Since then, the debate on the role of grupos negociadores has been 
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principle of union parallelism that permitted the coexistence of multiple unions within 
firms (Rojas, 2007, p. 212) nor the restriction of the subject matters of collective 
bargaining to “economic issues” (salaries, economic compensation, etc.) and the 
consequent exclusion from bargaining of any matter that might undermine “the 
employer’s power to organize, run, and manage the firm” (Article 82, Law 19,069).   
Although the reform repealed the articles that limited to 60 days the length of 
the strikes, it did not change significantly the employers’ ability to replace striking 
workers. The new regulations established that employers could hire replacements from 
the first day if their offer was the same as or better than what was offered in the 
previous bargaining process (corrected by inflation). If the offer did not meet these 
conditions, the employer was allowed to hire replacement workers from the fifteenth 
day of strike. In addition, the new laws excluded public sector employees and other 
workers from “strategic industries” (e.g. electricity, water, and telecommunication 
supply) from the right to strike. The new Law 19,069 also distinguished four types of 
unions—company-level unions, inter-firm unions, temporary workers unions, and 
independent workers unions, and stated that only the first one had the right to 
bargaining collectively and, consequently, to strike. Finally, it also established that in 
companies with more than 50 workers the threshold for forming a union was 25 workers 
or the number needed to represent at least 10% of the employees. In small firms (less 
than 50 workers), the number of people needed to form a union was 8 workers or a 
																																																																																																																																																																		
recurrent because unlike unions, the grupos can engage in collective agreements (convenios colectivos) 
without the right to strike or protections for their leaders. For workers, this explains why employers’ 
promote the creation of grupos negociadores as a tool to weaken the power of unions. As Chapter 4 will 
show, the legal status of the grupos was a key issue during the 2015 – 2016 labor reform.   
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number equivalent to at least 50% of the employees of the firm (Article 16, Law 
19,069).  
Like for the law on labor central confederations, the bill was passed thanks to a 
political accord with RN. This caused public disagreements between RN and its ally 
UDI, as well as between RN leaders and the Labor Plan’s architect, former minister of 
labor José Piñera. RN Senator Andrés Allamand responded to the critiques from his 
allies by pointing out that the accord allowed the right to make “corrections” to the 
project without going to the Chamber of Deputies. More importantly, he pointed out 
that none of the regulations included in the bill endangered “the future of social market 
economy”27. The Concertación-affiliated leaders of the CUT, on the other hand, 
considered that the reforms were a “good”, though insufficient, starting point. This 
brought about, once again, public disputes between the leftist workers (Communist and 
non-Communist) and the CUT Concertación leaders. These disputes took over the 
agenda of the First CUT National Congress of October 1991. After the Congress, the 
CUT-vice president Arturo Martínez resigned from the Socialist Party, denouncing 
political interference from the PS, and arguing that he would favor an alliance with the 
Communists and the more confrontational positions they proposed28.  
 
3.1.1. The contrasting realities of employers and workers 
 Unlike labor, the situation of business in the early 1990s was promising in spite 
of the reformist agenda of the first democratic government. The “victories” obtained 																																																								
27 “La huelga indefinida no tendrá efectos prácticos”, El Mercurio, February 11, 1991.   
28 “Vicepresidente de la CUT renuncia al PS”, La Tercera, November 5, 1991; “Para la CUT, 1991 fue un 
año positivo”, Las Últimas Noticias, December 26, 1991.  
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during the reform process reaffirmed the leadership of the CPC. The Framework 
Agreement did generate, at first, some tensions between the more confrontational 
SOFOFA and the other more pragmatic sectoral associations affiliated to the CPC 
(Barrett, 2001, p. 584). However, the less-confrontational strategy led by Manuel Feliú 
soon proved to be successful, both in terms of the reform outcomes and the benefits 
derived from the exceptionally good relationship with the government and its ministers 
of finance and labor.  
In this context, the business community did not bother to hide its satisfaction for 
the way in which the Concertación had led the reforms process by maintaining the 
principles of market economy. This was clear not only in the claims by several business 
leaders, who defined the Framework Agreement as a “victory” (Barrett, 2001, p. 584), 
but also in the way in which businesspeople praised the Concertación’s economic team 
for defending the virtues of market economy. In the 1991 version of the business forum 
Encuentro Nacional de la Empresa (ENADE) most businesspeople believed, according 
to a survey conducted during the event, that the economy would keep growing thanks to 
the “stable environment” of the country, while even José Antonio Guzmán—a hardline 
CPC president who was seen as the antipode of Feliu’s consensual stance—claimed to 
“value” the government’s free market orientation. In the same event, minister of finance 
Alejandro Foxley responded to the compliments by praising businessmen for the effort 
they put in the construction of a “consensual environment”29.  
  In May 1992, the CUT signed a new agreement with the government and the 
CPC, which set the minimum wage for 1992-1993. The agreement included no 																																																								
29 All these data and quotes come from the ENADE 1991 offical report. See ENADE (1992).  
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reference to workers’ demands for amendments to the recently enacted law on unions 
and collective bargaining. The CUT demanded the repeal of the laws defining multi-
employer bargaining as voluntary for employers and of the articles that allowed 
employers to dismiss workers at will (article 155(f), now renamed article 161). Despite 
the CUT’s demands, the government signed a new agreement with RN, which allowed 
for the quick passage of a bill on individual contracts in the Chamber of Deputies (Law 
19,250)30. The CUT-government conflict escalated in August 1992, when the Minister 
of Labor René Cortázar disregarded labor leaders’ protest and stated emphatically: “no 
further reforms to the labor code will be carried out”31.  
Cortazar’s inflexibility led the CUT to cut off, once again temporarily, the 
relations with the government. In the meantime, the leftist sectors insisted that the 
central confederation should “broke” any dialogue with the Concertación. In an attempt 
to improve the relation with the CUT, President Aylwin and important ministers 
attended the celebration of the CUT 4th anniversary. This was strongly criticized by 
right parties, which contended that the Concertación should decide between either 
endorsing market economy or keeping its bods with labor. The UDI representative 
Pablo Longueira even said that the government’s tripartite initiatives were “no more 
than a show” Concertación officers put together to avoid making pro-labor reforms that 
they offer but “don’t agree with”32. In spite of the efforts, the CUT-government 
relations did not improve. As a result, the CUT called for a massive demonstration 
“against business and the ministry of labor”, which took place in mid October and early 																																																								
30 “Rechazo de CUT a proyecto de ley de contrato individual”, La Nación, January 18, 1992.   
31 “¿Qué fue de los buenos muchachos?”, El Mercurio, August 23, 1992.   
32 “La oposición critica nueva comisión tripartita laboral”, El Mercurio, October 28, 1992.   
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November 1992. The demonstrations showed more the internal problems of labor than 
the CUT’s capacity to put pressure on the government. At the end of the November 
demonstration, for example, the CUT President Manuel Bustos could not give his 
closure speech because he was hit and punched by some workers claimed to be opposed 
to his “conciliatory leadership”33. In this context of weakness, President Aylwin invited 
the CUT and the CPC to a tripartite commission to analyze the implementation of the 
labor reforms. Although Aylwin noted that the commission was only a “consultation 
initiative” that would not lead to a new labor reform project34, the CPC quickly rejected 
the invitation. “We think that the simple act of setting up a tripartite commission… is a 
sign of instability we do not whish to see”, José Antonio Guzmán contended, while 
stating that both the labor legislation and the reforms undertaken in 1990-1991 “have 
proved to be a good stimulus for employment”35.  
Aylwin’s invitation gave rise to a CUT-government meeting that did not work at 
all for workers, as Cortázar reiterated that he would not endorse more reforms. After the 
meeting, Bustos only claimed he was “embittered” by the minister’s “stubbornness”36. 
Once again, the situation of business was totally different. Both in private meetings and 
public conventions, the leaders of the CPC flattered the government’s management of 
the economy. For example, in his 1992 ENADE speech, José A. Guzmán contrasted the 
“extraordinary good judgment” of ministers Cortázar and Foxley with the 																																																								
33 “CUT anuncia marcha contra empresarios y el ministerio del trabajo”, La Segunda, September 17, 
1992; “Concentración de la CUT debió ser interrumpida por ataques a Bustos”, La Época, November 5, 
1992.  
34 “Ofrece S.E. a CUT: análisis tripartito de reforma laboral”, El Mercurio, November 10, 1992 
35 These quotes come from his speech in the 1992 version of ENADE (ENADE, 1993). See also the 
opinion piece by José A. Guzmán published in La Tercera on November 22, 1992 (“Legislación laboral: 
No al tripartismo”, La Tercera, November 22, 1992).  
36 “Bustos: ‘No hay voluntad para mejorar ley laboral’”, La Tercera, December 24, 1992.  
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“stubbornness” of labor leaders who insisted on their defense of “old” tripartite schemes 
and industry-wide collective bargaining (see ENADE, 1993).  
 By the end of the Aylwin administration, labor’s hopes for substantive reforms 
were definitely buried. In August 1993, new bills on working day length, holidays, and 
other individual rights were passed in the Senate (Law No 19, 250). In addition to these 
bills, the government introduced minor modifications that restructured the first, second, 
and fifth books of the labor code, and consolidated all the changes undertaken between 
1990 and 1993. This meant the culmination of the initiatives carried out by the Alywin 
administration37.  
Given the orientation of the reforms carried out by the Aylwin administration, it 
was no surprising that the CPC applauded the first Concertación government. In his 
1993 ENADE speech, José Antonio Guzmán not only praised the work of Aylwin, 
Foxley, and Cortázar, but also contended that free markets had “reached a point of no 
return”. He did so by noting that businessmen were the “vanguard” of the 
modernization process that led to that stage (ENADE, 1994, pp. 187-194). What was 
somewhat surprising was the stance of the CUT leadership. Despite the failure of the 
reforms and the bad relation with the government, the CUT leaders continued to openly 
support the Concertación project. Bustos, for example, blamed the failure of the labor 
reforms on the CPC and the right, largely ignoring the role played by the Concertación. 
In doing so, he contended that in spite of everything, he still thought that the 
Concertación was “a light of hope”, as it was “the only alternative” workers had38. The 
																																																								
37 “Culminó proceso de reformas laborales”, La Nación, September 24, 1993.  
38 “Manuel Bustos, presidente de la CUT: ‘Yo esperaba más’, El Mercurio, September 26, 1993.   
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CUT’s hopes were reaffirmed with election of the second Concertación president, the 
Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei. After his election in December 1993, labor leaders 
claimed that they were confident that the Frei administration would undertake all the 
policy changes needed to fix the problems stemming from the 1990-1993 reforms.  
  
3.2. The Frei administration and its failed labor reform (1994-1999) 
Despite the CUT’s support to Frei’s candidacy, the relations with the 
government did not start auspiciously for workers. In their first official meeting with the 
new minister of labor, Socialist Jorge Arrate, he let them know that the government’s 
approach to labor reforms would not differ substantially from that of the Aylwin 
administration39. In addition, workers soon realized that the new minister of finance 
Eduardo Aninat would privilege more distant relations with the CUT. Unlike his 
predecessor Alejandro Foxley, Aninat did not have strong links with workers (Foxley, 
like the ex-minister of labor René Cortázar, had worked as union advisor in the 1980s 
and were close to Christian Democrat leaders such as Manuel Bustos).   
As the state officials’ attitude towards labor was distant, the stance of the CUT’s 
leaders became more confrontational. Unlike his moderation during the Aylwin 
administration, Bustos now contended that Frei ran a “center-right government” that did 
not listen to workers demands40. Thus only four months after Frei took office, the CUT 
called for a mass mobilization demanding changes to the collective labor laws. The 
protest was held on July 11th 1994, and although several parties—including those 																																																								
39 “Frente a frente de Arrate y Bustos: ¿Se acaba la luna de miel laboral”?, La Segunda, April 15, 1994.  
40 “Bustos: ‘Gobierno parece de centro derecha’, La Época, June 14, 1994.  
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belonging to the Concertación—endorsed it, president Frei publicly condemned it and 
the minister of labor argued that it was “unnecessary”41. Employer associations also 
decried the CUT mobilization. The SOFOFA President Pedro Lizana said that it was 
“40 or 50 years outdated” and that the system of industry–wide collective bargaining 
demanded by workers should be “punished” as it was “something totally obsolete”. The 
CPC president José A. Guzmán went further and openly defended the virtues of the 
labor legislation, which for him was “key” for ensuring “economic growth”, 
“generating employment”, and “reducing strike activity”. In doing so, Guzmán accused 
the CUT of creating an “artificial state of conflict” that was at odds with the “new 
times” of industrial relations, characterized by low unionization rates and low strike 
activity42.  
The CUT demonstration was successful as it forced the government to put 
together bipartite meetings between workers and minister Arrate. In the first of these 
meetings Arrate said the government would introduce a reform proposal that might 
include the “extension” of collective bargaining to supra-firm levels. However a couple 
of weeks later Concertación officials rejected that type of initiatives. Such as argued by 
employers, they contended that industry-wide collective bargaining would be 
prejudicial to small companies43. Throughout the first year of the Frei administration, 
the government wanted to make it clear that it would privilege good relations with 																																																								
41 “Cómo ven hoy el PS y la DC la movilización de la CUT”, La Segunda, July 5, 1994; “Arrate: ‘Marcha 
de la CUT es extemporánea e innecesaria’”, La Nación, July 7, 1994.    
42 See “Empresarios cuestionan movilización de la CUT”, El Mercurio, July 2, 1994; “Pedro Lizana 
(SFF) sobre llamado a movilización del 11: ‘La CUT está atrasada 40 o 50 años’, La Segunda, July 4, 
1994; “Empresarios niegan responsabilidad en movilización de CUT”, El Mercurio, July 7, 1994.   
43 “Gobierno incluyó temas en su agenda pedidos por CUT”, El Mercurio, July 21, 1994; “Analizan 
extensión de la negociación colectiva”, El Mercurio, September 29, 1994.  
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business. This became even clearer when Frei made a cabinet reshuffle and removed 
ministers business deemed “too leftist”. The reshuffle was applauded by the CPC, 
which considered it a sign of “better economic perspectives”. By the end of 1994, 
journalistic reports noted how the friendly business-government relations contrasted to 
the “tempestuous” relation between the government and the CUT44. This contrast was 
somehow in line with Frei’s political economy approach. During his term, he sought to 
consolidate the internationalization of Chilean economy. To do so, he worked hard to 
join the NAFTA and sign free trade agreements with each of its members45. In this 
process, business associations became central actors, whereas workers played no 
substantial role.  
Several times, this was criticized not only by workers, but also by PS and PPD 
leaders who believed that the executive had an “excessively pro-business” orientation46. 
The PS and the PPD demanded the government to listen to labor and introduce to the 
Chamber of Deputies the reform proposal promised by minister Arrate. They aimed to 
bridge the gap between the executive and the now more confrontational CUT, whose 
leftist sectors were increasingly pushing for the adoption of mass mobilization strategies 
																																																								
44 “El cambio de gabinete ha sido muy bien recibido”, La Nación, September 25, 1994; “La hora de los 
empresarios”, La Época, November 20, 1994.  
45 This goal was partially achieved. Frei could only sing free trade agreements with Canada in 1996 and 
Mexico in 1998, while Chile could not join the NAFTA because Clinton was unable to obtain the 
approval from the US congress. A free trade agreement between Chile and the US was signed years later, 
on June 6th, 2003, under the Presidency of Ricardo Lagos. See “Chile takes its trade elsewhere”, 
Washington Post, December 25, 1997. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/trade/stories/tr122597.htm. Accessed on December 9, 2016.   
46 “La hora de los empresarios”, La Época, November 20, 1994.  
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vis-à-vis the government47. The government finally listened to the calls from its parties, 
and announced the submission of a labor reform bill in late December 1994.   
The reform project only aimed to take care of some “pending aspects” of the law 
on unions and collective bargaining passed in 1991 (Law 19,069). The government bill 
sought to broaden the scope of bargaining (i.e. extended it to medium- and small-sized 
companies), make multi-employer collective bargaining mandatory, grant bargaining 
rights to transitory (temporary, part-time, agriculture workers) unions, and repeal norms 
that enabled employers to replace striking workers (Campero, 2007, pp. 26-29). The 
government’s announcement was strongly criticized by the CPC president José A. 
Guzmán, who contended that the government had “compromised with the CUT”, and 
that he hoped the bill “would not survive” the legislative process48. According to 
Guzmán, the changes proposed by the draft bill would not only dismantle the Labor 
Plan, but also the “main pillars” of market economy. Therefore, the CPC president’s 
position was clear and straightforward since the very beginning of the legislative 
process: if the government wanted to avoid hostile relations with business, it should 
immediately withdraw the reform proposal49.   
In contrast, the government’s proposal was well received by union leaders who 
responded to the “positive gesture” by returning to the tripartite commissions and policy 
committees they had left months before as a sign of protest50. Such as in the 1990 
reforms, the CUT leaders demanded the government not to compromise with the right 																																																								
47 “Socialistas instan al gobierno a atender las demandas de la CUT”, El Mercurio, December 12, 1994; 
“Consejo DC respaldó peticiones de Bustos”, El Mercurio, December 20, 1994.  
48 “José Antonio Guzmán: ‘Gbno. claudicó ante la CUT’”, El Diario, January 2, 1995 
49 “CPC pidió retiro de proyecto de reforma laboral del congreso”, El Mercurio, April 5, 1995; “José 
Antonio Guzmán. Presidente de los empresarios”, Revista Hoy, April 16, 1995.  
50 “CUT vuelve a comisiones”, El Mercurio, January 25, 1995.  
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and carry out the legislative process as quickly as possible to avoid any potential 
“distortion” to the project in the Senate51. This time the government followed labor 
demands and started the legislative process by introducing the bill into the Chamber of 
Deputies. For Manuel Bustos, the bill did not solve the main “aberrations” of the labor 
code; yet he argued that the CUT would be willing to endorse any modification aiming 
to strengthen workers’ collective rights52.   
In mid 1995, the Chamber of Deputies’ Labor Commission approved the main 
aspects of the bill. Nevertheless, workers complained that the draft law did not include 
most of the amendments they made during the legislative process. To confront this 
unfavorable scenario, workers called for “massive protests” to oppose any potential 
compromise between the government, the right, and employers53. In an attempt to get 
workers’ support, the government made several amendments to the bill in late 1995. 
Although the SOFOFA President defined the amendments as “the biggest atrocity that 
someone might invent to destroy free entrepreneurism”54, the scope of the amendments 
was limited and the CUT continue to keep its position vis-à-vis the government.   
In December 1995, the Chamber of Deputies finally passed the labor reform 
bill55. Nevertheless, since then and until the end of the Frei administration, the second 
stage of the legislative process—i.e. the passage of the bill in Senate—took a totally 
different pace, which ended up in the reform’s failure in December 1999. After the 
Chamber, the bill passed to the Senate. However, this time the political environment 																																																								
51 “CUT pidió apurar el trámite de reformas al código laboral”, La Tercera, January 14, 1995.   
52 See the opinion piece by Manuel Bustos: “Reformas laborales”, El Mercurio, September 26, 1995 
53 “CUT anuncia que usará todas formas de presión”, El Mercurio, August 26, 1995.  
54 “Empresarios rechazan indicciones a proyecto de reformas laborales”, La Época, November 21, 1995.  
55 “CUT, tras rechazo a reforma laboral”, La Tercera, December 21, 1995.   
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was less favorable for reformist agendas. Along with the strong opposition of business 
and the right, within the Concertación itself there was no consensus regarding the need 
to implement new changes to the labor code, and some sectors worked hard to avoid 
any confrontation with business and the opposition (Campero, 2007, pp. 28-30). In this 
context, the bill got stuck in Senate for two years, until 1997. That year the government 
tried to reinstate the bill through negotiations with senator Eduardo Thayer. He was an 
independent senator linked to the right who was also president of the Senate’s Labor 
Commission. Trying to build a political accord with the right, the government made 
important concessions, and the provisions that allowed for multi-employer collective 
bargaining and prohibited the replacement of striking workers were dropped (Frank, 
2002, p. 43). The accord, which became known as the Arrate-Thayer agreement in 
reference to the role played by minister Arrate and senator Thayer, did not prevent the 
Senate from rejecting the bill. After the rejection, the bill moved to a joint (bi-chamber) 
commission where it remained until December 1999 (Campero, 2007, p. 30). 
As the country started to witness the effects of the Asian crisis, the relation 
between labor and the government got worse. In 1999, the CUT called for several 
massive demonstrations to protest unemployment and demand the withdrawal of 
PROTRAC bill (which would establish an unemployment insurance system but reduce 
severance payments). Meanwhile, within the CUT the PC became stronger (in 1998 the 
Communist worker Etiel Moraga was elected president), and the idea of a general strike 
became more and more accepted among workers—although it was never put into 
practice. Through escalating protests, the CUT leaders hoped to reactivate the debate on 
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the labor reform stuck in the Senate56. Yet against their expectations, the bill was 
eventually rejected in Senate on December 7th, 1999, after two consecutive votes that 
resulted in a 23-23 standoff (six out of nine designated senators followed the right and 
voted against it) (Cook, 2007, p. 143).  
The CPC and some small employers’ associations such as the CONUPIA 
applauded the resolution of the Senate. They defined it as “an act of legislative 
responsibility”57. In contrast, the minister of labor Germán Molina accused business of 
using “catastrophic arguments” to defend their interests and sabotage the reform. On the 
other hand, the CUT blamed the failure of the reform on the government’s lack of 
political will: “There is nothing to expect from this government”, the CUT’s vice 
president said58.  
Like at the end of the Aylwin administration, workers hoped the next 
Concertación government would pursue the reforms needed to address their main 
problems. Workers did not know, however, that the failure of Frei’s project would mean 
the last attempt by a Concertación government to undertake major changes to the labor 
code (Narbona, 2014, p. 25). In effect, they did not know that the reform carried out by 
the next Concertación president, Socialist Ricardo Lagos, would ended up in policy 
changes that in no way would meet their demands for the dismantling of the Labor Plan.   
 
																																																								
56 See “Etiel Moraga: ‘El presente requiere de nuestro compromiso, y el futuro será nuestro’”, El Siglo, 
August 13, 1999; “CUT exige suma urgencia a ref. laborales”, El Mercurio, October 30, 1999.     
57 “El gobierno intentó engañar a los trabajadores con fines electorales”, Estrategia, December 3, 1999.   
58 See “CUT recurre a OIT por situación laboral” and “Fuerte crítica de titular del trabajo a empresarios”, 
El Mercurio, December 8, 1999.    
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3.3. The Lagos administration and the third attempt to reform the Labor Plan 
(2000-2001) 
At the very beginning of his term, President Ricardo Lagos announced two 
reform initiatives: one aiming to create a system of unemployment insurance, and the 
other aiming to make changes to the existing labor laws (especially those regarding 
collective bargaining and union organizations). Unlike the unemployment insurance 
initiative, the labor reform was not an issue originally included in Lagos’ program. It 
was added to his campaign only weeks before the runoff election against the right-wing 
candidate Joaquín Lavín, as a way to get support from the left and particularly from the 
Communist Party59. To fulfill his promises, Lagos established the Consejo de Diálogo 
Social (Council for Social Dialogue, CDS), a tripartite commission made up of the 
minister of labor, Socialist Ricardo Solari, the CUT, and three entities representing 
business: the CPC, the SOFOFA (which was invited separately from the CPC), and the 
small business confederation CONAPYME60.  
Unlike business associations, which said they would support the initiative only 
as a gesture of “good will”, the CUT leaders were rather skeptical. For them, the CDS 
could easily end up in a “second version” of the unsuccessful tripartite initiatives 
undertook by past administrations (e.g. the 1990-1993 Framework Agreements and the 
Foro de Desarrollo Productivo established during Frei’s term). As a result, the CUT 
president, Communist Etiel Moraga, insisted that the CUT would be willing to 																																																								
59 “Anunció Pte. Lagos: Reformas con empresarios y trabajadores”, El Mercurio, March 13, 2000.   
60 “Consejo de diálogo social: mesa tripartita intenta mejorar mercado laboral”, El Mercurio, March 22, 
2000. As I will show in Chapter 8, in the early 2000s the relationship between the CPC and SOFOFA was 
strained. Often times, the SOFOFA tried to contest the leadership of the CPC by privileging direct contact 
with the government during, for example, the CDS and the initiatives for economic recovery organized to 
confront the effects of the Asian crisis.  
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participate as long as the CDS ensured labor’s effective influence over the decision-
making process. At that time, Moraga stated that the main demands of labor were the 
establishment of a system of unemployment insurance that replaced the PROTRAC 
proposed during Frei’s government, and the enforcement of the ILO conventions No 87 
(Freedom of Association and Protection to the Right to Organize) and 98 (Right to 
Organize and Collective Bargaining), which had been ratified by Senate in January 
199961.  
Although the CUT and the employer associations seemed to agree on the need to 
modify “some aspects” of the labor law, tensions arose only weeks after the first CDS 
meeting, when the executive introduced the unemployment insurance bill into the 
Chamber of Deputies without the approval of the CUT. The CUT leaders complained 
that the government’s project included none of their proposals. They also asserted that 
the government’s behavior was the “proof” that the CDS was “useless”, and that 
employers and some sectors of the government—in particular those close to the 
ministry of finance—were covertly influencing the executive’s decisions. In his 2000 
May Day speech, Etiel Moraga repelled the government’s attitude and announced that 
the CUT would withdraw from the CDS. Labor leaders changed their minds and 
returned to the CDS only after they met with President Lagos and he committed himself 
to introducing some amendments to the bill62.  
																																																								
61 See “Etiel Moraga y el consejo de diálogo social: ‘Queremos soluciones, plazos y metas’” and “Partió 
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62 See “Seguro de desempleo: El ‘regalito’ de Lagos a los trabajadores” and “Y la CUT dijo la firme” El 
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The unemployment insurance affair was the preface to what would happen later, 
in early June 2000, when President Lagos presented the first draft of the labor reform 
proposal63. The draft included general “goals” that would be the central components of 
the bill introduced into the Chamber of Deputies in late September. These goals were: 
promotion of autonomous industrial relations and actors; development of employer-
workers flexibility agreements at the firm level (flexibilidad pactada or “agreed 
flexibility”); establishment of stronger protections for unions and for the right to strike 
in order to “level the playing field” between workers and employers; formulation of 
new regulations reinforcing the sanctions to unfair labor practices; encouragement of a 
variety of firm-level agreements; promotion of employment and regulation of new 
“atypical” types of contracts (part-time, work from home contracts, etc.); and finally, in 
broader terms, incorporation of constitutional rights into firm-level relations (Frías, 
2002, pp. 23-26). 
Although minister Solari argued that the labor reform would lead the transition 
to democracy “to its end”64, the 2000 reform differed from the previous ones in that 
Concertación officers assumed that the institutional framework that regulated industrial 
relations was already set. As a result, “gradualist” approaches predominated in this 
reform period. According to them, the reform initiatives should simply lead to 
modifications of specific components of the labor code, such as those related to 
unemployment, skill training, wages, and employment (Campero, 2007, p. 34; Narbona, 
2014, p. 25). Also, like his predecessors, Lagos’s government emphasized from the very 																																																								
63 “Ante empresarios y trabajadores: Gobierno presentó propuesta base para reforma laboral”, El 
Mercurio, June 2, 2000.  
64 “La otra mesa, la laboral”, El Mercurio, July 2, 2000.  
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beginning of the reform process a consensual approach to its relations with business and 
the opposition. Despite the Concertación had the majority of seats in both the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate, minister Solari insisted that the government would “do 
everything through dialogue”, and that the Concertación would support workers’ 
demands as long as they did not affect cross-coalition agreements65. These gestures had 
a positive reception among employers’ associations. This did not mean that business 
supported the reform proposal as it included ideas such as “protecting workers’ right to 
strike”, which they saw as the basis for legal changes that would put limits on their 
ability to replace striking workers66. Nevertheless, employers’ attitude towards the 
reform proposal contrasted substantially from that of labor.  
Workers soon realized that the changes proposed in the reform project were “too 
limited” in their scope (for example, there was no reference to workers’ demand for 
industry-wide collective bargaining), and that the government’s stance towards business 
would be essentially the same a that observed during Aylwin’s and Frei’s terms. This 
led workers to call for a massive demonstration, the first during the Lagos’s 
administration, in August 200067.  The labor-government confrontations escalated in 
September, when the government made public the final draft of the labor reform 
proposal. According to workers, the content of draft demonstrated that Lagos had 
“given into” the pressures of business and that, like employers, the government was 
using unemployment and the effects of the Asian crisis as “excuses” to insist on norms 
that would facilitate labor flexibility. In addition, labor leaders criticized that the draft 																																																								
65 “La otra mesa, la laboral”, El Mercurio, July 2, 2000. 
66 “Reemplazo en huelga es tema crítico en las reformas laborales”, El Mercurio, August 14, 2000.    
67 “Multitudinaria marcha de la CUT”, El Siglo, August 11, 2000.   
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bill said nothing about industry-wide collective bargaining and norms to forbid the 
hiring of replacement workers during strikes. They also complained that the project not 
revoke the article 161 that allowed employers to dismiss workers on grounds of “the 
needs of the company”68.   
Overall, the reform proposal suggested to the CUT leaders that the CDS was not 
different from the other failed tripartite initiatives endorsed by previous Concertación 
governments. What was different, though, was the CUT’s leadership stance towards the 
government: this time, no leaders (included those belonging to Concertación parties) 
said they would be willing to support a reform that did not address their demands. As 
pointed out by the CUT vice-president José Ortiz, no one was willing to sacrifice 
himself and play the role of Manuel Bustos in the early 90s69. Based on this, and under 
the new leadership of Arturo Martínez—a Socialist labor leader who ran independent 
from the Concertación slate got elected with the support of the Communists—the CUT 
openly opposed the reform and called for a new demonstration held on the first days of 
November 200070.   
 
3.3.1. The legislative process and the consolidation of business power  
Since the beginning of the reform process, the CUT officialdom had reasons to 
not be happy with the government’s approach. In addition to the calls for consensus, the 
government   decided to split the bill in two parts before introducing it into Congress. 
																																																								
68 “Buscan flexibilizar normas de la reforma laboral”, El Mercurio, September 6, 2000; “La CUT rechaza 
ofensiva empresarios-gobierno”, El Siglo, September 22, 2000.    
69 “La CUT desenmascara maniobras oficiales”, El Siglo, October 29, 2000. 
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While the first part included “soft issues” (i.e. no problematic issues related to training 
and educational services for workers), the second one included the “hard issues” related 
to the norms promoting multi-employer collective bargaining and protecting workers’ 
right to strike. Lagos stated that the government would introduce the soft issues first, as 
all the actors involved in the reform process (business, labor, the right, and the 
Concertación) would undoubtedly support them. President Lagos claimed that the 
debate on the “hard issues” would be postponed, not only because they could “affect” 
employment rates, but also because he was not sure about the support the government 
could get from the right and even from some sectors of the Concertación. “What’s the 
point with introducing a project that is not going to pass in the Congress?” said Lagos, 
while noting that cross-coalitional agreements were the only way through which the 
government would pursue the reform71. The CPC applauded the temporary exclusion of 
the “hard issues” from the reform proposal and raised Lagos’ statements arguing that 
they had “brought peace” to business. However, it rejected the norms aiming at 
reducing from 25 to 8 the threshold for forming unions in firms with less than 50 
employees, claiming that norms like these would “artificially” increase the power of 
union leaders72.  
Similar to the 1990 – 1993 reforms, the Lagos administration attempted to avoid 
confrontation with business by introducing the reform proposal directly into the Senate. 
Lagos did so by arguing that the Senate—a chamber where the Concertación’s majority 
control of the seats was narrower than in the Chamber of Deputies—was the “best 																																																								
71 “Reformas laborales: el ‘fantasma’ asusta menos”, El Mercurio, October 17, 2000. 
72 “Fuertes reparos a la ley de reformas laborales. Hacen empresarios de la CPC”, El Mercurio, 
November 28, 2000.  
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place” to reach agreements. This decision was obviously endorsed by right-wing 
senators. At the same time, minister Solari nuanced some ideas included in the original 
version of project, and by the end of 2000, he contended that collective bargaining 
should be always kept at the firm level. Drawing upon the arguments similar to those 
framed by business associations, he said that industry-wide or multi-employer collective 
bargaining was not a “reasonable alternative” because it would “hurt” small business73.  
Labor and some Concertación leaders harshly criticized the executive’s “pro-
business” orientation. This became evident in December 2000, during the Concertación 
retreat known as “Santiago I”. There some PS and DC leaders demanded the inclusion 
of the “hard issues” in the labor reform bill. The government gave into these demands 
and promised to include some pro-labor amendments by Mach 2001. Business 
associations, the right, and some sectors of the DC defined the executive’s move as 
“worrisome” and as a “very bad sign”. In contrast, the CUT leaders deemed it a 
“victory” as they saw it as the result of the pressure they had put on their allies in the 
Concertación—e.g. PS leaders with historical links to the CUT, and former DC union 
leaders such as María Rozas and Rodolfo Seguel, who were deputies in the 
parliament74. The CUT’s victory was short-lived, though. Two weeks after Santiago I, 
the Presidency General Secretariat Alvaro García insisted that the government would 
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submit amendments in March 2001, although it would not change its “consensual” and 
“cross-coalitional” approach to the labor reform75.  
In March 2001, the executive incorporated the “hard issues” into the project by 
submitting dozens of amendments on collective bargaining, union organizations, and 
right to strike. As expected from the government’s non-confrontational approach, the 
amendments were less ambitious than the CUT demanded. For instance, the 
amendments reinforced multi-employer collective bargaining as voluntary for 
employers. Similarly, instead of prohibiting the replacement of striking workers, they 
only sought to make it “more expensive” through the inclusion of a clauses that obliged 
the employer to pay a fine of 4 UTM (around $160) per worker replaced. The 
amendments also included clauses that would allow workers to appeal the dismissal in 
cases of unfair labor practices and that would reinforce the supervisory attributions of 
the Labor Directorate. In spite of the fact that labor leaders immediately criticized the 
limited scope of the March 2001 amendments, the CPC President Ricardo Ariztía 
rejected their “pro-labor orientation”, saying that they showed that the Concertación did 
not “believe in the economic model”76.   
After a long debate, the Senate’s Labor Commission approved a new version of 
the bill with the votes of the Concertación and RN Senators. The Concertación-RN 
agreement moderated even more the few pro-labor norms. Thus, for example, the 
articles that granted the Labor Directorate the power to reintegrate workers in cases of 
																																																								
75 “Negociación colectiva: Gobierno limita alcances de reforma laboral”, El Mercurio, December 24, 
2000.   
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union-related dismissals was dropped from project. So were the norms that forbade 
grupos negociadores to bargain in firms where there was already a union. This last 
version of the bill did include some pro-labor measures—e.g. the protections for 
workers during collective bargaining (fueros) were extended to 30 days after the end of 
the bargaining process, covering all workers (leaders and rank-and-file) involved in it77. 
Yet the limited scope of most of its regulations led some Concertación leaders to claim 
that the reform was the result of an “alliance” put together by the right and the “liberal” 
(i.e. neoliberal) sectors of the Concertación. The tensions also got to the DC. In its April 
National Council, the former labor leaders and now deputies in the parliament María 
Rozas and Rodolfo Seguel pushed, without success, the DC officialdom to withdraw the 
party’s support for the reform project78.  
Labor’s critiques to the new draft bill were even harder. CUT’s vice president, 
Communist José Ortiz, defined it as a “treason” endorsed by neoliberal DC Senators 
such as Edgardo Boeninger and the former minister of finance Alejandro Foxley79.  In 
contrast to the early 1990s, this time labor leaders did not disregard any strategy to 
confront the unfavorable scenario. In his traditional May Day speech, the CUT 
President Arturo Martínez called for massive demonstrations and argued: “the time has 
come to think about a general strike”80. Despite Martínez’s announcement, the CUT 
called for no general strike during this reform period. The call only took place two years 
later, in August 13th 2003, when for the first time during a Concertación government the 																																																								
77 “Gobierno atenuó la reforma laboral”, El Mercurio, March 22, 2001.   
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CUT adopted that strategy to protest the government’s attempt to draft a labor 
flexibility bill (Frías, 2008, pp. 193-196).   
In contrast to labor’s reactions, business viewed the new version of the bill as an 
“advance”, especially because of the pro-flexibility measures it contained81. Although 
the CPC was not totally convinced with the bill—business disliked the decrees that 
protected labor leaders and workers during and after the bargaining process, it 
supported the government’s idea of enacting the new labor laws “as soon as possible”. 
Specifically, both business and the government wanted the Senate to pass the labor 
reform bill before the closure of the legislative year in September 18th, 200182.  On July 
4th, the Senate held its last session before submitting the reform proposal to the 
Chamber of Deputies, where it had to be ratified. There, senators agreed to reduce the 
weekly labor hours from 48 to 45 (which finally came into force in 2005). Also, after 
the suggestions by DC senator Edgardo Boeninger, they took out of the project some of 
the most significant (though small) pro-labor advances contained in the bill. For 
example, the norms that would allow a fired worker to get his/her job back if the labor 
tribunal declared that the dismissal was due to union-related reasons were removed 
from the bill. So were the decrees that would limit the attributions of grupos 
negociadores by defining unions as the only labor organization with the right to 
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negotiate flexibility agreements. To show its discontent with this new defeat, the CUT 
called to new a demonstration that was held in August 200183.  
However, the CUT’s demonstration was unsuccessful, as the final steps of the 
legislative process in the House were fast, such as business and government wished. In 
just a month, the government proposed minor amendments that aimed, among other 
things, to increase the staff of the Labor Directorate and improve its enforcement 
functions, as well as extend to 60 the number of days for a worker to appeal the 
dismissal if it was based on the article 161 (dismissal for “company’s needs”). The final 
draft passed by the Chamber of Deputies also legalized, as demanded by business, the 
existence of “multi-functional contracts” which allowed employers to hire workers to 
perform multiple, not necessarily complementary tasks84. In a matter of days the project 
went back to the Senate to its final passage. In the course of this process, the norms on 
agreed flexibility were removed—the government argued the debate on firm-level 
flexibility should be postponed, although “exceptional changes” to the workday were 
permitted upon approval of the Labor Directorate (Frías, 2002, pp. 46-47). This debate 
would be resumed, as Chapter 4 will show, during the 2015 – 2016 reform process.  
On September 11th, and in just a one-hour debate, the Senate passed the labor 
reform bill whose changes would be contained in the new Law No 19,759.  The labor 
reform was officially enacted on September 27th, 2001. Neither the CUT nor the CPC 
attended the government’s ceremony where Lagos publicly announced the enactment of 																																																								
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the new labor law. Despite being favored throughout most of the legislative process, 
business associations contended that many of the regulations included in the new law 
were “inconsistent” with the “modern” (pro-flexibility) orientation of others. They also 
complained that the government’s reformist agenda was unnecessary because it 
promoted an “anti-business environment” and discouraged employment. The CUT also 
had a critical stance towards the reform, although not as clear as that of the CPC. Labor 
leaders said they would not attend the ceremony because the reform did not meet their 
aspirations. However, they also noted that the reform did include some “advances” (e.g. 
reduction in the number of workers needed to form unions) that should be 
complemented by further reforms, which should solve all the “pending issues” of 
Lagos’ agenda85.   
In the enactment ceremony, President Lagos emphasized the government’s 
consensual approach and its desire to build friendly business-government relations. In 
his speech he said: “We sought accords: this legislation is based on demands and 
proposals from businessmen and workers, and amendments that make the labor market 
more flexible were included. We listened to everyone, especially to business”86. 
Notwithstanding Lagos’ emphasis on consensus, the 2001 reform process showed—like 
that of the early 1990s—not only the gap existing between labor’s and business’ power 
to influence policymaking, but also the failure of tripartite initiatives (the Framework 
Agreements first, then the Consejo de Diálogo Social). Although they were designed as 
permanent initiatives, the labor reform processes revealed that they were unsuccessful 																																																								
85 See “Reformas laborales: CPC pide poner fin al sesgo antiempresarial”, El Mercurio, September 14, 
2001; “Sentido y alcances de la reforma laboral”, El Siglo, September 14, 2001.  
86 “¿Por qué la reforma laboral?”, El Mercurio, September 30, 2001.  
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as instances of dialogue and agreement. To this respect, the case of the Consejo de 
Diálogo Social was rather illustrative: it died down in November 2000—i.e. a month 
and a half after the enactment of the labor reform—once the CPC abandoned it after the 
CUT accused business of increasing “artificially” unemployment rates to create “social 
instability”87.  
  
3.4. Conclusion  
In comparing the CUT’s demands with the actual results of the legislative 
processes carried out between 1990 and 2001, it is clear that the reforms did not meet 
most of labor demands. For example, the laws enacted during the Aylwin 
administration—e.g. Law 19,010 on contract termination of 1990, and Law 19,049 on 
collective bargaining and unions of 1991 did not repeal the clauses that allowed 
employers to dismiss workers at will or replace striking workers. Nor did they result in 
norms protecting workers’ right to bargain at supra-firm (let alone industry-wide) 
levels. Workers’ failure to influence policymaking was also clear in the government’s 
sponsored amendments during Frei’s failed reform effort, and in the final outcome of 
Lagos’ reform (Law 19,759 on union rights and new types of labor contracts). Similar 
to the Aylwin administration’s reforms, in these two cases, the government amendments 
moderated substantially the already modest pro-labor measures contained in the first 
drafts of the reform proposal. A good example of this is what happened with industry-
wide collective bargaining. Since the 1994 reform initiative, the CUT toned down its 
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demand for it, and in an attempt to fight for achievable demands, the labor 
confederation defended multi-employer collective bargaining, which was explicitly 
contained in Frei’s and Lagos’ original proposals. However, workers obtained no 
substantial gains. Thus after the 2001 reform multi-firm collective bargaining continued 
to be voluntary for employers, such as the replacement of striking workers continued to 
be legal (although it became “more expensive” after 2001).  
In this sense, this chapter showed that the CPC’s strong opposition to the CUT’s 
demands was successful. Not only did the reform outcomes represent business effective 
resistance to any attempt to change the labor code, but also the legislative process itself 
largely followed, in timing and content, what was demanded from the CPC. During 
Aylwin and Lagos’ terms, for example, the executive the government started the 
legislative processes by endorsing draft laws that did not meet most of the proposals 
made by workers in the tripartite commissions put together to ensure business-labor 
concertation. Listening to business, the executive also initiated the reform process by 
introducing the bills directly into the Senate, despite in that chamber the Concertación 
did not have majority (Aylwin’s government) or that majority was much narrower than 
in the Chamber of Deputies (Lagos’s administration). In doing so, throughout these two 
reform efforts the government followed business demands and privileged a “slow” 
debate in the legislature, which guaranteed cross-coalition consensus and implied the 
substantial modification of the original proposals. Thus, in these two reform processes, 
both Aylwin and Lagos ignored the calls from labor leaders who demanded the 
government to begin the legislative process in the Chamber of Deputies and carry out 
the reform as quickly as possible to avoid “interferences” from the right.  
		
97 
Several factors explain why the 1990-2001 reforms mostly favored business 
interests. First, as noted by several researchers (Barrett, 2001; Frank, 2002) a consensus 
approach to politics was predominant during the first post-dictatorial governments. It 
was born out of the Concertación leaders’ experiences of polarization in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, which ended up in the coup d’état. These experiences gave rise to the 
belief that political parties should be subordinated to the executive in the search for 
“broad”, “cross-coalition” agreements (Frank, 2015, p. 190). As a result, the 
Concertación was largely reluctant to undertake reforms that might endanger its relation 
with business and the right. In some cases (Aylwin’s reforms), this implied ignoring 
campaign promises in which leaders pledged to dismantle the 1979 Labor Plan; while in 
others (Lagos’s reform) it meant the formulation of policy reforms with a very limited 
scope. 
 Closely related to this, a second factor that explains the outcomes of the 1990 – 
2001 reforms was the influence of the dictatorship’s neoliberal ideological legacies, 
mainly expressed in the Concertación’s “minimalist” conceptions of industrial relations 
(Frank, 2015). Based on these, policymakers defined social concertation in very 
restrictive terms, i.e. as something that could be optimal as long as labor and capital 
were willing to maintain a minimum of dialogue and as long as the country was not 
plagued by too many industrial disputes (Frank, 2015, p. 190). This consolidated the 
role of technocrats located in key positions in the ministries of finance and labor, which 
enjoyed great decision-making power, and favored pragmatic, pro-market, and non-
ideological politics (Frank, 2002, p. 58; Fuentes, 1999). They also were central actors in 
the Concertación’s attempts to build good relations with business and the right, even at 
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the expenses of workers’ demands. Not surprisingly, labor leaders, the left, and the 
some sectors of the Concertación usually labeled these technocratic state officials as the 
“spokesmen” of business interests within the government coalition.   
The government’s attempt to build good relations with business could be seen in 
the innumerable compliments that, despite the initial mutual mistrusts existing between 
them, business leaders, the presidents, and these technocrats usually make to each other. 
This was clear even during the presidency of Lagos, whose election was initially 
resisted by business for the connotations associated to the election of the first socialist 
president after Salvador Allende. The good business-government relation was also 
visible, as Chapter 8 will show, in the active role of business associations played in the 
government’s sponsored initiatives, such as those aiming to consolidate the 
internationalization of the Chilean economy during Frei’s term or to face the 
consequences of the Asian crisis during the Lagos administration.  
This contrasted significantly with the situation of labor. Despite the party 
affiliations of most of the CUT leaders, the workers’ central confederation had a 
relation with the Concertación governments that became more and more strained, 
especially by the end of the Aylwin administration. At least between 1990 and 2001, 
this created particular labor-government relations, in which labor leaders used to leave 
the government-sponsored commissions (i.e. break their relations with the government) 
whenever the executive did not fulfill its promises, and then return to them whenever 
the government promised to make pro-labor amendments to the reform in question.      
The Concertación’s consensus and pro-business approach nuances explanations 
that overemphasize the institutional constraints faced by the Concertación governments 
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(e.g. electoral binomial electoral system and designated senators that gave the right a 
veto power that otherwise would not have had). It is true that due to the conservative 
orientation of most of the designated senators the right-wing opposition had a majority 
in the Senate during Aylwin’s term. However, that was not true during the government 
of Lagos, in which the Concertación did have the majority of seats in both chambers. 
Also both in the Aylwin and Lagos government the executive did not listen to the CUT 
and introduced the reform projects into the Senate, even though that chamber was not 
the best place to “protect” the project vis-à-vis the right. It was not surprising, then, that 
labor leaders often times blamed the failure of the reforms on the Concertación’s lack of 
political will.    
Finally, a third factor explaining the reform outcomes had to do with the 
collective action capacities of capital and the working class, their ideological and 
strategic orientations, and the way political parties represented them in the political 
system. As noted in the literature, business ended the dictatorship in a privileged 
position: the CPC was not only stronger than ever, but also organized business entered 
the democratic period with strong levels of ideological and political cohesion (Álvarez, 
2015; Arriagada, 2004; Montero, 1997; Undurraga, 2014). In contrast, organized labor 
arrived in the new democracy deeply affected by both the dictatorship’s repression 
(which implied the annihilation of the most militant unions and leftist parties) and its 
socioeconomic restructuring observed in the deindustrialization of the economy and the 
normative changes derived from the 1979 Labor Plan (Drake, 1996; Feres, 2009a; 
Winn, 2004).  
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The differences in the collective power of business and labor had a direct effect 
on the way both classes could influence policymaking. These differences depended 
largely on the way that either class organization succeeded in establishing coherent 
ideological and strategic orientations vis-à-vis the governments and their reformist 
agendas.  
Aware of its power, since the beginning of the democratic governments business 
was less willing to make concessions than labor, and the CPC successfully lined 
employers up under a common, strong, a coherent rejection of the reforms. In the early 
1990s, business’ orientations were expressed in the political arena through the action of 
right-wing parties (RN and UDI) and, during the Frei and Lagos reforms, through these 
parties and the “neoliberal” sectors of the Concertación. Regardless of all the 
differences existing between them, right parties and the Concertación’s neoliberals 
coincided in their defense of market economy and the labor institutions inherited from 
the 1979 Labor Plan.  
 Once again, the situation of labor was totally different both in the orientations of 
the CUT and in its strategic relation with parties. In line with the consensual approach 
of the Concertación, the CUT privileged restraint during the first democratic 
government. Thus, with the exception of the Communists, the main leaders of the CUT 
defended the Framework Agreements and made significant concessions hoping that the 
Concertación parties would someday return the favor. Labor concessions were 
especially significant during the Aylwin administration, which was the only one that 
had made campaign promises to repeal the Labor Plan. In so doing, workers missed the 
only concrete opportunity they had to fulfill their demands, and supported reforms that 
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ended up legitimizing democratically the dictatorial labor code. This was, according to 
several CUT leaders interviewed in the course of this research, the “biggest mistake” 
made by labor during the Concertación government88. At the same time, this was one of 
the main arguments used by business associations to deny the need to undertake further 
reforms89. As this chapter showed, this created harsh strategic divisions within the labor 
central confederation, which were mainly expressed in the left’s accusations to the “pro-
government” orientations of the Concertación leaders. It also brought about strained 
relations between the Concertación workers and their party allies, which seemed less 
and less interested in responding to their demands.  
According to former minister of labor Yerko Ljubetic, this was main difference 
between the links between the Concertación and the CUT, and those between right 
parties and business associations. Unlike the Concertación-CUT linkages, the relations 
between right parties and the CPC were based on cohesive and aligned ideological 
positions. Regarding this, Ljubetic pointed out: “(When I was minister) I always knew 
that after having meetings with the CPC or the SOFOFA, the right parties would go to 
Congress with exactly the same positions. I always had doubts, however, about how 
many Concertación politicians would support labor’s points of view. So I always had to 
make calculations on how many (Concertación) senators would support us, and how 
many would support the right—which frequently happened”90.      																																																								
88 In several interviews, Socialist and Christian Democrat leaders alike repeated this idea.  
89 In 1994, for instance, the CPC president José A. Guzmán decried the CUT’s demands for labor reform. 
He said that the existing labor laws had been formulated with the support of most of the actors involved 
in the Aylwin reforms, including the CUT and the Concertación. “I don’t understand how the CUT 
officials changed their mind in only four years”, he said. See “Empresarios cuestionan movilización de la 
CUT”, El Mercurio, July 2, 1994.  
90 Interview with Yerko Ljubetic, November 12, 2015. 
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This chapter showed that despite the strained party-union relations and the few 
advantages labor obtained from their allies in government, most of the Concertación 
workers did not take confrontational stances, nor used direct action strategies, during 
the reform processes. At least between 1990 and 2001, none of the Concertación-
affiliated leaders of the CUT could resolve the problem of labor autonomy. This was 
expressed in the tension between the moderation in the strategies resulting from leaders’ 
party affiliations—observed, for example, in their rejection to the Communists’ 
attempts to call for national strikes—and the actual outcome of the reforms, which 
indicated that restraint might not be the best strategy to pursue91. The CUT’s excessive 
moderation could be understandable in the first and apparently fragile democratic 
government. So was Manuel Bustos’ stubborn defense of the Concertación’s project and 
the conformism of other leaders who insisted that, despite everything, the reforms were 
“advances” next governments should improve. However, it was less understandable 
during the second and third democratic administrations, in which the government’s fee 
market and pro-business orientation was explicit, and the intra-coalition disputes 
resulting from them became more recurrent.  
Far from disappearing with the end of the reform processes, these intra-coalition 
disputes became recurrent until the end of the Concertación in 2013. They were usually 
depicted as arguments between the “neoliberal” and the “progressive” sectors of the 
Concertación or, in terms of the roles these groups played in the administration of the 																																																								
91 Perhaps the only exception to this is the case of Arturo Martínez. Since the 1990s, his membership in 
the Socialist Party was rather irregular, so he always showed himself as “more independent” than his 
Concertación-affiliated counterparts. This autonomy allowed him to make alliances with the Communists, 
even though the rest of the Concertación leaders worked hard to replicate the government coalition within 
the CUT.     
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state, as disagreements between the ministries of finance and labor92. As I will show in 
the next chapter, these intra-coalition splits, as well as the tensions within the CUT 
associated to the party affiliations of their leaders, are key for understanding the results 
of the 2016 labor reform. Along with the CPC’s organizational power, they are key for 
explaining why business succeeded in defending the Labor Plan, despite many of the 
limitations existing between 1990 and 2001 (consensual politics, designated senators, 
etc.) were not already present. 
																																																								
92 In interviews with former Concertación state officials such as Ricardo Solari (PS, former Minister of 
Labor), Yerko Ljubetic (former Subsecretary and Minister of Labor, also former member of the DC), and 
María Ester Feres (PS, former head of the Labor Directorate), the interviewees used drew upon this 
dispute to describe the ideological differences that coexisted within the Concertación. Despite the 
different point of view they had regarding the “success” of the labor reforms, they all agreed that the 
neoliberal sectors were clearly more influential than the progressive ones in the outcomes of the reforms.  
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4. The failure of the Bachelet labor reform and the persistent imbalance of power 
between workers and capitalists  
 Unlike the reform processes of the 1990s and early 2000s, the 2015 – 2016 
reform was formulated in much more favorable conditions. Many of the institutional 
constraints existing during the first two decades of democratic governments were no 
longer present. After the 2005 constitutional reform, the nine unelected, designated 
senators that used to increase the veto power of the right were eliminated. Also, the 
consolidation of the democratic regime and the death of dictator Augusto Pinochet in 
2006 made the threat of authoritarian regression less and less likely. In a similar way, 
the Concertación itself experienced important changes after losing for the first time the 
presidential race in 2009. The defeat implied not only the victory of the right-wing 
candidate, businessman Sebastián Piñera, but also an internal process of self-criticism 
among the Concertación leaders. Piñera’s victory forced them to critically assess the 
causes of the electoral defeat and the role of the Concertación throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. Eventually, it led the Concertación to abandon—or at least moderate—its 
excessive concern with consensus.   
The critical assessments were not the simple result of the election. They were 
also the response to important changes observed in Chile since the mid 2000s, and 
particularly since 2011. In that year, Chilean society witnessed several waves of protests 
that suddenly became part of the most important process of social mobilization 
observed since the arrival of democracy in 1990. The demonstrations led by the student 
movement exposed Chileans’ discontent with the institutionalization of a political 
system that since 1990 privileged “inter-elite agreements” over participatory politics, as
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well as their unrest with the high levels of inequality resulting from more than 30 years 
of market-oriented policies established during the dictatorship and largely unchanged 
during the democratic governments. Social discontent also undermined business’ 
legitimacy, which became more and more deteriorated after several corruption scandals 
involving powerful businessmen and groups became public in 2010. Since then 
Chileans started to see business as a group whose power relied more on corruption, 
political favors, and insatiable hunger for profit than on the “entrepreneurial ethos” 
usually emphasized by business associations (cf. Atria, Larraín, Benavente, Couso, & 
Joignant, 2013; Mayol, 2012)1.   
The 2011 events changed substantially the political agenda of the country. In 
analyzing critically their role since the 1990s, Concertación leaders decided to move to 
the left, and included the Communist Party and other small left parties (Izquierda 
Ciudadana and Movimiento Amplio Social) into the government coalition, which was 
now renamed Nueva Mayoría (NM). In an attempt to deal with the demands from the 
citizenry, the NM faced the 2013 presidential election by endorsing the candidature of 
the Socialist and ex-President of Chile between 2006 and 2010 Michelle Bachelet. She 
proposed an ambitious reformist agenda that included tax, educational, labor, and 
constitutional reforms.  
The incorporation of a labor reform into Bachelet’s presidential program was the 
direct result of the pressures from the Communist Party and the CUT. Months before 
the election, on July 11th 2013, the CUT called for a general strike. Rather than targeting 
																																																								
1 See also report by Héctor Soto: “Los últimos estertores del Chile fáctico”, La Tercera Reportajes, 
December 27, 2015. 
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the Piñera administration, the strike was a “message” to the just formed Nueva Mayoría. 
Through the general strike the CUT said it would support Bachelet’s candidacy only if a 
labor reform was included in her presidential program2. The same request was made by 
the Communist Party, which three weeks earlier had decided to support Bachelet. The 
NM parties accepted the requests from labor and the PC, and days before the 
presidential election the CUT openly endorsed her candidacy. The CUT president 
Bárbara Figueroa noted that Bachelet’s program was built on the basis of “participatory 
instances” that allowed CUT leaders to have a voice in central parts of it—particularly 
in the draft of the labor reform project3. Labor’s hopes increased after the results of the 
2013 election. Not only did they show the high popularity of President Bachelet (she 
obtained 62% of the votes in the runoff election), but they also gave the NM a majority 
in the both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate4.      
The new “leftist” and “pro-labor” orientation of the NM differed substantially 
from that of the Concertación, especially regarding policymakers’ openness to labor 
demands. This time, the position of the CUT and the center-left (including Bachelet, 
who was usually labeled as a “left Socialists”) vis-à-vis the conservative sectors of the 
NM—particularly the Christian Democracy—was stronger than ever. The power of the 
leftist sectors of the NM was also reinforced by a significant number of developments 
occurred within the labor movement itself, which was clearly stronger than in the 1990-																																																								
2 Interview with Arturo Martínez, September 25, 2015. See also “Exitoso paro de la CUT. Por qué 
pararon los chilenos”, El Siglo, July12, 2013.   
3 “Bárbara Figueroa: los trabajadores comprometemos nuestro protagonismo”, El Siglo, December 6, 
2013.  
4 In the Chamber of Deputies, the NM obtained 67 out of 120 seats, while the right opposition grouped in 
Chile Vamos only obtained 47 seats (the six remaining seats were held by independent representatives, 
many of who were leftists). In Senate the NM got 21 out of 38 seats, Chile Vamos got 14 seats, while 
independent competitors with a center-right orientation held the 3 remaining seats.  
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2001 period. Between 2007 and 2014 radicalized and powerful unions called on long 
strikes in important sectors of the economy such as mining and the forestry industries in 
2007, and the port industry in 2014. As I will show in detail in Chapter 7, workers’ 
militancy, organizational strength, as well as the significant gains they obtained through 
radical strategies led several analysts to talk about a “renaissance” of the labor 
movement in Chile (Aravena & Núñez, 2009). Regarding labor reform, the 2007 strikes 
were of particular importance. They took place during Bachelet’s first term, and the 
unexpectedly high levels of worker mobilization they brought about made important 
Socialist leaders such as Osvaldo Andrade (then minister of labor) note the need to 
undertake “important changes” to the labor code. In a similar way, taking advantage of 
the momentum created by the strikes, on August 29th 2007 the CUT called for a mass 
mobilization demanding to reform to the regulations on collective bargaining and strike. 
However, the political environment was not favorable for policy changes like these. 
Despite officers close to the ministry of labor endorsed the CUT’s demands (minister 
Andrade himself prepared a draft bill along with the CUT leaders), policymakers 
aligned with the minister of finance Andrés Velasco opposed them, and business 
associations turned down the simple idea of “discussing” changes to collective labor 
laws5.   
In Bachelet’s second term, the government’s stance toward the CUT’s demands 
for reform was considerably different. This time there was absolute agreement on the 
																																																								
5 “CPC golpea la mesa por caso Codelco y pide al gobierno mantener orden público”, Diario Financiero, 
July 12, 2007; “Efectos de la movilización de 29. Gobierno y CUT revisan agenda laboral”, “Hacienda y 
empresarios restan importancia al diálogo CUT-gobierno”, El Siglo, 28 September, 2007; “Los nuevos 
ejes labrorales”, Revista Capital, No 215, 19 October, 2007.    
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need to change the laws on collective bargaining, union organization, and strike. 
Likewise, the comfortable electoral victory of 2013 and the erosion of citizens’ trust in 
business suggested that there were good conditions for the success of this type of reform 
initiatives. Despite these favorable conditions, organized business was in no way more 
willing to make concessions than in the 1990s or 2000s. Nor did these conditions mean 
weaken the CPC’s ability to unify the interests of employers and influence the 
policymaking process. As this chapter will show, business power was as high as before, 
and similar to the previous reform processes, it was exercised through the action of both 
right wing parties and the conservative sectors of the ruling coalition.  
 
4.1. The beginning of the reform process   
After succeeding in passing a tax reform in 2014, President Bachelet announced 
the introduction of a comprehensive labor reform, such as pledged in her presidential 
campaign. Weeks before the official announcement—which took place in late 
December 2014—state officers arranged meetings with the CUT and the CPC where 
employers and workers were informed about the government’s reform plan.    
For the CUT, these meetings seemed propitious. State officers told workers the 
government would be willing to incorporate their demand for multi-employer collective 
bargaining and the repeal of the article 161 that allowed employers to dismiss workers 
on grounds on “the needs of the company”. Important socialist leaders such as the 
former minister of labor and now parliament deputy Osvaldo Andrade openly endorsed 
the CUT’s requests. Andrade even asserted that he was “personally committed” with the 
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success of the reform, recalling that a “profound transformation” of the labor code was 
something he failed to undertake in 2007 as minister of labor6.  
Unlike the CUT, the attitude of organized business toward the reform process 
was hostile since the very beginning. Since the first informal meetings with the 
government, business leaders complained that their participation in the drafting of the 
bill was largely irrelevant, and that most of their demands were simply ignored7.  
Employers’ hostility was reinforced when the government announced that the bill 
would not address their demand for labor flexibility and the reduction (or end) of 
severance pay. In compensation, the government said the project would incorporate 
another long-desired wish of business: the extension of the subject matter of collective 
bargaining through the inclusion of firm-level workday and work schedule agreements 
(called in the reform project as “adaptability pacts”). Despite this gesture, business 
associations rejected the “syndicalist orientation” of the government proposal, arguing 
that a true labor reform should focus on “employment” and “workers” instead of 
“unions”8.  
 In this context on December 29th 2014, Bachelet officially announced the 
submission of the reform proposal. The presidential message contained in the proposal 
argued that the goal of the reform was to develop “modern, fair, and balanced labor 
relations, where dialogue and agreement predominate, and where the goals of equity, 																																																								
6 “Esto es un triunfo del Ministerio del Trabajo… no todos estaban convencidos de que era bueno 
presentar la reforma este año”, El Mercurio, December 27, 2014. See also “Gobierno se abre a estudiar 
temas  propuestos por la CUT en reforma laboral”, El Mercurio, December 19, 2004.  
7 Interview with Pablo Bobic, CPC legal advisor, May 8, 2015.  
8 “Nueva Mayoría califica de histéricas críticas de los empresarios por agenda laboral”, El Mercurio, 
December 24, 2014. See also: “Empresarios: agenda laboral no es proempleo y se enfoca en sindicatos, 
no trabajadores”, El Mercurio, December 26, 2014 and “Gobierno no incorporaría demandas centrales del 
empresariado”, El Mercurio, December 25, 2014.  
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efficiency, and productivity work together”. To do so, the project focused on the 
“extension” and “improvement” of collective bargaining, meaning that the right to 
bargaining should be exercised by more workers, under mechanisms that “facilitate 
agreements with employers”9. In more specific terms, the government proposal aimed 
to make changes regarding ten general “headlines”, which became the “guiding 
principles” of the reform10. The ten guiding principles stated in the presidential message 
were: 
1. Extension of collective bargaining to some fixed-term workers unions excluded 
from the right to bargain and, under some circumstances, inter-company unions 
(sindicatos interempresas);  
2. Recognition of the union’s “ownership” of both the right to bargain (titularidad 
sindical) and the ability to extend collective bargaining benefits to workers not 
affiliated to the union (extensión de beneficios);  
3. Improvement of the union’s access to the company’s financial information 
during collective bargaining;  
4. Simplification of the collective bargaining process;  
5. Balance in the worker-employer relation during strikes, in accordance to the ILO 
conventions No 87 and 98 (which meant, among other things, the prohibition for 
employers to hire replacement workers during strikes);  
																																																								
9 “Mensaje No 1055-362. Mensaje de S.E. la Presidenta de la República con el que se inicia el proyecto 
de ley que moderniza el sistema de relaciones laborales, introduciendo modificaciones al código del 
trabajo”, Cámara de Diputados de Chile, December 29, 2014. 
https://www.camara.cl/pley/pley_detalle.aspx?prmID=10248. Accessed on July 1st 2016.   
10 The ten headlines were accompanied by two other procedural, formal proposals related to the new 
law’s entry into force and some changes to the Books I and II of the Labor Code.   
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6. Protections for the “floor” of the collective bargaining process, i.e. negotiation 
with a “floor” (piso mínimo) that includes at least the stipulations and benefits 
set in the last collective agreement; 
7. Extension of the subject matter of collective bargaining through in the inclusion 
of “adaptability pacts” (workday and work schedule firm-level agreements); 
8. Regulations aiming at protecting union leaders’ performance of their duties 
(fueros sindicales); 
9. Modifications to the system of state arbitration and mediation; and  
10. Promotion of women’s involvement in union activities.  
To define these guiding principles, the government drew largely upon an accord 
signed by CPC and the CUT in January 2012. The accord, known as “Declaración de 
voluntades CPC-CUT”, made a call to look for “understandings” that might lead to 
“improvements” in the collective bargaining system. Among these improvements, the 
document emphasized the need to simplify the bargaining process and to modify 
employers’ ability to manage the extension of collective agreements. The 2012 CPC-
CUT declaration also noted that in some exceptional cases—e.g. when the union 
represents at least 65% of the firm’s workers—firm-level flexibility agreements could 
be included into the subject matter of bargaining. Regarding unions, the accord 
explicitly recognized one of the principle points of Bachelet’s reform: the titularidad 
sindical or the union’s “ownership” of the right to bargain. In effect, the declaration 
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defined the union as “the main actor in collective bargaining” so, it concluded, any 
element that might weaken the union’s role should be “prevented”11.  
The 2012 Declaración de Voluntades was ratified two years later, in January 
2014, after the CPC and the CUT drafted a document that would work as an “input” to 
the labor agenda of Michelle Bachelet. This new document defended, once again, the 
titularidad sindical. This was undoubtedly an important stimulus for the government’s 
reformist agenda as the CPC explicitly recognized the union’s “ownership” of the right 
to bargain and, consequently, accepted CUT’s demand for the ban of “negotiating 
groups” (grupos negociadores), which according to the labor leaders were the main tool 
through which the Chilean legislation undermined the union’s right to “own” the 
bargaining process. The government also used the CPC-CUT accord to show the “social 
dialogue” approach of its reform project and to note that the bulk of the reform initiative 
was based on agreements already made by the two organizations12.  
 
4.2. The first stage: the passage of the bill in the Chamber of Deputies  
In contrast to the 1990 – 2001 reforms, this time the executive did take 
advantage of its comfortable majority and started the legislative process of the reform 
by introducing the bill into the Chamber of Deputies. The executive sought to 
“strengthen” the bill in the lower chamber before it passed the senate. In addition, 
different from the previous reform processes, this time the CUT did participate in the 
																																																								
11 “Declaración de voluntades CPC-CUT”, January 31, 2012.   
12 See, for example: “La Ministra del Trabajo, Javiera Blanco, asegura que el proyecto de reforma laboral 
es transversal”, El Mercurio, January 4, 2015.  
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drafting of the bill, so the contents of the government’s proposal did not “surprise” 
labor leaders. In line with the declarations by the minister of labor Javiera Blanco, who 
argued that the Bachelet reform would change regulations that had not been modified 
since 1979, the CUT president Bárbara Figueroa contended that the labor reform was 
“the most important” of at least the last 25 years. In stating this, Figueroa asserted that 
the CUT would help the government not to repeat the failures of the 2014 tax reform, 
whose final outcome was largely the result of a political accord between the right and 
some Christian Democrat senators. Organized labor would be, for Figueroa, the main  
“safeguard” of the advances contained in the proposal13. Among the most significant 
advances of the reform, Figueroa mentioned the extension of the right collective 
bargaining to some categories of workers unable to do so (e.g. workers with fixed term 
contract), the union’s “ownership” of collective bargaining (titularidad sindical) and the 
consequent weakening of negotiating groups, and the legal recognition of workers’ 
“effective” right to strike derived from clauses that would ban the replacement of 
workers on strike14.   
However, both Figueroa and the rest of the CUT officialdom were aware that the 
proposal did include several “negative aspects” that counterbalanced the advances. 
These negative aspects—defined by some non-CUT sectors of labor as “setbacks”—
were related to: limitations to fixed-term workers’ right to bargain (according to the 
project they could bargaining, although without right to strike nor legal protections for 																																																								
13 See “La Ministra del Trabajo, Javiera Blanco, asegura que el proyecto de reforma laboral es 
transversal”, El Mercurio, January 4, 2015; “Bárbara Figueroa, presidenta de la CUT. ‘Ésta es la reforma 
laboral más importante de los últimos 25 años’”, El Siglo, January 9, 2015.   
14 “Reforma Laboral”, Presentation of the CUT National Directive Council at the Chamber of Deputies’ 
Commission of Labor. Available at: http://www.prosindical.cl/reforma-laboral-ii-la-veintena-de-puntos-
que-peleara-la-cut/. Accessed on March 23rd, 2016.  
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their leaders [fueros sindicales]); the exclusion of labor federations and confederations 
from the right to collective bargaining; the possibility of according “adaptability pacts” 
during the bargaining process regardless of the representativeness of the firm’s union; 
and the existence of articles in the bill that would require the union to provide 
“minimum services” to guarantee the company’s “indispensable operations” during 
strikes15. These two last points—adaptability pacts and minimum services—were the 
most problematic for the CUT. Labor leaders saw adaptability pacts as a concession to 
employers and, more importantly, as a source labor flexibility that they would 
eventually impose during collective bargaining. They argued that adaptability pacts 
would only “make sense” when a powerful union exists, i.e. when it represents at least 
70% of the workers of the firm, so they demanded this norm to be excluded from the 
project. The practical results of norms on adaptability pacts, they said, were “at odds 
with the spirit of the Nueva Mayoría’s program”. As for minimum services, the CUT 
requested to “shorten” them as much as possible, so they could not be used as a “legal 
tool” to hire replacement workers during strikes16. 
In addition to these negative aspects, workers quickly realized that the 
government’s proposal would not include their demand for industry-wide or multi-firm 
																																																								
15 According to the first version of the bill, these “indispensable operations” referred to all operations 
aiming to prevent “irreparable damages to the company’s material goods, facilities or infrastructure, as 
well as other damages affecting either the environment or the company users’ health (for the case of 
health care centers)”. See “Reforma Laboral”, Presentation of the CUT National Directive Council at the 
Chamber of Deputies’ Commission of Labor. Available at: http://www.prosindical.cl/reforma-laboral-ii-
la-veintena-de-puntos-que-peleara-la-cut/. Accessed on March 23rd, 2016. 
16 See “Bárbara Figueroa, presidenta de la CUT. ‘Ésta es la reforma laboral más importante de los últimos 
25 años’”, El Siglo, January 9, 2015; “Reforma Laboral”, Presentation of the CUT National Directive 
Council at the House of Representative’s Commission of Labor. Available at: 
http://www.prosindical.cl/reforma-laboral-ii-la-veintena-de-puntos-que-peleara-la-cut/. Accessed on 
March 23rd, 2016. 
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collective bargaining. CUT officials such as Arturo Martínez (secretary) and Nolberto 
Díaz (vice-president), as well as union leaders unaffiliated with the CUT, noted that this 
was the biggest failure of Bachelet’s reform project17. Although during the pre-
legislative meetings of 2014, the government had claimed to be “willing to analyze” 
that demand18, a radical transformation of the collective bargaining system was not a 
central component of the original formulation. Within the CUT, this gave rise to 
different stances regarding the strategy to face the legislative process to come: while the 
Communist leaders argued for the need to secure the “positive aspects” of the reform, 
workers closer to the leadership of Martínez demanded to adopt more confrontational 
stances, stressing that the reform would be at best “partial” if it did not change the 
restrictions to supra-firm collective bargaining19.   
Regarding this particular point, Martínez’s sector agreed with other non-CUT 
groups, which argued that mass mobilization strategies were the only way to force the 
government to include industry-wide bargaining in the bill. In fact, regardless of their 
affiliation to the CUT, important unions and confederations also believed that, although 
“partial”, the reform contained improvements that should be “protected” and “deepen” 
through mass mobilization. These unions and confederations later formed coalitions 
such as the Agrupación de Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma Laboral (“Group of 
Workers for a Better Labor Reform”) and the “4x4”—a coalition of labor 																																																								
17 This was clearly seen in more than fifty interviews with CUT and non-CUT union leaders conducted 
between February and December 2015. See also Gamonal and Ugarte (2015).  
18 “Gobierno se abre a estudiar temas  propuestos por la CUT en reforma laboral”, El Mercurio, 
December 19, 2014.  
19 Interviews with CUT leaders Nolberto Díaz, José Figueroa, Horacio Fuentes, Jorje González, Arturo 
Martínez, Etiel Moraga, Laura San Martín, Pedro Muñoz, Valentín Vega, and Claudio Urrutia. The 
interviews were conducted between September and November 2015.  
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confederations representing workers from strategic sectors of the economy, which 
included the subcontracted copper workers confederation CTC and the confederation of 
port workers UPCh, two key actors in the 2007 – 2014 wave of strikes20. These groups 
pursued strategies separated from (though not necessarily against) the CUT, especially 
once they realized that the Figueroa’s leadership was “too passive” to adopt direct 
action tactics during the passing of the bill through the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate21.  
Within the business community, the agreement on the government’s project was 
clearer from the very beginning: a labor reform would have a negative impact on the 
economy because it would hurt business confidence and increase uncertainties22.  In line 
with the opinions of business leaders, a survey by newspaper El Mercurio and 
Generación Empresarial Foundation showed that 93% of the 175 big businessmen and 
CEOs interviewed asserted that the labor reform would have a “negative impact” on the 
economy, while 90% of them said that, if passed, the reform would “increase conflict 
within companies”23. The rejection to the reform also came from the right and 
conservative newspapers such as El Mercurio. Drawing upon the same arguments 
developed by the 1979 Labor Plan’s architect José Piñera (1992), in its Editorial of 																																																								
20 In addition to the CTC and the UPCh, the 4x4 also gathered together the inter-firm construction worker 
union SINTEC and, the forestry workers federation FETRAFORMA.  
21 Interviews with several non-CUT, 4x4 and Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma Laboral workers (e.g. 
Richard Aránguiz, Carmen Miranda, Claudia Muñoz, Christian Riveros, among others) conducted 
between August and December 2015.    
22 “Bachelet despachó la agenda laboral: ‘Es el momento adecuado’”, La Segunda, December 29, 2014. 
In Chapter 8, I will show that the only exception to this stance was seen in the opinions by the ABIF 
president Jorge Awad who supported the reform project. However, Awad’s endorsement was a minority 
and gave rise to the strong opposition from business leaders. Months later these leaders managed to 
remove Awad from the ABIF’s presidency accusing him of using his position to make “personal 
comments”.   
23 “EL 93% del sector empresarial afirma que la reforma laboral será negativa para la economía”, El 
Mercurio, January 10, 2015.  
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December 30th, 2014, El Mercurio criticized the government’s project arguing that it 
only represented the “strategic approaches of the Communist Party”, which aimed, 
according to the Editorial piece, “to strengthen the union’s power to increase artificially 
its affiliates’ salaries”24. Two weeks later, the same newspaper published an opinion 
piece by Juan Andrés Fontaine, which decried the reform project for making collective 
bargaining a tool “for redistribution of rent from employers to workers”. According to 
Fontaine, this was a “60s idea that the CUT’s Communist officialdom love”, but that 
“failed both in Chile and the whole wide world” (Fontaine, 2015).   
Like the CUT, the CPC initiated its participation in the legislative process by 
presenting its proposals in the Chamber of Deputies’ Commission of Labor. There, 
Andrés Santa Cruz said that five points were the main sources of concerns for business: 
1) Clauses allowing some inter-company unions to bargain; 2) Norms recognizing the 
union’s ownership of the right to collective bargaining; 3) Regulations accepting the 
union’s ownership of the collective bargaining benefits (which the CPC had endorsed in 
the 2012 Declaración of Voluntades); 4) Prohibitions to replace striking workers; and 5) 
Excessive influence of the Labor Directorate in the collective bargaining process. 
Despite these numerous critiques, the CPC applauded the norms on firm-level flexibility 
agreements, although considered them as “limited” by regulations establishing that they 
could take place only if the union to represent at least 30% the company’s employees25.  																																																								
24 “Laboral: otra reforma estructural”, El Mercurio, December 30, 2014.  
25 “CPC: reforma laboral impone una ‘sindicalización automática encubierta’”, El Mercurio, January 13, 
2015. According to the original project detailed in the “Presidential Message”, flexibility pacts could be 
extended to all workers of the company when the union represents more than 50% of them. If it 
represents between 30% and 49%, the Labor Directorate should approve the pact. In further discussions, 
the government stated that the first years after the enactment of the law, a higher percentage would be 
required (60% or 65%, as established in the 2012 CPC-CUT Acuerdo de voluntades); under the 
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The CPC asserted that the three most problematic proposals of the bill were the 
union’s “ownership” of collective bargaining (titularidad sindical), the norms that 
would allow unions to decide whether to extend the benefits of collective agreements to 
non-unionized workers, and the regulations that would ban the replacement workers on 
strikes. For businessmen, the titularidad sindical was a threat to “workers’ individual 
freedom” because the right to bargain belonged, according to business leaders, to the 
“individual worker” and not to the union. Based on this, the CPC defended the existence 
of negotiating groups, and contended that any legal modification aiming at eliminating 
them would be unconstitutional. In a similar way, business contended that the union’s 
right to decide whether to extend the bargaining benefits to non-unionized workers 
would mean “mandatory unionization” for workers and, more important, a threat to 
private property because it would “force” employers to decide what to do with their 
firms’ assets. Regarding the regulations on the replacement of striking workers, the 
CPC defended the existence “minimum services” to guarantee the continuity of the 
company’s operations, but strongly decried the idea of agreeing the supply of them with 
the union, such as established in the proposal26.   
Throughout the first months of 2015, sectoral associations affiliated to the 
CPC27, and later right parties, emphasized these arguments to criticize what the CUT 
saw as the main “advances” of the labor reform. Not surprisingly, the bulk of the debate 																																																																																																																																																																		
assumption that 30% of union representation should take place only once unions became stronger (as a 
result of the reform).   
26 “CPC: reforma laboral impone una ‘sindicalización automática encubierta’”, El Mercurio, January 13, 
2015. 
27 “CNC propone creación de un gobierno corporativo en Dirección del Trabajo y plazo de 15 días para 
que huelga se haga efectiva”, El Mercurio, March 2, 2015; “CUT insiste en impulsar la negociación pro 
rama dentro del proyecto de reforma laboral”, El Mercurio, March 3, 2015.  
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throughout most of 2015 and 2016 focused on the resolution of these three issues 
(union’s ownership of the right to bargain, union’s ownership of bargaining benefits, 
and right to strike).  
While the leftist sectors of the NM strongly rejected business stances, the 
minister of labor—Christian Democrat Javiera Blanco—took less a confrontational 
stance. She noted not only that the government’s project included the main ideas 
endorsed by the CUT and CPC in the 2012 Acuerdo de voluntades, but also that the 
executive would be open to listen to business’ and labor’s suggestions, as long as they 
did not go against the ten “guiding principles” of the reform28. In remarking the need to 
stick with the guiding principles, Blanco ruled out labor’s demand for industry-wide 
collective bargaining and business’s proposal to shorten severance pay29. Later, in early 
April, the government shut down the possibility of including an amendment to extend 
collective bargaining to supra-firm levels, even though that idea was openly supported 
left representatives within and outside the Nueva Mayoría. Drawing upon the same 
arguments pointed out by business associations, the ministers of labor and finance said 
that industry-wide or any type of supra-firm collective bargaining “would put the 
economy at serious risk”30.  
																																																								
28 See “Andrade (PS): ‘Detrás de la reforma laboral hay una pérdida de poder empresarial’, La Segunda, 
December 29, 2014; “La Ministra del Trabajo, Javiera Blanco, asegura que el proyecto de reforma laboral 
es transversal”, El Mercurio, January 4, 2015.   
29 “Javiera Blanco y la reforma laboral: ‘No hay vuelta atrás’”, La Tercera, March 15, 2015.   
30 “Gobierno cierra las puertas a negociación por rama para no afectar el crecimiento”, El Mercurio, April 
2, 2015. The ministers also contended that the executive was the only authority constitutionally 
empowered to introduce that type of amendments. A similar reasoning had already been made by the 
government, which contended that industry-wide collective bargaining could not be included in the 
project because it would require a constitutional change. Labor lawyers and experts such as Gamonal and 
Ugarte (2015) rejected the government’s argument showing that the constitution establishes that firm-
level collective bargaining is the “minimum” (not the “only”) level of collective bargaining. They did so 
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4.2.1. The April 13th amendments and the emergence of “alternative actors”  
On April 13th, 2015, the government submitted more than 800 amendments to 
the Chamber of Deputies’ Commission of Labor. The amendments included some 
modifications demanded by labor. For instance, the clauses that required the strike to be 
“peaceful” was removed, and labor federations’ and confederations’ right to bargain 
collectively was reinstated—although collective bargaining for these types of 
organizations continued to be voluntary for employers (such as in the already existing 
labor law). However, the bulk of the bill’s “setbacks” noted by workers persisted. The 
right to strike continued to be limited by the clause on “minimum services”, which was 
reinforced by another clause establishing that the employer had the right to make all the 
“necessary modifications” (in labor shifts, work schedules, etc.) to ensure, during the 
strike, the continuity of the company’s tasks. Also, the norms on adaptability pacts, 
fixed-term workers’ collective bargaining (without right to strike nor protection against 
dismissal for union leaders), and bargaining “floor” (which excluded salary adjustment 
to the inflation level) remained virtually intact (Vergara, 2015b).  
The April 13th amendments gave rise to dissimilar reactions among workers. 
While insisting that they did not express all the CUT’s demands, Figueroa noted that 
there were “advances” and called on NM representatives to deepen the pro-labor 
orientation of the reform. However, an increasingly important group of workers started 																																																																																																																																																																		
by pointing out that multi-employers collective bargaining was technically legal but “voluntary” for 
employers (that is why, according to Gamonal and Ugarte, it has barely been put into practice).   
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to undertake actions to show their discontent with what they deemed to be a reform with 
more and more “setbacks” and less and less “advances”. On April 21, the 4x4 coalition 
called to a “production stoppage” to protest the pro-business orientation of the labor 
reform and the absence of policy changes aiming to establish industry-wide collective 
bargaining31. Some 4x4 confederations were key actors of the union revival of 2007 
(CTC) and 2014 (UPCh). Through the long strikes these confederations forced 
employers to establish de facto industry-wide agreements, which in some cases persist 
until the present day. These confederations did not have an “anti-CUT” position; the 
CTC was indeed affiliated to it, and the CUT was asked to “endorse” (yet not to 
“organize”) the stoppage. Yet they certainly criticized the “excessive” passivity and 
pro-government orientation of Figueroa’s leadership32.  
Along with the 4x4, another group of unions showed up to protest the reform, 
the CIUS (Comité de Iniciativa Unidad Sindical). Unlike the 4x4, the CIUS workers 
were openly against the CUT. They saw it as the “union branch” of the government and 
as an anti-democratic confederation controlled by political parties. The CIUS workers 
also differed from the 4x4 in their stance toward the reform: they did not believe that 
mass mobilization strategies could protect its few “positive aspects” and undermine the 
setbacks. Instead, they saw the reform as a “lost cause” because of both the “pro-
business” orientation of the government and the CUT, and the weak mobilization 																																																								
31 “Quiénes son los nuevos líderes sindicales que se levantan contra la reforma laboral”, La Segunda, 
April 21, 2015;  “Movimiento sindical paralizó para exigir reforma laboral que restituya derechos y 
disminuya desigualdad”, El Siglo, April 24, 2015.  
32 Interviews and informal conversations with several SINTEC and UPCh labor leaders, conducted 
between April and July 2015.  See also, “La Reforma laboral y el difícil escenario que enfrenta el 
Gobierno”, El Mostrador, May 1, 2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2015/05/01/la-reforma-laboral-y-el-dificil-escenario-que-
enfrenta-el-gobierno/. Accessed on May 1, 2015. 
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capacity of the working class as a whole33. The division between the “anti-CUT” 
positions of the CIUS became evident in the May Day commemoration, when the CIUS 
workers put together, as in years before, a “classist commemoration” that paralleled the 
traditional one led by the CUT. There, the CIUS leaders insisted that “nothing good” 
could come from a “neoliberal government” with no real intentions of strengthening the 
labor movement34.  
In defending the CUT’s position, in her May Day speech Figueroa called on 
workers to support the government’s proposal: “We’re not discussing the same bill as 
the one we discussed in December. We have made progress”, she said in reference to 
the government’s amendment that eliminated “the criminalization of union activity” by 
removing the clause requiring the strike to be “peaceful”35. However, Figueroa’s 
defense of the reform was not entirely supported within the CUT. Labor leaders such as 
Arturo Martínez constantly complained that the changes proposed in the amendments 
would always be insufficient if they did not include industry-wide collective bargaining.   
Workers’ aspiration for industry-wide collective bargaining was definitely 
buried in early May, after representatives Gabriel Boric and Giorgio Jackson proposed 
and amendment on that matter in the Chamber of Deputies’ Labor Commission. Boric 
and Jackson were left independent deputies aligned with another sector of the labor 
movement unaffiliated with the CUT and organized in the mentioned “Group of 																																																								
33 Interview with CIUS leaders Esteban Hidalgo (September 2, 2015) and Manuel Ahumada (September 
4, 2015). 
34 “CUT presiona por una nueva Constitución y defiende reforma laboral del gobierno”, El Desconcierto, 
May 1, 2015” Retrieved from http://www.eldesconcierto.cl/pais-desconcertado/2015/05/01/cut-presiona-
por-nueva-constitucion-y-defiende-reforma-laboral-del-gobierno/. Accessed on May 1, 2015. 
35 “CUT emplaza al oficialismo a ejercer mayorías para aprobar reforma laboral”, La Tercera, May 2, 
2015. 
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Workers for a Better Labor Reform” (Agrupación de Trabajadores por una Mejor 
Reforma Laboral). This group gathered unions from different industries 
(telecommunication, agro-industry, services, etc.) that criticized the “passivity” and 
“pro-government” stance of the CUT, although unlike the CIUS did believe that the 
reform was, at least in its first stages, an “opportunity” the labor movement could not 
afford to lose36. Hence they worked with representatives such as Boric and Jackson to 
make an amendment aiming to protect workers’ right to industry-wide collective 
bargaining. Despite the amendment had the support of important Nueva Mayoría 
leaders (in particular Socialist deputy Osvaldo Andrade), it was declared 
“inadmissible”. The president of the lower chamber’s Commission of Labor, 
Communist Lautaro Carmona, argued that the Boric-Jackson proposal referred to a 
matter (collective bargaining) whose change was constitutionally defined as an 
“exclusive power” of the President. This meant that proposal could not even be included 
in the draft bill (Vergara, 2015a).   
With this decision, one of the biggest fears of business—industry-wide 
collective bargaining—was entirely removed from Bachelet’s labor reform project. In 
spite of this, both right parties and business associations believed the bill was becoming 
increasingly “harder” (more pro-labor) in the Chamber of Deputies. Not only were they 
worried about the elimination of the norms that would require strikes to be “peaceful”, 
but they also believed that the reinstatement of labor federations’ and confederations’ 
																																																								
36 Interview with union leader Carmen Miranda, October 6, 2015.  
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right to bargain was “the first step” towards industry-wide collective bargaining37. They 
did so even though the amendments would just reinstate what already existed in the 
legislation (which had been taken out of the government’s original proposal): 
bargaining between employers and a supra-firm labor union (a federation or 
confederation) would be legal, although it would continue to be voluntary for 
employers.    
Similar to labor, some sectors of business confronted what they saw as “pro-
labor” amendments by forming a coalition “alternative” to the CPC. In April 2015, 
businessmen from SOFOFA, the CNC, and CChC put together an “Anti-reform front”, 
which also included the small-employers Asociación de Emprendedores de Chile 
(ASECH). Large and small businessmen formed the front as a way to oppose as a 
“single block” the labor reform, especially once they realized that the April 13th 
amendments included none of the suggestions they had made38. Although large business 
associations such as the CNC, SOFOFA, and CChC were already participating in the 
reform process through the CPC, they privileged this alternative (and broader) coalition 
to confront the subsequent stages of the labor reform. Juan Pablo Swett (ASECH), 
Hermann Von Mühlenbrock (SOFOFA), and Ricardo Mewes (CNC) became the 
leaders of this new business group, which albeit independent from the CPC, never 
aimed to replace it or to question its leadership—at least in the way that “alternative” 
labor organizations such as the CIUS questioned the CUT. Some of the leaders of the 																																																								
37 “Gobierno se abre a introducir nuevos cambios en R. Laboral”, La Tercera, April 15, 2015; “Reforma 
laboral se endurece en la Cámara de Diputados y senadores ven lejano un acuerdo político”, El Mercurio, 
May 10, 2015.  
38 “Empresarios reclaman falta de diálogo y crean inédita instancia para corregir reforma laboral”, Diario 
Financiero, March 31, 2015; “Dirigentes gremiales adelantan impacto de la reforma laboral sobre sus 
sectores”, El Mercurio, April 14, 2015.    
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business front (e.g. Hermann Von Mühlenbrock) certainly criticized the “consensual” 
style of the CPC president Alberto Salas. However, they never cast doubts on the CPC’s 
legitimacy—let alone proposed to form a new peak association—such as the CUIS 
unions several times did with respect to the CUT. Indeed, both SOFOFA and the CNC 
and the CChC continued to be regular members of the CPC. As the actions of the 
business front would suggest throughout the rest of the reform process, and as I show in 
Chapter 8, this “alternative” group was born more from differences in leadership styles 
than from critiques to the legitimacy of the CPC.   
 
4.2.2. Government’s “pro-business” gestures, unified business opposition, and 
dissimilar reactions from workers 
Businessmen hoped that the “pro-labor bias” observed in the April 13th 
amendments would be corrected in the Senate, where the pro-business sectors were 
stronger than in the lower chamber. Although right parties did not have a majority, in 
the Senate there were Christian Democrat senators who had not only criticized the 
“excesses” of the CUT’s demands, but also played a crucial “moderator” role during the 
2014 tax reform. This “moderation” of the tax reform in the Senate made business 
leaders confident about the prospects of the labor reform39. Business’ optimism 
increased after Bachelet decided to reshuffle her cabinet: minister of labor Javiera 
Blanco was reassigned to the ministry of justice and was replaced by the Christian 
Democrat Ximena Rincón, while minister of finance Alberto Arenas was replaced by 																																																								
39 “Reforma laboral: empresarios unen fuerzas y crean comisión negociadora para pedir cambios”, Diario 
Financiero, April 16, 2015.  
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the PPD Rodrigo Valdés. Business community applauded the reshuffle and saw it as a 
sign of moderation of the government’s reformist agenda. Businessmen had long 
criticized Alberto Arenas because they thought he did not the play “moderator” role 
ministers of finances used to play during the Concertación governments. In early 2015, 
the former CPC president and prominent business leader José Antonio Guzmán had 
even argued: “If the government really want to recover business confidence, minister 
Alberto Arenas should be removed now”40. Finally, after several disagreements with 
business, Arenas became the first minister of finance removed from office in a post-
dictatorial democratic government41. Unsurprisingly, the CPC president Alberto Salas 
claimed to be “optimistic” about the cabinet reshuffle, noting that unlike Arenas, 
Rodrigo Valdes was an economist close to the private sector and who was always 
“willing to dialogue with business”42.  
In this context, the reform project overcame its first hurdle: on June 17th 2015, 
the Chamber of Deputies passed the bill with the support of all the representatives from 
the Nueva Mayoría (67 votes)43. As expected, the CPC and the anti-reform front 
strongly criticized the “dangers” contained in the draft bill, while right-wing politicians 
said that the pro-labor emphasis of the bill proved that the government “was hijacked by 																																																								
40 “José Antonio Guzmán analiza el escenario económico y gremial: ‘Si lo que busca el gobierno es 
recuperar la confianza de los empresarios, el ministro Alberto Arenas debe ser removido ahora’”, El 
Mercurio, January 18, 2015.  
41 A year a half later, in his first interview after the cabinet reshuffle Alberto Arenas reflected on the 
political implications of his dismissal saying that “My dismissal was meant to be a sign, in the sense of 
attenuating the reforms promised (during the presidential campaign). See “Arenas y su salida del 
gobierno: ‘No fue proporcional a la confianza que tenía con la presidenta’”. La Tercera Reportajes, 
September 25, 2016. 
42 “Entrevista: ‘Necesitamos hechos: que el diálogo público-privado no sea un diálogo de sordos’”, La 
Tercera Negocios, May 17, 2015.  
43 The only article rejected was the one on strikes in strategic industries, which the government would 
reintroduce during the negotiations in the Senate. See “Cámara de Diputados aprueba reforma laboral y 
discusión pasa al Senado”, La Tercera, June 18, 2015.   
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the CUT”44. In doing so, both business and the right called to build “broad” and “cross-
coalition” agreements in Senate, which were welcomed by some sectors of the Christian 
Democracy45. 
The passing of the bill in the Chamber of Deputies produced much less cohesive 
reactions among workers. Bárbara Figueroa applauded it, although in an attempt to 
anticipate possible pro-business amendments in the Senate, she contended that the CUT 
would not be willing to make further concessions. Using the 2014 tax reform and the 
consensual orientations of the Concertación’s governments as examples, Figueroa 
emphatically asserted: “Some sectors are interested in reproducing the consensus 
politics that suited them during 20 years. However, I think we’re in a totally different 
context… (Now) the labor movement is alert and vigilant… so this is not as simple as 
just saying that there’s going to be a cross-coalition agreement”46. Despite these fears, 
the CUT leadership was still confident that the bill could bring about important gains 
for labor. This was not the case of other sectors of labor, which increasingly realized 
that the setbacks of the project were much bigger than the advances. A day before the 
passing of the bill in the lower chamber, the labor confederations that had participated 
in the April work stoppages (the UPCh, the CTC, and FETRAFORMA), along with 
several other labor organizations—the Confederation of Bank Workers Unions, 
National Confederation of Subcontracted Workers of ENAP, and the National Union of 
ENTEL Workers, among others—signed a declaration where they stated that the few 																																																								
44 “Cámara de Diputados aprueba reforma laboral y discusión pasa al Senado”, La Tercera, June 18, 
2015.   
45 “Andrés Allamand (RN), Senador de la Comisión de Trabajo: ‘Estoy 100% dispuesto a buscar fórmulas 
de entendimiento’, La Tercera, June 19, 2015.  
46 “Bárbara Figueroa, Presidenta de la CUT: ‘No es tan simple decir que vamos a llegar a un acuerdo 
transversal en el Senado’”, La Tercera, June 20, 2015.  
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“advances” contained in the bill were undermined by numerous setbacks. Among the 
most important setbacks, the declaration mentioned: labor confederation’s right to 
collective bargaining continued to be voluntary for employers; the “floor” of the 
bargaining process did not imply salary adjustments to the inflation level, and the 
employer was allowed not to accept it when “the financial condition of the company 
requires it”; the replacement of striking workers was forbidden but the replacement of 
the “function” was not, so the employer would be able to make the “necessary 
modifications” in shifts and schedules to ensure the company’s activity; and finally, 
according to the bill the union should provide “minimum services” during strikes, 
which would “legalize” a union-provided system of striker replacements47. Setbacks 
like these led these unions to call to a new “national work stoppage” (“paro nacional 
productivo”) that took place in June 18th, 2015. Like in the April action, workers 
organizations received support from leftist parties such as Izquierda Libertaria and 
housing and neighborhood assemblies such as the Movimiento de Pobladores 
Ukamau48.  
 
4.3. The second stage: the passage of the bill in the Senate 
Throughout the legislative process in Senate, the CPC insisted on its opposition 
to the reform project, while arguing that a “true” labor reform agenda should promote 
women and youth employment, as well as changes to system of severance pay, which 																																																								
47 “Declaración sobre proyecto de reforma laboral aprobado en la Comisión de Trabajo de la Cámara de 
Diputados”, June 17, 2015. Available at: http://www.elmostrador.cl/media/2015/06/Declaracion-17-06-
2015.pdf 
48 “Dirigenta que participó en bloqueos reconoce influencia de piqueteros”, La Tercera, June 19, 2015.  
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was defined by Alberto Salas as the main “rigidity” of the labor market. In line with the 
CPC, both sectoral associations and small and medium-sized employers associations 
kept rejecting the norms that protected union’s “ownership” of collective bargaining 
and those that prohibited the replacement of striking workers49.  
Different from the unified stances of business associations, the legislative 
process in Senate showed the increasingly divergent positions existing within labor. The 
disagreement became overt particularly between the CUT and those unions that, despite 
their critiques, saw the labor reform as an “opportunity” that should not be lost. In its 
presentation in the Senate’s Commission of Labor, for example, the Agrupación de 
Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma Laboral contended that all the setbacks included 
in the project had turned the reform into a “pro-business” labor reform. The Agrupación 
de Trabajadores also noted that the reform was inefficient to “empower unions” and 
“make collective bargaining an instrument of wealth distribution”50.  
The stance of the CUT was totally different. Despite their internal 
disagreements—e.g. socialist and left CUT officials accused Figueroa (and the 
Communists) of holding “too conciliatory” postures—all the CUT leaders agreed on the 
need to protect the gains obtained in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, Figueroa 
																																																								
49 “Observaciones de la Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio al proyecto de ley que moderniza 
el sistema de relaciones laborales introduciendo modificaciones al código del trabajo”, Confederación de 
la Producción y del Comercio, July 6, 2015; “Reforma laboral: cómo les afectará a las pymes”, La 
Tercera Negocios, July 12, 2015; “SNA expuso su postura frente a la iniciativa de Reforma Laboral en 
comisión de Trabajo del Senado”, Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, July 14, retrieved from 
http://www.sna.cl/noticias/destacado/sna-expuso-su-postura-frente-a-la-iniciativa-de-reforma-laboral-en-
comision-de-trabajo-del-senado/. Accessed on May 25, 2016. 
50 “Exposición de Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma Laboral en la Comisión de Trabajo del Senado de 
la República de Chile”, Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma Laboral, August 3, 2015. Retrieved from: 
https://noalplanlaboral.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/exposicion-de-trabajadores-por-una-mejor-reforma-
labora-en-la-comisic3b3n-03-08-2015-1.pdf. Accessed on May 25, 2016. 
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demanded senators to correct the bill’s “weak points” by insisting, for instance, that the 
idea of “minimum services” should be delimited as much as possible, and that the 
“floor” of bargaining should be adjusted to the inflation level. In doing so, she accused 
the CPC of “disowning” the 2012 Acuerdo de voluntades, and demanded the 
withdrawal of the clauses on firm-level agreements (“adaptability pacts”) from the 
reform project51.  
In an attempt to put pressure on the senators and the government, as well as to 
confront the increasing critiques to its “passivity”, the CUT leadership called to a mass 
mobilization that took place on July 11th, 2015. Afraid of a closed-door agreement 
between the right and the some “conservative” DC senators, at the end of the 
demonstration Figueroa stated: “The reforms in this country cannot stop... if they 
(business, the right, and conservative DC senators) try to mess up the labor reform in 
Senate, the response from labor will be a national strike to tell them that the advances 
gained will not be touched”52.  
The impact of these conservative DC senators would become evident only days 
later, when several Christian Democrat leaders and experts (including the former 
minister of labor René Cortázar) questioned the most pro-labor articles of labor reform 																																																								
51 “Reforma laboral: CPC pide fin de indemnización y CUT insiste en negociación ramal”, La Tercera, 
July 7, 2015.  
52 “Discurso de Bárbara Figueroa en marcha ciudadana por reforma laboral y nueva constitución”, 
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, July 11, 2015. The call for the demonstration did not succeed in facing 
the critiques to CUT. As noted during the authors’ observations and interviews with union leaders, 
several sectors of the labor movement criticized that the call was just a call for “demonstrations”, not for 
a national strike. More importantly, these sectors questioned that the mobilization took place a Saturday 
and not a weekday, which substantially diminished its impact. According to the leaders I interviewed, the 
demonstration was largely a strategy orchestrated by the PC to show the government the need to “keep 
going” with the labor reform and not compromise with the “conservative sectors” of the Christian 
Democracy, which were calling on the executive to “back off” and implement the reform “gradually” (see 
“Nueva Mayoría pide precisar límites y gradualidad de reformas educacional y laboral”, El Mercurio, 
July 12, 2015).   
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bill. They did so by drawing upon the same critiques already articulated by business 
associations and right parties. They defended, for instance, broad definitions of 
“minimum services” and “multifunctional contracts” which would allow employers to 
face strikes through systems of internal replacement (i.e. by reorganizing freely the 
work of the firm’s non-striker workers). Like during the Concertación’s times, these 
senators started to openly support “cross-coalitional agreements” as the best to 
overcome the “uncertainties” stemming from the labor reform. Although several NM 
leaders decried these proposals, they had the key support of minister of finance Rodrigo 
Valdés, who had worked hard to detach himself from his predecessor Alberto Arenas 
and his “confrontational” relation with business53.  
 
4.3.1. Amendments in Senate, intra-coalition disputes, and the beginning of the end 
of workers’ hopes  
On September 12th 2015, the government introduced a package of amendments 
into Senate. With these amendments the government aimed to “shut down” the debate 
and avoid further delays in the passing of the bill. Most of the September 12th 
amendments were concessions to business. Not only did they reinstate the norms that 
prohibited strikes in strategic industries and allowed workers to individually quit the 
strike (descuelgue), but they also reinforced the idea of “necessary modifications” (e.g. 
																																																								
53 See “Documento DC se abre a reemplazo interno de trabajadores en caso de huelga”, El Mercurio, July 
17, 2015; “El aterrizaje de Hacienda en la reforma laboral”, La Tercera Negocios, July 26, 2015; “La 
gente que hizo el programa creó la expectativa de que con voluntad se solucionaba todo a la vez”, La 
Tercera Reportajes, August 16, 2015.  
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multifunctional contracts) for employers to readjust shifts and working hours during 
strikes (Vergara, 2015c)54.   
 In spite of these concessions, both business and the opposition parties decried 
the amendments, arguing that they did not substantially change the orientation of the 
bill passed in the lower chamber. Senator Allamand (RN) contended, for example, that 
“only winners” with the amendments were the CUT, the PS, the PC, and all those “who 
said the project passed in the Chamber (of Deputies) should not be changed in the 
Senate”55. Business’s reaction was even stronger. The business associations grouped in 
the anti-reform front (SOFOFA, ASECH, CONAPYME, among others) claimed they 
were in a “state of high alert”, whereas the six sectoral associations affiliated with the 
CPC stated that the labor reform project would only “strengthen union monopoly” and 
“amplify conflict”56.  
In the following weeks, the anti-reform front worked hard to reinforce its 
communicational campaign—which had already included YouTube videos and a 
webpage devoted exclusively to spreading propaganda against the labor reform. This 
time, the anti-reform front’s associations paid for a two-page advertisement on the 
edition of Sunday, October 18, 2015, of La Tercera. The advertisement showed well-
known businessmen, economists, and political leaders—including some former 
Concertación officers—who demanded the government and the minister of finance to 																																																								
54 As a concession to the CUT, adaptability pacts were reduced to 72 hours per quarter, and subjected to 
“compensation mechanisms” (vacation days, leaves, etc.). See “Gobierno acelera envío de cambios a 
reforma laboral y enfrenta primeras críticas”, La Tercera, September 13, 2015.   
55 “Andrés Allamand, Senador RN y miembro de la Comisión de Trabajo: ‘Esta es una derrota para el 
nuevo gabinete’”, La Tercera, September 13, 2015.   
56 “Empresariado en picada contra la reforma laboral: ‘Consagra monopolio sindical, extrema 
conflictividad y no ayuda a crear confianzas’, La Segunda, September 16, 2015.  
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“correct” the norms that would forbid the replacement of striking workers. Business’ 
preoccupation with these norms was evident in the content of advertisement: although 
the advertisement’s title argued for the existence of a “technical consensus” regarding 
the need to “correct the Labor Reform”, all the experts’ quotes included in it referred 
solely to the clause on strike replacements57.  
 Within the government coalition, the amendments were also a source of tension. 
Disavowing the party’s agreement, the conservative DC senators rejected the “pro-
labor” orientation of the amendments. The intra-coalition conflict escalated after the 
same DC senators, in alliance with right wing and one PPD senator, announced the 
creation of the Bancada pro-PYME (Pro-small and medium-sized business legislators 
group). Immediately after its creation the Bancada’s proposed, with the sponsor of the 
minister of finance, to increase the threshold for forming unions from 8 to 25 workers in 
companies with 50 or less employees. Although this issue was not at the center of the 
debate, the Bancada pro-PYME’s proposal succeeded in taking an issue demanded 
several times by the small business associations CONAPYME and ASECH58.  
The CUT, the Communist Party, and even the minister of labor Ximena Rincón 
strongly criticized the pro-PYME proposition. Rincón first argued that the Pro-PYME 
proposition went against the “heart” of the reform59. However, as a good expression of 
the NM’s inconsistencies during the second half of the reform process, weeks later she 																																																								
57 “Crece consenso técnico que pide corregir la Reforma Laboral”, La Tercera, October 18, 2015.  
58 See “Senadores DC toman distancia de acuerdo por reforma laboral”, La Tercera, September 15, 2015; 
“Gobierno y senadores acuerdan subir quórum para formar sindicatos en pequeñas empresas”, La 
Tercera, September 16, 2015.  
59 See, for example, “Indicaciones pro-pymes dividen a Hacienda y Trabajo”, La Tercera, September 17, 
2015; “Partido Comunista expresa preocupación por indicaciones a Reforma Laboral”, Diario RED 
Digital, September 25, 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.reddigital.cl/. Accessed on September 25, 2015.      
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changed substantially the tone of her statements, saying that the government would 
endorse “any proposal” (including those of the Bancada pro-PYME) as long as it helped 
to reach “cross-coalition agreements”. She also emphasized that the government was 
“autonomous” in its orientations, noting that it was a “good sign” that neither the CUT 
nor business declared their “total support” to the labor reform project60.  
 The September 12th amendments also gave rise to important tensions among 
workers, as they consolidated the separation between the CUT and groups such as the 
Agrupación de trabajadores por una mejor reforma laboral. The CUT leaders argued 
that they were not entirely “satisfied” with the government’s modifications, although 
they recognized that the amendments “could have been more disastrous”61. The reaction 
from the workers grouped in Agrupación de Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma 
Laboral was way more confrontational. They argued that the September 12th 
amendments only reinforced the setbacks already contained in the bill, and that the pro-
PYME proposals would make them even worse. In a letter sent to Ximena Rincón, the 
Agrupación de Trabajadores stated: “We have come to the conclusion that this project 
will not contribute to achieve any of the goals it set, so it must be turned down. It makes 
no sense to try to keep distinguishing between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ of it. Even a 
center-right government didn’t dare to promote norms as anti-union as the ones 
contained in this project. If passed…(the draft bill) will rightly know as “the Bachelet 
																																																								
60 “En algunos empresarios, no en todos, hay casi una obsesión por derribar la reforma laboral”, La 
Tercera Negocios, October 4, 2015.  
61 “CUT: indicaciones ‘pudieron ser más desastrosas’”, La Tercera, September 15, 2015.  
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Labor Plan” (in reference to the 1979 Labor Plan, commonly known as the “Piñera 
Plan”)62.   
In a context marked by political disagreement and the inevitable delay of the 
labor reform’s legislative process, the government and the pro-PYME senators 
proposed new amendments on December 9th, 2015. The government’s amendments 
aimed to facilitate employers’ use of “minimum services” during strikes. According to 
some analysts, they undermined all the advances regarding workers’ right to strike that 
existed in previous versions of the bill. Doniez and Kremerman (2015) suggested, for 
example, that the amendments allow employers to hire replacement workers even 
before the strike takes place (e.g. during the bargaining process). Also they would 
enable them to hire the services of an external subcontracting company if the strike was 
called by subcontracting workers. Setbacks like these led Doniez and Kremerman to 
conclude that “business and the right” were the “winners” of the labor debate. 
On the other hand, the Pro-PYME senators’ amendments aimed to reinstate the 
norms that allowed workers to individually cross the picket line after joining the strike 
(descuelgue) and to repeal the articles that defined the hiring of workers during the 
collective bargaining process as anti-union practice. These senators’ amendments also 
sought to increase the requirements to form unions in small and medium-sized 
companies (in addition to 8 workers, the they established that the union would have to 
represent at lest 50% of the firm’s employees) (Vergara, 2015d).  
																																																								
62 “Carta a Ximena Rincón”, Agrupación de Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma Laboral, September 
28, 2015.  
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The leaders of the CUT saw the pro-PYME senators’ proposals as the vivid 
expression of the executive’s incapacity to order the NM parties. In light of this, 
Bárbara Figueroa called on President Bachelet to “take a clear, powerful, and strong 
leadership role”63. The government faced the critiques by denying that the reform 
project had “turned to the right” and by insisting in its “neutrality”. “The labor reform”, 
said minister of labor, “is neither for the PC nor for the DC, but for the country”64. This 
emphasis on the “neutrality” of the reform proposal was nonetheless useless to prevent 
the critiques from the right and even the conservative sectors of the Christian 
Democracy.  
RN senator Andrés Allamand said, for example, that the clauses that protected 
the union’s “ownership” of collective bargaining were “the CUT’s and the PC’s dream” 
because they would lead to a “hidden and forced unionization”65. In line with the claims 
made by business associations at the beginning of the reform process, he argued that 
these regulations were unconstitutional because they were a threat to workers’ 
individual freedom and their right to bargain with or without a union (e.g. through 
negotiating groups). Allamand said that the opposition parties would appeal to the 
Constitutional Tribunal if these regulations passed. The conservative DC senators made 
similar types of critiques, and demanded “corrections” to the norms protecting the 
																																																								
63 “Bárbara Figueroa, Presidenta de la CUT: ‘La Presidenta debe asumir un rol claro, potente y firme en la 
discusión de la reforma laboral’”, La Tercera, December 12, 2015.   
64 “Éste no es un proyecto para el PC ni la DC, sino que para el país”, La Tercera, December 13, 2015.   
65 “Andrés Allamand (RN) y extensión de beneficios: ‘Es una materia constitucional por la que 
recurriremos al Tribunal Constitucional’”, El Mercurio, December 13, 2015.   
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union’s ownership of collective bargaining. As in previous instances, this gave rise to 
mutual accusations between the NM parties (this time, between the DC and the PC)66. 
In this context of internal divisions, the CUT decided to take a more “active” 
stance. During its IX National Congress of January 2016, the CUT leadership called—
for the first time during a reform process—to a general strike to protest the “capture” of 
the labor reform by conservative senators who, according to Bárbara Figueroa, “still 
work under the logic of the Concertación”67. The general strike would finally take place 
on March 23rd 2016. The CUT’s call was ineffective to change the conservative DC 
senators’ stance, which became more and more aligned with the right. For the 
government, the support of these senators was key to pass bill. Therefore, in an attempt 
to avoid a new delay in the legislative process, the executive quickly gave into the DC 
senator’s pressure and reinstated the norms permitting employers to ensure the firm’s 
operations during strikes by making the “necessary modifications” in the non-strikers’ 
work schedule and shifts68. The CUT, the PC, and the PS strongly rejected the 
government’s move and the “pro-business” stances of the DC senators69. Despite the 
government’s concessions, the CPC defined the amendments as “insufficient” as they 
did not repeal the right of inter-company unions to bargaining. Similarly, the ASECH 																																																								
66 See, for example, “Laboral: gobierno no convence a la DC y reforma sigue sin acuerdo”, La Tercera, 
January 20, 2016; “Escala pugna DC - PC y oficialismo advierte que pone en riesgo el futuro de la Nueva 
Mayoría”, La Tercera, January 26, 2016.  
67 “CUT hace llamado a paro nacional en marzo por reforma laboral”, La Tercera, January 23, 2016.  
68 “Reforma laboral: Bachelet cede ante senadores DC y acepta reemplazo interno en huelga”, El 
Mostrador, March 2, 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2016/03/02/reforma-
laboral-bachelet-cede-ante-senadores-dc-y-acepta-reemplazo-interno-en-huelga/ Accessed on March 2, 
2016.   
69 “PS y PC adelantan rechazo a indicaciones del ejecutivo por reforma laboral”, La Tercera, March 4, 
2016. Experts also criticized the reinstated amendments. Not only did they say that the new norms were 
“confusing”, but that they would bring about high levels of “judicialization”, as the concrete definition of 
what “necessary modifications” imply would be open to interpretation. See “Expertos: adecuaciones 
necesarias’ serían un foco de conflicto en tribunales”, La Tercera, March 4, 2016.  
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President Juan Pablo Swett said that the norms allowing workers to form unions with 8 
employees—which already existed in the legislation—would mean establishing “a 
union dictatorship within small and medium-sized businesses”70.  
In accordance with the government’s schedule, in early March the senate’s 
Commission of Labor approved the final draft of the bill. The draft included all the 
government-sponsored rectifications plus some minor amendments on multi-company 
unions made by the executive upon request of the PS71. Two days later, on March 10th 
2016, the Senate finally passed the main amendments of the labor reform bill72. Such as 
throughout the whole legislative process, business associations criticized the passage of 
the bill. While the SOFOFA president Hermann Von Mühlenbrock said that the bill 
“ended worse than it started”, the CPC leader Alberto Salas regretted that he was not 
able “to convince policy-makers” about the wrong orientations that gave rise to the 
reform initiative73.   
																																																								
70 “Gremios y economistas rechazan negociación intermpresas y pronostican impacto en empleo”, El 
Mercurio, March 4, 2016.   
71 “Gobierno cede ante presión PS y ratifica obligatoriedad de negociación interempresa”, El Mercurio, 
March 9, 2016. According to these amendments, collective bargaining by multi-company unions would 
become mandatory in medium-sized and big business (companies with more than 50 employees), 
whereas in small business it would be mandatory only if the multi-company union represents persons 
working in the same type of firms (cf. Vergara, 2015b).   
72 This time two issues gave rise to new disputes. First, right wing and the pro-PYME DC senators vetoed 
the norms on collective bargaining by multi-company unions. Second, the norms on “necessary 
modifications” were approved even though a serious disagreement took place between the ministers of 
labor and finance regarding the interpretation of these norms. Unlike the minister of labor and the NM’s 
left parties, the minister of finance, the pro-PYME DC senators, and the opposition parties defended a 
“looser” interpretation of the articles, according to which the “necessary modifications” did allow the 
employer to replace striking workers with non-striker workers of the firm, no matter the functions 
“agreed” (i.e. contractually stipulated) between these latter and the employer. See “Negociación 
interempresas: norma clave para el Ejecutivo y la CUT se rechaza con votos DC”, El Mercurio, March 
11, 2016.  
73 See “Sofofa y reforma laboral: Proyecto ha terminado peor que el original”, La Tercera, March 14, 
2016; “Alberto Salas: ‘Lamento no haber podido convencer a los que toman las decisiones’”, La Tercera 
Negocios, March 20, 2016.  
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After passing the Senate, the reform bill was ratified by the Chamber of 
Deputies (its chamber of origin). Contrary to their position in previous stages of the 
reform process, several socialist representatives now supported the decrees on 
employers’ ability to make “necessary modifications” during strikes. Some of them did 
so because they gave into the government’s pressures, whereas others said they wanted 
to avoid the “defeat” of President Bachelet’s reformist agenda74. Despite the 
government’s concessions, the lower chamber did not reach an agreement regarding the 
articles on collective bargaining and strike activity. Following a pre-accord between the 
government and the NM parties, these articles were introduced into a Joint Commission 
(Comisión Mixta) that would ensure the passage of the norms75.  
The same day of the Chamber of Deputies’ ratification, the general strike called 
by the CUT took place. Although the CUT officialdom defined the strike as 
“successful”, several non-CUT labor leaders considered it as a “useless performance”. 
In interviews and personal conversations with some of these union leaders, they 
contended that the bulk of the reform project was “done” with the passage of bill in the 
Senate, and that there was “nothing to fight for”. They strongly criticized the bad timing 
of the call to strike, noting that unlike the efforts they made (e.g. the national stoppages 
of April and June 2015) the CUT leadership was never really willing to call for a 
general strike, even during the moments where there were more real chances of 
influencing policymaking—e.g. when the bill was in the lower chamber. In a public 																																																								
74 “Reforma Laboral, el nuevo triunfo de la "cocina" del Senado”, El Mostrador, March 23, 2016. 
Retrieved from: http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2016/03/23/reforma-laboral-el-nuevo-triunfo-de-
la-cocina-del-senado/ Accessed on March 23, 2016.  
75 “Oposición prepara recurso al TC por cuatro materias de la Reforma Laboral”, La Tercera, April 5, 
2016. 
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declaration, these sectors of the labor movement and some extra-NM left parties 
depicted the bill passed by Senate and ratified by the Chamber of Deputies as the 
outcome of a parliament “hijacked by business and… by an antidemocratic, binomial 
electoral system”. In another open letter, labor lawyers, experts, and former 
Concertación’s state officers affirmed that Bachelet’s labor reform was “a setback in the 
rights of labor unions, and a deepening of the system of industrial relations designed 
during the dictatorship by José Piñera”76.   
After the joint commission approved the pending articles on collective 
bargaining and strike activity, and after a legislative process that lasted 465 days, in 
early April 2016 the Senate finally passed the last draft of the labor reform bill. During 
the session, socialist senator Juan Pablo Letelier explained the “advances” of the reform 
by reading a banner hung in the hall galley, which said: “(The labor reform) It’s a horse 
without tail. It’s not beautiful, but it works for riding”77.  
 
4.4. The epilogue: Injunction in the Constitutional Tribunal and final defeat of 
labor’s aspirations 
In contrast to the government’s desires, the Senate’s passing of the final draft 
bill did not mean the end of the labor debate. The same day all the opposition parties—
Amplitud and the parties grouped in Chile Vamos (RN, UDI, PRI, and Evópoli)—filed 																																																								
76 See “Declaración Pública en rechazo a la reforma laboral”, Revista Bagual, March 24, 2014. Retrieved 
from: http://www.revistabagual.cl/2016/03/declaracion-publica-en-rechazo-la.html. Accessed on March 
24, 2016; “Carta abierta de académicos sobre Reforma Laboral”, El Desconcierto, March 26, 2014. 
Retrieved from: http://www.eldesconcierto.cl/debates-y-combates/2016/03/26/carta-abierta-de-
academicos-la-reforma-laboral-es-un-retroceso-en-los-derechos-del-mundo-sindical/. Accessed on March 
26, 2016.  
77 “Diez claves para entender cómo se aplicará la reforma laboral”, La Tercera, April 7, 2016.   
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an injunction in the Constitutional Tribunal. In line with the claims made by the CPC at 
the very beginning of the legislative process78, the opposition parties argued that the 
articles protecting the union’s ownership of collective bargaining and its benefits were 
unconstitutional79.  
On April 27th, 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled in favor of the 
opposition’s injunction and declared the norms on union’ ownership of collective 
bargaining unconstitutional80. The Constitutional Tribunal’s decision was a hard defeat 
for the executive because the norms on union’s titularidad sindical were the “heart” of 
the reform, especially after all the amendments made in Senate. Unsurprisingly, the 
CPC applauded the tribunal’s decision, saying that it reaffirmed “the principles of 
freedom”. Similarly, SOFOFA President Hermann Von Mühlenbrock pointed out that 
the tribunal’s ruling made it clear that “there is no need to belong to a union to be able 
to bargain”. “If that were the case”, he went on, “it would be as if someone told me that 
I have to belong to a political party to be able to vote”81. 
In contrast, government officers and NM leaders condemned the Constitutional 
Tribunal, and labeled it as “absolutely ideological” and “pro-business”82. Labor leaders 
																																																								
78 See, for example, “CPC: reforma laboral impone una ‘sindicalización automática encubierta’”, El 
Mercurio, January 13, 2015. 
79 “Diez claves para entender cómo se aplicará la reforma laboral”, La Tercera, April 7, 2016.   
80 “T. Constitucional propina duro revés a la reforma laboral y rechaza titularidad sindical”, La Tercera, 
April 28, 2016. The final version of the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling was released on May 9th, 2016. 
See http://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/wp/ver.php?id=3251. In addition, the tribunal partially accepted 
an injunction aiming to limit unions’ ability to unilaterally extend collective bargaining benefits to non-
unionized workers, and rejected other injunctions about collective bargaining by multi-company unions 
and unions’ access to the firm’s financial information during collective bargaining. 
81 “Empresarios valoran decisión del TC: ‘Reafirma los principios de la libertad’”, La Tercera, April 28, 
2016; “Hermann von Mühlenbrock: ‘Chile no puede jugarse a que la mediocridad actual la resuelva un 
presidente que llegue en dos años más’, La Tercera Negocios, June 26, 2016.  
82 “Osvaldo Andrade, Presidente de la Cámara (PS): "El tribunal fue absolutamente pro empresario”, La 
Tercera, April 29, 2016.   
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also resented the decision, because it essentially legitimized employers’ defense of 
negotiating groups. In engaging in semi-regulated bargaining, negotiating groups were 
seen by union leaders as a tool used by employers to establish parallel negotiations, 
make more attractive offers to nonunionized workers, and weaken unions. In several 
interviews, even the union leaders who were more skeptical about the labor reform 
recognized that these regulations would mean, if passed, an important instrument to 
strengthen unionization. Similarly, in personal conversations with CUT leaders many of 
them referred to these regulations as the main concrete victory that made them “keep 
fighting” for the reform.  
Aware of the implications of the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling, Bárbara 
Figueroa urged the government to reform the Constitution “to get rid of the 
Constitutional Tribunal’s arbitrariness”, and called to a new general strike that was held 
on May 31st, 2016. The CUT also appealed to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, due to the tribunal’s “violation” of the ILO conventions No 87 and 9883. 
To confront this unfavorable scenario, the government used a Presidential veto (veto 
supresivo) to suppress the articles on firm-level flexibility agreements—specifically 
those related to agreements on exceptional workdays, overtime work, and other 
complementary hours—as well as the norms that would prevent unions in small and 
medium-sized companies from bargaining if they could not maintain a minimum 
																																																								
83 “CUT por fallo del TC: ‘Está por descontado hacer quejas en organismos internacionales’”, La Tercera, 
May 3, 2016; “Sindicatos presentan queja ante la OIT en Ginebra por la reforma laboral”, La Tercera, 
June 29, 2016.  
		
143 
number affiliates84. According to the government, these norms were concessions to 
business that “made sense” only when the union was the “owner” of collective 
bargaining.  
As in other stages of the reform process, the reactions of the government 
coalition varied substantially. The minister of labor and the NM’s left parties supported 
the executive’s case, while the secretary of finance and the conservative DC senators 
criticized it for having “political connotations”85. Business associations also decried the 
veto. They argued that the lack of regulations regarding negotiating groups’ ability to 
engage in firm-level flexibility agreements derived from the veto would produce the “de 
facto” disappearance of negotiating groups (according to the new laws, only unions 
were empowered to sign that type of “adaptability pacts”). However, due to the unclear 
stipulations on this matter included the final draft, lawyers and experts were unsure 
about the final implications of the new regulations. Even minister of labor Ximena 
Rincón recognized the new regulations would probably bring about “judicialization” in 
the definition of what unions and negotiating groups “can” and “cannot do”86. Despite 
problems like this, the government decided to shut down the labor reform debate and on 
																																																								
84 In using the veto, the executive did not submit a complementary law (ley corta) that would recognize 
the coexistence of unions and negotiating groups and demarcate the right of each to engage in the 
adaptability pacts that were not suppressed by the veto, e.g. those referred to family-related changes in the 
workday. While the complementary law had been demanded by the conservative sectors of the DC and 
the minister of finance, the PS and the PC had disallowed it arguing that it would mean the de facto 
“equalization” of the attributions of unions and negotiating groups. See “Gobierno desecha cambio 
constitucional, opta por veto y admite futura judicialización”, La Tercera, June 18, 2016. 
85 See “Gobierno opta por vetar dos aspectos de la reforma laboral y enviar nueva ley”, La Tercera, May 
8, 2016; “Veto suprime quórum para negociar y tres tipos de adaptabilidad”, La Tercera, May 10, 2016.   
86 “Gobierno desecha cambio constitucional, opta por veto y admite futura judicialización”, La Tercera, 
June 18, 2016. 
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August 29th, 2016, President Bachelet officially enacted the new labor law (Law 
20,940)87.  
For labor leaders affiliated and unaffiliated with the CUT, the balance of the 
labor reform was negative. Not only was the main advance of the reform (union’s 
“ownership” of collective bargaining) declared unconstitutional, but the government 
itself was unable to defend the pro-labor measures included the original formulation. 
Throughout the reform process, these advances were undermined by numerous setbacks 
reinforced in the Senate. According to the analysis of union advisor Juan Vergara 
(2016), the most important “setbacks” stemming from the Bachelet labor reform were 
related to:  
1. Stronger exigencies to form unions in medium and small-sized companies (8 
workers and 45% of employees’ representation); 
2. New norms that prohibit federations and confederations from bargaining (before 
the reform these workers’ organizations could engage in collective bargaining, 
although it was voluntary for employers);  
3. The extension of collective bargaining benefits has to be agreed between the 
employer and the union, as demanded by labor. However, it does not require the 
beneficiaries to pay a minimum fee to become union members (in the former 
legislation, beneficiaries had to pay 75% of the union fee);  
																																																								
87 “Presidenta promulga Ley que moderniza Sistema de Relaciones Laborales”, Gobierno de Chile, 
August 29, 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.gob.cl/presidenta-promulga-ley-moderniza-sistema-
relaciones-laborales/. Accessed on August 29, 2016.  
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4. Norms that permit the employer to avoid accepting the negotiation minimum 
floor demanded by workers if the “financial condition of the company” requires 
it;  
5. Articles that make the bargaining process and the strike more cumbersome (e.g. 
the Labor Directorate can cancel a collective bargaining process if there is no 
agreement between the union and the employer regarding the union’s provision 
of “minimum services”, and the start of the strike is delayed from 3 to 5 days 
since the day the workers voted it); 
6. Stronger obligations for the union to provide the “emergency teams” needed to 
ensure the firm’s “minimum operations”;  
7. Regulations that legalize a new system of “internal strike replacements”, which 
empowers employers to make “necessary modifications” in non-strikers’ shifts 
and work schedules;  
8. Norms that facilitate employers’ replacement of striking workers (e.g. the fines 
for employers who replace striking workers, which had been established in the 
2001 reform, were eliminated). 
 
Why did the Bachelet reform fail to transform the central aspects of the Labor 
Plan?  Why despite the more favorable political conditions did the Bachelet reform end 
up like the reform attempts of the 1990s and 2000s? The next chapter answers these 
questions by comparing all the reform processes carried out throughout the democratic 
period. To do so, it focuses on role played by state business and labor, and on the way 
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these actors—represented by CPC and the CUT—tried to influence the actions of the 
state agents during the legislative processes.   	
		 147 
5. Class, politics, and reform: explaining the persistence of the 1979 Labor Plan 
The evidence showed in the last chapter indicates that the main pillars of the 
1979 Labor Plan remained intact even after the last (and most promising) reform effort 
carried out by President Bachelet. The regulations that in practice restrict collective 
bargaining to the firm level did not change at all, and in some cases they became even 
stronger (e.g. the 2016 reform gave rise to norms that prohibit federations and 
confederations from bargaining). Similarly, in the last reform process the right to strike 
was severely undermined by regulations that bureaucratized the strike activity, that 
legalized a system of internal replacement of striking workers through the recognition 
of the employer’s ability to make “necessary modifications” in the work of non-striking 
workers, and that even eliminated the fines (established in the 2001 reform) for the 
employers who hire replacement workers during industrial disputes.  
Why did the central aspects of the 1979 persisted even after Bachelet’s reform 
efforts? To answer this question it is useful to compare the last reform period with the 
reform attempts undertaken between 1990 and 2001. As already suggested, the Bachelet 
reform differed from its predecessors in that most of the institutional and political 
constraints derived form the dictatorship did not exist anymore. These constraints have 
been usually emphasized by standard explanations of policy change in Chile. Therefore, 
a comparison like this can shed light on the mechanisms that explain why the 
dictatorship’s collective labor laws have been so persistent during the democratic 
period. For the sake of exposition, in what follows I compare the reform periods by 
focusing on the role of the three main actors involved in them: state actors, labor, and 
business.
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5.1. State actors  
 In Chapter 4, I showed that during the 2015 – 2016 reform process state actors 
were less constrained than in the 1990s and the 2000s. Institutional dictatorial legacies 
such as the unelected Senators (Senadores Designados) that increased the veto power of 
the right did not exist anymore. So did the threat of authoritarian regression, and the 
excessive concern with consensus derived from it. In a similar way, unlike the 2001 
reform, the country was not facing the effects of an economic crisis that, as the Asian 
crisis, increased substantially unemployment rates and reduced incentives for 
policymakers to change labor market regulations.  
In terms of the political orientation of the ruling coalition, there were also 
important differences. In contrast to the Concertación, the Nueva Mayoría worked hard 
to show itself, at least during the first two years of Bachelet’s second term, as a center-
left coalition that would lead an ambitious reformist agenda. Aware of the more “leftist” 
orientation of the government coalition (which now included the Communist Party and 
other left parties), some NM senators even defined the Bachelet administration as “the 
backhoe” that would “destroy the underpinnings of neoliberalism”1. At the beginning of 
the reform process this reformist approach seemed to be clear. Unlike the reforms under 
the Concertación, this time the government did not hesitate to propose a project whose 
formulation counted on the active participation of labor, and whose main “guidelines” 
																																																								
1 “Senador Quintana anuncia ‘retroexcavadora’ contra modelo neoliberal”, EMOL, March 25, 2014. 
Retrieved from: http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2014/03/25/651676/nueva-mayoria-advierte-
que-pasara-retroexcavadora.html. Accessed on November 15, 2016 
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met most (yet no all) of the demands of workers. As a result, at the beginning of the 
legislative process the CUT leaders defended the project by noting, such as NM 
government officials, that the Bachelet reform proposal represented the “most 
important” labor policy change of the democratic period.  
In effect, in contrast to the limited scope of the reform effort undertaken by 
Lagos in 2001, Bachelet’s project planned substantive changes to the regulations on 
collective bargaining and right to strike (e.g. norms extending collective bargaining to 
some multi-company unions, protecting titularidad sindical, and prohibiting the 
replacement of striking workers). Because of the more ambitious scope of these 
proposals, even sectors of the labor movement unaffiliated with the CUT saw these 
changes as “important advances”. In the first months of 2015, the Nueva Mayoría’s 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate seemed to ensure that the main 
aspects of the reform project would easily pass. Equally important, the government’s 
actions in the first stages of the legislative process were an indicator of its commitment 
with the success of the reform. Different from the reform processes carried out by the 
Aylwin and Lagos administrations, this time the government did take advantage of the 
parliamentary majority and started the legislative process by introducing the draft bill in 
the Chamber of Deputies. In doing so, the Bachelet administration fulfilled what labor 
had long demanded during the previous reform efforts. In introducing the bill in the 
lower chamber, the government could “strengthen” it before passing through the Senate 
where the power of the right was stronger. However, despite this promising start, 
Chapter 4 showed that the development of the legislative processes, and especially its 
		
150 
final outcome, did not differ substantially from the Concertación’s reforms. From the 
side of state actors, there were important continuities.  
First, similar previous reform attempts, the NM government was never really 
willing to establish a mandatory and system of multi-employer (let alone industry-wide) 
collective bargaining. In 1990, the government did so by simply disowning its 
presidential campaign promise. In the other reform efforts (Bachelet’s reform included), 
such a proposal was never explicitly included in the government’s projects. In spite of 
this, in the early stages of the 2015 – 2016 legislative process the government claimed 
to be willing to “study” a proposal like that. Yet the government quickly ruled it out, 
drawing upon the same arguments repeated for decades by business associations and 
arguing that a policy change like that could have “negative” effects on the economy. 
Then, in the Chamber of Deputies, the government claimed that the proposal was 
“inadmissible”, even though several NM representatives claimed to be willing to 
endorse workers’ demand.    
 Also, similar to the pro-business orientation of the Concertación administrations, 
throughout the legislative process of 2015 and 2016 the government’s amendments 
disproportionally favored business interests, moderating substantially the pro-labor 
measures included in the original draft bill. In the reform process of 1990-2001, for 
example, the government submitted amendments that weakened the norms protecting 
multi-employers bargaining which ended up defining it as “voluntary” for employers. 
During the Bachelet reform, the government’s business-friendly approach was seen in a 
particular mix of pro-worker measures and a few but significantly strong concessions to 
business, which in the end undermined the positive aspects of the proposals aiming to 
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protect workers. A good example of this could be observed in the regulations on strikes. 
Although the government’s project claimed to defend workers’ “effective” right to 
strike (i.e. their right to carry out strikes without the replacement of striking workers), it 
included clauses that required the strike to be “peaceful”, and that safeguarded the 
employer’s ability to make “necessary modifications”. For workers these clauses meant 
the “criminalization” of strike activity and the legalization of a within-firm system of 
strike replacements. Although the norms on “peaceful strikes” were removed from the 
bill in the course of the legislative debate, the clauses on “necessary modifications” 
during strikes were progressively reinforced through government’s sponsored 
amendments, especially during the passage of the bill in the Senate.  
 The Bachelet administration’s labor reform was also similar to the reform 
processes under the Concertación (particularly those between 1994 and 2001) in the 
significant intra-coalition ideological disputes. Despite the “turn to the left” of the NM, 
the last reform attempt witnessed the same divisions between the “pro-labor” and “pro-
business” sectors of the ruling coalition. In Chapter 3 and 4 I showed that the pro-labor 
segments were represented by leftist parties (the PS and then the PS/PC) and state 
officers located mostly in the ministry of labor, while the pro-business sectors were 
represented mainly by the “conservative” parties of the coalition (the DC) and state 
officials closer to the minister of finance. As suggested in chapter 3, the latter sector’s 
hegemony during the Concertación period gave business a privileged position vis-à-vis 
the government, which reinforced the CPC’s power to influence policymaking. In 
chapter 4, I showed that things could have been different, at least in the early stages of 
the Bachelet reform because both labor and the left of the NM were stronger, and even 
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state officials traditionally aligned with business—for example, the minister of 
finance—openly endorsed the reformist orientation of the government. Nevertheless, 
significant events occurred during the passage of the bill in the Chamber of Deputies. 
Bachelet reshuffled her cabinet and, such as demanded by business associations, 
removed the “atypical” (reformist) minister of finance Alberto Arenas from office. 
Thus, like its predecessors, the NM government undertook most of the legislative 
process under the leadership of a minister of finance that, like Rodrigo Valdés, was 
openly closer to business than labor. Valdés not only meat the return to the traditional 
“moderator” role of the Concertación’s ministers of finance (which was several times 
applauded by business), but he also quickly became a key ally of the conservative DC 
and right-wing senators grouped in the “Bancada pro-PYME” (he sponsored, in fact, 
most of the amendments proposed by this group of legislators). The role of these DC 
senators was crucial. Given the reformist orientation of the NM, they became the 
political representatives of business within the ruling coalition. In so doing, they were 
the agents that revived, within the NM, the Concertación’s consensual politics observed 
between the 1990 and 2001 reforms.  
All these similarities between the labor reforms proposed by the NM and the 
Concertación explain, from the side of state actors, the persistence of the 1979 Labor 
Plan. In 2016, the persistence of the dictatorial regulations was also determined in part 
by authoritarian legacies such as the Constitutional Tribunal, whose “legislative” 
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functions (established in the 1980 Constitution) had not been seen in previous labor 
reforms2.     
 
5.2. The working class 
 At first sight, the position of the CUT during the Bachelet reform was stronger 
than before. This time the government was more open to its demands and since 
Bachelet’s presidential campaign labor leaders had had an active participation in the 
drafting of the reform proposal. Thus, unlike what happened during the Aylwin and 
Lagos reforms, the government’s project did not “surprise” them with unexpected pro-
business measures. In addition, the strikes led by important sectors of the labor 
movement since the late 2000s had showed that unions’ collective power had not 
disappeared, and that it could actually bring important victories for workers. Within the 
CUT itself important changes had taken place as well. In 2012, the Communists, who 
had always criticized the excessive restraint of Concertación’s leaders during the 1990s 
and 2000s, consolidated their influence with the election of Bárbara Figueroa. Similarly, 
since at least the mid 2000s, all the CUT leaders critically assessed their role during the 
1990s. Regardless of their party affiliations, they all came to similar conclusions 
regarding the role of the CUT during the 1990 – 2001 labor reforms: they all concluded 
the lack of autonomy from the Concertación parties, and the moderation of labor 
stemming from the party affiliation of the CUT leaders had not led to significant gains 																																																								
2 In Chapter 4, I saw the role of the Constitutional Tribunal mainly as exogenous. However there are good 
reasons to believe that its persistence is to some extent the result of power imbalances. During the 1990s, 
for example, the CUT demanded the end of the Tribunal Constitutional, arguing that it was an 
“authoritarian enclave” that right parties might use to veto pro-worker reforms. See “Preocupación de la 
CUT por actuación del TC”, El Mercurio, July 22, 1995.  
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in terms of collective bargaining, strike, union rights. In interviews with CUT leaders 
belonging to different parties (PC, PS, DC) conducted in 2015, the issue of the CUT’s 
autonomy from political parties was always present. Although the leaders had different 
opinions on how to deal with that problem, they all agreed that the CUT’s “excessive 
commitment” with the Concertación’s project was, as noted in chapter 3, labor’s 
“biggest mistake” in the post-dictatorial period. More importantly, they all agreed on 
the need not to repeat such a mistake.   
 However, in spite of these developments, Chapter 4 showed that role of the CUT 
during Bachelet’s labor reform did not differ substantially from its role in previous 
reform periods. As before, throughout the 2015 – 2016 reform process labor leaders 
endorsed the government proposal arguing that, although “insufficient”, it did contained 
“advances”. Nonetheless, it was surprising that the CUT officialdom kept the same 
stance even though the “setbacks” of the reform proposal became much more important 
than the “advances”. It was also surprising that the CUT quickly endorsed the 
government’s project despite some of these insufficiencies were seen as early as when 
the legislative process started. In interviews with CUT leaders, many of them asserted 
that the pro-worker measurements included in the first version of the proposal (the 
“Presidential Message” that initiated the reform) were in many respects different from 
the actual bill discussed in the Parliament. “They seem like two different projects”, 
several leaders complained, in reference to the way in which some central ideas (e.g. 
“right to strike without strike replacements”) were undermined, in the first draft of the 
project introduced in the Chamber of Deputies, by clauses that would later become the 
basis of pro-business amendments (e.g. employers’ ability to make “necessary 
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modifications” during strikes). Notwithstanding this type of problems, the CUT 
officialdom continued to support the government’s reform initiative, and Figueroa even 
labeled it as “the most important reform of the last 25 years”.  
As in previous decades, the “pro-government” stance of the CUT leadership was 
clear. Also, as before, it brought about important disputes between different sectors of 
labor, many of which were now working outside the CUT. These disputes revolved 
round the strategies CUT should adopt vis-à-vis the government. Within the CUT, the 
disagreement confronted mainly the Communist leaders, who during most of this period 
promoted restraint, and the workers close to the leadership of Arturo Martínez, who 
insisted on the need to adopt more confrontational strategies. Because of the 
“presidentialist” organization of the CUT (the president has large degree of autonomy to 
perform her duties), the Communists’ position prevailed, and these disputes were most 
of the time an issue discussed internally in the National Councils. By the end of 2015, 
when the setbacks in the Senate were more and more evident, these strategic 
disagreements took over the agenda of the National Councils. There, the workers close 
to Martínez’s leadership and some Socialists frequently accused the Communists of 
being “too committed” with Bachelet’s agenda. In an interview with an important 
Communist CUT leader, he replied to the critics arguing that, “They [Martínez’s 
followers and Socialists] controlled the CUT for twenty years and did nothing. They 
never called for a national strike when we demanded them to do so. Why do they show 
up now pretending to be radicals?” In defending moderation, the Communists workers 
were confident that partisan links would help them deepen the “advances” of the 
reform. However, as the bill passed through the different stages of the legislative 
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process, their strategy proved to be unsuccessful, not necessarily because their allies in 
office—the PC—were not committed with labor demands, but rather because these 
allies were a minority in a coalition with serious ideological disagreements.  
In fact, unlike the Concertación’s parties during the 1990s and 2000s, the 
Communist Party did have an ideological commitment with labor. This difference was 
evident in interviews with important union leaders of the CUT. In them, several DC and 
PS workers complained about how their parties “did not care” about unionism. Many of 
them argued that the PS’ and DC’s union fronts (frentes sindicales) were “dead” and 
that their members did not have a voice in the parties’ hierarchies. Communist leaders 
held totally different opinions. They all argued that unionism was a “key component” of 
the PC’s politics, and many of them held indeed important positions in the PC’s 
structure. This difference was clearly observed during the Bachelet reform. Compared 
to the PS and the DC, the PC held a much more consistent pro-worker stance towards 
the reform project. The Communists always emphasized the need to achieve the goals 
stated in the first version of the project (the Presidential Message) under the assumption 
that they were the “floor” and not the “ceiling” of the pro-worker policy changes that 
would result from the reform. Yet the PC’s minority position within the government 
coalition implied not only the defeat of these aspirations, but also the practical defeat of 
the “restraint strategy” endorsed by Figueroa and the other Communists leaders of the 
CUT.     
  Regarding the strategic disagreements within the CUT, the labor reform process 
under Bachelet did not differ substantially from those under the Concertación. As 
shown in Chapter 3, the disputes between restrain and mass mobilization strategies 
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existed throughout the 1990s and 2000s. However, under the Bachelet administration 
the agents of the disagreements played different roles: in contrast to their role in the 
1990s and 2000s, the Communist leaders now represented the “moderate” positions in 
the dispute. Relatedly, the last reform period differed from its predecessors in that this 
was the first time that mass mobilization strategies were largely carried out by 
“alternative” expressions of organized labor. While some of these alternative actors 
argued for totally oppositional stances against the reform and the CUT’s “pro-
government” stance (e.g. CIUS), others were not necessarily anti-CUT but certainly 
criticized Figueroa’s leadership for being “too passive” vis-à-vis the government (e.g. 
the 4x4 coalition and the Agrupación de Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma 
Laboral).  
Drawing upon the lessons form the successful strikes of 2007 and 2014, some of 
these groups—particularly the confederations grouped in the 4x4 coalition—called for 
two general strikes in April and June 2015. They contended that “productive stoppages” 
(paros productivos) were the only way to have a real impact on the legislative process, 
and although the CUT endorsed the strikes, it played no role in their organization3. 
Based on this, they also decried the CUT’s calls for two general strikes in 2016. 
Although this was the first reform process where the CUT made that type of calls, they 
																																																								
3 Days before the April strike, for example, the confederations involved in the 4x4 coalition invited the 
CUT to endorse the strike. The connections between the 4x4 coalition and the CUT did exist before the 
actions. One member of the coalition (the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre) was affiliated with 
the CUT since its foundation in 2007, and main its leaders were members of the Communist Party. In 
spite of these links, the CUT’s endorsement of the strike action consisted in no more than a press 
conference in which Figueroa call on the government “to listen workers’ demands”. “Quiénes son los 
nuevos líderes sindicales que se levantan contra la reforma laboral”, La Segunda, April 21, 2015.  
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were no more than a “performance” (as argued by these union leaders) as they took 
place at the very end of the legislative process.  
 In general terms, the 2015 – 2016 events suggest important continuities in the 
way the CUT confronted the reform process. Resembling its stances of the 1990s and 
early 2000s, the CUT leaders privileged restraint and moderation, hoping that party 
linkages would help them influence policymaking. Similarly, like in past decades, these 
stances these gave rise to strategic disputes (e.g. mass mobilization vs. restraint) that 
were the expression of a much more important issue: how to deal with the problem of 
“labor autonomy” expressed in the relation between the CUT and its political allies in 
office.   
 
5.3. Business 
 A comparison of the reform periods suggests that there are strong continuities in 
the way that the organized business acted throughout the legislative processes between 
1990 and 2016, and particularly in the way the CPC successfully defended business 
interests regarding the collective bargaining, strike, and unions. Both in the early 1990s 
and the mid 2010s, the CPC succeeded in influencing policymaking and blocking any 
substantial change (or demand for change) to the norms that restrict bargaining to the 
firm level, permit employers to replace striking workers, allow union parallelism, and 
encourage the coexistence of unions and negotiating groups.  
The CPC succeeded in it defense of business interests even in the 2015 – 2016 
legislative process, in which business-government relations were not only more distant 
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(Bachelet kept her distance even after her “pro-business” cabinet reshuffle), but also 
business itself did not enjoy the “hegemonic” power it used to have during the first 
democratic governments. Since 2010, corruption scandals that involved important 
businessmen became public—e.g. unilateral debt renegotiation by La Polar (one of the 
biggest retail stores of the country), price collusion in highly concentrated industries, 
and more recently illegal campaign contributions. These scandals seriously undermined 
entrepreneurs’ legitimacy, and as Chapter 8 will show, soon became one the main 
preoccupations of the business associations during the NM administration.  
However, despite this lost of “hegemonic” power the CPC’s capacity to 
influence the policy-making process and maintain the unity of the business sector was 
as strong as before. In relation to this the contrast with labor was evident. Workers were 
always divided between those who saw the reforms as “advances” proposed by their 
allies in government, and those who saw them as “lost battles” that would never bring 
about gains for workers. Businessmen, in contrast, always managed to maintain a 
consistent hardline defense of the basic elements of the 1979 Labor Plan vis-à-vis the 
government. Based on this defensive stance, all the reform proposals were seen as 
attacks to market economy, economic prosperity, and the country’s modernization. 
Business’ hardline defense of the 1979 Labor Plan was observed throughout all 
the reform efforts, regardless of whether the dismantling of market economy was a real 
threat4. Both in the early 1990s and the mid 2010s, businessmen opposed labor reforms 
																																																								
4 During the first Concertación governments, this threat was much more recurrent than by the second 
decade of the 2010s. As Chapter 8 will show, the Lagos administration (2000-2006) was the final proof 
businesspeople needed to be convinced about the center-left parties’ commitment to market economy. 
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by drawing upon historical memories according to which they saw these policy changes 
as transformations that would bring the country “back to the 1960s”, replicate “failed” 
socialist and corporatist models of industrial relations, increase “past” class conflicts 
(i.e. conflicts observed during Allende’s government), and imply the realization of “the 
Communist Party’s agenda”. The archival and interview evidence collected throughout 
this research indicate that these constant references to “past times” are recurrent among 
businessmen, and that they are, as Chapter 8 will show, a central factor that explains the 
cohesion of Chilean business.  
Based on this, employers always opposed proposals aiming to extend collective 
bargaining or strengthen union’s bargaining power. In some cases (e.g. at the end of the 
Aylwin administration in 1993 or during Bachelet’s first term in 2007) business 
associations even decried the simple idea of “discussing” labor issues. In others, 
governments’ initiatives forced them to participate in legislative processes, which they 
resisted from the very beginning (e.g. reforms during Lagos’s administration and 
Bachelet’s second term). The only exception to this stance was the CPC’s endorsement 
of the Framework Agreements during the Aylwin administration. However, even in that 
case important sectoral associations such as the SOFOFA refused at first to participate 
in the tripartite initiatives, and the CPC contended that business would support policy 
changes as long as they did not hurt the pillars of market economy protected by the 
regulations inherited from the dictatorship.  
																																																																																																																																																																		
Thus the concern with the “defense of the model” became less and less recurrent (although it never 
disappeared).     
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In all the cases analyzed, these hardline ideological stances were strengthened 
through the action of business associations during the legislative processes. Thus 
employers’ positions in the final stages of the reform processes were usually harder than 
at the beginning of them. This was seen, for example, in the CPC’s endorsement of the 
Framework Agreements between 1990 and 1993 and then, once the reform bills were 
passed, in its strong opposition to tripartite initiatives aiming to analyze the 
implementation of the new policies. This was seen even more clearly during the Lagos 
and Bachelet reform processes, in which business complained about the “pro-worker” 
bias of the reforms even until the enactment of the new laws. They did so despite in 
both cases the majority of the government’s sponsored amendments had a clear pro-
business orientation. A good example of this occurred during the Bachelet reform. 
There the CPC not only disavowed the CPC-CUT agreement of 2012 (in which it 
recognized the union’s ownership of the collective bargaining process), but also 
frequently complained that the bill was becoming more and more “pro-worker”. The 
CPC kept this stance even though the government did not endorse industry-wide 
collective bargaining amendments and, in the course of the discussion in Senate, 
introduced amendments that protected employers’ ability to make “necessary 
modifications” during strikes and put harder restrictions to form unions in small and 
medium size firms. In spite of this, during the last stages of the legislative process the 
CPC always defined these amendments as “insufficient”, and some business leaders 
even contended that the reform project ended “worse than it started”.    
Along with the CPC’s successful defense of employers’ hardline ideological 
positions, a second common feature of the reform periods analyzed was the way in 
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which business influenced policymaking through its strategic relation with parties and 
state officers. In all the reform periods the main right wing parties, RN and the UDI, 
were closely aligned with business associations. They were in fact the main vehicles 
through which business interests were represented in the legislature. This was a central 
difference with the CUT, whose allies in government never had a clear position 
regarding labor demands. Neither during the Concertación nor the Nueva Mayoría 
ruling parties defended as a single political block the interests of labor. In effect, 
regardless of more leftist orientation of the NM, the 2016 reform closely resembled the 
Concertación’s reforms in that business influenced policymaking through both the 
conservative sectors of the ruling coalition (mainly the DC and some sectors of the 
PPD) and key state officers located in the minister of finance.   
The analysis of the legislative processes indicates that the type of relation 
established between business and state actors varied according to the executive’s 
stances. When the person in office was someone with a clear pro-business approach, 
such influence was more direct. This happened during the Aylwin and Frei 
administrations, in which the executive carried out the legislative process by largely 
following business demands. Thus the government privileged a “slow” legislative 
process and introduced the bill into the Senate instead of the Chamber of Deputies as a 
way to ensure a broad, cross-coalition consensus on the labor reform bill. On the other 
hand, when the person in office held a more “distant” stance, business tended to rely 
more on the conservative parties of the ruling coalition to pursue its interests. This was 
particularly noticeable during Bachelet’s second term. Unlike all the Concertación 
presidents (Bachelet herself included), in her second term President Bachelet built a 
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relation with business associations that employers usually defined as “cold” and even 
“oppositional”5. In this context, business associations worked aligned with the DC 
Senators grouped in the Bancada Pro-PYME, which endorsed the most important pro-
business amendments made in Senate. Something similar occurred at the end of the 
legislative process under Lagos. In the first years of his administration, the relation 
between him and business was marked by mutual distrusts, so DC Senators such as 
Edgardo Boeneinger and Alejandro Foxley played a key role in sponsoring the 
amendments through which business associations could get rid of the “hard issues” 
included in the original proposal (e.g. norms aiming to protect the right to strike and 
extend collective bargaining).    
A third common feature observed in the role of the CPC between 1990 and 2016 
is the particular in which it mixed hardline ideological stances and pragmatic with non-
ideological strategic positions. This was a central factor between 1990 and 2016, 
because it allowed Chilean employers to influence policymaking through cohesive 
ideological principles—e.g. a defense of the market economy based on broad ideas of 
individual freedom and private property—and, at the same time, to establish coherent 
strategic positions vis-à-vis the government and political parties. Based on these 
strategic positions, employers managed to keep a pragmatic, non-ideological relation 
with parties and the government. Despite the fact that businesspeople recognized that 
right parties were their “natural allies”, they detached themselves from their partisan 
affiliations and never doubt to activate their links with government officers and ruling 
coalition parties when the need arouse. This was clearly expressed by the former 																																																								
5 “La vía institucional que Bachelet trazó con el empresariado”, La Tercera Negocios, October 25, 2015.  
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president of the CPC Alberto Salas, who in an interview contented: “The identification 
with a particular political sector hurt business associations a lot. When you identify so 
much with a political position, the government will not trust you. This association (the 
CPC) was sometimes too much identified with right parties. As a result, there were 
moments in which some presidents—for example, President Lagos—did simply not 
meet with the CPC president”6. As I will show in Chapter 8, this pragmatic relation with 
parties and governments has been central component of Chilean business mobilization, 
nurtured in the late 1980s and consolidated in the mid 2000s.  
Hardline ideological stances and pragmatic, non-ideological strategic positions 
vis-à-vis the government and parties were two key characteristics of the CPC’s action 
during the 1990 – 2016 labor reforms. Based on them, employers from all industries and 
economic sectors confronted the labor reforms by drawing upon a particular mixture of 
orientations. On the one hand, they accepted the reforms as expressions of the 
democratic struggle (despite the complains, the CPC never refused to participate in 
them). Yet, on the other hand, employers never believed that the democratic struggle 
implied making significant concessions on what the CPC defined as the foundations of 
market economy.  
Finally, the continuity in the role of the CPC during the reform processes could 
be seen in a fourth aspect: the legitimacy of the CPC as the class-wide organization of 
Chilean business. Sectoral associations, in particular the SOFOFA, did sometimes 
question the legitimacy of the CPC to represent class-wide interests of Chilean business. 
As Chapter 8 will show, the SOFOFA did so by reducing the role of the CPC to a 																																																								
6 Interview with Alberto Salas, June 30, 2015.    
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simple “coordinator” of its sectoral associations’ interests. This might explain in part 
why during the last reform period the SOFOFA worked hard to put together, along with 
the ASECH, the “Anti-reform front”. This had important implications, as the Bachelet 
labor reform was the first time that business confronted the legislative process through 
two different channels (the CPC and the anti-reform front). However, although this was 
an important difference between this reform process and the previous ones, the role of 
the Anti-reform front should not be overemphasized. The business front’s ideological 
and strategic orientations were the same as those of the CPC. Also, none of its members 
that were CPC affiliates (SOFOFA, CNC, and CChC) called into question the CPC’s 
legitimacy. Again, a comparison with the situation of labor is illustrative to this respect. 
During the last reform initiative, several sectors of the labor movement worked outside 
the CUT and strongly criticized the CUT’s leadership. Most of these critiques referred, 
as suggested in Chapter 4, to strategic matters, particularly to the way that the central 
confederation repeated the same “mistakes” made during the Concertación’s reforms. 
Some sectors of labor even claimed that the CUT did simply not represent the interests 
of the working class. According to these sectors the CUT was at best an organization 
representing public sector’s employees and, at worst, a simple extension of the Nueva 
Mayoría parties’ workers fronts7.  
																																																								
7 In interviews with leaders of the other two central confederations, the Central Autónoma de 
Trabajadores (CAT) and the Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT), the interviewees also repeated the 
first of these critiques. They argued that the overrepresentation of public sector workers within the CUT 
was one of the main problems of the central confederation (“The CUT leaders had no idea about what it 
means working in the private sector”, many of them contended). The second critique was made mainly by 
union leaders located at the “left” of the CUT (e.g. those grouped in the CIUS), who several times defined 
the CUT as the “government’s union department”. Despite the huge ideological differences existing 
between the leaders of these different sectors (i.e. most of the CAT and UNT leaders were close to the 
Christian Democracy, and most of the CIUS leaders were non-PC Marxists), they all shared a similar 
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In contrast to organized labor, the “alternative” Anti-reform business front did 
not emerge from critiques to the CPC’s legitimacy or its ideological orientations but 
rather from a matter of leadership styles and tactical/strategic positions. Some sectors of 
business criticized the consensual approach of the CPC President Alberto Salas, and 
despite they valued its leadership skills (his consensual approach was actually one the 
reasons why he was elected in 2015), they soon realized that a more a confrontational 
and “activist” style was better suited to confront the government’s reformist agenda. 
They did so by drawing upon the experience of the 2014 tax reform, in which a new 
generation of leaders such as the ASECH’s president Juan Pablo Swett had stood out for 
their use of non-traditional tools—e.g. aggressive Internet campaigns and YouTube 
videos—to defend business interests in a more “activist” way. As I will demonstrate in 
Chapter 8, this new generation of leaders, and the activist leadership styles they 
defended, did create tensions within the CPC. Yet in no way did they imply a challenge 
to the CPC’s power vis-à-vis its affiliates, nor a challenge to its legitimacy as the 
representative of business interests vis-à-vis the government.   
 
5.4. Conclusion 
The comparison of the reform processes developed in this chapter, as well as the 
evidence showed in Chapters 3 and 4, suggest that the persistence of the 1979 Labor 
Plan is largely the result of the persistent power imbalances between workers and 
employers. The imbalance of power—vividly expressed in the CPC’s successful 																																																																																																																																																																		
story: as Chapter 7 will show, they all belonged to the CUT and broke with it for political and ideological 
reasons.     
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defense of the 1979 Labor Plan—has been the most persistent factor shaping the 
outcomes of the reform processes between 1990 and 2016. It explains, in fact, why the 
dictatorial collective labor laws have remained intact after the 2016, even though the 
Bachelet administration carried out the reform process in a context where most of the 
authoritarian legacies that shaped the outcomes of Concertación’s reform efforts did not 
exist anymore.  
This indicates that the approaches commonly used to examine labor reform and 
policy in Chile fall short to explain the persistence of the 1979 Labor Plan. As noted in 
chapter 2, these approaches center mostly on authoritarian legacies (for example, 
institutional or ideological legacies) (cf. Barrett, 2001; Cook, 2007; Feres, 2009b; 
Frank, 2015) or on the role of state actors—particularly on policymakers’ consensual 
and pro-business approaches to labor policy (cf. Campero, 2007; Taylor, 2004). In using 
these approaches, researchers defined working class and business collective action not 
as a causal factor, but only as a mechanism through which state actors and authoritarian 
legacies shaped the reform processes. For example, in the 1990s and 2000s researchers 
described the role of capitalists and workers by showing how economic, ideological, 
and institutional legacies undermined workers’ capacity to influence policymaking (cf. 
Barrett, 2001; Campero & Valenzuela, 1984; Cook, 2007; Drake, 1996; Feres, 2009b; 
Frank, 2002; Winn, 2004) or by remarking how employers’ “obstructionist” position 
(Haagh, 2002) was facilitated by the neoliberal orientation the Concertación 
governments and politico-institutional legacies that reinforced the veto power of 
business’ political allies (e.g. right wing parties) (cf. Barrett, 2001; Feres, 2009b; Frías, 
2002; Ljubetic, 2008; Montero, 1993; Narbona, 2014; E. Silva, 1996; Undurraga, 2012).  
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These explanations might have worked well to describe the reforms processes of 
the 1990s and early 2000s. However, they are less suited to account for the class 
foundations of labor reforms or, more specifically, the class-based processes that 
explain policy continuity in Chile in the second half of the 2010s. The Chilean case, as I 
have argued, shows that the continuity of collective labor laws is largely explained by 
the unequal collective power through which business and the working class have 
pursued their interests regarding labor law. This resembles recent political sociologists 
who emphasize the relational character of power (Korpi, 2006, p. 206; Lawrence, 2014, 
pp. 13-14). Korpi (2006), has noted the importance of power relations by suggesting 
that that variations in social policy should be analyzed not as effects of the interests and 
actions of a single class (e.g. the working class), but rather as an the outcome of the 
interactions between different classes—employers and workers in this case— and the 
changes in their relative positions of powers.  
Following traditional political sociology debates (cf. Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; 
Dahl, 1958; Polsby, 1960) and especially Luke’s (2005 [1974]) “radical” view of 
power, the evidence suggests that unlike the working class organized business has 
succeeded in the realization of its interests through the exercise of collective power over 
three different dimensions. First, business has shaped policymaking by influencing the 
timing and the speed of the legislative processes (e.g. the government’s decisions on 
where—in what chamber—to start the legislative process and when to “hurry” or “slow 
down” the reform process), as well as in the content of the amendments sponsored by 
either government officials or pro-business groups of legislators.  
		
169 
Second, organized business has also exercised its power by limiting the scope of 
the reforms themselves. For example, in simply refusing to discuss the possibility of a 
tripartite system of industry-wide collective bargaining, they have not only ruled it out 
from political consideration, but also reduced the scope of policymaking to issues 
relatively “innocuous” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). Finally, employers have succeeded 
as well in shaping the preferences of key state actors (particularly those belonging to the 
“conservative” or “neoliberal” sectors of the Concertación and the Nueva Mayoría), 
who always defended the “positive aspects” of the labor plan by drawing upon the same 
arguments articulated by the CPC since the mid 1980s. This implied, among other 
things, that employers’ interests regarding collective labor laws have always been 
defended from within the same government coalitions that proposed the legislative 
changes.  
The third dimension of business power, which Lukes (2005 [1974]) defines as 
“hegemonic shaping of preferences”, is key as it implies that power relations exist even 
in contexts where consensus prevails, that is, where conflict is largely covert. Therefore 
this dimension of power is the most difficult to study. This problem can be addressed by 
drawing upon recent research on social policy and employers’ collective action. In their 
study of the New Deal, Hacker and Pierson (2002) criticize the employer-centered 
approach (Swenson, 2002) by noting that employers’ influence on social policy can be 
proven to exist only when the researcher first identifies ex ante business preferences 
(e.g. when we he or she has an idea of “what employers want”), and then establishes 
causal relations between these preferences and policy outcomes. For Hacker and 
Pierson this is the way the researcher can avoid making the mistake of imputing 
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causality only from observed ex post correlations between policy outcomes and 
employer interests—which might express ex post business’ accommodation to the new 
policies or changes in attitude derived from policy feedbacks (Hacker & Pierson, 2002, 
pp. 283-286). In this dissertation I follow Hacker and Pierson’s recommendation, and in 
Chapter 8 I will show that the Concertación and Nueva Mayoría state officers’ 
preferences for “business-friendly” collective labor laws, their defense of the “positive 
aspects” of the 1979 Labor Plan, and the way they presented them as the only “viable” 
alternatives, were largely based on the free-market orientations framed by the CPC 
since the beginning of the dictatorship and consolidated in the 1980s and 1990s.  
The comparison of the reform processes showed that the power imbalance 
between employers and workers was certainly affected, as suggested by standard 
explanations, by authoritarian legacies and the pro-business orientation of state actors. 
This was particularly noticeable in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, the comparison 
also demonstrated that the imbalance of power has persisted over time because of 
factors coming from within the collective organizations representing capitalists and the 
working class. These factors are key for understanding how either class pursued its 
interests during the legislative processes, and why the CPC’s defense of business was 
more successful than the CUT’s defense of workers interests.   
As for the working class, I showed that neither during the Concertación nor the 
Nueva Mayoría could the CUT solve the problem of its autonomy from the government 
coalition and parties. This was expressed particularly in the problem of how to influence 
policymaking through strategies that go beyond the unconditional support from the 
CUT leaders to government’s reform proposals. During the Bachelet reform, this 
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reproduced not only the disputes between restraint and mass mobilization strategies 
observed in the 1990s and 2000s, but also reinforced the critiques from important 
sectors of organized labor which called into question the CUT’s legitimacy to represent 
the interests of the Chilean working class.  A totally different picture could be seen for 
the case of organized business. Between 1990 and 2016, the CPC could effectively 
defend business interests in all the attempts to reform collective labor laws. In contrast 
to the CUT, the CPC successfully functioned as a legitimate class-wide organization 
able to mobilize employers and galvanize coherent responses to the governments’ 
agendas. Both the CPC’s collective action capacities and its legitimacy to represent 
business class-wide interests were indisputable even during the emergence of the Anti-
reform business front in 2015. Again, different from labor, this “alternative actor” did 
not challenge the CPC’s leadership, nor was its goal to do so.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that the persistence of the 1979 Labor Plan is 
largely the expression of the persistent power imbalance between business and the 
working class. What explains this huge contrast between the collective action capacities 
of employers and workers, and its persistence for nearly three decades since the end of 
the dictatorship? Why was CUT unable to resolve the problem of labor autonomy and 
repeated the mistakes of the past during the 2016 reform, even though its leadership 
claimed to be aware of those mistakes and ceaselessly claimed to defend labor 
autonomy? Why, on the other hand, has the CPC been so reluctant to accept reforms to 
the Labor Code? How has the CPC managed to remain as an organization able to 
generate strong cross-sectoral consensus, represent business class-wide interests vis-à-
vis the state, and influence the policymaking process?    
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In the second part of this dissertation (Chapters 6, 7, and 8) I address all these 
questions by examining the processes through which employers and workers built (or 
reconstructed) the CPC and the CUT since in the years before and after the enactment 
of the 1979 Labor Plan. I will show that the role of the CUT and the CPC in the reform 
periods depended largely on the way that employers and workers built or “resurrected” 
these organizations in the 1980s to deal with the radical socioeconomic transformation 
pursued by the dictatorship and recent experiences of class conflict (associated, for 
example, to the historical events of the socialist government of Salvador Allende). For 
the case of business, the role of the CPC also depended on the way employers organized 
to face the challenges and threats from the arrival of a center-left post-authoritarian 
democratic government. Overall, these processes were key for defining the ways in 
which labor and business framed their class identities and interests, overcome (with 
different degrees of success) collective action problems, and defined their strategies vis-
à-vis the state and political parties during the democratic period. 
		 173 
 	
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II. WORKER AND CAPITALIST COLLECTIVE ACTION, 1973 – 2016
		 174	
6. Approaches to worker and capitalist collective action 
The second part of this dissertation studies worker and business collective 
action. To do so, I develop a historical analysis of the processes that led during the 
dictatorial period (1973 – 1989), to the “resurrection” of the CPC in the early 1980s and 
the re-foundation of the CUT in 1988. In the two cases, my analysis also includes an 
examination of the ways in which workers and employers have engaged in collective 
action during the democratic period (1990 – 2016) to influence, through the CUT and 
the CPC, the policymaking process.  
In this chapter I present different approaches to capitalist and working class 
formation. At the end of this chapter I show the approaches I draw on to answer the 
questions posed at the end of Part I. The empirical evidence used to answer the 
questions and to build the arguments I develop is presented in the two following 
chapters, focused on the CUT (Chapter 7) and the CPC (Chapter 8).  
 
6.1. Identity, interests, and working class formation  
 In sociology, working class collective action has long been studied through the 
concept of class formation. Class formation refers to the process through which classes 
become collectively organized social forces (cf. Przeworski, 1985; Wright, 1997). 
Based on Marx’s class analysis (Marx, 1978 [1852]; Marx & Engels, 1978 [1848]), 
scholars have emphasized different mechanisms in the study of class formation. 
Although not mutually exclusive, the emphasis of these mechanisms has given rise to 
two different approaches to working class collective action.
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 The first approach follows the work of E. P. Thompson (1966), and focuses on 
the processes through which economic-productive experiences (e.g. the experiences of 
exploitation) are handled in “cultural terms”, embodied in “traditions, value systems, 
ideas, and institutional forms” (Thompson, 1966, p. 10). Several researchers have 
extended Thompson’s notion of experience to examine through qualitative and 
historical investigations the cultural and identity mechanisms that lead workers to act 
collectively as a class (cf. Biernacki, 1995; Fantasia, 1988; Sewell, 1980; Steinberg, 
1999)1. The Thompson-inspired analysts have rightly emphasized the need to study 
working class formation by focusing on the processes through which certain shared 
understandings of society, dependent on workers’ lived experiences, are expressed in 
workers’ identities. In this framework, these identities are defined as the basis of class 
solidarities that facilitates collective action among the members of the working class. 
That is why this approach has been described as processual (Crompton, 2008 [1993]; 
Wright & Shin, 1988): it emphasizes the process of class formation that leads to the 
consolidation of a given type of class consciousness and collective action.    
																																																								
1 Despite its enormous influence, Thompson’s framework has been criticized from different angles. Some 
analysts rejected Thompson’s (and Marx’s) analysis by pointing out that it relies upon a “naturalist” and 
“linear” interpretation of social history centered on the idea of proletarianization, as well as upon a “false 
universalism” based on the use of categories that, such as the notion of “working class,” emphasize public 
and masculine attributes at the expense of private and feminine ones (Rose, 1997; J. W. Scott, 1988; 
Somers, 1997). This type of critiques represented a “discursive move” in the analysis of working class 
collective action, and gave rise to important debates on the role played by discourse, politics, and other 
“non-material” determinants of action vis-à-vis the “traditional” determinants emphasized in classical 
Marxism (e.g. economic interests) (cf. Eley & Nield, 2000; J. R. Hall, 1997). Although not endorsing 
these “postmodern” critiques, other scholars also called into question Thompson’s concept of 
“experience” (Sewell, 1990) and his teleological scheme (Katznelson, 1986). Based on this scheme, 
Thompson presumed—wrongly, according to his critics—that in the process of its making the working 
class would inevitably become a revolutionary force totally aware of its “class interests” (Calhoun, 1982; 
Joseph, 1992; Katznelson, 1986).  
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This processual approach to class action has coexisted in recent decades with 
another approach focused more on the structural determinants of class action. This 
structural approach centers the analysis formation on the way that people’s location in 
the relations of production determines their material interests. In other words, rather 
than indicating the emergence of cultural identity among the members of a class, the 
structural approach is preoccupied with the problem of material interests and the way 
that people from different classes recognize them (Wright, 1997, p. 495). Based on this, 
several scholars have examined, mainly through quantitative research, how in current 
capitalist societies class structure and class location shape people’s class consciousness 
(understood as “awareness of their class interest) (Wallace & Junisbai, 2003; Western, 
1999; Wright, 1997).  
This focus on material interests has made scholars analyze class formation and 
solidarities as a “routine problem in collective action” (Joseph, 1992, p. 347). Under the 
assumption that the similarity of interests is a powerful but not sufficient determinant of 
collective action, scholars have drawn upon rational choice framework and game theory 
to examine the conditions under which working class action is more likely (cf. Elster, 
1985; Wright, 1985). For example, following Olson’s (1971 [1965]) suggestion that 
collective action involves individual costs and implies benefits (“public goods”) that are 
not restricted only to those who participated in it, Elster (1985) conceives of class 
consciousness as “the ability to overcome the free-rider problem in realizing class 
interests” (1985, p. 347)2.  
																																																								
2 Elster (1985) contends that collective action takes place only when the contradiction between the 
interests of individual class member and those of the class as a whole is overcome. Thus the probability 
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In general terms, these two approaches emphasize two different subjective-level 
mechanisms facilitating collective action. While the processual/identity-centered 
approach focuses on the way that class experiences create common identities and 
solidarities among the members of class, the structural/interest-centered framework 
focuses on the way class location shapes individual class interests and how these, under 
certain conditions, may lead to class solidarity and action. Both class identity and 
interests occupy a central place in the sociological accounts that have explained 
variations in the type of working class collective action. As I show in the next section, 
through a variety of arguments and explanations these accounts identify different 
mechanism that affect class identity and class interests and, in doing so, shape 
dissimilar patterns of working class collective action.  
 
6.1.1. Understanding variations in working class collective action 
 Most of the empirical research on worker collective action has aimed to explain 
variations in both labor power (usually understood in terms of unionization rates or 
strike activity) and the type of collective action adopted by workers in different political 
economy contexts (e.g. reformism or restraint, militancy or mass mobilization 
strategies, etc.). These two aspects of working class formation have been studied from 
research agendas that emphasize different (but not mutually exclusive) set of 																																																																																																																																																																		
of collective action increases when the individual’s expected utility associated with cooperation 
(participation) is larger than that associated with free riding (p. 352). Based on this principle, Elster 
asserts that the basic problem of collective organization is that of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which 
individuals’ decision to engage in collective action faces the dilemma between participate (cooperative 
game) and abstain (free-rider game) from the group’s action, and the preference for cooperation will 
depend on the expectation that the others will also cooperate. This conditional preference for cooperation 
(conditional altruism) is the essential content of class solidarity that leads to collective action (pp. 359-
363).  
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explanations. These accounts can be grouped in three broad categories: structural-
economic, institutional, and class-politics explanations.   
  
Structural-economic explanations. The impact of industrialization and 
deindustrialization  
 The basis of this argument dates back to Marx and Engels, who argued that 
capitalist development increased mass production and, in doing so, gathered workers 
together like “organized soldiers” with the same interests vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie 
(Marx & Engels, 1978 [1848], p. 479). For Marx and Engels, this commonality of 
interests would take the form of class action, first through workers’ organization in 
trade unions, and then through political parties (Booth, 1978; Elster, 1985, pp. 354-358; 
Marx & Engels, 1978 [1848], pp. 479-481). Both Therborn (1983) and Joseph (1992) 
have argued that the effects of industrialization are mediated through political factors—
particularly the timing of democratization. They contend that powerful, encompassing, 
and “solidaristic” working classes like the one observed in Nordic countries throughout 
the twentieth century are more likely to emerge in countries where industrial takeoff 
occurred before democratization (e.g. extension of universal suffrage). In contrast, when 
democratization and franchise precedes the existence of an organized working class, 
fragmented and more “militant” labor movements (such as those observed in the US, 
Canada or Italy) are more likely to appear (Joseph, 1992). 
 Based on the same premises of the industrialization thesis, since the mid-
twentieth century scholars started to argue that the decline of industrial capitalism and 
the consolidation of “service economy” and “post-industrial” society would inevitably 
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weaken working class collective action (Bell, 1973). Drawing upon different hypotheses 
and arguments, several analysts (Marxist and non-Marxist alike) contended that the 
transformation of the class structure of advanced capitalist nations implied the 
consolidation of white-collar occupations that represented a “new middle class”. This 
new middle class was thought to be a privileged segment within the salaried population, 
more permeated by capitalist values and less prone to join unions than the traditional, 
industrial working class (Bell, 1973; Blau & Duncan, 1967; Gagliani, 1981; 
Goldthorpe, 1982; Lockwood, 1989 [1958]; G. Marshall, Newby, Rose, & Vogler, 
1988; Poulantzas, 1975; Snipp, 1985). In a more extreme version of this argument, 
these economic changes associated to de-industrialization led some scholars to argue 
that class was an outdated category that should not be used for analyzing collective 
action (Pakulski & Waters, 1996). More recently, Craver (2005) has also used the de-
industrialization argument to explain the American labor movement’s incapacity to 
revert the persistent decline of unionization rates.  
 In Latin America, the de-industrialization thesis has been widely used, through 
different arguments, to account for decline in unionization rates observed since the end 
of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) regime (De la Garza, 2001, 2011a; 
Drake, 1996; Roberts, 2002; Stillerman & Winn, 2007; Weller, 1998). In analyzing 
Latin America as a whole, Garretón (2001) and Hershberg (2007) contend that the 
flexibilization of labor relations associated with globalization and post-industrial 
economy led to the decline of  “old” working class identities and interests. In countries 
like Argentina and Mexico, on the other hand, scholars have asserted that the neoliberal 
transformation increased social exclusion, informal employment, and other “non-
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classical” forms of labor (Collier & Handlin, 2009). In all these cases, the structural 
change was argued to debilitate industrial working class struggles traditionally 
expressed in labor-related conflicts and union activity.  
In contrast to the Argentinian and Mexican cases, in Chile scholars have mostly 
followed the “middle-class” version of the de-industrialization argument. In the mid 
1980s Chilean analysts asserted that the neoliberal restructuring led to the shrinking of 
employment in manufacturing, construction, and mining sectors (which were the core of 
the traditional labor movement), while expanding of weakly-unionized, white-collar 
activities in the service, retail, and finance sectors. According to these scholars, 
organized labor was largely unable to recognize these changes. Thus by the late 1980s, 
the labor movement continued to be concentrated in “traditional” industries of the 
economy, even though the percentage of the labor force they represented became less 
and less significant (Campero, 1986; Campero & Valenzuela, 1984; J. Martínez & 
Tironi, 1985). Since the 1990s, Chilean scholars have supplemented this argument with 
the idea of an expanding middle-class, whose values, identities, and lifestyles have been 
argued to be at odds with the development of a strong, ISI regime-like labor movement.  
León and Martínez (2007) and Ruiz and Boccardo (2015) contend, for example, 
that the expansion of the private service sector brought about the growth and 
consolidation of the middle-class in the country (this is what they call the 
“mesocratization” of the Chilean class structure). These authors explain the growth of 
the middle-class by noting the way that the development of the private service sector 
increased the need for high-skilled salaried occupations. Therefore, they argue, this 
process indicates the structural factor behind the emergence in Chile of what 
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Goldthorpe (1982) called “service class” (Ruiz & Boccardo, 2015, pp. 64-68). 
Similarly, in emphasizing the differences between employment in market economy’s 
private sector and that in the public sector (or in state-owned industries) during the ISI 
period, these scholars assert that the structural shift of the economy involved not only 
greater chances of accessing (white-collar) “middle-class” occupations, but also higher 
mobility opportunities—which, unlike the promotion mechanisms predominant in the 
public sector, depend exclusively on individual attributes. Therefore, they conclude that 
the end of the ISI regime meant both the dismantling of the structural foundations of 
traditional unionism (employment in manufacturing) and the destruction of its 
“ideological” underpinnings: unlike ISI industrial relations, in market and service 
economies “individualized” forms of relations predominate, so “entrepreneurial” values 
become prevalent among salaried workers (León & Martínez, 2007, pp. 308-315; Ruiz 
& Boccardo, 2015, p. 156).  
For León and Martínez (2007) this ideological change is one of the main factors 
explaining the lost of legitimacy of the labor movement and its traditional appeals to 
industrial worker and public employees. In line with this argument, through different 
propositions other scholars have suggested that the structural change of the economy 
consolidated, despite Chile’s persistent inequality, consumption-based and middle-class 
identities that weakened the traditional patterns of working class collective action 
(Castillo, Miranda, & Cabib, 2013; Espinoza, Barozet, & Méndez 2013; Méndez 2008).  
The de-industrialization approach has certainly shed light on recent mechanisms 
undermining working class mobilization. Among these, the expansion of private service 
sector activities and its “meritocratic” logics of promotion, as well as the expansion of 
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consumption-based, individualized, and “middle-class” lifestyles associated to it, are 
especially relevant. However, recent research suggests that the impact of some of these 
processes might have been overestimated, at least for the Chilean case, in this 
scholarship. In contrast to the idea of an “expanding” middle class, Table 1 shows that 
in the last decades middle class positions (supervisors and managerial positions) have 
not increased substantially. Thus by 2013 most Chileans (around 75%) continued to 
belong to either the working class or the informal self-employed.   
 
Table 1. Changes in the Chilean class structure, 1992-2013 
 1992 2003 2013 
 N % N % N % 1. Capitalists 41,631 0.9 50,705 0.9 29,106 0.4 
2. Small employers 126,337 2.7 176,896 3.0 84,840 1.2 
3. Petite bourgeoisie  166,874 3.5 302,064 5.2 372,109 5.2 
4. Informal self-
employed 877,442 18.5 903,190 15.6 1,054,839 14.8 
5. Managers 66,446 1.4 81,276 1.4 104,560 1.5 
6. Supervisors 557,486 11.8 708,075 12.2 947,584 13.3 
7. Experts 130,984 2.8 192,922 3.3 271,451 3.8 
8. Working class 2,776,735 58.5 3,386,332 58.4 4,263,120 59.8 
Total 4,743,934 100 5,801,459 100 7,127,609 100 
Source: author’s estimations on the basis of data from CASEN and ENETS surveys. Details on the 
construction of this table can be found in Pérez Ahumada (2017b).  
 
 
In line with this, Figures 2 and 3 also indicate the subjective mechanisms 
affirmed in the de-industrialization thesis as basis for the weakening of labor 
movement—e.g. consolidation of middle class identities and interests—are 
questionable. While Figure 2 shows that Chileans workers uphold comparatively high 
levels of working class identity (measured as working-class self identification), Figure 3 
indicates that Chilean private sector salaried workers hold, along with their Uruguayan 
counterparts, the highest levels of pro-union attitudes (measured as trust in unions) 
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among the selected Latin American countries. This evidence coincides with recent 
research suggesting that the recent the consolidation of market economy in Chile has 
not blurred traditional class distinctions and people’s perceptions of class opposition, 
nor has it produced a “middle-class” class consciousness among white-collar and 
service workers (Gayo, Méndez, & Teitelboim, 2016; Pérez Ahumada, 2014, 2017a).   
 
	
Figure 2. Identification with the working class among working class respondents. Selected countries 
(2009) 
Source: author’s estimations on the basis of data from the ISSP survey (“Social Inequality IV”, 2009). 
The category “working class” is the sum of the categories “lower class” and “working class” of the 
original variable. Respondents classified as “working class” corresponded to unskilled and skilled 
workers, as defined by Wright (1997).  
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Figure 3. Trust in unions among private sector salaried workers. Selected countries (1996-2015) 
Source: author’s elaboration on the basis of data from Latinobarómetro survey. Data represent the 
percentage of respondents (private sector salaried workers) who declared to have “a lot” and “some” trust 
in unions.  
 
 
Institutional explanations: labor law and state policies  
 Along with the level of industrialization or de-industrialization, institutional 
factors (particularly the nature of labor legislation) have been proved to shape working 
class formation in several ways. The institutional literature contends that the laws and 
regulations governing collective relations between employers and workers (e.g. right to 
strike and collective bargaining) provide different mixtures of “constraint” and 
“inducement” for workers to act collectively (Collier & Collier, 1979, p. 969). In doing 
so, institutions shape diverse patterns of working class power (commonly defined in 
terms of unionization rates, concentration, and centralization) and the type of collective 
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action adopted by workers (e.g. militancy or restraint) (Caraway, 2006; Riddell, 1993; 
Rogers, 1990)3.  
For instance, scholars interested in corporatism assert that corporatist regulations 
that promote nation- or industry-wide bargaining are associated with more centralized 
and coordinated labor movements (cf. Calmfors & Driffill, 1988; Golden, 1993; Hassel, 
2015; Lange & Garrett, 1985; Wallerstein et al., 1997). According to these scholars, 
corporatist labor movements differ from those existing under liberal legal systems in 
two important respects. First, as a consequence of their higher centralization and 
coordination, corporatist labor movements are usually more powerful than those 
existing under liberal regulations. Second, higher coordination and centralization makes 
them more able to control their affiliates and therefore more likely to exercise restraint. 
In contrast to corporatist systems, liberal or “pluralist” regulations encourage the 
fragmentation and decentralization of unions and bargaining. This makes labor 
movements not only weaker but also are more likely to pursue highly particularistic, 
economically “militant” bargaining strategies vis-à-vis employers. Thus pluralist 
systems of industrial relations and interest intermediation have been argued to promote 
higher distributive conflict and political instability than corporatist systems (Crouch, 
1993; Paloheimo, 1984; Schmitter, 1981). According to Rogers (1990, p. 76), under 
pluralist systems workers’ economic militancy is explained by the way in which liberal 
regulations fragment union organizations and the decentralized bargaining, and at the 																																																								
3 Olson (1971 [1965]) offers a different view on the effect of labor laws on collective action. In his 
classical formulation he states that labor legislation, as concerned with collective interests of workers, 
will never offer individual incentives for workers to pursue “class conscious” actions (1971 [1965], pp. 
106-107). In doing so, he implies that legislation would hardly help class organizations overcome 
collective action problems. 
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same time force workers to look for employer-provided social and labor protections, 
which in corporatist systems would be socialized as “social rights”. 
Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) have also theorized about the importance of labor 
legislation. They do not see labor law as the “ultimate cause” of the type of collective 
action adopted by workers (for them that cause has be found in the intra-organizational 
dilemmas of the working class associated with its “dialogical” pattern of collective 
action). Yet Offe and Wiesenthal contend that the corporatist “juridification” of class 
relations leads to what they define as a dissociation of representation from struggle 
(1980, p. 102). This process of dissociation is defined by workers’ rational and 
inescapable (but unstable and reversible) adoption of opportunism, expressed in three 
inter-related processes: 1) the inversion of means over ends observed when the desire to 
maintain the organization through legal recognition becomes more important than the 
pursuit of its goals), 2) the emphasis on short-term gains and losses vis-à-vis long-term 
struggles, and 3) the primacy of tactical bargaining over strategic mass mobilization.   
According to Offe and Wiesenthal, the main effect of opportunism and the 
dissociation of representation from struggle is working class moderation. In fact, 
opportunism denotes the transition from small, militant, weak, and non-bureaucratized 
unions to large, legally recognized, bureaucratized, and more powerful unions, which 
unlike small and militant unions tend to take the rules of the game for granted. 
Therefore, opportunism indicates the progressive abandonment of the archetypal 
“dialogical” pattern of working class collective action, through which small and militant 
unions mobilize their members (individual workers) by creating collective solidarities 
that make them act in defense of their class (not individual) interests. In corporatist 
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systems this dialogical pattern is increasingly replaced with a “monological” one, in 
which bureaucratized unions become less interested in creating collective interests and 
solidarities than in executing “top down” commands to their affiliates. 
Offe and Wiesenthal contend that in advanced capitalist societies opportunism is 
the best way to empower and legally protect workers’ organizations vis-à-vis employer 
hostility. However, opportunism is somewhat reversible when the legal guarantees to 
the union are undermined by business—e.g. by employers’ demands for “less rigid” 
labor legislation—and when, as a result of this, renewed forms of militancy appear. 
Although renewed militancy usually leads to new phases of working class mobilization 
in which workers have higher levels of political awareness vis-à-vis business, it also 
implies crises, splits, and strategic confrontations within the already existing 
organization. Thus, these confrontations can operate as sources of weakness for labor.       
To the best of my knowledge, the structural opportunism thesis has not been 
directly addressed in Latin America. However, numerous scholars have emphasized the 
importance of labor institutions and law provisions (cf. Anner, 2008; A. Marshall, 
2005). Decades ago, in their analysis of Latin American corporatism Collier and Collier 
(1979) noted that although corporatist provisions undermine labor autonomy, they also 
function as “inducements” through which unions obtain official recognition, monopoly 
of representation, compulsory membership, and subsidies. Based on this, several 
scholars have suggested that that during the ISI period organized labor in Argentina and 
Mexico was comparatively stronger than in Chile, because in Chile labor laws not only 
promoted union fragmentation but also did not provide unions with several inducements 
existing in the corporatist-like regimes of these countries (e.g. mandatory union 
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membership or union-provided welfare services) (Angell, 1972; Carnes, 2014; A. 
Marshall, 2005). In a similar way, in his analysis of Latin American dictatorships, 
Drake (1996) contended that unlike Brazil, where corporatist laws coexisted with a pro-
industrialization orientation, in countries such as Uruguay and especially Chile the de-
industrialization approach of the dictatorship was accompanied by labor law changes 
carried out with the overt goal of atomizing the labor movement.  
Unsurprisingly, the “atomizing” regulations articulated in the 1979 Labor Plan 
have been one of the main factors emphasized in the explanations of labor weakness in 
Chile (cf. Álvarez, 2012; Barrett, 2001; Campero & Valenzuela, 1984; Cook, 2007; 
Drake, 1996; Durán, 2013; Feres, 2007; Frank, 2004; López, 2009; Winn, 2004). 
According to Álvarez (2012), the 1979 Labor Plan was the only successful attempt by 
the dictatorship to discipline and depoliticize the working class through the imposition 
of market principles on industrial relations—particularly the extreme flexibilization and 
individualization of the worker-employer relations. Based on these principles the 1979 
Labor Plan consolidated, as shown in Chapter 1, a series of legal changes that until the 
present time have atomized and fragmented of unions, permitted “syndical parallelism” 
at all levels, decentralized collective bargaining, and put strong limits on the right to 
strike (Durán, 2013; Feres, 2009b; Narbona, 2014; Rojas, 2007). 
 
Class, parties, and action: the class politics approach   
Finally, the class politics research agenda offers a large set of explanations 
centered on the way that a variety of sociopolitical dynamics associated with the 
interaction between parties, unions, and the state shape different patterns of working 
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class formation. Within this framework, the idea of labor incorporation—i.e. the 
successful attempts by the state or the elite to legitimate and shape institutionalized 
labor movements, (Collier & Collier, 2002 [1991], p. 161)—has long occupied a central 
place in the literature. Based on this definition, Collier and Collier (2002 [1991]) 
demonstrated that the way in which labor was incorporated into the political systems of 
Latin America (that is, through elite- or party-led strategies) defined the type of labor-
party relations and political coalitions predominant for several decades in the continent. 
Recently, Eidlin (2014) drew upon the notion of labor incorporation to explain 
divergences between labor power in the US and Canada throughout the twentieth 
century.  
Other scholars have noted that working class collective action is a function of 
the type of relation established between unions, labor parties, and the state (especially 
when labor parties are the office-holding party). These relations have been especially 
emphasized in the scholarship espousing the Marxist and the Power Resources 
approaches. Through different arguments, these two approaches contend that left rule 
and union-party linkages positively affect working class power by reinforcing workers’ 
class consciousness and their associational capacities (cf. Huber & Stephens, 2001; 
Korpi, 1985, 2008; Wright, 1997). Marxists, for example, see parties as key agents 
promoting or strengthening working class consciousness, organization, and action (cf. 
Lenin, 1999 [1902]; Marx, 1978 [1852]; Weakliem & Adams, 2011; Wright, 1997). 
Power Resource scholars, on the other hand, focus on the assets (i.e. power resources) 
that actors bring into distributive conflicts within different institutional arenas. Among 
these arenas, the labor market is claimed to be especially relevant because it defines the 
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structural imbalance of resources between employers and workers—which are argued to 
be two of the most important actors of distributive conflicts in Western societies. Labor 
market also shapes the institutional settings that allow employers to control employment 
and, as a result, to exercise power over the outcomes of employment relations (Korpi & 
Palme, 2003, p. 427). Given this structural imbalance of assets, in the Power Resource 
Approach workers are thus expected to gain power to advance their interests through 
allied parties in the form of protective labor legislation, political rights, franchise, etc. 
(Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 2008). Similar to the literature on corporatism, some 
Power Resource scholars suggest that center-left rule and stronger working class power 
facilitates labor restraint and collaboration, while improving the prospects for 
Keynesian-style class compromises (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1985; for a Marxist 
interpretation of this see Wright, 2015).  
Party-union linkages are perhaps one of the factors most cited in the literature on 
working class collective action in Latin America before and after the authoritarian 
regimes (cf. Cook, 2007; Drake, 1996; Madrid, 2003; Murillo, 2001; Roberts, 2002). In 
describing the Latin American pre-dictatorial labor movements, Drake (1996) noted that 
labor parties were central developers of working class organization: “they supplied 
workers with union and party leaders, legal aid, legislative victories, influence with 
government agencies, media outlets, political education, and allies from other social 
sectors, such as professionals and students” (p. 22). Scholars have also noted that where 
unions were weak (e.g. Chile) parties dominated the relationship, while where unions 
were strong (e.g. Argentina) the logic of the relation was the inverse (Angell, 1972; 
Drake, 1996). In this context, during the pre-dictatorial period the Chilean working 
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class stood out as a case in which the labor movement sought to overcome its weakness 
by establishing “radical” alliances with strongly institutionalized, and ideologically 
committed Marxist parties (the Socialist and Communist Parties). This type of 
relationship contrasted with the “labor populist” or “corporatist” alliances where the 
labor movement allied with populist and weakly organized political programs (this was 
the case, for instance, of the Argentine working class and its relation with the Peronists) 
(Angell, 1972; Cook, 2007; Drake, 1996; Roberts, 2006). 
In line with this argument, Latin American scholarship has demonstrated that 
one of the main—and perhaps more enduring—effects of the dictatorial regimes was the 
weakening of the party-union ties forged during the ISI period (Álvarez, 2010; Drake, 
1996; Feres, 2009a; Garretón, 2001; Roberts, 2002; Winn, 2004). Analysts have 
suggested that in countries such as Brazil and Uruguay repression was less intense, in 
part because workers’ party allies were non-ideological, catch-all parties, which in some 
cases engaged in negotiations with the authoritarian governments. In contrast, in 
countries like Chile the most important labor parties had clear Marxist orientations, so 
they represented a bigger threat for the military regime. Consequently, dictatorial 
repression and the destruction of party-union linkages were more severe, and its effects 
were comparatively more lasting and difficult to revert (Drake, 1996; Winn, 2004).  
Although important, political repression was not the only factor explaining the 
weakness of labor in the post-dictatorial period. Roberts (2002) suggests that another 
key factor has to do with the ideological transformation of labor parties. In Chile, with 
the exception of the Communist Party, the main center-left parties in Chile have 
abandoned—whether for ideological or strategic reasons—class politics. This has had 
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important implications for the working class. The ideological “renovation” of the 
Socialist Party implied, for example, not only its de-unionization, but also the adoption 
of “business friendly” stances, the rejection of ideological programs centered on the 
idea of “working class”, and consequently the abandonment of political strategies 
aiming to strengthen working class organization (Barrett, 2001; D. Barría, Araya, & 
Drouillas, 2012; Espinosa, 2007; Feres, 2009a; Frank, 2004). 
Despite the deep transformation of center-left parties, union-party ties in Chile 
have remained quite stable. Throughout the democratic period, the CUT has continued 
to be subordinated to the PC, PS, and the DC and the government coalitions the have 
formed (first the PS-DC-led Concertación, then the Nueva Mayoría along with the PC). 
In relation to this, scholarly research has argued that the CUT’s political subordination 
has had negative consequences for the labor movement as a whole. In addition to being 
ineffective as a means to influence policymaking, it has “over-politicized” the CUT’s 
internal structures. This has not only compromised labor autonomy, but also widened 
the gap between high-rank and rank-and-file workers. In doing so, it has also 
deteriorated the legitimacy of the CUT among plant-level leaders, who tend to the see it 
as a “political” and “undemocratic” organization detached from the day-today 
experiences of workers (Espinosa, 2007; Feres, 2009a; Frías, 2008; Gutierrez, 2016; 
Leiva, 2013; Osorio, 2015). Based on this, both scholars and labor activists (included 
many affiliated with the CUT) have contended that party control is, along with the 
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CUT’s lack of internal democracy, the main obstacles for the revitalization the labor 
movement in Chile (Espinosa, 2007; Feres, 2016; Frías, 2008; Leiva, 2013)4. 
Contrary to the Chilean case, and in line with the expectations of the Power 
Resource Approach, in other Latin American countries party-union linkages have been 
argued to benefit the working class power. For instance, Murillo (2005) and Murillo and 
Schrank (2005) assert that partisan linkages are usually associated, when labor parties 
are in office, with more protective labor regulations. In a similar way, Madrid (2003) 
contends that the success of the Argentine and Mexican labor movement in resisting 
neoliberal reforms in the 1990 was largely explained by the way in which the main 
labor confederations enjoyed linkages with the ruling parties, which were in turn open 
to listen to labor demands. Like Madrid, Murillo (2001) studied the cases of Argentina, 
Mexico, and Venezuela, and pointed out that labor’s success in opposing neoliberal 
reforms—which in some cases implied the use of militant strategies and in others the 
use of restrain—depended largely on the shape taken by the ties between parties and 
union leaders. Particularly, it depended on whether union leaders were loyal to parties, 
whether there existed party competition for unions’ leadership, and whether there were 
unions competing to each other for the representation of workers in the same sectors. 
Based on these premises, Levitsky (2003) affirms that Argentina’s shift to neoliberalism 
observed in some policy areas was possible only after the Peronist Partido Justicialista 
could de-unionize it structures. This “de-unionization” weakened working class power 																																																								
4 For recent critiques from labor leaders see: “Dirigentes sindicales acusan a la CUT de prácticas 
antidemocráticas”, Diario UChile, January 30, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://radio.uchile.cl/2017/01/30/dirigentes-sindicales-acusan-a-la-cut-de-practicas-antidemocraticas/. 
Accessed on January 30, 2017; “Mario Aguilar: Si la CUT no corrige va camino a una crisis terminal”, 
Diairo UChile, February 2, 2017. Retrieved from: http://radio.uchile.cl/2017/02/02/mario-aguilar-si-la-
cut-no-corrige-va-camino-a-una-crisis-terminal/. Accessed on February 2, 2017 
		
194 
and helped party leaders to eliminate a potential source of intra-party opposition to 
President Menem’s market-oriented agenda.  
Drawing upon similar arguments, some scholars have recently explained union 
revitalization in countries such as Argentina or Uruguay by pointing to the 
reconstruction of traditional linkages between unions and pro labor-coalitions (e.g. the 
Frente Amplio in Uruguay) or pro-labor sectors within parties (e.g. the Kirchnerismo in 
Argentina) (Buchanan, 2008; Etchemendy & Collier, 2007; Quiñones, 2011; Senén, 
2011). Other authors have also suggested that labor revitalization can also succeed 
when the reconstruction of these linkages develops by meeting the challenges imposed 
by the structural economic changes—e.g. when unions successfully integrate workers 
marginalized from the formal labor force (De la Garza, 2011b; Elbert, 2017).   
Through explanations like these the class-politics approach has contributed to 
the analysis of working class formation in two important ways. First, it has rightly 
identified variations in working class formation derived from the particular ways in 
which party-union linkages are constructed or transformed over time (e.g. variations 
associated with the dominant or subordinated position of unions vis-à-vis parties or with 
the ideological or programmatic transformation of parties). Second, the class-politics 
approach has also been helpful to nuance structural-economic and other forms of 
“structuralist” accounts, which sometimes oversimplify explanations for the decline of 
labor power or for unions’ adoption of particular types of collective action strategies. 
For instance, in addition to showing that deindustrialization is not inevitably associated 
with union decline, class-politics research has also suggested that neither declines in 
union memberships nor higher levels of concentration and coordination lead necessarily 
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to restraint (such as usually argued in corporatist theories) (cf. Etchemendy & Collier, 
2007; Murillo, 2001).   
 
6.2. Capitalist class formation and action 
Unlike the study of working class formation, the analysis of business collective 
action has not taken for granted capitalists’ need for collective action. Engels (2010 
[1881]), for example, affirmed that due to their small number capitalists usually do not 
need to form associations such as workers do. Other scholars have drawn upon the 
notion of “structural power”—understood as the power derived from capitalists’ control 
over investment decisions—to contend that it allows capitalists to influence state 
policies without the need to act collectively (Block, 1977; Hacker & Pierson, 2002; 
Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1988). In its most extreme version, this line of reasoning 
argues that business does not need to “control” state apparatuses—and therefore engage 
in concerted collective action—because in capitalist societies the state performs the 
function of both reproducing the relations of production and coordinating employers’ 
general interests (Poulantzas, 1973; Therborn, 1978). 
Over the last decades research has stopped addressing the question of whether 
business needs to engage in collective action or not (Burris, 2005, p. 250). Instead it has 
focused on the forces that threaten to divide the business community at any given time, 
and the mechanisms through which (some degree) of business unity is achieved. These 
questions have been addressed in two different bodies of literature. The first one focuses 
on the mechanisms through which the capitalist class reinforces its class-wide interests 
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and identities and, in so doing, its chances of acting collectively, while the second one 
focuses on business associations as a particular expression of collective action and 
power mobilization. As I will show, this latter body of literature is particularly relevant 
for understanding business ability to influence policymaking in Chile.  
 
6.2.1. Mechanisms for business identity, interests, and collective action 
A first mechanism noted in this first body of literature refers to interlocking 
directorates. They have been argued to be the foundation of an “inner circle” consisting 
of a small group of managers of the large firms who, given their strategic position, are 
more likely to act on behalf of class-wide interests, that is, interests that are wider than 
those of individual firms (Useem, 1983). Based on this, scholars have defined 
interlocking directorates as a key factor reinforcing collective action (Mizruchi, 1996; 
Murray, 2014; Useem, 1983, 1984; Zeitlin, 1989). Recently, Chu and Davis (2016) have 
contended that the weakening of the “inner circle” in the 21st century—which according 
to them is the result of firms’ declining preferences for well-connected, multiboard 
directors—might undermine the chances for unified, broad-based political actions by 
the corporate elite.  
Along with interlocking directorates, scholars have emphasized the processes 
through capitalist collective action is reinforced by ideological or discursive 
mechanisms. In their analysis of PAC contributions over the 1956 and 1982 election 
cycles, Burris and Salt (1990) rejected the hypothesis that large and competitive firms 
are more willing to accept the costs of liberal reforms by showing that conservatism 
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defined the political behavior of the majority of American firms (even those large and 
competitive). Similar findings were found in Neustadtl and Clawson’s (1988) study of 
PAC contributions, which concluded that conservatism is a strong unifying basis of 
American business political behavior. Likewise, other scholars and have pointed to the 
importance of ideologies, collective discourses, and identities to explain differences in 
business attitudes toward labor organization (Haydu, 2008) and globalization (Cammett, 
2005).  
Finally, this scholarship has also emphasized mechanisms related to the extra-
economic processes such as kinship relations, social ties, and other forms of non-
economic practices (e.g. membership in social clubs), which have been proven to 
reinforce capitalists’ identities and interests. J. Scott (1997) and Zeitlin (1989) 
demonstrate that kinship relations are central determinants of capitalist collective action 
insofar as they key play a key role in strengthening employers’ class identities. 
Regarding social ties, Haydu (2008) suggests that when business economic 
organizations (e.g. trade associations) strengthen rather than transcend sectoral 
differences, capitalist class solidarity can emerge in realms where employers organize 
more broadly, such as the civic arena of political reform, city boosterism, and cultural 
philanthropy. Recently Barnes (2017) has argued that extra-economic ties such those 
formed through corporate directors’ participation in non-profit foundations, private 
social clubs, and policy planning organizations were key throughout the second half of 
the 20th century for maintaining social cohesion among the members of the American 
economic elite.  
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The case of Latin America: virtues and limitations of the research on business 
interests, identity, and action  
In Latin American societies, the structure of business differs in several respects 
from that of advanced capitalist nations. In Latin America the business sector stands 
out, among other things, for the high share of small firms, for the importance of 
business groups (gupos económicos), family ownership and management, and 
multinational companies (Karcher & Schneider, 2012, pp. 274-275). Despite these 
differences the three groups of mechanisms identified in the literature have been said to 
be important determinants business collective action in both Chile and Latin America. 
For example, Khanna and Rivkin (2006) note the importance of interlocking 
directorates in Chile by arguing that they are one of the strongest delineators of the 
boundaries of economic groups. They even suggest that such type of “fragile ties” might 
even become more important than family ties in defining the shape of economic groups 
(2006, p. 347). Along with this, the works by Erica Salvaj (Salvaj, 2013; Salvaj & 
Couyoumdjian, 2016) have shown that since at least the 1960s interlocking directorates 
in Chile have reproduced a network largely defined by high levels of cohesion and unity 
among its main components, business groups.  
Likewise scholars have emphasized ideological and discursive mechanisms by 
suggesting that they are central for understanding how Chilean employers succeeded in 
adapting themselves to the radical market reforms of the mid and late 1970s (cf. 
Campero, 1995; Gárate, 2012; Montero, 1997; Schurman, 1996; Undurraga, 2014). 
According to these investigations, Chilean capitalists lived through a deep process of 
ideological transformation and learning, through which they unified their worldview 
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and built clear entrepreneurial discourse. This ideological transformation became the 
basis of employers’ strong commitment to the neoliberal project observed until the 
present (Arriagada, 2004; Undurraga, 2014). Thumala (2007) has even suggested that 
the affiliation to ultraconservative catholic movements helped the members of the 
Chilean economic elite to consolidate their economic interests.  
Finally, regarding non-economic ties and practices, both Granovetter (2005) and 
Schneider (2013) assert that in Latin American countries kinship relations have been 
historically much more important for the formation of business groups than in 
developed nations. Similarly, in their study of Chilean business throughout the 20th 
century Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1988) coined the concept of “kinecon” to describe the way 
the Chilean ruling class constituted itself through the overlaps between business, 
politics, and kinship.  
Overall, this literature indicates that capitalist interests and identities are 
reinforced by mechanisms taking place both within and outside the economic realm. 
This research’s attention to interests, identities, and other subjective-level processes 
such as discourses and ideologies is helpful for understanding not only the conditions 
under which collective action might occur, but also the content of that action. In effect, 
and as I show in Chapter 8, Chilean capitalists’ attitudes toward labor reform during the 
democratic period cannot properly be understood without considering the ideological 
transformation of individual employers occurred during the dictatorship. However, the 
mechanisms emphasized in this literature fall short to explain collective action as 
expressed in, for example, the formation of business associations. Following Bowman 
(1989), this literature emphasizes mechanisms that, while enhancing inter-firm 
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communication, do not rely on coercive instruments (e.g. selective incentives) to punish 
defection and therefore ensure collective action. Perhaps as a result of this focus on 
“soft” collective action mechanisms, this literature leaves unanswered several questions, 
which are key for understanding the role of the CPC during the reform processes.  
First, evidence indicates that some mechanisms emphasized in this research 
might not be enough to explain the actual power of business. For example, in their 
analysis of interlocking directorates in Chile, Salvaj and Couyoumdjian (2016) 
demonstrate that the highly cohesive and unified network forged during the ISI period 
fell apart in the 1980s. They show that due to the radical free market policies and the 
financial crisis of 1981-2, a new and more fragmented network appeared in that decade. 
Based on this, they conclude that the 1980s was a period in which business power 
declined significantly (Salvaj & Couyoumdjian, 2016, p. 136). In some respects, this 
interpretation contrasts with that from the literature on business associations, which 
asserts that the 1980s was precisely the decade when a new “business actor” 
consolidated its power through the strengthening of the CPC (Álvarez, 2015; Campero, 
1995; Montero, 1993; Schneider, 2004; E. Silva, 1996). In line with latter literature, the 
evidence I present in this dissertation indicates that even though the fragmentation of 
the interlocking directorates ties did exist (as rightly shown by Salvaj and 
Couyoumdjian), its political effects were probably offset by processes occurred within 
business associations and expressed in the resurrection of the CPC.  
Second, the literature analyzed so far does not pay much attention to the 
processes through which businesspeople decide to strengthen encompassing peak 
business associations—i.e. associations that, like the CPC, represent multi-sectoral 
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interests—as the privilege means to engage in collective action and influence 
policymaking. Encompassing peak associations are indeed particularly important for 
business to exercise its “instrumental power”, i.e. that power which unlike structural 
power entails deliberate and concerted actions to influence policymaking (Block, 1977; 
Fairfield, 2015; Karcher & Schneider, 2012). In analytical terms, instrumental power is 
central because, as suggested by Hacker and Pierson (2002, pp. 282-283), it allows us to 
specify the mechanisms and the extent to which business can actually influence 
policymaking. Although instrumental power comprises a huge variety of channels—
from campaign finance to direct (and in Latin America largely unregulated) contacts to 
lobby top state officials and the Legislature—encompassing associations are one of the 
main tools through capitalists interact with the state and parties to pursue their interests 
regarding policymaking (Durand & Silva, 1998; Fairfield, 2015; Karcher & Schneider, 
2012; Schmitter & Streeck, 1999; Schneider, 2004; Traxler, Blaschke, & Kittel, 2001) 
Finally, due to its inattention to the specific processes involved in the formation 
of associations, the literature reviewed so far partially ignores the type of collective 
action problems capitalists face while forming (or in the case of the CPC “reviving”) 
these associations. In so doing, it does not explain why in contexts like Chile employers 
succeed in overcoming collective action problems and were bale to turn encompassing 
association into effective channels to exercise power.  
Questions like these have been addressed in the literature on encompassing 
business associations. It contends that associations become successful when they are 
able to attract members, build class-wide consensus (and enforce them), and extract 
resources from political parties or the state (e.g. official recognition, legal protections, 
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and right to participate in policymaking forums) (cf. Schmitter & Streeck, 1999; Traxler 
et al., 2001). This type of explanations is a good starting point for analyzing the 
developments of the CPC. Without neglecting the impact of mechanisms such as 
interlocking directorates, ideologies, and kinship relations, the literature on 
encompassing business associations is helpful for examining how the CPC managed to 
confront the labor reforms by lining the business sector up around coherent demands 
and strategies vis-à-vis the government, parties, and labor. In what follows I present the 
main aspects of this scholarly research.  
 
6.2.2. Encompassing business associations, policymaking, and power  
 This research revolves around two interrelated questions. First, it examines how 
encompassing business are formed or, to put it differently, what leads employers to 
form associations (or join them). Second, it aims to explain how and under what 
conditions these associations succeed in becoming effective means to represent business 
interests and affect policymaking. Schmitter and Streeck (1999, p. 19) analyze these by 
defining them as expressions of two particular organizational logics of business 
associations. While the first one (defined by Schmitter and Streeck as “logic of 
membership”) refers to the way in which associations offer incentives for their members 
to provide them with resources for its survival, the second one (“logic of influence”) 
denotes the means through which associations enable (or not) their members to exercise 
influence over public authorities and, in so doing, to extract from this exchange 
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adequate resources—state recognition, subsidies, concessions, etc.—to survive and 
prosper5.   
The empirical study of these organizational logics is difficult because capitalists’ 
organization differs significantly from that of other classes (say, the working class). For 
example, unlike unions the members of employer associations are firms, not individual. 
In addition, the way the associations relate to firms varies widely across national 
political economies: in some cases firms are obliged to obtain dual membership with 
both the encompassing—“peak level”—association and the sectoral association directly 
related to it; in others firms may choose between direct membership in the peak 
association and indirect affiliation via one of its lower-level affiliates. Yet in most of the 
cases—the Chilean CPC included—firms are only indirectly affiliated to the peak 
organization via their sectoral representatives (Traxler, 2000, p. 309).   
In addition to the relation between associations and their members, another 
complexity lies in the diversity of the domains associations represent. In some countries 
associations can represent the entire business sector (including publicly owned firms) 
or, while inter-sectoral, confine their membership to a limited number of industries. In 
other countries, associations can be divided by type of ownership (e.g. specialized in 
publicly owned companies or cooperatives), political/ideological allegiance or firm size 
(usually large firms form encompassing associations separated from small and medium-
sized firms) (Traxler et al., 2001, pp. 49-51). Associations can also be divided according 																																																								
5 Based on this, Schmitter and Streeck (1999) argue that the organizational properties of associations are 
shaped by the way in which one of these logics predominates. Associations in which the logic of 
membership predominates will tend to develop organization properties that lead to “pluralist” forms of 
representation and action, while association in which the logic of influence is more important will lead to 
“corporatist” types of action.  
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to the tasks in which they are specialized. Here the main divide is between employer 
associations representing business interests as producers—i.e. vis-à-vis the labor market 
and the industrial relation system that regulates it—and trade associations, which 
represent businesspeople as traders, that is, in their dealings with state regulations such 
as tariffs, taxes, etc. Sometimes the same association can perform both tasks 
simultaneously (cf. Behrens & Traxler, 2004, pp. 2-3; Schmitter & Streeck, 1999; 
Streeck, 1998, pp. 183-184).  
Finally, another complexity is more practical and lies in the difficulty of 
conducting research on business associations as such. In Latin America political 
engagement by employers is difficult to grasp and quantitative, reliable data are scarce 
(Karcher & Schneider, 2012, p. 280), and even in developed nations quantitative data 
on business associations’ membership are difficult to obtain (Schmitter & Streeck, 
1999; Traxler, 2000). This explains in part why despite their importance business 
collective action has remained understudied in Latin America (Karcher & Schneider, 
2012).   
Despite these difficulties, the literature on encompassing associations has 
offered a broad set of explanations for the question of why employers form/join 
associations, and how these associations become successful means to influence 
policymaking. These explanations can be grouped in four approaches: 1) the two-logics 
of collective action, 2) economic, 3) institutionalist, and 4) politics and class struggle 
approaches.  
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Two-logics of collective action  
 In contrast to the economic, institutionalist, and politics-class struggle 
explanations, the two-logic approach conceives of capitalist collective largely as 
unproblematic. Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) coined the idea of “two logics of collective 
action” to argue that there are substantial differences in the “logic” through which 
workers and capitalists organize collectively by forming trade unions and business 
associations. Particularly they contend that capitalist associations action do not depend, 
as workers’ organizations do, on the establishment of dialogical relations through which 
the individual employer can recognize his/her collective interests. Because of their 
position in the relations of production and their hegemonic power, capitalists’ collective 
action depends simply, to maintain that position of power, on an instrumental-
monological logic of organization based solely on the association of aggregated private 
interests.  
The main implication of Offe and Wiesenthal’s argument is that the formation of 
business associations does not imply the overcoming of serious collective action 
problems. In the two-logic argument business associations differ from trade unions in 
that they do not require the collective mobilization of their members (e.g. solidarity 
strategies) to represent and form their collective interests; nor do they have to bother 
with the formulation of “ideologies” to attract members while antagonizing others. 
Rather business associations’ internal integration and survival rely simply on the 
provision of “selective incentives” to their members such as advice and information 
(Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980, pp. 83-85). 
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 Offe and Wiesenthal’s framework has been labeled as “structuralist” because it 
treats the chances to organize class interest as a function of class position (Roy & 
Parker-Gwin, 1999). Based on this, during the last decades several scholars have 
criticized Offe and Wiesenthal’s framework by focusing on different aspects and 
hypotheses derived from it. For example, Streeck (1998) compared the number of 
business associations and trade unions in different economic sectors of several 
developed countries and found that trade unions were more, rather than less, 
encompassing than business associations. In contrast to what would be expected from 
Offe and Wiesenthal’s argument, Streeck found that business associations were usually 
small as they represent sectoral, fragmented interests. This suggests for Streeck that far 
from being “easy to organize”, capitalists are willing to join associations only if they are 
“narrow enough to cater to their immediate special interests, and if they are small 
enough to make for low transaction costs and a strong incentive against free-riding” 
(1998, p. 175)6.  
Similar to Streeck, Bowman (1998) analyzed the case of the Confederation of 
Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) and showed that Norwegian capitalists are exposed to two 
qualitatively different collective action problems. The first problem involves collective 
goods provided by NHO such as lobbying activity, and is observed as a problem of 
association recruitment that can be solved simply through selective incentives (private 
goods provided by the NHO in exchange for membership). According to Bowman, the 
																																																								
6 Another important implication of Streeck’s analysis has to do with the concept of opportunism. Again in 
contrast to Offe and Wiesenthal, Streeck contends that unions adopt opportunism not because they 
become like business associations, but rather because in doing so they do not assume the organizational 
properties of business associability, characterized by high levels of interest heterogeneity (pp. 184-185).      
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resolution of this collective action problem is structured through a monological logic of 
action because the individual employer who pays to join the association and receive 
private goods does not need to be “educated” to realize that what is in his or her own 
interests is in the interest of the collectivity. However, the second collective action 
problem faced by the NHO—coordination of market behavior observed, for example, in 
concerted moderation of wage increases —does require a dialogical solution because it 
implies making concessions on individual capitalists’ central-life interests. In the 
Norwegian case, Bowman shows that the resolution of this challenge implied efforts by 
the NHO aiming to convince executives of the member firms that labor costs were 
important and should be controlled “in the community’s interests” (Bowman, 1998, p. 
327).  
A different challenge to the two-logic argument can be found in Haydu’s (1999) 
and Lawrence’s (2014) studies of collective action. In his labor-capital relations in the 
late 19th century, Haydu argues that the development of class-wide solidarities required, 
both for employers and workers, overcoming attachments to trade and workplace 
interests. Similarly, Lawrence (2014, p. 331) concludes that the business organization is 
more “easy” does not hold in periods of economic crises in which employers (including 
large firms) find it increasingly to associate to represent collective interests and create 
stable hegemonic systems of workplace, state-level, and transnational rule.       
Like these scholars, Roy and Parker-Gwin (1999) affirm that capitalist and 
working class collective action differ from each other not because of structural features 
of capitalism but rather as a result of institutional, political (state-related), and cultural 
processes. In analyzing class conflict in the late 19th century Roy and Parker-Gwin show 
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how these processes gave rise to a particular political and institutional framework 
whose regulations that permitted business to associate and merge (corporate laws), and 
allowed to file injunctions against unions (labor laws). These regulations reinforced not 
only the homogenization of interests among employers, but also strengthened their 
associations, and at the same time put strong limits on working class mobilization. 
Based on this, Roy and Parker-Gwin explain that apparent “structural” asymmetry of 
power between capital and labor is historical because it refers to the particular ways in 
which interests and identities are converted into organization and, in turn, to the ways in 
which class organizations construct interests and identities. In noting this two-sided 
relationship, they argue that interests should not be seen as “antecedents” of 
organization (like Offe and Wiesenthal do), but rather as cause and effect of them7. 
According to Roy and Parker-Gwin (1999, p. 208), the main implication of this is that 
the “free-rider” problem should not be explained through a “logic of collective action” 
abstractly defined, but rather through an analysis of the specific, historically situated 
relationship between interests, identities, and organization. In effect, this historical 
relationship is what has allowed business to be more successful in engaging in 
collective action than labor.  
  Traxler (1993) compared the levels of organization (or what he calls 
“organizability”) of business associations and trade unions in developed countries and 
reached to similar conclusions. He identified three dimensions of a class’ organizability: 																																																								
7 Like Roy and Parker-Gwin, Traxler (1993, p. 677) contends that both Offe and Wiesenthal’s (1980) and 
Olson’s (1971 [1965]) theories share the same utilitarian premises according to which business’ levels of 
organization is as a function of interest distribution. Thus, according to Traxler neither of these theories 
clarifies how the relationship between interests and collective action operates, and how this relationship 
depends on factors such as resource availability (1993, pp. 684-685). 
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generalizability (understood as scope of interest domain covered by a class 
organization), associability (organization’s capacity to recruit members), and 
governability (organization’s capacity to unify diverging interests of its members and 
ensure compliance). Drawing upon this distinction, he suggested that although business 
associations have higher levels of associability (their membership density is higher than 
that of labor unions), their degrees of generalizability and governability are lower. 
Traxler explains these findings by arguing that capitalists’ higher resources make them 
more prone to defect and pursue particularistic goals than workers.  
Overall the critiques to Offe and Wiesenthal’s argument imply that business’ 
economic superiority does necessarily go together with easy generation of consensus on 
common interests8. This research has also pointed put that business economic 
advantages actually make associations less able to “govern” their members, comply 
with collective goals, and prevent defection (Streeck, 1998, pp. 187-188; Traxler, 1993, 
p. 689; Traxler et al., 2001, p. 64). In showing that capitalists face collective action 
challenges as serious as those faced by workers, this research has given rise to different 
hypotheses aiming to explain how business associations are formed, develop, and 
become effective means of power. Although several explanations derived from these 
hypotheses are far from mutually exclusive (cf. Behrens, 2004), it is useful to treat them 
separately as they emphasize different mechanisms—particularly mechanisms derived 
from economic, institutional, and political/class struggle factors. Unlike the mechanisms 
																																																								
8 Although not directly addressing Offe and Wiesenthal’s thesis, Moran (2006) makes a similar argument. 
In his study of business power in Britain he demonstrates that the turn the turn to market economy and the 
increment of firms’ economic importance associated to it did not lead to the strengthening of the 
Confederation of British Industry.  
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noted in the two-logic argument, the ones derived from these explanations have been 
addressed in empirical research in business associations in Latin America.   
 
Economic determinants of business organization   
This set of explanations comes from scholars who have noted the way in which 
the growth and development of business associations are shaped by factors such as a 
country’s levels of industrialization, economic openness, economic concentration or 
inter-sectoral diversification. The hypothesized impact of these variables is sometimes 
contradictory, although scholars usually contend that early industrialization and 
economic openness (e.g. a stronger export sector) foster business organization because 
they increase the need of coordination to achieve economic order and survive to 
international pressures (cf. Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1991; Wilensky, 2002). Similarly 
scholars have hypothesized that the larger the size of the national economy and inter-
sectoral diversity, the lower the chances of collective action. In contrast to economic 
concentration observed, for example, in the presence of few and powerful economic 
groups, size and diversity have been said to have a positive effect on interest 
heterogeneity and therefore a negative impact on collective action (Granovetter, 2005; 
Martin & Swank, 2012; Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). In relation to this, the literature 
indicates that sectoral distinctions based on firm size, exposure to international markets, 
and capacity to adapt to changing economic environment are important sources of 
divisions within the business sector (cf. Traxler, 2010; Traxler et al., 2001).   
In recent decades, scholars have also argued that international market pressures 
associated to globalization would lead to some degree of convergence towards 
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decentralized and flexible industrial relations, which would in turn weaken the 
importance of business associations (Boni, 2009; Lash & Urry, 1987; Van Gyes & 
Schulten, 2015). This  “convergence hypothesis” has been questioned from different 
angles. For example, Traxler (1999) suggests that the changes associated with 
international market pressures and deindustrialization have not meant the overall 
weakening of European encompassing business associations as most of them have 
managed to maintain their coordination capacities vis-à-vis their members. Traxler et al. 
(2001) also demonstrate that at the aggregate levels, centralization of business 
association has remained stable (p. 71), just like their membership rates, which have 
been rather “immune” to these economic pressures (p. 94). Finally, Traxler (2010) has 
also demonstrated that participation in policymaking by business associations (and 
unions) has not suffered significant changes due to, for example, variations in economic 
openness. Like Wallerstein et al. (1997), Traxler et al. (2001) draw on this evidence to 
contend that the impact of economic pressures on industrial relations has not been 
uniform across nations.  
In relation to the Latin American case, scholars have noted the impact of 
economic factors by affirming that hyperinflation, depression, and deep depression were 
key for the foundation or “resurrection” (like in Chile) of encompassing associations in 
the early 1980s (Durand & Silva, 1998, pp. 7-10; Schneider, 2004). In Chile, the debt 
crisis has been argued to provoke important disputes between sectoral associations—
particularly between the most “modern” (neoliberal) segments of business and 
agriculturalists affiliated to the SNA, the Association of Metallurgic and Metalworking 
Industrialists (ASIMET), and small business associations (e.g. associations of truck-
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owners and merchants), which stood against the dictatorship’s radical free market 
policies (Campero, 1995). However, these internal disputes were offset by the way in 
which the debt crisis forced business leaders to overcome sectoral differences, and 
strengthen the CPC to represent class-wide interests vis-à-vis the government. As noted 
by Schneider (2004, p. 165), “After the initial shock, business leaders came to the 
conclusion that the sectoral associations would have to work through the CPC to 
develop a joint position an what package of policies the government should accept to 
confront the crisis”. According to Durand and Silva (1998, p. 12), the CPC’s class-wide 
representation role was also economically facilitated by the emergence of a core of 
strong conglomerates that endorsed rapid economic change and forced the 
modernization of traditional landowners and industrialists.  
Despite the importance of economic processes, Schneider (2004) has argued that 
some hypotheses derived from these accounts might not be suited to explain why 
business associations are more encompassing in some countries than others. Schneider 
contends although increasing homogeneity of interests among firms and facilitating 
collective action, economic concentration is not sufficient for explaining variations 
among nations (p. 45). Moreover, it is not sufficient to explain why even in small 
countries with powerful economic groups (like Chile), businesspeople opt for investing 
in encompassing associations if they may become dispensable.     
 
Institutions and variations in employers’ organization  
The critique of the convergence hypotheses has led scholars to emphasize the 
mediator role of institutions. Traxler et al. (2001, p. 289) reject the convergence thesis 
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by noting the existence of path-dependent processes explained largely by the way in 
which the impact of international market pressures on industrial relations is mediated 
through national institutions. From a different perspective, scholars espousing the 
Varieties of Capitalism approach contend that the variations in the consequences of 
economic internationalization on industrial relations are explained by differences in 
employers’ preferences (P. A. Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hassel, 2015). Hassel (2015), for 
example, argues that employers’ preferences for coordination are the main factor that 
explains why bargaining coordination and centralization have remained especially high 
in CMEs, while “virtually collapsing” in LMEs (pp. 239-240).  
In addition to showing how national institutions mediate the impact of economic 
factors, scholars have pointed out that institutions play a role by themselves. The 
literature on corporatism suggests that under corporatist regulations the organization of 
business interests is, like for workers, more centralized and coordinated than in 
“pluralist” systems. This means that both business peak associations’ membership rates, 
their capacities to “govern” their membership (i.e. unify interests and ensure 
compliance), and perform wider representational activities vis-à-vis the state are higher 
(Behrens & Traxler, 2004; Martin & Swank, 2012; Schmitter & Streeck, 1999; Traxler, 
1999, 2000, 2010; Traxler et al., 2001). Despite the patterns identified, the relationship 
between these aspects of business associations is complex. For instance, while higher 
centralization has been argued to increase associations’ influence over policymaking, it 
may sometimes reduce employers’ willingness to join them (Traxler, 2000, p. 312). Yet 
according to this scholarship institutions play a key role in mitigating contradictory 
relationships like these. For instance, the existence of regulations favoring multi-
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employer collective bargaining and statutory schemes of collective agreement 
extensions have been proven to function as selective incentives that, while increasing 
membership of business associations, offset the negative impact of centralization 
(Behrens, 2004; Traxler, 2010; Traxler et al., 2001).  
The particular features of Latin American industrial relations suggest that 
several hypotheses posed in the literature on corporatism should operate through 
different mechanisms. In Latin America labor market institutions are defined, among 
other things, by low collective bargaining coverage, weak unions, and generally 
atomized labor relations. In this institutional context unions and business associations 
rarely negotiate. Consequently, both labor and business organizations are comparatively 
weaker than under corporatist regulations, and the absence of intermediating forums 
like work councils or factory committees decreases significantly the potential gains 
from organized negotiation (Schneider, 2013, p. 35). This creates not only fewer 
incentives for firms to join associations, but also turns business associations into tools 
through which employers organize not to deal directly with labor but rather to influence 
state policies concerning labor. According to Schneider (2004, p. 37), even corporatist-
like associations such as the Mexican Coparmex and the Brazilian FIESP rarely 
bargained directly with labor: while the former organized to influence government 
legislation and rulings, the latter did negotiate with labor, although it was organized on 
sectoral lines and primarily as a trade association.  
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Politics and class struggle: interactions between business, labor, and the state 
Finally it is possible to identify a last group of scholars who, despite the 
important differences existing between the hypotheses proposed by them, agree to 
analyze the development of business associations by putting the emphasis on class 
struggle and politics—particularly on the relation between business, organized labor, 
and the state. These scholars’ explanations can be distinguished between those that 
conceive of the role of the state and state actors as promoters of business organizations 
and those that see them (in combination with labor) as threats that lead business to form 
associations. Regardless of these differences, some of these scholars are also interested 
in the study of the political consequences of business associations—e.g. how these 
shape employers’ preferences and attitudes towards democracy and social policy.  
State promotion of business organization: Several investigations have suggested 
that state actors are, directly or indirectly, the main promoters of business organizations 
(cf. Markus, 2007; Martin & Swank, 2012; Polsky, 2000; Schneider, 2004). Martin and 
Swank (2012, p. 35), for instance, argue that collective actions problems of business are 
usually solved through the intervention of state agents (political leaders and 
governmental bureaucrats) who have organize employer associations in order to expand 
their constituency base, gain political support for legislation, and gain help with 
implementation. They contend that the outcome of state intervention depends, however, 
on the structure of political competition (particularly the electoral rules and the number 
of parties) and the way in which authority is distributed across (centralized or federal) 
structures of state administration. Based on this, Martin and Swank reject economic-
centered explanations for cross-national variations in business organization. They argue 
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that although levels of industrialization or deindustrialization are important motivations 
for the formation or the change of business associations, their effect is less important 
than (and is largely shaped by) political factors.  
From a different perspective, Bowman (1989) has noted the importance of the 
state by asserting that state intervention in the economy—particularly in the form of 
regulation of trade practices at the industry-level—is the most effective mechanism 
employers can draw upon to overcome inter-firm competition (which according to 
Bowman is the main collective action problem they face). State-related mechanisms, 
defined by Bowman as public organizational mechanism, are more effective than 
internal mechanisms (that is, mechanisms that enhance inter-firm communication such 
as joint ventures and interlocking directorates) because they relied on a broad set of 
selective incentives—from “regulatory agencies” that control entry, output, and prices 
to the provision of differential advantages through fiscal policy—that business 
associations can use as coercive instruments to punish defection. Bowman argues they 
are “general” and therefore more effective than external mechanisms observed, for 
example, when unions help employers coordinate market behavior by standardizing 
labor costs through industry-wide agreements. In effect, unlike state intervention, 
external mechanisms can exist only within a narrow range of industries—e.g. industries 
in which labor costs constitute a significant proportion of production costs and where 
workers are highly organized.     
According to Schmitter and Streeck (1999), the interaction between these two 
aspects of business-state relations (state actors as organizers of business and state 
structures as providers of incentives), shapes the degree of influence business 
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associations have. It also explains why business organization in pluralist societies is 
weaker than in corporatist ones. Unlike the former, in corporatist systems public 
authorities are in charge of promoting the realization of profit and accumulation of 
capital, so they need to promote business organization by engaging in transactions with 
business associations. While some transactions imply state policies that promote 
associations directly (from subsidies to their existence to of privilege access to 
information), others imply the provision of benefits to the firms affiliated to the 
association, which in turn operates as an indirect incentive for associability (Schmitter 
& Streeck, 1999, pp. 32-33). 
In his analysis of several Latin American countries, Schneider (2004) offers the 
most systematic study of the way in which state actors are the main promoters of 
business organization. Schneider’s main thesis is that the most significant variations in 
business organization in Latin America—whether business associations are rich or poor, 
strong or weak, encompassing or narrow (sectoral)—depend largely on the way that 
self-interested state actors help business organize. These actors may have different 
incentives to organize business, from the desire to minimize opposition to the desire to 
reveal or construct business collective preferences, and to pursue these ends they can 
draw upon to mechanisms as varied as providing business associations with privileged 
access to policy-related information or giving them full responsibility for policy 
implementation.  
For the case of Chile, Schneider contends that the political and economic crises 
of the 1970s-1980s led businesspeople to “resurrect” the CPC in the early 1980s. Yet 
CPC power consolidated only after the dictatorship, in seeking support from business, 
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integrated business associations into policymaking and invited them to participate 
actively in consultation instances along with technocrats. For Schneider (2004) this 
pattern of business-state relations remained largely intact during the democratic period: 
as the main representative of business, the CPC became a protagonist in all the 
discussions on policy change undertaken after 1990 (tax reform, labor reform, 
redistribution, etc.) (see also E. Silva, 1998; P. Silva, 1995). According to E. Silva 
(1998, pp. 233-234), this stable pattern of business-state collaboration in Chile had 
important consequences for the associations themselves as it forced them to 
professionalize its staff and its technical competences. In line with Durand and Silva 
(1998), Schneider (2004) argues that the Chilean case contrasts with those of Argentina 
or Brazil, where the new democratic governments interacted with business mostly by 
bypassing encompassing organizations and, in so doing, they did not provide individual 
employers with incentives to invest in these associations.  
Labor and the state as threats: In this variant of the political-class struggle 
approach, scholars define business associations mainly as a response by employers to 
threats such as organized labor and governments’ reformist agendas. Schmitter and 
Streeck (1999, pp. 12-13) describe this mechanism by simply saying that capitalists 
form associations whenever their power to invest is no longer sufficient to control the 
political process and realize their economic interests—i.e. whenever business power is 
threatened by the political mobilization of workers or by state intervention. Thus when 
considering the state as a threat, this hypothesis differs from the state-centered one in 
that it does not assume that state actors have an incentive for promoting the organization 
of capitalists. Instead, business associations are thought as the unexpected outcome of 
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state actions. The same reasoning is used for explaining the effects of labor mobilization 
on business organization: when labor unions are stronger membership in business 
associations increases and employers are more likely to accept centralized associations 
(and industrial relations), and sometimes the very act of forming a business association 
is a direct response to labor mobilization (cf. Behrens, 2004; Schmitter & Streeck, 1999; 
Traxler, 1999).  
In Latin America the literature has suggested that over the twentieth century 
labor organization, exclusion from policymaking, and threats to property rights have 
been key determinants for the formation of encompassing associations (Durand & Silva, 
1998, pp. 7-10). In Chile, authors agree that formation of the CPC in 1935 was the 
response by business to intense popular uprisings (which included a 100 day-socialist 
government), and that similar to other countries in the region the CPC’s significance 
diminished once the threats ameliorated (Arriagada, 2004; Menges, 1966; E. Silva, 
1998).   
Like these investigations, in his analysis of economic policy in Latin America, 
Frieden (1991) suggests that class conflict played a key role in defining how organized 
business reacted toward financial liberalization in the 1970s and the effects of the debt 
crisis in the 1980s. According to him, where class conflict was salient and business 
perceived labor as real threat, such as in Argentina and especially Chile, capitalists 
confronted the governments by privileging class-wide stances to maintain or restore, 
often against labor, an attractive climate for investment. In doing so, and different from 
capitalists in Brazil or Venezuela, they promoted inter-sectoral organization and muted 
sectoral demands (which were usually put together in alliance with labor). Similarly, 
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research on the Chilean case has contended that recent “traumatic experiences” (for 
example, those associated with the Socialist government of Salvador Allende) were a 
key determinant of the “political learning” processes through which entrepreneurs 
became aware of the need to reinforce peak associations, participate in public debates, 
and invest in cultural circuits like think tanks to defend their interests and worldviews 
(cf. Álvarez, 2015; Campero, 1995; Gárate, 2012; Undurraga, 2014).  
The political consequences of encompassing associations: Regardless of the 
focus on either state actors or threats from labor, the left, and the state, the politics and 
class struggle approach has also speculated about the political consequences of business 
associations. Martin and Swank (2012, p. 149), for instance, argue that more 
encompassing organizations expand coordination among employers, and in doing so 
their support for the welfare state. According to their argument, encompassing and 
centralized associations are more able to adjudicate among the demand of diverse 
industrial sectors, bind members to negotiated decisions, and engender norms of trust, 
which will in turn lead a broader cross section of business to comply with the 
associations’ broader goals. Martin and Swank affirm this idea by showing that in 
macrocorporatist economies employer associations are more willing to support active 
labor market policy and social protection than in pluralist systems of representation. A 
similar argument can be found in Swenson’s (2002) analysis of the welfare state. 
According to him, welfare regime in Sweden was more extended than the American one 
largely because Swedish employers developed, through more encompassing 
associations, “solidaristic” strategies of labor market governance.   
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Schneider (2004, p. 210) reaches to somehow analogous conclusions for the 
Latin American case. He contends that stronger associations in Chile, Colombia, and 
Mexico have contributed to democratic governability more than their institutionally 
weaker counterparts in Brazil and Argentina. In effect, stronger associations allow for 
better collaboration between business communities and the government, and thus 
facilitate the negotiation and the implementation of policies. In line with this idea, in the 
mid 1990s Haggard and Kaufman (1995, pp. 340-345) contended that Chile was one of 
the few cases in the region where, at least from the business side, there were appropriate 
conditions for the establishment of societal corporatist arrangements. More recently, 
Tironi (2013) has noted that organized employers have successfully adapted themselves 
to the democratic conditions by overcoming many of the confrontational stances they 
adopted after the traumatic experience of the Allende government. Several scholars 
have nonetheless questioned this optimistic view. Álvarez (2015) asserts that during the 
democratic period business associations’ “renovated” leaderships and stances have been 
the exception rather than the rule, while Durand and Silva (1998, p. 37) contend, in line 
with Haggard and Kaufman (1995, p. 341), that societal corporatism is unlikely to 
develop due to the structural weakness of labor and business’ unwillingness to accept 
participation in the policymaking. Likewise, in her study of tax reforms in Latin 
America, Fairfield (2015) suggests that the hypothesis that higher business organization 
encourages elites to focus on shared long-term interests might not hold in the region. On 
the contrary, she argues that higher organization can help elites oppose progressive 
reforms: “elites may or may not perceive strong incentives to accept tax increases 
independently of whether they are cohesive or fragmented. And when they do no 
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perceive incentives to accept tax increases, …cohesion is a source of power than 
enhance their ability to resist reform” (2015, p. 7). 
 
6.3. Approach of this dissertation 
 So far, I have presented different approaches to working class and capitalist 
collective action. Regarding working class collective action, I showed that the 
economic-structural approach offers a fruitful description of the objective 
transformation associated to, among other things, the deindustrialization of the economy 
and the growth of the service sector. I argued, however, this approach’s description of 
these objective trends is usually accompanied, at least in the analysis of the Chilean 
case, with an overestimation of its effects on the working class and the class structure as 
a whole. The overestimation of these effects can be seen in the alleged shrinking in the 
number of people employed in working class positions and in the alleged expansion of 
middle-class identities and interests among salaried workers, on the basis of which the 
structural-economic approach develops “linear” accounts that see the decline in labor 
power largely as inevitable. This makes it unable to explain how and under what 
conditions labor revitalization actually take place (cf. Aravena & Núñez, 2009; 
Etchemendy & Collier, 2007; Gutierrez, 2016; Leiva, 2013).   
Therefore, in this dissertation I will draw upon the main ideas developed in the 
other two frameworks: the institutional and the class-politics approaches. Without 
denying the importance of objective constraints emphasized by the structural-economic 
approach, these two approaches seem to be better suited to account for the Chilean case. 
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The institutional approach is useful for understanding how the 1979 Labor Plan’s 
regulations have constrained unions’ action at the plant and confederation levels, and 
the type of labor conflict stemming from them (conflict that, as the next chapter shows, 
can be observed in workers’ frequent use of unregulated and extra-legal forms of 
collective action). The class-politics approach, on the other hand, is useful for 
explaining why the reconstruction of the traditional party-union linkages in Chile has 
not led, like in other Latin American countries, to increases in working class power and 
why, despite its ineffectiveness, CUT’s leaders have insisted on restraint during the 
periods of labor reform.  
In relation to capitalist collective action, I reviewed two different bodies of 
literature. While the first one focuses on mechanisms that facilitate capitalists’ 
recognition of class-wide interests and identities (e.g. interlocking directorates, shared 
ideologies, and kinship relations), the second literature focuses exclusively on collective 
action organized through associations. Without dismissing the importance of the 
mechanisms emphasized in the first group of research, I suggested that the explanations 
stemming from the study on business encompassing associations are particularly 
relevant for examining Chilean employers’ defense of the 1979 Labor Plan. For 
instance, in its economic variant this literature argues that factors such as the early 
1980s financial crisis were a key incentive for Latin American business to form or 
resurrect encompassing associations. Likewise, it contends that higher exposure to 
international markets might have increased the needs for coordination and thus 
employers’ incentives to join associations, and that business collective action can be 
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facilitated in countries that, like Chile, are small and have few economic groups that 
concentrate the economic power.  
However, explanations focused on the role of institutions and class politics and 
struggle indicate that, although certainly important, economic variables cannot explain 
by themselves why despite similar economic conditions the levels of employer 
organization vary across nations, or why some national business associations have 
remained stronger and more centralized than others (Martin & Swank, 2012; Traxler et 
al., 2001). Nor can they explain why businesspeople opt for investing in encompassing 
associations if in small countries with concentrated economic power (like Chile) they 
may become dispensable vis-à-vis other informal mechanisms of coordination 
(Schneider, 2004, p. 45). I this chapter I argued that these questions have been directly 
addressed by approaches focused on the role of institutions and class politics and 
struggle.  
Institutional research has rightly noted the important differences existing 
between the industrial relation systems of Latin America and developed countries with 
corporatist traditions—e.g. inexistence of societal corporatist regulations in Latin 
America, rare centralized bargain between business and labor, and weaker selective 
incentives to join employers’ associations. Similarly, without ignoring these particular 
institutional features, research on class politics and struggle is particularly helpful for 
understanding the conditions that led Chilean employers to revive the CPC in the 1980s 
as well as the mechanisms through which it has remained an effective instrument to 
exercise power. In focusing on the interactions between business, labor, and the state, 
this research can also shed light on the processes that explain why a powerful 
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encompassing association such as the CPC developed in Chile, where fragmented 
industrial relations largely echo those found in “pluralist” regimes, and where threats 
from labor—and since the early 2000s from the left—are apparently weaker than most 
of the 20th century. Finally, in analyzing the political consequences of business 
associations, the class politics and struggle approach can help to explain why, in 
contrast to the hypothesis for developed countries, an encompassing association such as 
the CPC has been used as an instrument to oppose changes to the authoritarian labor 
code. In other words, in contrast to the expectation that stronger class-wide associations 
encourage business to accept progressive reforms as a way to advance their long long-
term interests, this approach can shed light on why organized business in Chile has been 
so reluctant to reform the Labor Plan if it remains as one of the most central 
authoritarian legacies of Chilean society. 
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7. Labor laws, political-partisan organization, and working class weakness, 1973-
2016 
 In previous chapters I showed that one of the main features of the labor reform 
processes has been the CUT’s incapacity to influence policymaking and realize 
workers’ demand for the dismantling of the 1979 Labor Plan. Despite the unsatisfactory 
policy outcomes observed in the 1990 – 2001 reforms and the frequent strategic 
disputes within organized labor derived from them, it was surprising that even during 
the 2015 – 2016 reform process CUT leaders continued to privilege restraint vis-à-vis 
the government, hoping that their linkages with power-holding parties would help them 
influence the formulation of the labor reform project. The CUT’s adoption of what 
Murillo (2001) has termed “ineffective restraint” is perhaps the most persistent aspect of 
working class’ collective action in the post-dictatorial Chilean society.  
 What explains the CUT’s persistent exercise of restraint? Why, despite that 
strategy proved to be unsuccessful in the 1990s, did CUT leaders insist on it during the 
last reform period? Why, for example, didn’t the CUT take advantage of the incipient 
but certainly important revitalization of labor observed in the country since the mid 
2000s? Answering these questions is crucial for understating the weakness of organized 
labor in Chile and. As this chapter will show, addressing these questions is directly 
related to the way in which labor leaders have dealt with the problem of labor autonomy 
vis-à-vis office-holding parties. In this chapter I will explain labor weakness by noting 
the negative effects of CUT’s “politicization”, and, particularly, by showing how they 
have reinforced and have been reinforced by the constraints on collective action derived 
from the 1979 Labor Plan.
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  In analyzing the CUT’s “politicization”, some analysts argue that the persistent 
weakness of the working class is the direct consequence of the political cooptation of 
the CUT. Accordingly, the CUT’s reluctance to use mass mobilization strategies should 
be seen as the simple result of a bureaucratized leadership (a sort of “union 
aristocracy”) that consciously “sell out” the working class in exchange for political or 
economic favors. Although political cooptation is certainly a problem in the CUT 
(Leiva, 2013), in this chapter I will show that description like these oversimplify the 
problem. As I will demonstrate, the situation of the CUT differs significantly from the 
“bureaucratized” central confederations of corporatist countries. Unlike them, the 
CUT’s financial problems are recurrent, its organizational structure is weak (so it 
cannot easily control firm-level unions “from above”), and since the late 1990s most of 
its labor leaders have been relegated to marginal positions in their parties. 
Consequently, unlike countries with powerful central confederations, occupying a 
leadership position in the CUT has become largely irrelevant as an “asset” leaders can 
use to “climb the ladder” of party or state structures. 
Trying to avoid this type of accounts, in this chapter I will analyze the effects of 
the CUT’s “politicization” by analyzing the labor movement during the Pinochet 
dictatorship (1973-1990) and the democratic period (1990 – present). I will show that 
the authoritarian government’s ban on parties forced workers to rebuild the labor 
movement autonomously from parties. I will argue that by so doing workers could 
successfully organize themselves through coalitions and de facto confederations that 
also allowed them to circumvent the 1979 Labor Plan’s legal restrictions to collective 
action. According to evidence I present, for a short period of time this gave rise to an 
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autonomous (but in no case depoliticized) labor movement. Yet by the end of the 1980s 
parties reasserted their control over labor, the traditional union-party ties were 
reconstructed, and thanks to different inter-party agreements the CUT was founded in 
1988. After describing this process, I will suggest that the “political foundation” of the 
CUT has had lasting and largely detrimental consequences for labor throughout the 
democratic period. It meant the establishment of a “political-partisan” logic of 
organization through which the CUT’s decision-making process, its electoral system, 
and its leadership structure became shaped by partisan preferences, conflicts, and 
agreements. Among other negative consequences, I will show that the CUT’s political-
partisan organization has reinforced several constraints on collective action associated 
with the 1979 Labor Plan (for example, labor dependence on governments and parties 
derived from unions’ economic weakness).   
In this chapter, I contribute to the literature on labor, class, and collective action 
in Chile by looking at the politico-institutional factors that have shaped working class 
formation since 1973 onwards. By analyzing the dictatorial and democratic periods, I 
aim to show how workers have engaged in collective action under relatively similar 
institutional rules (defined, since 1979, by the regulations contained in the Labor Plan) 
and totally different political conditions. To do so, I draw upon the institutional and 
class-politics approaches to working class collective action described in the previous 
chapter. As argued in that chapter, both approaches are better suited than the structural-
economic one to account for the Chilean case because, unlike the latter, they do not to 
offer “mechanical” and “linear” arguments that see the decline of labor power as largely 
inevitable. Without denying the importance of objective constraints emphasized by the 
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structural-economic approach (e.g. constraints associated with the de-industrialization 
of the economy), institutional and class-politics approaches are better suited to elucidate 
the persistent weakness of organized labor, the CUT’s leaders continual use of restraint, 
as well as the revitalization of union activity observed since the mid 2000s and the 
factors that explain why the CUT has not taken advantage of it.  
In what follows, I describe working class collective action during the 
dictatorship (section 7.1) and the democratic period (section 7.2). Within each period I 
will focus on the institutional constraints on collective action associated with the Labor 
Plan, and the political factors shaping working class formation (particularly the 
destruction and reconstruction of union-party linkages). Finally, in section 7.3, I offer a 
general explanation for the Chilean case and discuss its implications for the literature on 
working class collective action reviewed in chapter 7.   
 
7.1. Working class collective action during the military dictatorship (1973-1990) 
 
7.1.1. The dictatorship’s approach to labor and the 1979 Labor Plan  
Although fiercely anti-Marxist, the Pinochet dictatorship did not have, at least 
until the late 1970s, a clear approach to labor (Álvarez, 2010; Campero & Valenzuela, 
1984). Right after the coup d’état that overthrew the Socialist President Salvador 
Allende, the CUT was declared illegal through a decree that forbade “political” 
entities1. So were workers’ rights to bargaining, strike, and elect union leaders, which 																																																								
1 “Por política deja de existir la CUT”, La Tercera, September 26, 1973. 
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were suspended through decree laws 43 (rights to bargain and strike) and 198 (election 
of union leaders). Thus in 1974, former CUT leaders formed the CUT in Exile 
Committee in France, which became known as CEXCUT (Comité en el Exterior de la 
Central Única de Trabajadores)2.  
Although the core of the labor movement was fiercely repressed, the military 
junta tried to establish alliances with the anti-Allende unions led by the old 
Confederation of Copper Workers (CTC), and the Confederation of Private-Sector 
White-collar employees (CEPCh)3. Similar to the attempts by General Carlos Ibáñez in 
the twenties, some members of the military government worked hard to create an anti-
communist and de-politicized labor movement coopted by the state through a right-
wing corporatist system of representation. Only three months after the military coup, 
some of these unions decided to found, with the endorsement of important business 
leaders, the Central Nacional de Trabajadores (National Central of Workers) (Campero 
& Valenzuela, 1984, p. 194)4. Within the military government, these attempts had the 
support from officers such as General Gustavo Leigh and Minister of Labor Nicanor 
Díaz Estrada. Although they even drafted a law project in 1975 (the so-called “Social 
Projects”), their approach to labor failed by the end of that year when the influence of 
neoliberal technocrats on government policymakers became indisputable (Campero & 
Valenzuela, 1984, pp. 207-214). 																																																								
2 “Constitución Comité Exterior Central Única de Trabajadores”, Central Única de Trabajadores, Comité 
Exterior, July 18, 1974, in Chapter 7Lawrence (2014).  
3 These unions had belonged to the “Comando de Acción Gremial”, a group of civil society 
organizations—from business to professional associations and labor unions—that mobilized against the 
Allende government.  
4 See also: “Se formará confederación única del trabajo”, El Mercurio, September 16, 1973; “¿Quién 
reemplazará a la CUT?”, Qué Pasa, February 1, 1974. 
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This led to a new phase in the Pinochet dictatorship’s approach toward unions, 
which implied the final success of the attempts to depoliticize and discipline the labor 
movement. In Chile, in fact, discipline and depoliticization were achieved not through 
the cooptation of the union leaders or the development of a “pro-government” labor 
movement, but rather through an extremely liberalized set of regulations articulated in 
the 1979 Labor Plan (Álvarez, 2012; Durán, 2013; Feres, 2009b; Narbona, 2014; Rojas, 
2007).  
In 1979, the enactment of the Labor Plan’s two main decrees—DL 2,756 on 
union organizations and DL 2,758 on collective bargaining and strikes—gave workers, 
for the first time since the coup d’état, the possibility of engaging in collective 
bargaining and free union activity5. According to the legal stipulations, the first rounds 
of collective bargaining would start in mid August. By early October 1979, workers 
from more than 300 firms had actually bargained, and only 5% of them went on strike6. 
After the first rounds of collective bargaining, minister of labor José Piñera claimed that 
that the new legislation “proved to be successful”, while noting that he was not 
“worried” about an eventual “politicization” of workers stemming from the legalization 
of union activity. He argued that the Labor Plan’s emphasis on “technical bargaining”—
																																																								
5 Before the enactment of the Labor Plan, the government gave into the workers’ pressures and abolished 
the decree law 198, which prohibited elections of union leaders. This was the only concession the 
government made to workers during this period, and was determined largely by the threats of boycott 
organized by Chilean unions grouped in the “Grupo de los 10” and endorsed by the AFL-CIO. See 
“Abierto desafío lanzaron los 10”, La Segunda, January 5, 1979; “Ministro del Trabajo: ‘El gobierno 
seguirá su política laboral’”, El Mercurio, January 17, 1979.	 
6 “La huelga fría”, Ercilla, October 3, 1979.  
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for instance, the restriction of the subject matters of bargaining to economic issues—
would “punish” anyone who privileges politics over technical knowledge7.   
In contrast to Piñera’s declarations, scholarly research and the statements made 
at that time by workers suggested that the implementation of Labor Plan was, at least in 
terms of salary adjustments, totally detrimental for workers (Campero & Valenzuela, 
1984, pp. 302-303)8.  
 
7.1.2. Workers’ responses to the Labor Plan   
By the end of the 1970s, workers’ reaction to the repression and the policy 
changes carried out by the dictatorship was as diverse as the ideological affiliations of 
the confederations and coalitions then in existance. The Grupo de los 10 (“Group of the 
Ten”), for instance, represented a moderate opposition to the dictatorship led by 
Christian Democratic workers who had been opposed to the Allende government and, 
for a short period of time, trusted in the “democratic orientations” of the military junta. 
In the late 1970s, these workers openly adopted oppositional stances towards the 
regime, which implied the final rupture between the majority of the Christian Democrat 
unionism and the Pinochet administration (Campero & Valenzuela, 1984, p. 257). The 
Coordinadora Nacional Sindical (CNS, founded in 1978) represented another group of 
opposition unions that, unlike the Grupo de los 10, were headed by leaders who were 
clandestine members of leftist parties (e.g. the MAPU, the PS, and even the PC) and 
																																																								
7 “Plan laboral. Quiénes ganan y quiénes pierden”, Revista Hoy, February 13, 1980; “Elecciones 
sindicales. Colores que no inquietan”, Ercilla, July 2, 1980.    
8 See also “Declaración del Comando de defensa de los Derechos Sindicales”, La Tercera, December 29, 
1979. 
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from the very beginning stood up against the Pinochet regime. Therefore, despite its 
heterogeneity, the CNS was more radical than the Grupo de los 10. Finally, a third 
group of unions included confederations such as the Unión de Trabajadores de Chile 
(UNTRACH), which were mostly led by pro-Pinochet workers9.  
 The Grupo de los 10 and the CNS were the two main oppositional coalitions of 
unions. Despite their common goals, there were important ideological divisions between 
them derived largely from their leaders’ stances toward Marxism and the role played by 
the “over-politicized” CUT until 1973. Most of the leaders of the Grupo de los 10 were, 
in fact, Christian Democrats with strong anti-Marxist positions. These stances were in 
conflict with those of the “progressive” Christian Democrats who defended the unity 
with CNS no matter the presence of Marxists in its leadership10. This was a frequent 
source of tension that hindered labor unity, even though throughout 1978 these two 
groups carried out similar campaigns to denounce human right violations, to reject the 
government’s promotion of “syndical parallelism” (i.e. the appointment of pro-regime j 
																																																								
9 An example of these “pro-Pinochet” leaders was the miner and government-appointed president of the 
CTC, Bernardino Castillo. In addition to UNTRACH, other minor coalitions of workers of this time were 
the Frente Unitario de Trabajadores (affiliated with some sectors of the Christian Democracy) and the 
pro-government Frente Laboral de Unidad Nacional (presided by René Sottoliccio).   
10 A good example of these conflicts occurred in June 1978, when the Grupo de los 10 expelled two of its 
leaders, Manuel Sepúlveda and Hernán Mery, for attending a CNS meeting. Some Grupo de los 10 
workers described the CNS as an organization that, like the CUT, had “Marxist affiliations”. In noting the 
differences between the Grupo de los 10 and the CNS, the Grupo de los 10 leader Tucapel Jiménez 
argued: “we, as Grupo de los 10, do not give the ex-CUT a space of participation (in the labor 
movement)… We don’t recognize it. We ignore it”. Later, the Christian Democrat Manuel Bustos also 
left the Grupo de los 10 because, in contrast to other DC workers, he openly supported the unity between 
the Grupo de los 10 and the “Marxist” CNS. See “Expulsados dirigentes del ‘Grupo de los 10’ por adherir 
a entidad de filiación marxista”, El Mercurio, June 9, 1978; “El asunto de ‘los 10’ y las expulsiones”, La 
Tercera, June 25, 1978.	 
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labor leaders or the creation of pro-regime unions), and to demand the repeal of the 
decrees that prohibited collective bargaining, strikes, and free union elections11.  
Similar unity attempts were observed after the enactment of the Labor Plan and 
the development of the first rounds of legal collective bargaining since August 1979. 
The repressive character of these regulations meant a serious challenge for workers, 
which increased the need to undertake concerted actions to oppose the dictatorship. In 
fact, both before and after the enactment of the Labor Plan labor leaders contended that 
the new regulations were designed to deteriorate labor bargaining power by promoting 
the formation of “thousands of small, weak, and underfunded unions”. They also 
complained that the Labor Plan’s laws had the only goal of undermining workers’ 
disruptive power by making the strike a “powerless” tool to face employers’ hostility. 
Based on this, the CNS depicted the Labor Plan as a “conservative reaction” that 
symbolized “the subordination of one class to another”, while the CEXCUT defined it 
as tool of the “Chilean bourgeoisie” to “atomize, destroy, and disperse the labor 
movement in order to consolidate the existing economic regime”12.  
Likewise, in noting the Labor Plan’s negative effects on workers bargaining 
power, the Grupo de los 10 leader Tucapel Jiménez called on workers not to bargain 
																																																								
11 Sometimes, even pro-government unions participated in these unity initiatives. This occurred, for 
example, in September 1978 when the Grupo de los 10 and the UNTRACH joined together to demand the 
restitution of union freedoms. See “Los trabajadores y la tarea de Chile”, Revista Mensaje, No 269, June, 
1978; “Trabajadores. Impaciencia de los cinco años”, Revista Hoy, September 13.  
12 “Afirma el Grupo de los Diez: ‘El gobierno quiere dividirnos para evitar la fuerza sindical’, La 
Tercera, July 5, 1979; “Experiencia de los que no quedaron conformes con la negociación”, El Mercurio, 
October 14, 1979; El mensaje de la Coordinadora, Revista Hoy, January 9, 1980; “Plan laboral. Quiénes 
ganan y quiénes pierden”, Revista Hoy, February 13, 1980; “Trabajadores desbordan el Plan Laboral”, 
Boletín Informativo del CEXCUT, February 1980 in Araya (2015: 68-77). 
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with their employers, arguing that it would mean “the loss of their rights”13. Even 
workers belonging to powerful industries made similar claims. For example, in 
1981workers from the El Teniente division of the state-owned copper company 
CODELCO went on strike. Despite the significance of the strike, the government 
followed the strategy adopted during these years, and trusting in the “technical virtues” 
of the Labor Plan (i.e. strikes without big economic repercussions) it decided not to 
intervene in the conflict. The El Teniente strike lasted nearly 40 days, and proved to be 
a failure for labor leaders. None of their demands was met even though they did have, 
compared to most workers in Chile, high associational and disruptive power. For these 
leaders, the strike demonstrated that “no worker should engage in collective bargaining” 
and that it was imperative to “dismantle” the Labor Plan14.  
Aware of problems like these, even before the implementation of the Labor Plan 
workers demanded the establishment of a system industry-wide collective bargaining in 
which unions could have a real bargaining power15. In an attempt to organize a 
concerted opposition to the Labor Plan, in 1979 several unions formed the Comando de 
Defensa de los Derechos Sindicales (Commando for the Defense of Union Rights). The 
																																																								
13 ‘El grupo de los 10 tiene plena vigencia’, declaraciones de Tucapel Jiménez”, La Segunda, April 15, 
1980. 
14 “El Teniente. El Plan Laboral a prueba”, Revista Hoy, June 10, 1981. Similar complaints were made 
throughout the 1980s. In 1985, for example, union leaders and advisors defined the strike as a 
“boomerang” that always would end up hurting workers. Some union advisors even said to identify a 
“concerted strategy” by employers from different industries oriented to promoting strikes through the 
rejection of any petition made by workers in the course of the bargaining process. Thus, workers would 
have to opt for the last resource (the strike), already knowing that they would not get anything from it. 
See “Negociación y huelga: Estrategia empresarial anula derechos laborales”, Fortín Mapocho, 
September 9, 1985. An interesting analysis of a series of strikes occurred in this period and of the way 
workers interpreted their effects can be found in Araya (2015, pp. 49-50).  
15 “Negociación por área piden trabajadores del cuero y calzado”, El Mercurio, May 20, 1979; “Los 
trabajadores del transporte insisten en negociación por área”, La Tercera, July 11, 1979; “Coordinadora 
Nacional Sindical a la opinión pública”, La Tercera, July 27, 1981.   
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Commando gathered together groups such as the CNS, the Grupo de los 10, and the 
CEPCh (whose president Federico Mujica was described a “pro-government” leader) 
with the overt idea of opposing the Labor Plan. Yet the unity effort was fragile and 
short-lived. In less than a year, political divisions led to its dissolution. Labor leaders 
such the Federico Mujica accused other workers of mixing “unionism with politics”, 
while organizations such as the FUT and the CEPCh left the Commando arguing 
“excessive intervention” from international labor confederations, particularly the AFL-
CIO (allied to the Grupo de los 10), the Marxist-inspired WFTU, and the Social 
Democrat ICFTU (the last two closer to the CNS) (Campero & Valenzuela, 1984, pp. 
320-321)16.  
In light of these divisions, in the early 1980s opposition unions tried to 
reconstruct central confederations separately. In November 1980, the CNS, now led by 
Socialists, Communist, and “progressive” Christian Democrat workers such as Manuel 
Bustos, put together its first national meeting where the workers declared to fight to 
“reconstruct the Chilean labor movement”. In noting the need to achieve labor unity, 
CNS workers emphasized the need to integrate all ideological positions into the same 
labor organization and build a movement able to “respect labor autonomy from political 
parties”17. In a similar way, in a attempt to dispute the CNS leadership, the Grupo de los 
10 (now without the presence of the “pro-Marxist” Christian Democrat leaders) turned, 
in April 1981, into a new confederation: the Unión Democrática de Trabajadores 
(UDT). Although declaring itself as a confederation open to all workers “no matter 																																																								
16 “Constituido comando para rechazo del Plan Laboral”, La Tercera, August 18, 1979; “Terremoto entre 
sindicalistas disidentes”, Qué Pasa, May 15, 1980. 
17 “Trabajadores. La tarea pendiente”, Revista Hoy, December 3, 1980.   
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political, religious, class-based, professional, or craft distinctions”, the UDT rejected 
both “capitalist-individualist” and “Marxist-collectivist” regimes, arguing that neither of 
them would allow the “complete development” of the labor movement18.   
 
7.1.3. Working class revitalization in the 1980s: between autonomy and subordination 
to political parties 
 Despite the hostile political conditions and the labor-repressive laws, workers 
took advantage of the limited (but important) opportunities derived from the 
legalization of union activity and bargaining. Although workers were aware of the 
Labor Plan’s “anti-labor’ regulations, they decidedly joined unions, participated in 
bargaining processes, and build legal federations “with the only goal of reconstructing 
the labor movement”19. Thus they soon managed to become the most important social 
movement amid the anti-dictatorship national protests that took over the country 
between 1983 and 1986 (Álvarez, 2012; Araya, 2014; Campero, 1986; Frías, 2008).  
Unlike the ISI regime, during this period labor power did not depend on parties’ 
support. In fact, dictatorial repression had created the conditions for the emergence of a 
more autonomous labor movement (Campero, 1986; Frías, 2008). In the early 1980s, 
workers’ autonomous action led to what Drake (1996) class the “Argentinization” of the 
Chilean labor movement. This “Argentinization” was expressed in the process through 																																																								
18 See: “Declaración de principios de la Unión Democrática de trabajadores de Chile (UDT)”, April 26, 
1981 in Araya (2015: 76-86); “G10 cambió de nombre a Unión Democrática de Trabajadores de Chile 
(UDT)”, El Mercurio, April 28, 1981.	 
19 Interview with Valentín Vega, November 10, 2015. Other labor leaders and activists made similar 
accounts to explain how, despite all the restrictions included in the Labor Plan, they decided to use 
“strategically” the laws under the understanding that they gave them “opportunities” that did not exist 
between 1973 and 1979.  
		
238 
which unions came to play a variety of roles previously monopolized by parties—for 
instance, as opposition spokespersons, as facilitators of representative mechanisms and 
social mobilization, and as providers of policy alternatives (Drake, 1996, p. 54). 
Perhaps the clearest expression of this new phase of the organized working class in 
Chile occurred in 1983, amid the first National Protest Days (Jornadas de Protesta 
Nacional) where unions’ “strategic” use of dictatorial laws was illustrative.   
In early 1983, copper miners grouped in the CTC took advantage of the repeal 
of the decree law 198, and in the first free union elections upheld since the beginning of 
the dictatorship they managed to sweep away labor leaders appointed by the 
government. Right after the election, the new CTC leadership summoned a national 
congress that accorded to call for a general strike to protest the government’s 
management of the economic crisis and the lack of democracy in the country (Araya, 
2014, p. 17). The call for strike soon escalated into a broader call for a “national 
protest” against the dictatorship. The national protest took place in May 11, 1983, and 
became the first organized protest against the regime. The protest was a success, and ten 
days later opposition unions announced the creation of the Comando Nacional de 
Trabajadores (National Commando of Workers, CNT), which would become the 
organizational basis for the foundation of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) 
in 1988. 
Between 1983 and 1986, the CNT achieved a notorious public presence. In the 
course of the anti-dictatorial protests that took place between 1983 and 1986, anti-
dictatorship activists and political leaders recognized defined the labor movement (and 
the CNT in particular) as the “center” of the “social convergence” that would lead to the 
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end of Pinochet’s regime20. Aware of its hegemonic position, the CNT made several 
proposals aiming to build a cross-class coalition to ensure the transition to democracy, 
to undertake profound reforms to the neoliberal regime, and to stop the privatization of 
public companies, among other issues. These proposals were included in documents 
such as the “Petitorio del Pueblo” (The People’s Petition) and the “Pliego de los 
Trabajadores” (The Workers’ Petition) of 1984, which served as inputs for the 
document entitled “Pliego de Chile” (Chile’s Petition) of 1985 that gathered together 
the demands from different sectors of civil society opposed to the dictatorship21. A year 
later, in 1986, the CNT became a central actor in the Asamblea de la Civilidad 
(Assembly of Civility), a coalition of parties, student federations, neighborhood 
associations, and other social movements that would later become the base of the 
center-left coalition the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Frías, 2008, p. 
103). In the same year, workers elaborated the manifesto entitled “Chile’s demand” in 
which they reiterated the need to carry out deep political and economic 
transformations—including the repeal of the Labor Plan. In a clear effort to bridge the 
gap between traditional (industrial) unionism and “marginalized” sectors of society, the 
manifesto also addressed several demands related to gender equality, housing, 
education, free speech, and political freedom22. In addition, through the Assembly of 
Civility, the CNT called for the national protests of July 2 and 3, 1986, which according 
to analysts would become decisive for the defeat of the dictatorship (cf. Frías, 2008). 																																																								
20 See, for example, “Concertación para la unidad”, Fortín Mapocho, September 5, 1984; “Unánime 
respaldo al paro”, Fortín Mapocho, October 29, 1984; “Declaración oficial del CNT: ‘Chile ha dicho 
basta’”, Fortín Mapocho, November 2, 1984.    
21 “CNT: movilización social por la democracia”, Fortín Mapocho, August 12, 1985.		 
22 “CNT impulsa la ‘Demanda de Chile’”, Fortín Mapocho, May 5, 1985.   
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After these protests, the CNT declared that workers’ mobilization demonstrated that 
they had become the “vanguard” of the “arduous struggle for the recuperation of liberty 
and democracy”23.     
 Throughout this period, most of the opposition labor leaders, from Christian 
Democrat to Communist workers, endorsed the CNT as they saw it as the best 
expression of working class unity. The CNT was the clearest attempt to build a new 
type of union movement, based on a stronger presence of Christian Democrat leaders—
who during the 1970s had been less exposed to repression than Communists and 
Socialists—and a critique of the “extreme ideologization” and the subordination to 
political parties of the pre-dictatorship labor movement (Araya, 2014; Drake, 1996). 
The features of the “new” labor movement were clearly observed in the CNT workers’ 
defense of labor autonomy and the principles of labor unity, ideological pluralism, and 
democracy24. 
 The emphasis on ideological pluralism and labor unity did not mean that the 
labor movement was free from strategic or ideological divisions. In terms of strategy, 
by the end of this period the CNT started to witness the same strategic disputes 
observed between parties—particularly those between electoral and insurrectional 
strategies, and after 1986 between the “electoral mobilization” and “mass mobilization” 
approaches (Araya, 2014). Although by the second half of the 1980s electoral 
mobilization predominated and in 1988 the CNT endorsed parties’ call to register to 
vote in the plebiscite, workers did not abandon mobilization. Insisting on the 
																																																								
23 “El Chile de los trabajadores y la movilización social”, Fortín Mapocho, July 7, 1986. 
24 See “CNT: Unidad, pluralismo y autonomía para formar una central”, Fortín Mapocho, July 2, 1985.  
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combination of “negotiation and mobilization”, the CNT argued asserted that “massive 
and ascending social mobilization” would be the guarantee for “any successful 
negotiation” to defeat the dictatorship25. Regarding the ideological divisions, the 
conflicts between DC and Communist workers were recurrent. However, they did not 
endanger the adoption of ideologically “pluralist” frameworks of actions, which 
decisive for the foundation of the CUT in 1988. In fact, in contrast to the position of 
“conservative” DC leaders affiliated with the UDT (now called CDT26), who defended 
the idea of building “ideological central confederations” and rejected to collaborate with 
Communists27, CNT workers always stressed the necessity of establishing “unitary and 
pluralist confederations” where internal democracy would be a central axis. Based on 
this, CNT workers stressed labor unity by opposing both the ideological segmentation 
of labor unions and the idea of “depoliticized” labor movement28.   
 Another and perhaps more important issue also defined the conditions for the 
foundation of the CUT: the progressive weakening of labor autonomy. As soon as the 
anti-dictatorship protests endangered the stability of Pinochet’s regime, repression 
against labor leaders increased while, by the mid 1980s, the restrictions on parties 
softened. Despite in 1983 labor leaders strongly defended labor autonomy vis-à-vis 
opposition parties, workers’ participation in the negotiations with the regime soon 
became mediated through parties. Moreover, as soon as the protests became a national 																																																								
25 “Mensaje a los Trabajadores y al Pueblo” Consejo Directivo del Comando Nacional de Trabajadores. 1 
de Mayo de 1987. In Fortín Mapocho, May 9, 1987. 
26 At this time, the UDT had been renamed Central Democrática de Trabajadores (CDT). The change of 
name occurred after UDT workers led by the anti-Marxist Christian Democrat Eduardo Ríos definitely 
broke with the CNT.  
27 See, for example, “CUT. Una historia complicada”, Revista Hoy, July 18, 1988.  
28 “Proposición: Por una central sindical unitaria”, Fortín Mapocho, April 21, 1986; “I Conferencia del 
CNT: Unidad y decisión de lucha”, Fortín Mapocho, May 5, 1986.   
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issue, CNT leaders openly called on parties to lead these negotiations. In doing so, the 
labor movement lost a big portion of the leadership role it had gained since the late 
1970s (Araya, 2014; Campero, 1986; Frías, 2008).  
 
7.1.4. The reconstruction of traditional union-party linkages: the “political” 
foundation of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT)  
 Throughout 1988 workers undertook an important organizing work to prepare 
the Foundational Congress of the new central confederation that, according to its 
organizers, would represent the “historical continuity” of the outlawed Central Única de 
Trabajadores. The congress took place in August 1988, and in line with the new 
ideologically pluralist approach, the new central confederation was named Central 
Unitaria de Trabajadores (Workers Unitary Central)29.  
In spite of leaders’ emphasis on pluralism, a report of the epoch described the 
foundation of the new CUT as “a difficult birth”. According to this report, the causes of 
the difficulties were associated with the persistent political and ideological differences 
existing among its founders. In addition to the strategic divisions between the workers 
who defended the participation in the plebiscite to determine whether Pinochet should 
leave office (moderate Socialists and Christian Democrats) and those who refuse it 
(Communists and other leftist workers), the differences revolved around ideological 
issues such as the character of the new central (e.g. moderate Socialist and DC leaders 																																																								
29 In interviews with labor leaders involved in the reconstruction of the CUT (e.g. José Figueroa, Arturo 
Martínez, and Valentín Vega), they contended the change of name was much more a simple change of 
words. It denoted the desire to build a new labor movement based on the principle of “unity” without 
denying the ideological diversity of Chilean workers. The interviews were conducted between September 
and October 2015. 
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rejected the Communists’ proposal to define it as “antifascist” and “classist”), the 
concept of “class struggle” (DC workers did not endorse it), and the CUT’s affiliation 
with ideological international unions such as the Marxist WFTU, the Social Democrat 
ICFTU, and the Christian Democrat WCL30.  
These divergences were addressed at the political level, particularly through 
agreements between opposition parties grouped in the Concertación (the DC, the 
moderate sectors of PS, and other center-left parties) and left parties such as the PC. In 
this agreement the positions of the Concertación parties predominated as the DC-PS 
alliance gave the majority to the Concertación labor leaders. Taking advantage of their 
majority, they accorded to build a “center-left block” to ensure, among other things, the 
CUT’s “governability” and the moderation of labor demands if the option “No” won the 
plebiscite. Moderation of demands did not mean—at least at that moment—abandoning 
mobilization, as CUT leaders asserted that even in a period of democratic transition the 
general strike was “a legitimate and inalienable tool” of workers31.  
In noting the significance of this type of political agreements, Drake (1996) 
depicted the foundation of the CUT as an “orchestration” by political parties, which 
“increasingly reasserted their domination over trade unions” (p. 142). For Drake the 
consequences of this were evident: similar to the pre-cup days, the CUT became a 
confederation whose internal organization—for instance, its electoral process—was 
permeated by political divisions and alliances, even though both the CUT’s declaration 																																																								
30 “Entretelones de la nueva CUT”, Revista Hoy, February 15, 1988; “Central Unitaria de Trabajadores. 
Los costos de una polémica a destiempo”, Revista Cauce, July 18, 1988; “Manuel Bustos, presidente de 
la CNT: ‘Paralizar el pacíficamente el país si se desconoce el triunfo del NO’”, Revista Cauce, August 1, 
1988; “Sergio Barriga: Proponemos una Central destinada a cambiar las estructuras sociales”, Informativo 
del Comando Nacional de Trabajadores, in Fortín Mapocho, August 2, 1988.  
31 “Conducción moderada proponen para CUT”, El Mercurio, August 20, 1988.	 
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of principles and traditional labor parties expressed desires for greater autonomy from 
parties32. At a more general level, the political foundation of the CUT was the clearest 
expression of the reconstruction of the union-party linkages cut off for years by the 
dictatorship. The importance of these linkages was visible in the results of the first 
electoral process, which gave the presidency to the Christian Democrat and former CNT 
leader Manuel Bustos. Not only was Bustos’ victory achieved through an agreement 
between the slates of the parties belonging to the Concertación (particularly the DC and 
the moderate sectors of the PS), but also the general results of the electoral process 
suggested important continuities with the pre-coup CUT: the offices obtained by the 
Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists essentially replicated the political 
composition of the CUT’s Executive Committee in the early 1970s (Drake, 1996, p. 
143)33. Not surprisingly, in 1989 the CUT officially endorsed the Concertación 
presidential candidate Patricio Aylwin, who in exchange promised to reform “the entire 
labor legislation and social policy”34.    
 
7.2. Workers and collective action during the democratic period (1990-present) 
The “political” nature of CUT’s foundation has had lasting effects on working 
class collective action during the democratic period, as it meant the establishment of 																																																								
32 “Declaración de principios Central Unitaria de Trabajadores”, Fortín Mapocho, August 27, 1988. See 
also: “Mensaje del Partido Socialista a los trabajadores chilenos (Inserción)”, Fortín Mapocho, August 
21, 1988.	These desires for labor autonomy contrasted with the view of conservative newspapers such as 
El Mercurio, which depicted the CUT as a “small, politicized minority of workers” that was “nothing 
more than the extension of the labor departments of the Christian Democracy, and the Socialist, and 
Communist Parties (see, for example, El Mercurio’s Editorial of August 24, 1988). 
33 Details on the results of the electoral process can be found in “Manuel Bustos es elegido presidente de 
la CUT”, El Mercurio, August 21, 1988.  
34 “La CUT apoyó oficialmente al candidato opositor”, La Época, July 13, 1989; “La CUT bajará nivel de 
sus demandas laborales”, La Nación, October 20, 1989.	 
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“political-partisan” logic of organization. In addition to being the center of what 
analysts and labor leaders have termed the CUT’s “politicization”, it has also been a key 
factor that reinforces (and is reinforced by) the constraints on collective actions 
associated with the persistence of the 1979 Labor Plan. In what follow I will show how 
the mutual reinforcement between institutional and political factors operates. After 
describing the effects of the persistence of the Labor Plan’s regulations, I will show 
how the political-partisan logic of organization has operated since throughout the 
democratic period.  
 
7.2.1. The continuity of the 1979 Labor Plan and its consequences for organized 
labor  
 As shown in the previous chapters, since the return to democracy the labor 
movement has demanded, without success, the repeal of the 1979 Labor Plan and the 
establishment of industry-wide collective bargaining and regulations protecting the right 
to strike. Quantitative data on unionization rates, union average size, and collective 
bargaining coverage show, in line with workers’ demands, that the labor reforms carried 
during the democratic period have been largely unsuccessful as since the enactment of 
the Labor Plan these indicators have stayed unchanged.  
Table 2 suggests, for example, that since the beginning of the dictatorial period 
unionization rates have never reached the peak observed in 1973 (33.7%), and that even 
though they have increased since the mid 2000s, during the whole democratic period 
they have remained below the peak observed in 1991 (18.2%). Also, since the early 
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1990s collective bargaining coverage has persistently remained below 10%, whereas, 
average union size has never reached the levels observed before the enactment of the 
Labor Plan. Since then, the average size of unions has remained around 80 workers, 
whereas throughout the pre-Labor Plan era it was around 130 workers.  
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Table 2. Number of unions, workers affiliated to unions, unionization rates, union size (average), 
and collective bargaining coverage 
Year Unions (1) 
Number of workers 
aff. with unions (1) 
Unionization 
rate (2) 
Average 
union size 
Collective bargaining 
coverage (3) 
1932 421 54,801 4 130 ND 
1935 669 83,262 5.2 124 ND 
1940 1,888 162,297 10 86 ND 
1945 1,581 232,714 11.5 147 ND 
1950 1,907 260,071 12 136 ND 
1955 2,177 305,192 15 140 ND 
1960 1,915 272,956 10.5 143 ND 
1965 2,059 302,408 10.5 147 ND 
1970 4,581 627,666 22.5 137 ND 
1973 6,502 934,335 33.7 144 ND 
1975 5,900 661,268 ND 112 ND 
1977 5,816 627,217 ND 108 ND 
1980 4,597 386,910 12.5 84 ND 
1981 3,977 395,951 12 100 ND 
1982 4,048 347,470 11.5 86 ND 
1983 4,401 320,903 10.5 73 ND 
1984 4,714 343,329 10.5 73 ND 
1985 4,994 360,963 10.7 72 ND 
1986 5,391 386,987 11 72 ND 
1987 5,883 422,302 11.2 72 ND 
1988 6,446 446,194 12 69 ND 
1989 7,118 507,616 15 71 ND 
1990 ND 606,812 16.2 ND 7.6 
1991 7,707 701,355 18.2 91 10.1 
1992 8,323 724,065 17.9 87 8.6 
1993 7,974 684,361 16.0 86 9.1 
1994 7,891 661,966 15.4 84 8.2 
1995 7,505 637,570 14.6 85 7.4 
1996 ND ND 14.0 ND 7.6 
1997 7,446 617,761 13.3 83 6.2 
1998 7,439 611,535 13.1 82 6.9 
1999 7,057 579,996 12.7 82 5.6 
2000 7,659 595,495 13.2 78 6.3 
2001 7,410 599,610 12.9 81 5.4 
2002 8,149 618,930 13.1 76 5.9 
2003 8,967 669,507 13.8 75 4.5 
2004 9,416 680,351 13.7 72 5.2 
2005 9,148 676,368 13.4 74 5.3 
2006 9,424 703,706 12.8 75 5.4 
2007 9,365 724,606 12.9 77 6.1 
2008 9,340 801,251 13.9 86 6.4 
2009 9,776 837,055 14.6 86 5.9 
2010 9,871 858,571 13.9 87 6.2 
2011 10,310 892,365 14.1 87 6.9 
2012 10,585 940,603 14.6 89 6.2 
2013 10,634 940,222 14.2 88 6.4 
2014 11,162 985,770 14.7 88 6.9 
2015 11,433 1,048,234 15.4 92 7.2 
(1) 1932-1973 data obtained from Garcés and Milos (1988, p. 113); 1975-1977 data obtained from Campero and 
Valenzuela (1984, p. 165) (they exclude agricultural unions); 1980-1989 data obtained from Posner (2017, p. 241); data 
for 1990-2015 were obtained from Dirección del Trabajo (2016b, pp. 18-22) and include only active unions.   
(2) 1990-2015 data obtained from Dirección del Trabajo (2016b, pp. 18-22) and Durán and Kremerman (2015, p. 7) 
(they exclude public employees because these are not allowed to form unions). Data for 1932-1989 are estimations based 
on Durán (Forthcoming).  
(3) Data obtained from Dirección del Trabajo (2016a, p. 49). These figures include only private sector workers. These 
figures are lower than the ones presented in other statistical reports (e.g. ILO) probably because they are estimated 
considering only the number of workers who signed a collective agreement (whether a convenio or a contrato colectivo) 
and do not consider the cases when the employer extend it to non-unionized workers.  
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In addition to these objective constraints on workers’ organization, labor 
regulations have had several effects on working class collective action in Chile. The 
first of these effects is what workers define as “personalistic leadership” (caudillismo), 
which operates as a collective action problem because it reinforces union fragmentation. 
The second effect is unions’ economic weakness. As caudillismo, it also operates as a 
collective action problem because it is a central cause of labor subordination to parties 
and governments that—as I will show later in this chapter—is one of the main sources 
of weakness for the CUT. Finally, the third effect of labor regulations refers to the way 
in which they have undermined workers’ right to strike and, in doing so, have 
encouraged the adoption of extra-legal forms of collective action. Unlike the other two 
effects, this last one is an important constraint on collective action which workers have 
nonetheless managed to bypass. The circumvention of the legal restrictions on the right 
to strike has been indeed one of the most important aspects of the incipient 
revitalization of labor activism observed in the country. 
 
Personalistic leadership (caudillismo) 
At least since the return to democracy, caudillismo has been a collective action 
problem usually noted by activists and union leaders. In the late 1990s, for example, the 
CUT president Roberto Alarcón referred to it to argue that due to personalistic leaders’ 
particularistic and non-solidaristic orientations the CUT’s general assemblies were 
“unmanageable”. “Even Mr. Clotario (Clotario Blest, the historic Chilean labor leader) 
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would not be able to lead the CUT nowadays”, he contended35. Similarly, in interviews 
with plant-level and confederation-level leaders caudillismo was on one the most 
common factors used by the interviewees to explain the unions’ “lack of unity”.  
According to the interviewees personalistic leadership styles are, both in firm 
level unions and federations, the direct result of labor regulations that facilitate the 
formation of multiple unions that “compete” to each other to get affiliates. At the firm 
level, interviewees asserted that employers are usually the main promoters of 
personalism. Drawing upon these labor laws, employers frequently encourage the 
formation of parallel unions as soon as a “problematic” one emerges. To do so, they 
simply reinforce or “make up” leadership problems in the existing union and endorse 
the formation of a new one, which usually receives higher benefits from the firm to 
make it more “attractive” for workers.  
According to the labor leaders interviewed, at the federation and confederation 
level the situation is the same, although without the direct intervention from employers: 
no matter their causes (ideological, strategic, or simply “personal” issues) leadership 
disputes usually end up in the formation of parallel confederations (or federations) that 
sometimes are no more than the expression of a labor leader’s “feudal domain” (feudo). 
Legally encouraged personalism explains, for the interviewees, why in industries such 
as commerce and agriculture there are dozens of confederations claiming to represent 
the same type of workers. This also explains Chilean leaders’ persistent emphasis on 
their “quantitative representation”, i.e. the number of workers his/her union, federation 
																																																								
35 “Robeto Alarcón: ‘Ni don Clotario Blest habría sido capaz de dirigir hoy a la CUT’”, La Segunda, May 
9, 1997.  
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or confederation represents. Based on such a measure, they show their counterparts how 
“important” they are and how many people they can potentially mobilize.     
 
Unions’ economic weakness and labor subordination  
The second collective action problem, union’s financial weakness, has been 
argued to be a consequence of labor regulations that, while promoting the emergence of 
small and “underfunded” unions, do not recognize permanent state funds for supra-level 
labor organizations. According to the articles 261 and 286 of the Chilean labor code, 
federations’, confederations’, and central confederations’ funds depends entirely on the 
amount of money plant-level unions affiliated with them agree to contribute. This has 
undermined labors’ autonomous power, as underfunded unions give rise to precarious 
supra-level organizations (Feres, 2016; A. Martínez, 2005). Financial precariousness 
and budget crises have indeed been a permanent problem for the CUT, which have 
forced labor leaders to compromise the CUT’s autonomy by looking for financial 
assistance in governments, international labor federations, NGOs, foundations, and 
parties36.  
Regarding this, since the return to democracy the CUT’s economic dependence 
on center-left parties and governments has been notorious. Such dependence has 
operated, on the one hand, through parties’ economic assistance to the unions 
participating in the CUT’s congresses. Through that type of assistance, parties usually 
pay the CUT’s dues and fees on behalf of unions unable to do so (and consequently 																																																								
36 “Ahora ni llueve, gotea”, El Mercurio, December 28, 1997; “Sindicatos fantasma y acusaciones de 
vicios electorales: la semana en que la democracia indirecta de la CUT hizo crisis”, El Mercurio, 
September 4, 2016. 
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unable to participate in the congresses). In exchange, parties ask union leaders to 
support their candidates or positions during the electoral or decision-making processes 
that take place in the congresses. According to several reports and the union leaders 
interviewed in the course of this research, payment of dues and fees is perhaps the main 
mechanism through which parties have “co-opted” the CUT’s decision-making 
process37.  
Along with this, the CUT’s autonomy has also been endangered through 
government assistance and, especially since the mid 2000s, through what Leiva (2013) 
calls “the appeal to the CUT’s corporate interests”. This form of dependence became 
possible thanks to laws that allowed leaders to manage their own finances by accessing 
to state-provided competitive funds. Based on these, CUT leaders have been able to 
establish workers training centers (e.g. OTECS dependent on the Servicio Nacional de 
Capacitación y Empleo) and research institutions such as the Fundacion de Estudios 
Laborales (FIEL), whose profits also functioned as a source of funds for the CUT.  
Non-CUT labor leaders usually refer to these types of services and foundations 
as the “proof” of the CUT’s subordination to center-left administrations. They also draw 
upon them to criticize the “privileged” position of the CUT officials vis-à-vis the rest of 
the union leaders38. However, even the CUT officials decry these funding mechanisms, 
arguing not only that they have undercut autonomy, but also that they have been 
ineffective to solve unions’ financial weakness. For example, in describing these 																																																								
37 “Congreso CUT: Confrontaciones peligrosas”, Revista Análisis, October 28, 1991; “Roberto Alarcón: 
‘Ni don Clotario Blest habría sido capaz de dirigir hoy a la CUT’”, La Segunda, May 9, 1997; “Sindicatos 
fantasma y acusaciones de vicios electorales: la semana en que la democracia indirecta de la CUT hizo 
crisis”, El Mercurio, September 4, 2016.  
38 In the interviews, several labor leaders affiliated with the Agrupación de Trabajadores por una Mejor 
Reforma Laboral and the CIUS made use these ideas to criticize the CUT officialdom.  
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problems, the CUT general secretary Nolberto Díaz asserted: “It is not difficult to 
understand why labor leaders are not united and are always thinking about saving their 
own union. In many cases I understand it, because with these unfair labor laws they 
have to fight for small, underfunded unions, to defend their 60, 100 workers, with a tiny 
union and against all the laws. So can I expect them to give their money to fund the 
CUT? Nah. (Because) they simply can’t make it”39.  
 
Limitations to the right to strike, alternatives (extra-legal) forms of collective action, 
and labor revitalization  
In addition to caudillismo and unions’ economic weakness, the Labor Plan’s 
regulations have also have undermined workers’ ability to exercise the right to strike. 
They have done so either directly (e.g. by recognizing employers’ ability to replace 
strikers) or indirectly by bureaucratizing the procedures and phases through which 
workers can go on strike in the course of the bargaining process. Unsurprisingly, the 
impact of strike activity and collective bargaining on workers’ salaries is modest. So are 
the rates of participation in legal strikes. Since 1998 the average annual salary 
adjustment derived from collective bargaining has remained below 1.25%, and since 
1992 less than 10% of workers who could potentially strike—i.e. private-sector 
unionized workers covered by a collective contract—have participated in them40. When 
																																																								
39 Interview with Nolberto Díaz, September 24, 2015.  
40 As argued in previous chapters, the Chilean legislation recognizes two types of collective bargaining 
instruments: semi-regulated convenios colectivos (collective agreements) and legally regulated contratos 
colectivos (collective contracts). The main difference between these two types of instruments is that under 
a collective agreement workers do not have the right to strike and enjoy legal protections if they decide to 
go on strike in the course of the bargaining process. According to official data, in 1990 88% of the 
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all private sectors workers are considered, the percentage of participation in strikes is 
less than 1% (Durán & Kremerman, 2015, pp. 12-13).   
In the last decades, these constraints have been argued to encourage extra-legal 
and unregulated forms of collective action (Armstrong & Águila, 2011). At least since 
the mid 2000s, the proliferation of extra-legal strikes has been the basis of the 
revitalization of working class militancy in Chile. According to Velásquez, Medel, and 
Pérez (2016) the use of extra-legal strikes has been correlated to higher levels of 
politicization which can be observed, among other things, in unions’ increasing use of 
extra-legal actions as a means to either influence sociopolitical processes (e.g. solidarity 
strikes) or pursue “political demands” that go beyond bread and butter issues (e.g. 
demands for changes in the organization of the labor or demands). 
Table 3 shows different indicators of strike activity between 1979 and 2015, 
based on the calculations made by Armstrong and Águila (2006) and updated by the 
researchers of the Observatorio de Huelgas Laborales (2014, 2016). The data suggest 
that strike activity has grown over the last decades, and that when the number of 
workers involved and worker-days lost is strikes are considered the increase is 
particularly significant after 2007. In line with what recent research has suggested, the 
data also show that the increase in strike activity is largely explained by the growing 
importance of extra-legal strikes (Armstrong & Águila, 2011; Velásquez et al., 2016). 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																																																																		
collective bargaining instruments signed by unions were collective contracts. Since then, such percentage 
has slowly but steadily decreased to 77% in 2015 Álvarez (2012).  
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Table 3. Indicators of strike activity in Chile (1979-2015) 
 
Number of strikes 
 Workers involved 
(annual average) 
 Worker-days lost (annual 
average) 
Legal  Extra-legal  Total 
 Legal  Extra-legal  Total 
 Legal  Extra-legal  Total 
1979 38 ND 38  287 ND 287  3,190 ND 3,190 
1980 52 ND 52  351 ND 351  10,700 ND 10,700 
1981 82 ND 82  299 ND 299  7,551 ND 7,551 
1982 11 ND 11  97 ND 97  2,661 ND 2,661 
1983 39 1 40  106 1,463 140  1,696 61,446 3,190 
1984 39 ND 39  94 ND 94  1,116 ND 1,116 
1985 40 ND 40  112 ND 112  1,255 ND 1,255 
1986 39 ND 39  98 ND 98  1,483 ND 1,483 
1987 105 19 124  125 1,078 271  1,040 1,878 1,169 
1988 92 21 113  97 1,126 288  941 4,454 1,594 
1989 112 38 150  176 3,651 1,056  1,954 7,613 3,388 
1990 168 153 321  145 380 257  1,137 850 1,000 
1991 204 72 276  222 4,370 1,304  2,981 6,746 3,963 
1992 242 75 317  116 1,142 359  1,140 2,117 1,371 
1993 203 108 311  123 771 348  1,240 2,720 1,754 
1994 189 190 379  86 511 299  1,041 1,336 1,189 
1995 163 134 297  124 3,011 1,426  1,422 4,149 2,653 
1996 181 120 301  137 3,428 1,449  1,147 20,200 8,742 
1997 183 136 319  120 2,263 1,033  1,279 1,963 1,571 
1998 120 124 244  101 3,274 1,714  864 11,459 6,248 
1999 91 148 239  113 643 441  945 1,192 1,098 
2000 123 112 235  109 1,587 813  829 1,832 1,307 
2001 95 130 225  140 801 522  1,261 1,263 1,262 
2002 116 142 258  125 2,974 1,693  1,534 4,125 2,960 
2003 91 116 207  114 3,669 2,106  462 9,847 5,721 
2004 122 85 207  107 2,314 1,013  1,164 3,745 2,224 
2005 101 85 186  111 704 382  762 992 867 
2006 131 100 231  118 3,157 1,433  1,249 9,131 4,661 
2007 148 133 281  119 3,594 1,764  990 6,887 3,781 
2008 159 152 311  110 10,288 5,085  1,089 26,799 13,655 
2009 171 124 295  128 12,752 5,434  1,235 52,010 22,578 
2010 132 105 237  195 8,008 3,026  1,640 19,875 7,622 
2011 151 114 265  142 15,906 5,988  1,307 36,660 12,716 
2012 149 148 297  202 1,970 916  1,312 3,949 1,991 
2013 192 168 360  160 10,532 4,386  1,695 54,209 17,794 
2014 193 173 366  229 3,699 1,758  1,980 21,852 8,786 
2015 175 205 380  146 8,132 3,910  1,610 93,498 43,725 
Source: author’s elaboration on the basis of data from the Observatorio de Huelgas Laborales OHL-COES. 
The original dataset was built by Armstrong and Águila (2006), and the 2010– 2015 figures were updated by 
Medel, Pérez, and Velásquez (2014). 
 
 
Sectoral disaggregation of the data indicates that the growth of extra-legal 
strikes is the result of two processes that express the way in which workers have 
managed to overcome the constraints of the Chilean labor laws by using extra-legal 
		
255 
forms of collective actions. The first of these processes refers to the proliferation of 
extra-legal strike activity in the public sector. Here collective relations are not regulated 
by the Labor Code but by the “Estatuto Administrativo”, which among other things 
does not recognize workers’ right to strike and form unions—that’s the reason why 
public sector employees are organized in “associations” (asociaciones) and not in 
“unions” (sindicatos). In the public sector, strike activity is, by definition, “illegal”, and 
is mainly expressed in the form of sectoral-wide stoppages (paros sectoriales) that 
occur at the beginning of the bargaining process. In line with previous investigations 
(Armstrong & Águila, 2011), Figure 4 shows that since the beginning of public sector 
strikes in 1987, the annual average of worker-days lost in public sector strikes 
outnumbers that of the private sector. In 2015, for example, the average of worker-days 
lost in the public sector was 33 times the average of the private sector (in 2009 the ratio 
was equal to 83).   
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Figure 4. Annual average number of worker-days lost in strikes by sector (1987-2015) 
Source: author’s elaboration on the basis of data from OHL/COES dataset 
 
 
The second process refers to the proliferation of extra-legal strikes—i.e. that 
take place outside the bargaining process—in the private sector41. In this case, the 
impact of extra-legal strike activity has escalated substantially in relation to the impact 
of legal strikes. Figure 5 shows the proportion of worker-days lost in extra-legal strikes 
relation to the total number of worker-days lost in the private sector. As can be seen, 
despite some variations the proportional impact of extra-legal strike activity has risen. 
Thus, for example, if in 1991 only 7% of the days lost per worker were explained by 
extra-legal strikes, that percentage went up to 60% in 2015 (and in years such as 2003 
and 2011 it was over 75%).  
 																																																								
41 To this respect, this sector also includes state-owned companies whose unions are regulated, like in 
private firms, by the Labor Code.   
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Figure 5. Worker-days lost in extra-legal strikes as percentage of the total number of worker-days 
lost in private sector strikes (1987-2015) 
Source: author’s elaboration on the basis of data from OHL/COES dataset 
 
Recent research has shown that in the private sector, the use of extra-legal 
strikes has been observed in two different manners. On the one hand, it has been seen in 
workers’ use of short-duration, firm-level strikes through which they make demands 
outside the bargaining process (Armstrong & Águila, 2011; Leiva, 2013; Observatorio 
de Huelgas Laborales, 2016; Pérez, Medel, & Velásquez, Forthcoming). On the other, it 
has also been observed in highly disruptive industry-wide strikes which, since the late 
2000s, have taken place in key industries of the Chilean economy (e.g. mining, port, 
and forestry industries) (Aravena & Núñez, 2009; Echeverría, 2010). Although this 
latter example of extra-legal collective action has not been widespread, it has had 
enormous political implications. In fact, the unexpected success and disruptive power 
of many of these industry-wide strikes, as well as the militancy of the workers involved 
in them, led several scholars to call into question the main assertions of the de-
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industrialization thesis—particularly its “linear” or “deterministic” interpretations 
according to which the decline of working class power was inevitable and irreversible 
(Aravena, 2009; Gutierrez, 2016). In the most notorious cases, these strikes were 
organized by de facto labor confederations such as the Unión de Sindicatos Forestales 
de Arauco (USINFA), the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (CTC), and the 
Unión Portuaria de Chile (UPCh), which stood out as collective organizations that 
represented particular types of workers—e.g. subcontracted workers in mining and 
forestry industries—whose right to bargain and strike were (and still are) strongly 
limited by law. However, in all these cases workers managed to overcome, through the 
use of direct action tactics, both the legal constraints and employers’ opposition and, in 
so doing, could engage in different types of multi-company collective bargaining.  
In relation to this, the 2007 wave of strikes was particularly significant. In 2007, 
subcontracted workers in the forestry, mining, and fish production industries carried out 
massive industry-wide strikes, which in some cases ended up in significant gains for 
workers42. The Communist Newspaper El Siglo defined these victories as a “historical 
																																																								
42 Two very successful cases were the strikes in the forestry and mining industries. Forestry workers and 
miners (grouped in USINFA and the CTC respectively) made several demands related to disparities in 
wages and working conditions between subcontracted and permanent workers (trabajadores de planta). 
Given that their work was directly related to the main contractor company’s trade, subcontracted miners 
also demanded the state-owned copper company Codelco to hire them permanently as required by the 
2006 Law of Subcontracting. In both cases, workers obtained exceptional improvements in salary, 
working conditions, and hiring practices through a bargaining process that took place between them, the 
contractor companies (their direct employers), and different firms or divisions associated with the main 
contractor company (Bosques Arauco in one case, Codelco in the other), even though that type of 
bargaining was outlawed. For several analysts, the Codelco strike was especially important because it 
showed the flaws of the Law of Subcontracting. The law was unable to specify when and under what 
conditions the main contractor company (Codelco in this case) should hire the subcontracted worker. 
Thus, for example, amid the strike, government authorities noted that the law did not explicitly “force” 
Codelco to hire subcontracted miners, although they noted that this was the “spirit” that defined how the 
law should be interpreted. See “Crónica de una huelga decisiva”, El Siglo, July 6, 2007; and “La hora de 
los sindicatos”, Revista Capital, No 211, August 24, 2007. 
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triumph”43, and several analysts started to talk about a “renaissance of the labor 
movement in Chile” (Aravena & Núñez, 2009). In contrast, the business journal Revista 
Capital described these events by noting that the “time of labor unions has come”, 
while reporting employers’ preoccupation with the “extremely high” levels of 
radicalism exhibited by workers44. In a similar way, business associations constantly 
accused the government of being “too permissive” with these “illegal” actions45.  
Similar events took place in early 2014, when longshoremen and dockworkers 
grouped in the UPCh, who shut down the ports throughout Chile’s shore demanding 
issues as diverse as the firm’s recognition of their labor union (port of Angamos) or the 
enforcement of agreements that would recognize their right to on-duty meal period (port 
of San Antonio). Like in 2007, both the amplitude of the strikes and its timing—
summer session when most of the agriculture crops are exported—caused alarm among 
business associations, which unsuccessfully called on the government and the sectoral 
business association—CAMPORT—to avoid negotiating at the industry-wide level46.   
These forms of collective action have had a significant impact in organized 
labor. Along with the small-scale, firm-level, extra-legal strikes, they are the clearest 
example of how private sector workers have attempted to bypass the Labor Code’s 
																																																								
43 “Las razones del histórico triunfo de los trabajadores forestales”, El Siglo, May 11, 2007; “Crónica de 
una huelga decisiva”, El Siglo, July 6, 2007.  
44 “La hora de los sindicatos”, Revista Capital, No 211, August 24, 2007. 
45 “CPC golpea la mesa por caso Codelco y pide al gobierno mantener orden publico”, Diario Financiero, 
July 12, 2007; “Las lecciones del conflicto laboral en Codelco”, Diario Financiero, July 24, 2007; 
“Eliodoro Matte: ‘Hay claras intenciones de volver a esquemas del pasado’”, Diario Financiero, August 
1, 2007. 
46 “Otros cinco puertos del norte se suman al paro y empresariado alerta sobre graves efectos”, Diario 
Financiero, January 8, 2014; “Lecciones del paro portuario”, Diario Financiero, January 17, 2014. A 
detailed analysis of this wave of strikes, its causes, and consequences for the UPCh can be found in 
Santibáñez and Gaudichaud (Forthcoming). 
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limitations. Despite the significance of these forms of militancy, the CUT has been 
largely unable to integrate them and take advantage of the momentum they produced. In 
the next section I will explain why this is so. In doing so, I will also show how several 
collective actions problems derived from the labor law—e.g. labor subordination to 
parties associated with unions’ economic weakness—have been reinforced by the 
CUT’s internal organization (particularly by its political-partisan logic of organization 
upon which it was founded at the end of dictatorial period.  
 
7.2.2. The CUT’s political-partisan logic of organization and its effects on collective 
action  
 The foundation of the CUT symbolized the workers’ unity efforts forged in the 
struggles against the dictatorship. At the same time, it represented the reconstruction of 
the traditional union-party linkages the military regime tried to destroy, and the 
reassertion of parties’ control over labor (Drake, 1996). Parties played a key role in the 
foundation of the CUT. They facilitated political accords that made it possible, before 
and during the CUT’s foundational congress, to overcome the strategic and ideological 
disputes that challenged workers’ desires for unity. However, the “politicization” also 
implied the establishment of a on a “political-partisan” logic of organization through 
which the CUT’s decision-making structure, its electoral system, and the distribution of 
its leadership offices have been shaped largely by partisan criteria. This has been the 
central mechanism through which parties have attempted to influence, from within the 
CUT itself, working class organizations and action.  
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 The politicization of the CUT’s internal structures has found its most explicit 
expression in the CUT’s congresses, where accusations of party intervention have been 
recurrent. The accusations have always been related to the way that labor leaders draw 
on party resources to “overpay” CUT membership dues of the federations or 
confederations they lead. By doing so, leaders can “inflate” artificially the electoral rolls 
and represent, during electoral or decision-making processes, more workers than they 
actually do. Sometimes, in addition to dues overpayment (pago “abultado” de cuotas) 
union leaders use party resources to “revive ghost unions” (sindicatos fantasmas), that 
is, federations or confederations historically led by their party fellows but in state of 
inactivity.    
The CUT’s electoral and decision-making systems are based on indirect 
elections and the weighted count of votes, in which the weight of each leader’s vote 
depends on the number of affiliates he or she represents. This has made these trickeries 
decisive to define decision-making outcomes and, more importantly, who becomes 
member of the CUT’s main leadership structures: the National Directive Council and 
the Executive Council. The electoral system establishes that union leaders have to elect, 
among candidates running in several party-affiliated slates, the National Directive 
Council’s 45 councilors who in turn are in charge of electing the members of the 
Executive Council, the highest leadership body in the CUT. Since 1988, no single party-
affiliated slate has obtained the majority of the seats in the National Directive Council 
needed to get the presidency of the Executive Council and the CUT (equivalent to 23 
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seats in the elections where the National Directive Council has 45 seats47). Therefore, a 
complicated process of negotiations between slates (and between parties themselves) 
takes place to define the elections. Through these negotiations, parties and labor leaders 
agree to divide up the offices of the Executive Council (presidency, general secretary, 
etc.) according to the votes obtained by each of them.  
The basic pattern of partisan negotiations has remained unchanged since 1988. 
Combined with repetitive accusations of electoral fraud and the Labor Directorate’s 
incapacity to certify and keep updated information on the actual existence of the 
thousands of federations and confederations affiliated with the CUT, this pattern has 
given rise to several inter-slates conflicts that are usually resolved via political parties. 
This is the core of the CUT’s political-partisan logic of organization, and although there 
are innumerable examples of how it has operated for almost 30 years, a brief description 
of a few significant cases will suffice to illustrate it48.  
In 1991, for instance, weeks before the CUT’s 1st Congress took place, leftist—
PC and MIR—leaders of the Teachers’ Union (Colegio de Profesores) accused 
Christian Democrat leaders of inflating the electoral roll that defined the number of 
delegates their federation should send to the Congress as part of the Colegio de 
																																																								
47 In the 4th Extraordinary Congress of 2003 the number councilors increased to 60 as a way to boost the 
Directive Council’s internal pluralism. That measure was reversed in the 10th National Congress of 2016 
due to, among other reasons, the difficulty of achieving quorum for meetings 
48 For other examples not described here see: “Central Unitaria hizo pelear a profesores”, Fortín 
Mapocho, August 2, 1988; “Quiebre en congreso de CUT en Valparaíso”, El Mercurio, April 24, 1989; 
“Grave pugna interna en la dirigencia de la CUT”, La Tercera, September 10, 1991; “Anomalías en 
designación de delegados a congreso CUT”, El Mercurio, October 11, 1991; “Maniobras en la cúpula de 
la CUT: Once confederaciones marginadas del congreso”, El Siglo, April 22, 1994; “La CUT, ¿se 
convirtió en la central "dividida" de trabajadores?”, La Nación, April 23, 1994. A detailed description of 
all the electoral process between 1988 and 2010 can be found in Santibáñez and Gaudichaud 
(Forthcoming).  
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Profesores’ delegation. According to the leftist leaders, the DC workers forged the 
membership numbers of one of the federations they led in order to have more delegates 
in the Congress and, consequently, more power in the decision-making process. Given 
labor leaders’ mutual hostilities, the conflict was solved only once political parties 
(particularly the DC and the PC) intervened and agreed to apportion the total number of 
delegates representing the Colegio de Profesores according to party affiliation criteria49.  
During the 1st Congress, party influence could also be observed in the way that 
the election of the CUT’s leadership was. In this election, Concertación parties ran in 
separate slates (one led by the Christian Democrat Manuel Bustos, and the other headed 
by the Socialist Arturo Martínez). Despite these two slates obtained the majority of the 
seats in the National Directive Council (the DC slate obtained 17 seats, and the PS 15), 
conflicts started when the just-elected 45 councilors had to divide up the offices, and the 
Communists offered Martínez to make an electoral alliance. The Socialist leader 
accepted the offer because it would give him the presidency. However, Concertación 
parties decidedly opposed it. In accusing Martínez of “endangering the Concertación’s 
future”, the Socialist Party forced him to make a deal with his “natural allies” (the DC 
workers). Martínez finally gave up, although a couple of days later, he resigned from 
the Socialist Party arguing that parties’ involvement in unionism “has only created 
problems for workers”50. 
																																																								
49 “Caos en la CUT a sólo cuatro días del Primer Congreso Ordinario”, La Época, October 24, 1991.  
50 He also contended that he resigned because the PS was no longer “the party preoccupied with the 
workers, peasant, and urban poor (pobladores)”. See “Vicepresidente de la CUT renuncia al PS”, La 
Tercera, November 5, 1991. 
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 Similar and even more serious problems were observed in the mid and late 
1990s. The electoral process that took place during the 2nd National Congress of 1996, 
for instance, was fraught with analogous accusations of fraud and both before and after 
the congress itself party intervention was overt51. Aware of the growing influence of the 
Communists, the DC and the PS worked hard to put together a single Concertación 
slate. Despite their efforts, parties failed because Socialist union leaders disobey the 
PS’s commands and decided to form their own separate slates52. This time, the election 
was won by the Christian Democrats’ list led by María Rozas. However, she could not 
get the presidency because her “natural ally”—the now “Autonomous Socialist” slate 
led by Martínez (who had returned to the PS)—declined to make an agreement, 
preferring to ally with the Communists53. Like in 1991, Concertación parties proceeded 
to solve the problems “from above”. The PS punished Martínez and another Socialist 
leader (the miner Raimundo Espinoza) for disobeying the party’s orders, while trying to 
make “gestures” to the DC to reach an agreement on who was going to preside the 
CUT. Nevertheless, different from 1991, this time the Autonomous Socialist workers 
																																																								
51 Weeks before the congress, the PC denounced that the Concertación labor leaders “inflated” the 
electoral roll by affiliating confederations that did not belong to the CUT, and that were even affiliated 
with another central confederation, the CAT (e.g. Confederación Vitivinícola). This time, the PC 
denounced that the “machination” had the support of the Government office in charge of defining the 
CUT’s electoral roll, the Labor Directorate. Although the head of the Directorate of Labor emphatically 
denied the accusations, she recognized that it would be “practically impossible” to certificate the 
affiliation numbers presented by the CUT leadership as the official electoral roll. See: “Reconoce 
Dirección del Trabajo: ‘No podemos fiscalizar el número de afiliados’”, El Mercurio, March 23, 1996.  
52 “Concertación con ‘tejado de vidrio’”, El Siglo, March 2, 1996;  “Elección estremece a la CUT”, La 
Tercera, April 12, 1996.  
53 Since this election, PS workers have run in separate slates. Although one slate represents the “official” 
PS, and the other the “autonomous” socialists led by Martínez, PS members form the two of them.   
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opposed their party’s command, allied with the Communists, and managed to give the 
presidency to their fellow worker Roberto Alarcón54.  
Alarcón’s election gave rise to one of the most serious political crises within the 
CUT. DC labor leaders temporarily abandoned their offices in the Executive Council, 
while at the party level the DC cut its relation with the PS and demanded it to 
“discipline” its workers (which eventually happened when the PS punished Arturo 
Martínez and Raimundo Espinoza). Similarly, ignoring socialist workers’ opposition, 
the PS, the DC and the affected DC leaders forced the just-elected officialdom to call 
for a “Programmatic Congress” to solve what some media started to call the CUT’s 
“terminal crisis”55. After several delays, the congress took place in May 1997.  
In this congress, officially called 2nd Extraordinary Congress, CUT leaders made 
important changes to the electoral system. By granting the right to vote to all plant-level 
union leaders, the electoral roll increased from around 600 to more than 8,000 workers 
(until then only federation and confederation leaders had the right to vote)56. In spite of 
these changes, the next electoral process held in 199857 was again filled with allegations 
of fraud and intervention by political parties and the government (particularly from the 
Labor Directorate, in charge of supervising the making of the electoral register). Once 
again, these accusations ended up in an inter-party accord through which Concertación 																																																								
54 “Socialista Alarcón es el nuevo presidente de la CUT”, La Nación, April 20, 1996.  
55 “PS retira a dos dirigentes”, La Tercera, April 1996; “DC endurece posición y mantiene tensión con 
PS”, El Mercurio, April 23, 1996; “CUT: dirigentes rechazan acuerdo político”, La Tercera, May 3, 
1996; “PS y DC demandan a sindicalistas alternancias”, La Época, May 15, 1996; “Réplicas del 
terremoto de Abril”, El Mercurio, January 19, 1997; “Crisis terminal en la CUT”, La Tercera, April 27, 
1997.    
56 “Consejo CUT deberá definir si hay una nueva elección”, El Mercurio, May 25, 1997. 
57 Alarcón’s weak leadership capacities as well as the confrontations associated with his election, led the 
CUT’s officialdom to anticipate the electoral process (which was supposed to take place in 2000) to 1998. 
See “Elecciones en la CUT son este año”, La Tercera, January 30, 1998.  
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parties and the PC agreed to shorten the term of the new president (Communist Etiel 
Moraga) in two years, and call to new elections in 200058. The 2000 electoral process 
was relatively peaceful, although accusations of fraud and political intervention 
persisted. Thanks to a PS-PC alliance, the election gave the presidency to the 
Autonomous Socialist Arturo Martínez, who would lead the CUT until 2012.   
Throughout the 2000s, the electoral processes were relatively calm by the 
CUT’s standards. However, in the 2016 elections—in which the Communist Bárbara 
Figueroa was reelected president—the problems would become as serious as those 
observed in the 1990s. The day of the ballots the three slates unaffiliated with the 
government parties (the DC, PS, and PC) denounced that the electoral roll was 
fraudulent. They contended that the membership numbers of confederations led by 
Autonomous Socialists and Communists were, with the help of political parties, falsely 
“inflated” through the “dues overpayment” method59. The conflict escalated into a new 
crisis in the CUT when PS and PC workers made accusations against each other60. 
Notwithstanding the strong proofs of fraud that became public61, DC and PC workers 
agreed to make an alliance and reelect Bárbara Figueroa as a “transition president”. 
Right after taking office, Figueroa promised to call to an Extraordinary Congress to 																																																								
58 “CUT acorta mandato de su directiva”, El Mercurio, April 21, 1999. 
59 “Escándalo en las elecciones CUT: Dirigentes eliminados y padrones adulterados en todo el país”, El 
Desconcierto, August 28, 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.eldesconcierto.cl/pais-
desconcertado/2016/08/26/escandalo-elecciones-cut-padrones/. Accessed on September 1, 2016. See also 
the public statement “Carta presentada al CEN el día de ayer, tal conocer el padrón electoral de la CUT” 
by the slate “A recuperar la CUT para las y los trabajadores”, August 25.   
60 “Sindicatos fantasma y acusaciones de vicios electorales: la semana en que la democracia indirecta de 
la CUT hizo crisis”, El Mercurio, September 4, 2016;  
61 See “El 41% de los 706 mil votos de las elecciones CUT corresponde a padrones sindicales inflados”, 
El Desconcierto, September 27, 2016. Retrieved from http://www.eldesconcierto.cl/pais-
desconcertado/2016/09/27/el-41-de-los-706-mil-votos-de-las-elecciones-cut-corresponde-a-padrones-
sindicales-inflados/. Accessed on September 27, 2016.  
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reform the bylaws and the electoral system. Although the Extraordinary Council was 
held in January 2017, several labor leaders called into question the CUT’s officialdom 
willingness to implement real changes, arguing that in the 8th Congress of 2008 similar 
proposals had been accorded but never implemented62.  
As can be seen, party’s intervention in the decision-making and electoral 
processes is a pervasive aspect of the CUT’s logic of organization. However, it is not 
the only one. Another less visible but equally important aspect is party’s de facto 
“ownership” of its leadership offices observed in parties’ capacity to remove leaders 
from office when they resign to their party affiliations or when their actions contradict 
party agreements. Amid the 1996 crisis, for example, the PS tried (with relative success) 
to force its “rebellious” leaders to resign from office arguing that the PS “respects labor 
autonomy”, but that “it does not mean that democratically agreed party’s accords can be 
broken”. Also in 1996, the PS removed two members of the National Directive Council 
after they questioned Roberto Alarcón’s leadership, and the CUT vice-president, 
Manuel Ahumada, was removed from office after he resigned from his party (the 
Communist Party) due to disagreements with the its leadership. Although Ahumada 
asserted that he would not leave office, Communist leaders contradicted him saying that 
the party had the “right” to remove him because the CUT’s offices belonged to “the 
party’s slate” and not to the individual worker. The PC justified parties’ control of the 																																																								
62 “CUT: alianza de Figueroa y Díaz impide presidencia de Martínez”, La Tercera, September 9, 2016; 
“CUT inicia congreso con incertidumbre respecto a aprobación de voto universal”, El Desconcierto, 
January 27, 2017. Retrieved from http://www.eldesconcierto.cl/2017/01/27/cut-inicia-congreso-con-
incertidumbre-respecto-a-aprobacion-de-voto-universal/. Accessed on February 2, 2017; “Dirigentes 
sindicales acusan a la CUT de prácticas antidemocráticas”. Diario UChile. Retrieved from: 
http://radio.uchile.cl/2017/01/30/dirigentes-sindicales-acusan-a-la-cut-de-practicas-antidemocraticas/. 
Accessed on February 2, 2017 
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offices by arguing that it was an “accepted norm” within the CUT established during the 
inter-party accord upon which the CUT was founded63.   
 In recent years, party’s removal of high-rank leaders has not been frequent. Yet 
parties still have the ability to change or replace councilors when need arises (e.g. when 
a councilor leaves office). For instance, in one of the interviews conducted in the course 
of this research the president of a historical (but now weak) confederation said, off the 
record, that he would become a new member of the National Directive Council. He said 
that he had not mentioned it during the interview because that was “a political issue”. 
His party had just told him that he had been nominated for the position after a party 
fellow left office, so he had to keep the news in reserve until it became public through 
the CUT’s official channels.  
Parties’ ownership of offices is certainly contested and depends largely on 
parties’ capacity to exercise it. For example, the strained relation between the PS and its 
“autonomous” workers makes the PS much less able to control offices than, say, the PC. 
However partisan control of offices continues to be, along with parties’ intervention in 
decision-making and the electoral process, an important mechanism through which the 
CUT’s political-partisan logic of organization is reproduced.  
Both aspects of the CUT’s organization suggest what is perhaps the most 
important continuity between the pre- and post-dictatorial labor movement. In the early 
1970s Angell (1972) contended that the old CUT was mainly a “political organization” 
																																																								
63 “PS retira a dos dirigentes”, La Tercera, April 1996; “Buscan a sucesor de Ahumada”, Las Últimas 
Noticias, December 25, 1996; “PS y PC oficializan cambios en la CUT”, El Mercurio, December 27, 
1996; “Réplicas del terremoto de Abril”, El Mercurio, January 19, 1997; “Crisis terminal en la CUT”, La 
Tercera, April 27, 1997.     
		
269 
because its major divisions, decisions, and power structures ran along party lines. Pretty 
much like in the current period, he described the CUT in the 1960s by pointing out (p. 
215):  
“The main CUT groups are organized on a party political basis. Unionists meet with their party 
advisers before and during the congress to discuss tactics, and the choice of candidates to be 
included in the list to be presented for election. Lists presented for election to the executive are 
not alliances of one union with another, but of members of the same party affiliation from 
different unions, and the ties that bind groups of union leaders together on the executive are 
political ones… 
[E]ach congress repeats the debate going on in the country at large between the parties. The 
importance of the congresses lies in the rise and fall of parties on the executive and in the 
political alliances that are made”  
 
 
During the post-dictatorial democratic era, the perpetuation of these practices 
has significantly debilitated working class power because it has reinforced, from within 
the CUT’s structures, the subordination to parties (and governments) derived from 
unions’ economic weakness caused by the 1979 Labor Plan’s regulations. In what 
follows, I will show that it has also undermined labor power through three different but 
interrelated mechanisms: 1) it has compromised the CUT’s capacity to represent the 
interests of the Chilean working class; 2) it has increased ideological and especially 
strategic divisions among workers; and 3) it has undermined the CUT ability to 
understand and take advantage of the extra-legal forms of labor militancy produced by 
labor laws’ limitation to the right to strike—particularly those taking place in the private 
sector—. As I will suggest, these forms of collective action are at odds with CUT 
leaders’ assumption that partisan motivated restraint is always the most effective 
strategy to realize working class interests. 
 
		
270 
The problematic representation of working class interests  
 Interest representation is perhaps the central problem derived from the CUT’s 
political-partisan organization. Since the early 1990s, this issue has usually been subject 
of public debate during congresses and elections (which usually take place together), 
where workers and leaders—affiliated and unaffiliated with the CUT—denounce the 
extreme “politicization” of the CUT. In describing the 1st Congress, for example, 
participants complained about the unfortunate similitudes between the post-dictatorial 
labor movement and the “old vicious of hyper-politicization” that dominated organized 
labor in the pre-coup period. According to some commentators, these vicious could be 
found in an excessive emphasis on politico-ideological discussions that displaced more 
urgent labor-related issues as well as in “closed-door” agreements between party 
members, which made the congress’ general assemblies largely irrelevant64.  
 CUT workers have certainly been aware of these difficulties, and several times 
have attempted to deal with them. In the 1990s they pointed out the need to develop a 
less “politicized” discourse, more oriented towards the problems of the rank-and-file65. 
Also, at the beginning of that decade some CUT workers proposed to create a “Workers 
Party” to overcome “external” political interventions, and until the present day different 
sectors have demanded the establishment of direct and universal elections as a way to 
																																																								
64 “Congreso CUT: Confrontaciones peligrosas”, Revista Análisis, October 28, 1991; See also report by 
the former leader of the radio journalists’ union Gladys Díaz: “¿Por dónde empezar?”, Revista Análisis, 
November 11, 1991. 
65 During this time, they also tried to address problems as diverse as the increasing “bureaucratization” of 
the CUT officialdom, the emergence of “new” types of workers associated with “post-industrial” society, 
and what they saw as an “identity crisis” of Chilean workers derived from the consolidation of neoliberal 
society See, for example, “En debate: elecciones en la CUT”, La Nación, October 24, 1991; “Arturo 
Martínez, vicepresidente de la Central: ‘La CUT está atrasada y no es sólo una cuestión de discurso’”, El 
Diario, January 9, 1995. 
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make the CUT more “representative”66. However, none of these attempts have been 
successful. As a result of either the minority position of the groups making these 
proposals or the CUT officers’ lack of capacity or willingness to implement them, the 
CUT continues to be unable to overcome its representation problems.  
 The CUT’s difficulties to represent working class interests have been 
documented in several investigations showing how workers and plant-level union 
leaders tend to consider the CUT as an “over-politicized” organization, detached from 
workers’ reality, and “careless” about their demands. These investigations have also 
showed how these critiques have undermined the CUT’s legitimacy vis-à-vis the rank-
and-file workers (Baltera & Dussert, 2010; Espinosa, 2007; Gutierrez, 2016; Leiva, 
2013; Osorio, 2015). In line with this, the interviews conducted in the course of this 
research showed that labor leaders unaffiliated with the CUT questioned the way in 
which partisan agreements have led to the “over-representation” of “traditional” and 
“more politicized” sectors of the labor movement within the CUT (e.g. mining industry 
and public sector workers), which used to be the core of the traditional labor movement 
and the social basis of the left and center-left parties. While important, they have 
become are a minority in the labor population, so according to the leaders I interviewed 
their overrepresentation has significantly weakened the CUT’s ability to understand 
workers’ “real problems” and “current necessities”. This type of critiques was clear 
amid the 2015 labor reform process. Most of these non-CUT leaders worked in the 																																																								
66 See, for example:  “La CUT y su congreso: para subirse al carro”, Revista Hoy, September 23, 1991; 
“Más de cien dirigentes apoyarían la idea de ‘Autonomía Sindical’, La Época, October 5, 1991; “Poner la 
CUT al servicio del movimiento sindical”, El Siglo, February 10, 1996; “Dirigentes sindicales acusan a la 
CUT de prácticas antidemocráticas”. Diario UChile. Retrieved from: 
http://radio.uchile.cl/2017/01/30/dirigentes-sindicales-acusan-a-la-cut-de-practicas-antidemocraticas/. 
Accessed on February 2, 2017. 
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private sector in industries such as communication, retail, and banking. Both in private 
conversations and formal interviews they complained that the CUT’s leaders that 
represented workers in the negotiations with the government were public employees 
that “had never participated in a collective bargaining” and that “did not even know 
private sector collective bargaining laws”.  
Table 4 presents data on the industrial and sectoral (private/public) composition 
of the CUT’s 2012 – 2016 National Directive Council as well as the industrial and 
sectoral composition of the whole salaried working population and the unionization 
rates by industry for the whole country in 2013 (the unionization rates excluded public 
employees affiliated with associations who are not allowed to unionize). The “degree of 
representation” columns were calculated by subtracting the population values from 
CUT’s percentages, so positive values indicate that the industry or sector is over-
represented in the National Directive Council, while negative values indicate that they 
are underrepresented.  
The data somehow reflect what the interviewees said: when compared to 
unionization rates, there are highly unionized sectors—e.g. construction, financial 
intermediation, and transport, storage, and communications—which are largely 
underrepresented in the CUT. This is not surprising as large confederations representing 
these sectors such as the Confederation of Chilean Bank Workers (Confederación de 
Sindicatos Bancarios y Afines) and the Confederation of Chilean Port Workers (UPCh) 
have never been affiliated with the CUT (UPCh) or disaffiliated from it decades ago 
(Confederation of Bank Workers). In these two cases, they have harshly criticized the 
CUT’s “politicization” and “party co-optation”.  
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When considering the degree of representation in relation to the whole salaried 
working population, the data show that industries such as mining, public 
administration/social security, and health/social work are overrepresented, while 
wholesale and retail activities (which absorb 15% of the salaried workers) are largely 
underrepresented. The overrepresentation of public or social service-related industries 
is mostly an effect of the overrepresentation of public sector unions in the CUT. In fact, 
when the public sector/private sector divide is considered, it is possible to see while 
50% of the CUT’s councilors are public sector employees, even though only 9% of the 
salaried working population belongs to that category. In other words, public employees 
are overrepresented in 41% vis-à-vis the population numbers. According to these crude 
estimations and in line with what was observed in the interviews, this sectoral distortion 
is—at least in the period analyzed—the biggest representation problem existing in the 
CUT.  
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Table 4. Composition of the 2012-2016 CUT National Directive Council, unionization rates by 
industry, and salaried labor force by industry and sector (2013) 
     Degree of representation 
 
Members of the 
CUT National 
Directive Council 
(N = 60) 
Unionization 
rates by 
industry  
Salaried 
working 
population  
 According to 
unionization 
rates 
According 
to salaried 
working 
population 
 (%) (%) (%)  (%) (%) 
Industry    
   
1. Agriculture, hunting and 
forestry 10 4.7 8.5 
 +5.3 +1.5 
2. Fishing 0 73.2 0.5  -73.2 -0.5 
3. Mining and quarrying 15 9.5 3.5  +5.5 +11.5 
4. Manufacturing 13.3 22.5 11.0  -9.2 +2.4 
5. Electricity, gas and 
water supply 3.3 14.5 0.7 
 -11.2 +2.7 
6. Construction 1.7 22.5 9.5  -20.8 -7.8 
7. Wholesale and retail 
trade 5 6.6 15.3 
 -1.6 -10.3 
8. Hotels and restaurants 0 14.4 4.5  -14.4 -4.5 
9. Transport, storage and 
communications 13.3 27.3 7.9 
 -14 +5.5 
10. Financial 
intermediation 3.3 29 2.1 
 -25.7 +1.2 
11. Real estate, renting 
and business activities 0 11.8 6.7 
 -11.8 -6.7 
12. Public administration 
and defense; compulsory 
social security 
11.7 6.1 4.7 
 
+5.6 +7.0 
13. Education 8.3 13.6 9.5  -5.3 -1.2 
14. Health and social work 15 23.1 6.2  -8.1 +8.8 
15. Other community, 
social and personal service 
activities 
0 28.4 2.5 
 
-28.4 -2.5 
16. Activities of private 
households  0 - 7.0 
 - -7.0 
17. Extraterritorial 
organizations  0 5.8 0.1 
 -5.8 -0.1 
Total 100 14.2 100    
Public/private sector       
Private Sector 50  90.7   -40.7 
Public Sector 50  9.3   +40.7 
Total 100  100    
Source: author's elaboration on the basis of information provided by CUT staff.  Salaried working population 
data were calculated from the 2013 CASEN survey. Unionization rates were taken from Dirección del Trabajo 
(2014, p. 31). They exclude the public sector whose workers are not allowed to form unions. In this table, private 
sector salaried working population includes workers from state-owned companies because like in private firms 
their unions are regulated by the Labor Code.   
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One of the main consequences of this is that the CUT has become dependent 
almost exclusively on public sector organizations. In the late 1990s, for example, public 
sector confederations such as the Colegio de Profesores (Public School Teachers’ 
Union), the ANEF (public employees), and the CONFENATS (health care workers) led 
the most important labor mobilizations of the decade. According to reports of the 
epoch, these mobilizations developed largely independently from the CUT, which at 
that time was more concerned with the resolution of its political-electoral disputes. One 
report suggested that these mobilizations were the proof that CUT had turned into a 
confederation dependent on public employees’ confederations, which nevertheless had 
enough power to act on their own—without needing the CUT’s help. Based on this, the 
report speculated that these confederations’ affiliation with the CUT was simply a 
question of “sentimental loyalty” derived from workers’ “memories” of past 
struggles67. Recent events indicate that things have not changed much. For instance, 
after the crisis derived from the 2016 electoral process, in early 2017 the Colegio de 
Profesores decided to “freeze” its participation in the CUT. Some reports have argued 
that if this decision becomes permanent, it will weaken the CUT significantly as the 
Colegio de Profesores represents, on its own, 10% of the 520,000 its affiliated 
workers68. 
 
 
 																																																								
67 “La CUT: ese viejo amor”, La Tercera, November 9, 1997. 
68 “Presidente de los profesores busca congelar la participación en la CUT”, El Mercurio, January 19, 
2017.   
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Persistent ideological and strategic challenges to working class unity  
 In addition to compromising interest representation, the political-partisan logic 
of organization has affected working class power by increasing strategic and ideological 
divisions. Since the foundation of the CUT, both challenges to unity have ran along 
partisan lines, and in some cases ended up in important splits. They gave rise, for 
example, to the establishment of the two “alternative” central confederations existing 
until the present day in Chile—the Central Autónoma de Trabajadores (CAT), and the 
Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT). They have also led to the foundation of 
confederations or de facto coalitions that, without pretending to be “central 
confederations”, have certainly called in to question the CUT’s legitimacy (e.g. the 
Confederación General de Trabajadores, CGT-MOSICAM or the Agrupación de 
Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma Laboral). 
 Unlike the strategic divisions that have persisted until now, ideological disputes 
were most recurrent in the early 1990s. In this period, one of the most important 
ideological conflicts had to with the CUT’s affiliation with an “ideological” 
international federation. As shown, the beginnings of this debate date back to the 1980s 
and the arguments between those who favored and opposed to the foundation of 
“ideological centrals”. Since the 1st Congress it became again a source of conflict after 
the Concertación leaders (Socialists and “progressive” Christian Democrats) proposed 
to affiliate the CUT with the Social Democratic ICFTU. In contrast to this proposal, 
Communist workers defended the historical “ideological neutrality” of the CUT, and 
contended that the CUT, as the voice of Chilean workers, should never be aligned with 
particular ideologies. Finally, a “conservative” group of Christian Democratic workers 
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defended the affiliation with the Christian Democrat-inspired WCL and its Latin 
American branch, the Confederación Latinoamericana de Trabajadores (CLAT). 
Unlike the Communists, these workers openly contended that they would leave the 
CUT if the pro-ICFTU proposal passed69. 
After several failed attempts, in 1994 Concertación leaders managed to call to 
the CUT’s 1st Extraordinary Congress, mainly to discuss this single issue. These leaders 
defended the affiliation with the ICFTU arguing that it would be the best way to insert 
the CUT into international forums, and that ICFTU could be an important source of 
funding for training in matters of globalization, and economic and human 
development70. Although these arguments did not convince the opponents, the proposal 
was endorsed by 80% of the congress amid accusations of “political machinations” and 
“undemocratic” practices by the CUT officials71. The main effect of these disputes 
became clear months later, when the “conservative” DC leaders executed their threat, 
left the CUT, and founded a central confederation that later would be named the Central 
Autónoma de Trabajadores, CAT. A minority group of Concertación workers endorsed 
the new central confederation by criticizing of the CUT’s lack of democracy, its 
excessive bureaucratization, and its “disproportionate” dependence on political 
																																																								
69 “Bustos reelegido presidente de la CUT”, La Época, October 31 1991; “Trabajadores cristianos 
rechazan amarre de la CUT a la CIOLS”, El Siglo, March 1, 1994; “Abrir la CUT a los trabajadores”, El 
Siglo, April 5, 1994.    
70 “El desencanto de las masas”, La Nación, April 30, 1994. 
71 For example, representatives of significant labor organizations such as the Confederation of Chilean 
Construction Workers, the National Confederation of Metalworkers, the Public School Teachers’ Union, 
and the CEPCh, denounced that around a hundred and thirty leaders opposed to the pro-ICFTU proposal 
were not allowed to participate in the Extraordinary Congress. “La encrucijada del movimiento sindical”, 
El Siglo, April 22, 1994; “La CUT, ¿se convirtió en la central "dividida" de trabajadores?”, La Nación, 
April 23, 1994; “El 80 por ciento de los socios de la CUT votó por entrar a la CIOLS”, La Tercera, April 
28, 1994.  
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parties72. The CAT was officially founded in November 12, 1995, and represented 
around 100,000 workers. Since then, it has played a marginal role in the labor 
movement.  
Similar conflicts and divisions have resulted from the innumerable strategic 
disputes existing until the present day. All these strategic debates have revolved around 
the CUT’s stance vis-à-vis the government. As noted in chapter 3, during the Aylwin 
administration numerous disagreements arose over the CUT’s participation in the 
tripartite Framework Agreements, and especially after the Aylwin administration told 
the CUT it would not implement the labor reform in the terms promised during his 
presidential campaign (i.e. it would not repeal the Labor Plan). This last issue gave rise 
to the first serious confrontations between Concertación and leftist leaders. While the 
Concertación leaders argued for restraint and negotiation, leftist leaders defended the 
“negotiation with mobilization” strategy. Leftist leaders did so under the understanding 
that this was the only way to act vis-à-vis a government more interested in improving its 
relation with business than in fulfilling workers’ aspirations. For them this was also the 
only way to face a capitalist class unwilling to make concessions to labor73.   
 Since the beginning of the Frei Administration in 1994, the unsuccessful 
restraint strategies led the CUT officials to adopt more confrontational discourses 
against the government, right parties, and business74. Moreover, the threat of a general 
strike was more recurrent, although it was never put into practice during this 																																																								
72 “Trabajadores tras nueva opción sindical”, La Nación, February 9, 1995.	 
73 See: “Sindicalistas PC: ‘El gobierno ha cedido a presión de empresarios’”, El Mercurio, April 27, 
1990; “Según dirigente comunista Moisés Labraña: Política de CUT en reformas laborales ‘ha hecho 
agua’”, El Mercurio, August 21, 1990; “Puñete a la CUT”, La Nación, November 22, 1992. 
74 A good example of the more distant relations with the Concertación governments occurred in 1995, 
when for the first time no state officer was officially invited to the CUT’s May Day commemoration.  
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administration75. By the end of the 1990s, the Concertación government’s neoliberal 
orientation became overt. So were the effects the Asian Crisis, and the government’s 
“pro-business” strategy to solve them. In addition to making labor-government relations 
more strained, this also contributed to the empowerment of the leftist sectors of the 
CUT and their direct action approaches76. However, other than the CUT continual—and 
mostly symbolic—decision to cut and resume formal relations with the government, no 
substantial change occurred. Most of the CUT officialdom still believed in the 
advantages of restrain and the linkages between labor and office-holding parties.  
 These strategic tensions persisted in the following years, especially in the early 
2000s when different movements or collectives emerged within the CUT. Some of these 
movements (e.g. Fuerza Social y Democrática and Movimiento Sindical por los 
Cambios) criticized the Concertación officialdom by noting the need to promote 
autonomy from ruling parties and “go back” to the rank-and-file workers. Among these 
movements, the Movimiento Sindical por los Cambios (MOSICAM), led by the ex-
Communist and CUT vice-president worker Manuel Ahumada, was especially critical 
of the CUT’s lack of autonomy (Frías, 2008, pp. 176-182). According to the 
MOSICAM leaders, party control was so “embedded” in the CUT organizational 
structure that it was impossible to change it from within. This led the unions affiliated 
with MOSICAM to disaffiliate with CUT and found the Confederación General de 
Trabajadores (CGT-MOSICAM) in 2004. They did so not to “replace” the CUT with 																																																								
75 See: “CUT cambiará estilo en relación con el gobierno”, La Tercera, May 20, 1994; “Manuel Bustos, 
presidente de la CUT: ‘La derecha es la guardiana de los explotadores’”, La Nación, April 30, 1995. 
76 “CUT convoca a concetración”, La Nación, October 18, 1998; “Movilización para alcanzar plena 
democracia”, El Siglo, August 6, 1999; “CUT en el camino del Paro Nacional”, El Siglo, November 5, 
1999.  
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the CGT, but to “start the debate” on the construction of a new central confederation 
that would eventually replace the CUT77.  
 In this context of divisions, in August 13th 2003 the CUT called, for the first 
time since the return to democracy, to a general strike to protest the government’s 
attempt to draft a labor flexibility bill. By making this call, the CUT president Arturo 
Martínez sought to show the virtues of what he called “sociopolitical unionism”, i.e. a 
type of labor movement able to integrate mobilization and negotiation into the same 
action framework (A. Martínez, 2005, pp. 206-207). In defending this approach, 
Martínez also tried to lower the increasing pressure from his leftist allies (mainly 
Socialists and Communists) who insisted on need to resume the direct action practices 
forgotten in the 1990s78. For its proponents, sociopolitical unionism was the best way to 
show workers’ discontent with the government of Ricardo Lagos, which since the 
beginning made it clear that it would not alter the pro-market orientation of the previous 
Concertación administrations. Nevertheless, and regardless of the contrasting 
evaluations of the strike’s success79, the August 13th action gave rise to new strategic 
disputes between the defenders of restraint and mobilization approaches (Frías, 2008, p. 
196).  
 This time, the disputes were the result of critiques made by groups such as the 
“Sindicalismo del Siglo XXI” collective formed mostly by DC and PR workers. Led by 
the DC worker Diego Olivares, these workers rejected Martínez’s “extremely 
																																																								
77 Interview with Manuel Ahumada (September 4, 2015) and Esteban Hidalgo (September 2, 2015). 
78 Interview with Arturo Martínez, September 25, 2015.  
79 According to its critics the levels of participation were low, so the strike was a failure. However, its 
defenders argued that thanks to it the Lagos administration backed off its labor flexibility agenda.   
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confrontational” postures, the lack of accountability of the CUT officialdom, and the 
CUT’s “ideological” opposition to business. According to them, this was at odds with 
the technical, non-ideological, and non-confrontational unionism of the 21st century80. 
Based on critiques like these, in May 2004 they founded the third central confederation 
existing until now, the Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT) (Frías, 2008, p. 211). 
Similar to the CAT, since its foundation the UNT has played a marginal role in labor 
struggles.   
 In the following years there were no major divisions within the CUT. Yet the 
mobilization-restraint debate persisted, both within the CUT and among the groups 
unaffiliated with (and sometimes openly opposed to) it. A good example of this 
occurred in the call to general strike of July 11th 2013. Aware that the right-wing Piñera 
administration had “nothing to offer” to labor, the CUT (now led by the Communist 
Bárbara Figueroa) called to a general strike demanding the center-left candidate, former 
president Michelle Bachelet, to include a labor reform proposal in her electoral 
program81. In chapter 4, I showed that at the political level the PC made similar requests 
to the Concertación parties as a condition to support Bachelet’s candidacy. In this sense, 
the CUT-PC’s strategy was successful: endorsed by the Nueva Mayoría coalition, 
Bachelet did include a labor reform proposal in her program and, once elected, drafted a 
bill to reform the 1979 Labor Plan.   
However, several unions and confederations saw the CUT’s move as doomed to 
failure for its results were highly dependent on the negotiations between the PC and the 																																																								
80 Interviews with UNT leaders Pablo Vilches, Segundo Steilen, and Luis Aravena. The interviews were 
conducted between October 13 and October 28, 2015.  
81 “Exitoso paro de la CUT. Por qué pararon los chilenos”, El Siglo, No 1671, July 12-18, 2013. 
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other ex-Concertación parties. They disavowed, for example, that the CUT leaders 
urged confederations to participate in the strike and endorse the CUT’s “demonstration 
of power”, while refusing to draw upon the same tactics if Bachelet got elected and if, 
as a result of that, a labor reform bill was introduced into the parliament. This explains 
why important labor organizations such as the dockworkers confederation, the Unión 
Portuaria de Chile (UPCh), did not join the July 2013 strike even though it had been the 
main organizer of a similar action month earlier. Like other labor leaders, dockworkers 
said they would support the CUT’s strike only if Figueroa promised to call to a general 
strike during the first month of the new administration, no matter the ruling coalition in 
office. The UPCh said that mobilization would be the only way to make a “real 
demonstration of power” vis-à-vis the new administration. In contrast, Figueroa and the 
other Nueva Mayoría CUT leaders argued for a less confrontational, “wait-and-see” 
approach82.   
This strategic dispute was clearly observed throughout the 2015 – 2016 labor 
reform. As noted in chapter 4, coalitions of unions the such as 4x4, the CIUS, and the 
Agrupación de Trabajadores por una Mejor Reforma Laboral (Group of Workers for a 
Better Labor Reform) strongly criticized, despite the important differences existing 
between them, the CUT’s “extreme passivity” vis-à-vis the government, as well as its 
overt subordination to the office-holding parties. Similar to the 1990s, these types of 
schisms were also present within the CUT. However, there were important differences 																																																								
82 This strategic debate was evident in several in-depth interviews with union leaders conducted for a 
separate research project between July and September 2013. Although in this research project I focused 
on workers and union leaders from the metal manufacturing, construction, banking, and retail industries 
(see Pérez-Ahumada, 2017) , I also interviewed and had informal conversations with leaders from other 
industries (e.g. dockworkers, and miners).     
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as Communist leaders changed substantially their role: in contrast to their mobilization 
approach of the 1990s they were now the main defenders of restraint. In line with the 
position of the now office-holding Communist Party, PC leaders promoted restraint 
under the idea of “protecting” Bachelet’s project and its “advances” in the face of the 
attacks from opposition parties and the conservative sectors of the Christian 
Democracy83.  
 
The missed opportunity of labor revitalization  
Finally, the CUT’s political-partisan pattern of organization has affected 
working class collective action by undermining the CUT’s ability to understand and 
take advantage of alternative (extra-legal) forms of militancy taking place primarily, but 
not exclusively, in the private sector. I showed that in the private sector extra-legal labor 
militancy has been observed in workers’ use of short-duration, firm-level strikes outside 
the bargaining process or in their use of highly-disruptive industry-wide strikes 
organized in key sectors of the Chilean economy. Given the CUT’s separation from the 
rank-and-file, its own organizational weakness, and the fragmented nature of the 
Chilean industrial relation system, it is somehow understandable that the CUT has been 
unable to “grasp” and take advantage of the proliferation of firm-level extra-legal 
strikes, occurring “from below” and largely detached from its representation structures. 
However, the CUT’s inability to capitalize alternative forms of militancy has 
also been notorious in its response to the extra-legal industry-wide strikes, which since 
																																																								
83 In interviews with several Communist leaders of the CUT, these were the most recurrent reasons for 
defending restraint.    
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the late 2000s have become the most important expression of labor revitalization in 
Chile. During the 2007 strikes in the mining and forestry industries, for example, the 
CUT endorsed the subcontracted workers’ struggles, and the political affiliations of 
their leaders allowed it to develop friendly relations with them. For instance, the miners 
leading the Codelco subcontracted workers belonged to the Communist Party and the 
Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (CTC) became affiliated with the CUT right 
after its foundation in 200684. These political affinities also allowed the CUT to function 
as mediator between the government and the striking miners. Nevertheless the CUT 
leaders took this mediator role only after the conflict became a national issue, and 
neither during the organization nor the development of the strikes did the CUT play a 
significant role. Something similar, but more telling, occurred during the 2014 
dockworkers strike, in which the CUT aligned itself with the CUT-affiliated and 
Socialist-led Confederation of Chilean Port Workers (COTRAPORCHI), and along 
with it the CUT openly called into question the strike and the representativeness of the 
UPCh.  
Scholars have studied the implications of labor revitalization in Chile and have 
suggested that the CUT has been largely unable to adapt to the new reality of the labor 
movement. According to Leiva (2013), most of this “new unionism”—especially that 
developed at the plant-level in extra-legal strikes in the private sector—is at odds with 
the CUT leaders’ attachment to “old”, industrialist, gendered, state-centered, an 
legalistic sociocultural matrix. For Leiva, this sociocultural matrix makes CUT leaders 
																																																								
84 While having the same name, this CTC is different from the old CTC existing before and during the 
dictatorship.  
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dismiss the importance of this unionism “from below” and continue to privilege party 
linkages as the only way to defend labor interest. Similarly Gutierrez (2013) contends 
that this new unionism has given rise to models of labor militancy in which the 
“politicized” model of labor leaders represented traditionally by CUT officials has lost 
legitimacy. This explains, according to Gutierrez, why the emergence of new 
generations of labor activists has been accompanied by a decline in the rates of 
affiliation with the central confederations such as the CUT.  
In line with these explanations, the analysis presented here suggests that the 
CUT’s inattention to these new expressions of working class collective action might be 
explained as a result of the way in which the CUT’s political-partisan logic of 
organization has detached its leaders from forms of militancy that are at odds with 
partisan motivated restraint. As for this, the case of the port workers organized in the 
UPCh is perhaps the most indicative. The UPCh is one of the most powerful 
confederations in Chile, and in the last years it has also worked hard to build strategic 
alliances with several social movements that since 2011 took over the country’s agenda. 
For example, since 2011 the UPCh has called for several solidarity strikes to endorse 
the student movement, and since 2016 it has been an active supporter of the NO + AFP 
coalition of unions, which demands the end of the private pension fund system85.  
Nevertheless, despite the UPCh’s disruptive power and its attempts to create a sort of 
“social movement unionism”, the CUT has made no effort to incorporate it into its 
structure. Instead, it has continued to prefer the relation with the UPCh’s “rival”, the 																																																								
85 See, for example, “Chile se paraliza y exige fin de las AFP”, Radio UChile, November 3, 2016. 
Retrieved from http://radio.uchile.cl/2016/11/03/chile-se-paraliza-y-exige-fin-de-las-afp/. Accessed on 
November 3, 2016.  
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Socialist-led COTRAPORCHI—its president, in fact, usually occupies a seat the 
National Directive Council. Unsurprisingly, UPCh workers frequently criticize the CUT 
and claim to represent a different, autonomous (but not depoliticized) unionism 
(Gaudichaud, 2015; Santibáñez & Gaudichaud, Forthcoming).   
This type of conflicts has contributed to the persistence of the restraint-
mobilization strategic disputes by increasing the gap between the CUT and new sectors 
of organized labor that have emerged from a critique of the “traditional” labor 
movement’s failures (e.g. its excessive confidence in the virtues of party-union linkages 
and restraint strategies). Along with the UPCh, the case of the CTC is also illustrative. 
Despite the CTC is affiliated with the CUT, during the last labor reform process it 
defended, like the UPCh and other strategic sectors’ confederations, the use of mass 
mobilization strategies. As shown in chapter 4, these confederations formed the 4x4 
coalition and in April 2015 called for a “production stoppage” that, thanks to the ties 
between the CUT and the CTC, was endorsed by the CUT. Yet the CUT’s support was 
only symbolic, as its Communist leadership refused to participate in the strike. 
Moreover, according to the interviews I conducted, several CUT leaders were highly 
suspicious of the 4x4’s actions. Many of them described CTC and UPCh leaders as 
“political adventurers” who were “unable to understand” both the advantages of the 
relation with the Bachelet’s government and the need to let the Bachelet administration 
“do its job”. 
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7.3. Conclusion. Explaining labor weakness and the CUT’s ineffective restraint  
Throughout this chapter I have shown how institutional and political factors—
particularly the regulations included in the 1979 Labor Plan and the CUT’s political-
partisan logic of organization—have shaped working class collective action since the 
dictatorial period. Through different mechanisms, both factors are key for explaining 
why workers have been unable to realize their interests regarding labor law—that is, 
why they have been unable to influence policymaking—and why the CUT has been 
reluctant to use mass mobilization during periods of reform even though restraint and 
subordination to ruling parties have proven to be ineffective.  
 
7.3.1 Institutional constraints on collective action  
The historical analysis indicated that despite all its repressive aspects, the 
enactment of the 1979 Labor Plan propelled workers’ first systematic attempts to 
mobilize against the dictatorship. By strategically using the limited opportunities 
derived from the legalization of collective bargaining, workers could fight both the 
Labor Plan itself and the dictatorship as a whole. The strategic use of dictatorial 
regulations was key for the reconstruction of the labor movement and the formation of 
powerful coalitions such as the CNT in the early 1980. Although this strategy did work 
for a couple of years, the persistence of the 1979 regulations had important 
consequences for organized labor during the democratic period. In addition to 
promoting the fragmentation of labor organizations and bargaining structures usually 
noted in the literature (cf. Durán, 2013; Feres, 2009b; Narbona, 2014), in this chapter I 
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have showed that labor regulations have had three effects on collective action. First, 
they have fostered personalistic leaderships within the labor movement. Second, in 
promoting the proliferation of underfunded unions, they have also encouraged labor 
subordination to parties and governments. Finally, in debilitating the right to strike, they 
have promoted the use of “unregulated” forms of collective action, observed largely in 
extra-legal strike activity in both the public and private sectors.  
In this chapter suggested that unlike the two first effects (which are persistent 
collective action problems for workers), the labor movement has managed to bypass the 
legal restrictions on the right to strike. Moreover, I contended that the circumvention of 
these legal restrictions has been one most important aspects of labor revitalization in the 
last decade.   Considering the low economic benefits of the legal bargaining process and 
strike activity already noted (cf. Durán & Kremerman, 2015), workers’ use of extra-
legal strike might indicate an aspect of what Rogers (1990) calls “militant economism”. 
According to Rogers (1990, pp. 76-80) militant economism is defined, among other 
things, by workers’ pursuit of highly particularistic bargaining strategies vis-à-vis 
employers. The literature on corporatism and industrial relations asserts that this type of 
working class militancy is more likely to occur in “pluralist regimes”, i.e. in contexts 
where liberal regulations encourage fragmented labor movements that are therefore 
unable to promote restraint “from above”, such as centralized and coordinated labor 
movements do under corporatist regulations (cf. Calmfors & Driffill, 1988; Crouch, 
1993; Golden, 1993; Lange & Garrett, 1985; Paloheimo, 1984; Schmitter, 1981). 
Militant economist strategies can certainly explain workers’ use of extra-legal forms of 
collective action. This is what scholars somehow imply when they argue that workers’ 
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decision to use unregulated strike might reflect that they are more “efficient” or bring 
about more benefits than legal strikes (Aravena, 2009, p. 31; Armstrong & Águila, 
2011, p. 17). Nonetheless, recent research has also showed that in Chile, private sector 
extra-legal strikes are associated with higher levels of politicization of workers as they 
are the result of workers’ defense of their political interests—e.g. interests regarding the 
organization of the labor process or larger sociopolitical processes which go beyond 
bread-and-butter issues (Velásquez et al., 2016).  
An important consequence of this type of militancy is that it has called into 
question the CUT’s defense of restraint as the only feasible strategy to defend workers’ 
interests. Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) define confederations’ adoption of restraint as a 
consequence of the “juridification” of class relations and the way in which it facilitates 
the dissociation of “representation” from “struggle”. As noted in chapter 6, they contend 
that in corporatist systems this dissociation is marked by the adoption of “opportunism” 
expressed in the inversion of means over ends (observed when the desire to maintain the 
organization through legal recognition becomes more important than the pursuit of its 
goals), in the emphasis on short-term gains and losses vis-à-vis long-term struggles, and 
in the primacy of tactical bargaining over strategic mass mobilization. Recently, 
Lawrence (2014) has criticized Offe and Wiesenthal’s thesis by arguing that the 
hypothesis that worker mobilization declines when labor movements rely on legal 
recognition to protect their organizational gains only holds when labor law divides 
workers or preserves social, racial, confessional or ideological barriers. According to 
him, this occurred in Germany under Nazism and South Africa under the apartheid, 
where legally promoted divisions inhibited mobilization across party or industry lines 
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and allowed employers to exploit them to undermine working class unity. In contrast, 
Lawrence contends that when labor law facilitates organizational unity of workers, it 
can actually promote mobilization. To this respect, the labor movement’s degree of 
organization and cohesion at the time of its juridification is decisive: where workers are 
coherently organized vis-à-vis the state, this is less likely to define them, under its 
terms, through labor law. This is what happened in Germany during the Weimar era, 
where codetermination laws did not decrease strikes’ frequency and workers’ 
“dialogical consensus” was indeed facilitated by the establishment of work councils 
(2014, pp. 188-198). 
The analysis of the effects of the 1979 Labor Plan suggests that Offe and 
Wiesenthal’s tradeoff does not hold in contexts where liberalized labor regulations 
promote unions’ fragmentation and extra-legal forms of collective action exercised 
whether at the confederation or the firm level. To this respect, the comparison between 
the dictatorial and democratic periods is illustrative. During the dictatorship, workers 
mobilized and organized themselves through legal and extra-legal mechanisms—they 
participated, for instance, in collective bargaining once it was permitted and, 
simultaneously, formed de facto confederations such as the CNT and the CUT to 
materialize their desires for unity and ideological pluralism. Regarding this, the Chilean 
case is similar to the labor-repressive laws during the Nazi Germany, which indirectly 
encouraged working class mobilization by softening ideological (and in Germany also 
confessional) divisions among workers existing in the pre-authoritarian era (cf. 
Lawrence, 2014). 
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In Chile, the reforms to the dictatorial laws undertaken during the democratic 
period permitted, among other things, the legal functioning of the CUT. However, they 
did not create a corporatist-like or centralized industrial relation system. Consequently, 
the CUT remained organizationally weak and largely unable to process “from above” 
the unregulated forms of collective action through which workers have circumvented, 
such as during the dictatorship, the restrictions of the labor code. This has produced an 
important gap between the CUT’s logic of collective action based largely on the 
exercise of restraint, and the one developed by important sectors of the labor movement.  
The most recent expression of this disconnection could be seen during the 2015 
– 2016 labor reform, particularly with the formation of different coalitions of unions 
that openly criticized the CUT’s rejection to use mass mobilization. Although this 
disconnection is certainly an effect of the way in which the Chilean labor law 
decentralizes bargaining structures and restricts the role of central confederations, it 
differs significantly from the type of dissociation portrayed by Offe and Wiesenthal. 
Unlike their juridification thesis, the CUT’s adoption of “opportunism” is not the 
consequence of corporatist-like regulations that make opportunism the main tool to 
ensure the labor movement’s survival. Rather, it is a political phenomenon derived from 
way in which the linkages between parties and labor were reconstructed and became 
materialized, by the end of the dictatorship, in the CUT’ political-partisan logic of 
organization. In addition to creating particular collective action problems (e.g. weak 
interest representation), the political-partisan organization has reinforced several legal 
constraints on workers’ collective action (e.g. union subordination to parties). 
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7.3.2. The politics of working class collective action 
 The analysis of worker collective action during the Pinochet regime presented 
throughout this chapter suggested that the workers’ attempt to create an autonomous 
labor movement in the early 1980s were short lived. As soon as repression against 
parties softened, parties successfully reasserted their leadership roles over workers and 
the party-union linkages cut off by the dictatorship were quickly reconstructed. Under 
these circumstances the foundation of the CUT took the form of a “political” event 
orchestrated by parties and party-affiliated union leaders. Thus, the CUT’s foundation 
symbolized not only workers’ desires for ideological unity and pluralism, but also, and 
more important, the establishment of a political-partisan logic of organization which is 
the central aspect of the CUT’s “politicization”. Until the present day, it has operated as 
a key mechanism through which parties interact with organized labor from both 
“above” and within the CUT.  
In this chapter I asserted that this form of “politicization” has been largely 
detrimental for labor power. In addition to reinforcing the subordination to parties and 
governments encouraged by the labor law, the political-partisan pattern of organization 
has undermined labor power by compromising the CUT’s ability to represent working 
class interests, has reproduced ideological and strategic divisions (especially those 
related with the “restrain vs. mobilization” debate), and weakened the CUT’s ability to 
process and take advantage of forms of collective action that are at odds with its 
partisan motivated restraint.  
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 Based on this, it is possible to argue that the Chilean case contradicts the basic 
thesis of the Power Resource Approach. In this approach, alliances between unions and 
office-holding left parties are depicted largely as beneficial for labor, as they are 
assumed to represent an “advanced” stage of labor power (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Huber & Stephens, 2001; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Korpi, 1985; Korpi & Palme, 2003). 
In his critique to the Power Resource Approach, Lawrence (2014) has recently pointed 
out that autonomy from parties is not necessarily a source of weakness for labor and 
that, on the contrary, it can sometimes become a source of strength. According to 
Lawrence (2014, Chapter 7), this is what usually happens in authoritarian regimes 
where the ban on opposition parties allows unions to develop more independent and 
wide-ranging practices. In the repressive context of the Nazi Germany, for example, 
workers could undertake autonomous actions though their strategic use of 
codetermination laws, which provided them with strong firm-level collective action 
capacities. In the case of the South African apartheid regime, on the other hand, workers 
overcame the ban on parties by developing broad-ranging community ties, which were 
the basis of the South African “social movement unionism”.  
Similar to these cases, I showed that in Chile workers overcame the ban on 
political parties by using strategically the Labor Plan’s laws that legalized (under very 
restrictive conditions) union activity. Along with this, they put together coalitions such 
as the CNT, which grew out of previous experiences of struggle—e.g. the struggle 
against the Labor Plan—and whose internal organization put into practice the principles 
of labor autonomy. In doing so, they successfully managed to become, at least between 
1983 and 1986, the vanguard of the social movement demanding the end of the 
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Pinochet dictatorship. Throughout this period the CNT succeeded in the defense of its 
vanguard position by successfully protecting, regardless of the partisan affiliations of its 
leaders, labor autonomy vis-à-vis opposition parties (Araya, 2012, pp. 314-315). As I 
suggested in this chapter, both labor power and the experiences of autonomy started to 
vanish once the party-union linkages cut off by the dictatorship were reconstructed at 
the end of the 1980s.  
  This conclusion does not imply that alliances between labor and parties are 
always detrimental for labor power. Historical and comparative evidence suggests that 
they do become detrimental when labor traditional allies displace, whether for strategic 
or ideological reasons, workers’ struggles from the center of their political agendas and 
when organized labor is too weak to resist that type of displacements. To this respect, 
the comparison between the pre- and post-dictatorship democratic periods is illustrative. 
Before the military coup, Chilean workers overcame their organizational weakness 
derived from the 1931 Labor Code (which, similar the 1979 Labor Code, promoted the 
fragmentation of unions and bargaining structures) by establishing strong ties with 
Marxist parties such as the Socialist Party and Communist Parties. Such as in the 
current democratic regime, parties were the dominant side of the relationship. This gave 
rise to continual disputes among party-affiliated workers, and labor autonomy was a 
goal usually repeated by labor leaders (this was, in fact, one of the main principles 
behind the foundation of the old CUT in 1953 (J. Barría, 1971). Nevertheless, during 
the pre-Pinochet era the role of parties differed significantly from what can be observed 
nowadays. Unlike the post-dictatorial democracy, in the pre-1973 era most center and 
left parties placed workers at the center of their agendas. Thus, they reinforced labor 
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power by investing important amount of resources to organize different sectors the 
working class at the plant, federation, and confederation levels. This pattern of party-led 
working class organization was obviously clear in the Communist and Socialist parties. 
Yet it was also observed for the case of the Christian Democracy, which focused its 
organizing work on white-collar employees and, since the mid 1960s, peasants and 
agricultural workers (Angell, 1972; J. Barría, 1971; Campero & Valenzuela, 1984; 
Drake, 1996; Garcés & Milos, 1988). In the early 1970s, Angell (1972) contended that 
party support was so important for Chilean workers that it explained why the labor 
movement became a powerful social force even though the 1931 Labor Code was 
originally devised to debilitate it. 
In contrast, the post-dictatorial democratic regime grew out of reconstructed 
party-union alliances that, while similar in shape, were totally different in content. 
Despite labor’ allies have been office-holding parties (which was not usual during the 
pre-dictatorial period), with the important exception of the PC most of them have 
progressively detached themselves from their union constituencies. As a result of both 
their consensus politics orientation and their ideological “renovation”, traditional labor 
parties such as the PS de-unionized their structures, abandoned class politics, and 
openly embraced pro-business politics (Barrett, 2001; Espinosa, 2007; Feres, 2009a; 
Frank, 2004). This has been perhaps the clearest expression of the more general 
dissociation between parties and popular movements observed in the country since the 
late 1980s (Oxhorn, 1994; Somma & Bargsted, 2015), and whose consequences for 
organized labor have been telling. From the side of parties, it is a central factor that 
explains why their ties to organized labor have not meant the adoption of clear pro-labor 
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reformist agendas. From the side of workers, this is a factor that explains why (with the 
exception of the Communists) most CUT leaders contend, as suggested in chapter 5, 
that their parties “simply don’t care about unionism”, that their parties’ labor fronts 
(frentes sindicales) are “dead”, and that they—despite being leaders of the main labor 
confederation in Chile—simply do not have “a voice” in their parties’ hierarchies. More 
generally, parties’ abandonment of class politics explains why labor’s ties with office-
holding parties have not increased workers’ power to influence policymaking.  
These observations for the Chilean case contrast with recent experiences of 
other Latin American countries such as Argentina and Uruguay, where the Power 
Resource Approach’s thesis does seem to hold. In these countries, labor movements 
developed under regulations that made them comparatively more powerful vis-à-vis 
their allied parties, while the dictatorial repression of workers was somehow less 
pronounced than in Chile (Buchanan, 2008; Cook, 2007; Drake, 1996). In addition, in 
these countries the reconstruction of party-union alliances has been accompanied, 
especially since the 2000s, by electoral victories of labor parties or coalitions that 
adopted pro-labor agendas aiming to reverse the neoliberal reforms carried out in the 
early 1990s. At least in terms of unionization rates and collective bargaining coverage, 
in both cases the outcome of these party-union alliances was positive for organized 
labor (Alegre & Filgueira, 2009; Etchemendy & Collier, 2007; Quiñones, 2011; Senén, 
2011). This suggests that the main expectations of the Power Resources Approach hold 
when the reconstruction of party-union alliances takes places in contexts of 
comparatively stronger and relatively more autonomous labor movements, which are 
therefore more able to push their office-holding allies to pursue pro-labor agendas. 
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However, they do not hold when the working class is comparatively weaker. In these 
cases, union-party linkages are beneficial for workers only when parties are 
ideologically or strategically committed to strengthening working class organizations, 
such as in Chile until 1973. 
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8. Building unity to maintain class power: the successful story of the CPC, 1973 – 
2016  
 In this chapter I analyze the processes through which the CPC became a 
powerful encompassing association able to both represent employers’ class-wide 
interests and exercise strong influence over policymaking. Although formed in 1935, 
the CPC’s power was consolidated only in the 1980s after employers agreed to “revive” 
it in an attempt to ameliorate inter-sectoral conflicts and protect the historically fragile 
unity of the business sector.  
Based on the literature on business associations reviewed in Chapter 6, in what 
follows I show that both the resurrection of the CPC and the persistence of its power 
throughout the democratic period is the result of the interrelated political-ideological 
processes. First, it is the result of the way in which business leaders reflected on the 
causes of “political defeats” such as those embodied in Socialist government of 
Salvador Allende. Second, it is an effect of the way in which they carried out a politico-
ideological work within business community in order to confront to the “socialist 
threat” by unifying employers’ worldviews and interests. Finally, it is the consequence 
of the process through which these leaders and state actors established different patterns 
of business-state relations that defined, among other things, the degree to which 
governments integrated business associations into (or excluded them from) the 
policymaking process.  
In this chapter I also argue these politico-ideological processes strengthened 
business collective power only because they were (and have been) reinforced by the 
CPC’s organizational structure, which I define as sectoral-consensual logic of
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 organization. Based on organizational mechanisms such as a small but highly 
representative Executive Committee, a hierarchical structure of indirect affiliation, and 
a consensus-oriented electoral system, this sectoral logic of organization has facilitated 
unity and inter-sectoral consensus. In so doing, it has enabled the CPC to overcome 
recurrent inter-sectoral disputes that have long endangered unity and collective action.  
 This chapter is structured in 4 sections. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 describe the recent 
history of the CPC during the dictatorship and the democratic period, with a particular 
focus on the way in which organized business has confronted threats from the state and 
from “below”, has interacted with the state, and has faced collective action problems 
derived from inter-sectoral conflicts. Based on this historical description, section 8.3 
lays out the factors that explain why the CPC has been so successful in unifying 
business interests, overcoming collective action problems, and representing employers 
vis-à-vis the state in, for example, periods of reforms. Finally, section 8.4 presents the 
conclusions and implications for the study of business collective action and the role of 
encompassing associations in the formulation of policy reforms.  
 
8.1. Organized business during the dictatorship: from fragmentation and weakness 
to unity and collective power  
 Due to the strong reformist agenda of the Allende government, business support 
of the coup d’état was everything but surprising. Business associations openly 
acclaimed the “historical mission” of military junta, and quickly became of the most 
loyal supporters of the new rulers. However, organized business soon realized that 
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although the new administration was always open to its demands, the associations 
representing their interest were too weak to become key actors of the deep economic 
policy reforms that would take place in the following years. Business associations were 
certainly interested in policymaking, and since the times of the Allende government 
SOFOFA officers had participated in the making of the document known as “The 
Brick” (El Ladrillo), which contained key free market policy proposals implemented in 
the years to come. Also in these first years, the CPC developed a moderate approach to 
free-market economics that argued for gradual privatizations, price deregulation, agile 
capital markets, devaluation, and tariff reform (E. Silva, 1998, pp. 224-225).   
Nevertheless, business associations were weak and technically poor, and since 
the ISI period employers as a whole lacked a unified economic or social project 
(Arriagada, 2004; Campero, 1995; Schneider, 2004). Thus between 1973 and 1982 
organized business played only a minor role in the stages of policy initiation and 
formulation that ended up in the free market restructuring, and only a small minority of 
capitalists—i.e. those grouped in conglomerates related to financial activities—had 
privileged access to state information (Arriagada, 2004; E. Silva, 1998). Unsurprisingly, 
by the late 1970s and early 1980s business leaders’ complaints about their exclusion 
from policymaking were frequent. Although always endorsing the government’s 
political economy, some of these leaders even argued that due to the “non-politicized” 
features of the regime, the chances of influencing directly state officers had become 
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“lower than with any other previous government”1. A decade later, the president of the 
CPC Manuel Feliú recalled these days contending: “The truth is that during the military 
regime the structural changes were made without consulting anyone. We weren’t in a 
democratic system. No one called me to ask my opinion about the (policy) changes. Nor 
did they call the SOFOFA when thousands of manufacturers were complaining about 
(the lowering of) tariffs… What else could we do? There was no alternative (other than 
accept the changes)!”2.  
 
8.1.1. The first steps towards class unity  
 Despite the somehow secondary role of business associations, the first years of 
the dictatorship were key for the fate of organized business. Right after the coup, CPC 
leaders started a process of internal evaluation through which they reflected on business 
associations’ historical weakness and the consequences it brought to the country—e.g. 
the arrival of a socialist government. In the course of this process, they repeatedly 
insisted that, when promoted, the unity of the business sector had been key for the 
defeat of Allende, and that class-wide unity should be the main asset to be preserved 
through encompassing business associations such as the CPC3. The preservation of 
unity implied both unifying employers’ worldviews and overcoming historical inter-
sectoral conflicts, which during the ISI period were the rule rather than the exception 																																																								
1 “Señaló Manuel Valdés: ‘El sector privado aspira a ser protagonista y no espectador del proceso’”, El 
Cronista, April 17, 1977; Eugenio Heiremans. En el muro, pero sin lamentos, El Mercurio, November 21, 
1982.  
2 “En la reforma laboral se va a imponer la cordura”, La Nación, July 29, 1990. See also “Manuel Valdés, 
presidente de la Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio: ‘Jarpa representa valores muy 
importantes’”, La Época, February 7, 1989.  
3 “Presidente de la Confederación de Producción y Comercio: La Nueva Empresa consulta participación 
de trabajadores”, El Mercurio, September 20, 1973.	 
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(Arriagada, 2004; Menges, 1966). Thus the achievement of these goals would require 
the resurrection of the CPC as an encompassing, class-wide organization able to ensure 
capitalist cohesion by imposing itself over the particular interests of its sectoral 
associates.  
The first expressions of this new CPC were observed in the implementation of 
different initiatives undertaken since the very beginning of the dictatorship. Only three 
months after the coup, in December 1973, business leaders held the National 
Convention of Production and Commerce, where the CPC vice-President Manuel 
Valdés asserted: “A new and homogenous mentality is needed; one in which no group 
(within the business community) should try to take advantage of the others, but one in 
which everyone works together in the common task”4. To fulfill these ends, business 
leaders focused most of its organizing work in the ideological unification of the 
business community under the principles of free-market economy. This ideological 
work started right after the coup, and throughout the 1980s would become one of the 
most important aspects of the CPC’s activities. Between 1973 and 1974, for example, 
the CPC president Jorge Fontaine frequently claimed that the CPC would endorse the 
new economic policies, while insisting that individual employers should make 
“sacrifices”—i.e. work harder, and modernize their businesses—because they were 
simply “not prepared” to compete more efficiently. In line with this, Fontaine himself 
contended that the overcoming of ISI regime’s “bureaucratic mentality” would require 																																																								
4 “Papel de los empresarios en el nuevo momento que vive el país”, El Mercurio, December 14, 1973. In 
line with this idea, in 1974 the CPC established an Arbitration Committee in charge of resolving inter-
sectoral disputes and ensuring the “peaceful coexistence” of the industries “within the margins of the new 
economic regime”. This committee was made up of 15 members representing each sectoral association 
affiliated to the CPC. See “Formada comisión que dirimirá dificultades entre sectores de la producción o 
el comercio”, El Mercurio, June 1, 1974.    
		
303 
that business associations took the “inescapable responsibility” of compelling their 
members to work according to the entrepreneurial values of the “new Chile”5. The 
presidents of SOFOFA and SNA made similar claims regarding the need to modernize 
employers’ “mentality”. For instance, the SNA President Alfonso Márquez de la Plata 
endorsed market economy by depicting it as “totally contrary” to the “socialist and 
statist” projects that ended up in policies such as the Agrarian Reform. Likewise, the 
SNA leader Manuel Valdés—who was designated CPC president in 1974 after Fontaine 
left office—several times criticized the “rent-seeking” behavior of “old entrepreneurs”, 
arguing that in the face of the new economic order they would have to either adapt 
themselves or simply “disappear as businessmen”. In doing so, he usually referred to 
the “old businessmen” as “the leftovers” of the ISI policies6.   
In the first years of the dictatorship (1973 – 1975), business associations’ 
insistent calls for modernization were based on a “gradualist” approach to liberalization 
that was also endorsed by executives of internationally competitive but mostly domestic 
market-oriented conglomerates. They opposed to both the policymakers that argued for 
more drastic economic reforms (who under the leadership of the Chicago Boys would 
become the dominant segment of the ruling coalition between 1975 and 1982) and those 
that defended state-corporatist policies and whose orientations would be definitely 
defeated by 1975 (E. Silva, 1996, p. 88). The CPC calls proved to be key for the 																																																								
5 “Sector privado da sólido respaldo a planes económicos”, El Mercurio, October 17, 1973; “Para nivelar 
hacia arriba: ‘Hay que trabajar y dejar trabajar’”, La Tercera, April 18, 1974.  
6 Jorge Fontaine y Raúl Sahli: Actuales sacrificios serán recompensados por resurgimiento económico, El 
Mercurio, November 16, 1973; “Planteamientos de problemas agrícolas en la convención”, El Mercurio, 
May 5, 1974; “Frente a frente: empresarios y trabajadores”, Las Últimas Noticias, May 14, 1975; ‘El 
empresario tomó mayor conciencia de su rol en el desarrollo nacional’. Dijo Manuel Valdés al comentar 
término de año; El Cronista, January 3, 1976.				 
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modernization of Chilean capitalists, whose capacities to adapt themselves to the new 
times seemed to be anything but strong. In July 1974, the news magazine Qué Pasa 
described the liberalization of prices and trade as an “earthquake” businesspeople could 
barely deal with. The report stated that when price liberalization was implemented, it 
was common to hear stories of employers calling their associations to ask: “who would 
set up prices now?” According to Qué Pasa, these employers “could simply not 
understand that from now on no one would fix prices anymore”. Nor could they 
understand that they would no longer be the “little girl” (niña mimada) of protectionist 
regulations, the report concluded7.  
By the late 1970s, CPC leaders saw the development of a “new mentality” and 
the consolidation of a hegemonic position in society as part of the same process. Not 
surprisingly, debates on the role of business in society started to be recurrent among 
employers. Based on them, the CPC reinforced its demand for participation in the 
policy-making process, contending that employers should be “protagonists” and not 
“simple witnesses” of the government’s agenda8. In an attempt to frame more clearly 
the new role of business, in 1979 the CPC elaborated a document entitled “The socio-
economic transcendence of business”9. In addition to criticizing the “statist 
hypertrophy” of Marxist ideology, the document stated that entrepreneurial initiative, as 
“expression of human freedom”, had “the primary responsibility in the creation of 
																																																								
7 “La industria ante el remezón”, Qué Pasa, June 14, 1974.  
8 “Señaló Manuel Valdés: ‘El sector privado aspira a ser protagonista y no espectador del proceso’”, El 
Cronista, April 17, 1977.   
9 The Social Union of Christian Employers (USEC) also participated in the elaboration of this document, 
although it is not clear the degree of influence USEC leaders had on it.  
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wealth and goods in benefit of society” and that the state should play a “subsidiary role” 
focused solely on those realms where private initiative was absent10.   
  
8.1.2. Radical neoliberalism and the Labor Plan  
 The CPC’s partial exclusion from policymaking and its emphasis on the unity 
and modernization of the business sector help understand employers’ attitudes towards 
the neoliberal restructuring deepened in 1975, and particularly to the Labor Plan on 
1979. As noted in previous chapters, the Labor Plan was one of the policy changes that 
lagged behind in comparison with the general free-market transformation of the 
country. This meant that although the formulation of the Labor Plant occurred in the 
middle of the 1975-1982 period—when business associations’ influence on 
policymaking was weakest (E. Silva, 1998), important segments of the business sector 
were already “ideologically prepared” to endorse it. Yet such an endorsement was not 
without difficulties as ambivalent stances regarding the Labor Plan were frequent, 
especially after employers realized about the extremely flexible regulations it contained. 
Again, the intervention of business associations was crucial to the unity of employers’ 
discourses towards the new labor laws.   
In effect, right after the enactment of the Labor Plan several employers criticized 
the new regulations on the grounds that workers’ ability to present different collective 
bargaining proposals within the same firm would make the bargaining process “messy”. 
Some of them even argued that workers’ right strike was “protected” by regulations that 																																																								
10 “Documento de los empresarios: ‘Libertad regulada por una leal y rigurosa competencia’”, El 
Mercurio, August 12, 1979.   
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allowed strikes to last “too long”—i.e. 60 days11. In responding to these critiques, the 
head of the Labor Directorate Ramón Suarez said that employers were afraid of the 
Labor Plan because it would “promote freedom” and endanger employers’ “comfort 
zone” by forcing them to invest in labor relations departments12. Years later, in his 
account of the meetings where business associations were informed about the Labor 
Plan, Minster of Labor José Piñera described in similar terms employers’ first reactions. 
According to him, the radical policy changes of the mid 1970s “demolished” traditional 
business associations; yet “old” mentalities still remained in some segments of business 
which could not understand why tripartite a supra-enterprise bargaining instances such 
as the tarifados nacionales would no longer standardize salaries and labor conditions 
for entire industries. Although not ideologically opposed to the Labor Plan, these 
sectors were therefore “totally confused” with “so much market and freedom” in labor 
relations (Piñera, 1992, pp. 23-33).  
In an attempt to deal with this type of confusions, some associations made 
public calls to accept the new policies by emphasizing the need for capitalists to adapt 
themselves to Labor Plan, even though these leaders recognized that the changes were 
more rapid than they would have wanted to. “Whether we like it or not, we have to 
accept it”, said the president of the Association of Metallurgic and Metalworking 
Employers, ASIMET13. Likewise, SOFOFA leader Juan Riveros claimed to 																																																								
11 “’Negociacón colectiva tiene sentido social’. Aseguró ministro Piñera”, La Tercera, July 24, 1979. 
Somehow line with these critics, economist Fernando Dahse argued that the Labor Plan would eventually 
be “detrimental” for employers because its regulations would be unable to channel the proliferation of 
industrial conflict. See: “Lo bueno y lo malo: el plan laboral en 6 enfoques”, El Mercurio, July 15, 1979. 
12 “Corregir sin transar”, Ercilla, August 8, 1979. 
13 “Ninguna empresa puede resistir más de diez días. Enfatizan personeros de ASIMET”, La Segunda, 
July 25, 1979. 
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“understand” why the Labor Plan brought opposition from some employers by pointing 
out: “For us the (economic) model was like a catastrophe, because we were afraid that 
all our businesses would go bankrupt due to external competition and lower tariffs. 
However, after several years… we have understood that it has certain logical base on 
which it is possible for business to adapt itself to the model”14.   
  These stances toward the Labor Plan showed well the existence of somehow 
contradictory processes occurring within organized business during the period of radical 
neoliberal reforms. On the one hand, business supported the government’s free-market 
agenda and associations made efforts to “catch up” to the new conditions in both 
economic and ideological terms. Yet, on the other hand, associations’ influence on the 
policy-making process was weak, and although CPC-government relations were stable 
policy recommendations by business were usually ignored (Campero, 1995, pp. 131-
134; E. Silva, 1998, p. 227). Government’s inattention did not mean, however, that 
opposition to free market reforms was a feasible alternative for business leaders. 
Following E. Silva (1998, p. 228), it is possible to identify two factors that explain 
organized business committed support of neoliberalism. First, ample international 
liquidity spurred rapid economic growth in trading and service sectors. In turn, it 
produced plentiful hard currency credit that allowed businesspeople—especially those 
belonging to conglomerates oriented to foreign markets such as Vial-BHC, Cruzat-
Larraín, Matte, and Edwards groups—to expand, speculate, or borrow to survive. These 
conglomerates were indeed the closest allies of the Chicago Boys. Second, the 
																																																								
14 “‘También los empresarios estuvimos muy asustados’, Juan Riveros, Fomento Fabril”, La Tercera, July 
29, 1979.	 
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neoliberal transformation rested politically on the grounds of a “protected democracy” 
institutionalized in the 1980 constitution, which in addition to ensuring favorable 
conditions for investment guaranteed conservative forces the power to entrench the 
policies enacted during this period.    
Similarly, and regardless of its tenuous influence on policymaking, business 
associations’ endorsement of the Labor Plan rested on economic and political reasons. 
Even before the Labor Plan’s enactment, both the CPC and its sectoral associations 
defined the prohibition of industry-wide bargaining and employers’ ability to hire strike 
replacements and lock out workers during strikes as “efficient” regulations15. Also, after 
the legalization of bargaining and strike activity, large businessmen praised the virtues 
of the Labor Plan by emphasizing how the strike, although a “real negotiation weapon 
for workers”, would no longer “endanger” firms’ profitability16. Politically, both 
business associations and the more skeptical employers backed the new regulations 
because, as suggested by Minister Piñera (1992, pp. 43-44), they represented the first 
policy proposal that offered concrete ways of overcoming the old regulations that 
allowed “communism” to develop in the terrain of industrial relations. To do so, the 
Labor Plan would ensure the depoliticization of workers not through a state-corporatist-
like labor movement affiliated with the regime, but rather through the fragmentation of 
unions, the individualization of labor relations, and the emphasis on the “technical” 
character of bargaining (Álvarez, 2012; Piñera, 1992). In noting the importance of these 
regulations, the CPC president Domingo Arteaga claimed that the main “virtue” of the 																																																								
15 See, for example: “Ministro Piñera se reunió con dirigentes de ASIMET”, El Cronista, January 23, 
1979; “Plan Laboral y reacciones”, Revista Mensaje, March 9, 1979.  
16 “Plan laboral. Quiénes ganan y quiénes pierden”, Revista Hoy, February 13, 1980.  
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Labor Plan had to do with the way in which, and for the first time, the labor law would 
allow the individual worker to realize that his interest and the firms’ interests “are one 
and the same”. For Arteaga, this was key for avoiding “the political control of the 
workers” so many times observed during the ISI period17.   
 The enactment of the Labor Plan implied the termination of a central aspect in 
the dictatorship’s foundational work on social policy. However in 1981 the neoliberal 
model began to come under stress as a result of the international debt crisis. Economic 
recession threatened not only free-market economics and the political stability of the 
regime, but it also implied a shift in the economic interests of capitalists that 
endangered business unity by reactivating intra-class conflicts. The resolution of these 
conflicts was one of the most important challenges the CPC had to face before 
consolidating its position vis-à-vis labor and the state.  
 
8.1.3. The economic crisis and the struggle to unify the business community 
 The early 1980s debt crisis had enormous consequences for business, the 
political behavior of its associations, and the neoliberal project as a whole (Arriagada, 
2004; Campero, 1995; Schneider, 2004; E. Silva, 1996). Along with uncovering the 
transitory character of the economic prosperity based on ample international liquidity, 
the crisis increased the conflicts between the conglomerates that controlled financial 
intermediation of external credit and business associations that until then had been 
excluded from the policymaking process. In effect, as soon as loans became scarce the 
conglomerates pushed to increase internal interest rates to keep themselves from going 																																																								
17 “Domingo Arteaga. Presidente porfiado”, Ercilla, November 19, 1980.		 
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bankrupt. In contrast, business associations began to demand the adoption of 
“pragmatic” policies such as the devaluation of the peso to spur exports and the 
lowering of interest rates to stimulate the economy (E. Silva, 1996). As the crisis 
deepened, these pragmatic stances quickly became majoritarian within organized 
business.   
Within the CPC the pragmatic neoliberals were represented by the CPC past-
president Jorge Fontaine. He opposed the stance of the CPC president Domingo Arteaga 
who argued that the only way to confront the political effects of the crisis (e.g. the 
public critiques of business “speculative behavior”) was through a strong defense of the 
government’s radical free market political economy. Arteaga’s commitment to the 
government’s radical neoliberalism was so strict that several times he got in public 
disputes with prominent businessmen who criticized the “excesses” of free market 
policies. Arteaga even disregarded the demands from leaders of sectoral associations 
who insisted on special state loans to reactivate their own sectors18. These hardline 
orientations brought strong opposition from the more pragmatic sectors, which 
contended that state intervention and special sectoral measures—e.g. tariffs to protect 
national industry from international “disloyal competition”—were the only way to 
avoid the economic collapse. The pressures from these sectors eventually led to 
Arteaga’s resignation and the return of Fontaine as president of the CPC in 1982.  
Fontaine’s proclamation meant not only the defeat of the radical neoliberals 
within the CPC, but also a new way of approaching the inter-sectoral conflicts that had 
																																																								
18 See, for example: “Domingo Arteaga, presidente de los empresarios: Los riesgos del mercado”, El 
Mercurio, May 31, 1981; “Los verdaderos intereses” (Editorial), El Mercurio, May 20, 1982.    
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escalated in the course of the crisis. Right after his proclamation, Fontaine 
acknowledged that each industry had “its own interests” regarding state policy. Yet 
unlike Arteaga who denied ex ante the importance of sectoral demands, he contended 
that the conciliation of these diverging interests was essential for the survival of the 
entire business sector. Therefore, Fontaine argued, the construction of consensus should 
be a priority goal of the CPC: “we either reach an agreement or collapse together”, he 
emphasized19. Along with this, he worked hard to develop a pragmatic development 
agenda that would end up in several public declarations, documents, and policy 
proposals. For example, in June 1983, the CPC put together a retreat in the rural town of 
Alto Jahuel where leaders from different associations discussed policy proposals to 
revitalize the economy. The conclusions of the retreat were presented in an economic 
recovery program entitled of “Economic recovery: analysis and propositions” 
(Recuperación económica: análisis y proposiciones). Endorsed by the six associations 
affiliated to the CPC, the program represented the most developed alternative to the 
government’s laissez-faire orthodoxy. Among other things, “Economic recovery” 
argued that higher inflation resulting from expansive monetary policy designed to 
stimulate the economy was both desirable and necessary; called for the protection of 
domestic market producers; and demanded several sector-specific measures for 
commerce, agriculture, construction, and finance (E. Silva, 1998, pp. 230-231)20.  
																																																								
19 “Jorge Fontaine, presidente de la Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio. ‘O nos ponemos de 
acuerdo  o nos hundimos todos’”, La Tercera, July 22, 1982.  
20 See also: “La posición de los empresarios” (Editorial), La Segunda, July 10, 1983; “El grado de 
adhesión al programa empresarial”, El Mercurio, August 6, 1983. 
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The adoption of pragmatic stances during the economic crisis did not mean the 
resolution of all the threats to business unity. Amid the crisis, associations of employers 
(mostly small and medium-sized) from the sectors most seriously hurt by economic 
liberalization (e.g. commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing) openly blamed the crisis 
on the government and the Chicago Boys. These associations had been critical of the 
economic policies, and similar to the CPC they had long demanded more participation 
in the policymaking21. However, as they represented mostly small and medium-sized 
firms, these associations differed from the CPC in that they stopped their unconditional 
support of the regime and even casted doubts on the leadership role of the CPC. For 
instance, the Confederation of Truck Owners contended that it would not support policy 
proposals elaborated by the CPC as this represented “the same (large) businessmen who 
have us drowning in debts”22. In noting that the Pinochet regime had turned its back on 
them, they led what Campero (1995) calls the “entrepreneurial revolt” against the 
military government. Through public proclamations such as the Declaración de 
Valdivia (October 1982) and the Declaración de Rancagua (November 1982) these 
associations condemned the destruction of the agricultural and industrial apparatus and 
the liquidation of assets, and demanded more protections for the national industry 
(Campero, 1995, pp. 135-136).  
Although important, these critiques did not substantially undermine the CPC 
pragmatic economic proposals or its attempts to construct broad class-wide consensus 
																																																								
21 “Medianos y pequeños empresarios solicitan cambios en la economía. Se entrevistaron con el 
Presidente”, La Tercera, July 5, 1979; “Comercio detallista debatió el plan laboral”, El Mercurio, July 16, 
1979.		 
22 “Crece debate y análisis del programa económico de la Confederación”, La Tercera, August 9, 1983.   
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to deal with the crisis. Most employers saw these associations’ critiques to Pinochet as a 
sign of disloyalty vis-à-vis the left. Largely because of this, these rebel associations 
could not offer a unitary, class-wide alternative to confront the economic and political 
effects of the crisis. This is precisely what the CPC did through its recovery program. 
According to Fontaine, both the content of its proposals and the way in which they were 
drafted—i.e. through the participation of leaders from all sectors of business—turned 
the recovery program into a set of policies that, while focusing on the needs of specific 
sectors, were “totally compatible” with the defense of business general interests and the 
free market political economy established by Pinochet23.  
The success of the CPC vis-à-vis the most critical sectors of business was 
reinforced by the progressive shift in the government’s attitudes towards its policy 
proposals. After a year of ambiguous responses, by 1984 the government ended up 
adopting most of the prescriptions of the CPC. Also, it established, as demanded by the 
CPC, different mechanisms to institutionalize access to the policymaking process. 
Several conditions facilitated this change of attitude from the Pinochet regime 
(Campero, 1995; E. Silva, 1996). First, after the political opposition grouped in the 
Alianza Democrática made several propositions to the pragmatic neoliberal groups, 
Pinochet was compelled to take them seriously in order to avoid the potential (although 
unlikely) creation of a multiclass opposition that might include significant fractions of 
the capitalist class. Second, probably as a result of this Pinochet realized that the 
reconstruction of formal ties with business associations was essential. The results of this 
were clearly observed in the appointment of business associations’ leaders in key 																																																								
23 “Rol de los dirigentes empresariales”, in (ENADE, 1984, pp. 98-99).  
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economic ministries (for example the two ministers of economics between 1984 and 
1987, Modesto Collados and Juan Délano, were prominent leaders of the CChC and the 
CNC). Finally, business associations themselves carried out significant changes that 
reinforced business cohesion and its capacity to influence the state. Particularly, the 
election in 1982 of a strong and “militant” leader such as the Jorge Fontaine—which 
was accompanied in the same year by the election of Ernesto Ayala in SOFOFA—
allowed organized business to become more autonomous from the government and, in 
turn, facilitated the adoption of more “proactive” behaviors vis-à-vis the state (i.e. 
behaviors that were well beyond the passive endorsement of the regime’s proposals).  
The change in the relations between the state and the CPC had significant 
consequences for organized business. It meant the establishment of a system of 
collaboration in which the interaction between the government and business was 
balanced as neither side dominated the relationship (E. Silva, 1998). In the short term, it 
was key for ensuring business total support for the dictatorship. In the long term, it 
allowed the CPC to become the representative of the business sector vis-à-vis the state 
throughout the whole democratic period (E. Silva, 1998, pp. 234-235). However, this 
“new” CPC was consolidated only once Chilean employers became totally aware of the 
role they should play in society; once they became aware of the need to win “the battle 
of ideas” against ideologies that call into question both business and market economy as 
a whole; and once they became convinced that the CPC was, more than any other 
association, the main instrument to fulfill these political tasks. In other words, the 
resurrection of the CPC only succeeded once employers consolidated—between 1984 
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and 1989—the ideological and political work they had started at the beginning of the 
dictatorship.  
 
8.1.4. The resurrection of the CPC and the consolidation of business power, 1983-
1989  
Although the most disastrous effects of the crisis seemed to pass in a couple of 
years, by 1986 the levels of popular mobilization against Pinochet were higher than 
ever. So were chances for the dictatorship to come to an end. This context forced 
organized business to carry out strategic and political discussions whose results would 
define the role of the CPC in the times to come.  
The strategic discussions became public amid the election of Fontaine’s 
successor in mid-1986, and revolved largely around the role the CPC should play in that 
political context and the future post-dictatorial period (which in light of the strong 
demands for democratization seemed closer than ever). Regarding this debate, two 
positions were clearly observed. Leaders of associations such as CChC and ABIF 
contended that the CPC should focus on helping its sectoral affiliates to fulfill their 
demands, so the CPC president should be, they contended, a simple “coordinator” of the 
sectoral associations’ autonomous activities. In contrast, leaders from the four 
remaining associations argued that as sectoral issues had become “secondary” with the 
end of the debt crisis, it was necessary to think more “broadly” and strengthen the 
power of the CPC vis-à-vis its affiliates. To do so, the CPC should transcend the 
sectoral orientations of its affiliates and defend cross-sectoral, class-wide interests 
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through the promotion of actions that would no longer be purely “defensive”—like 
during the ISI period, but “vigorously influential” in society24. Most of the employers 
supported this latter position, and prominent business leaders such as Germán Riesco 
(former SNA president and sub-secretary of Agriculture) endorsed it because they saw 
it as the only way to confront the threats derived from the possible end of the 
dictatorship. The SOFOFA also endorsed this stance by arguing that the CPC should be 
actively involved in all national debates, not only through public declarations and 
positioning statements, but especially through the CPC’s participation in government-
opposition negotiations and bilateral meetings with the “democratic” (non-Communist) 
opposition parties25.  
The 1986 election gave the victory to the mining businessman Manuel Feliú. He 
was elected as a “consensus” president who, according to businesspeople, had the 
appropriate skills to develop a new leadership style more suitable to the politically 
unstable times. Despite Feliú attempted to reconcile these diverging views, he was an 
open supporter of the class-wide, strong-CPC approach. Accordingly, he worked hard to 
consolidate the CPC as a powerful and influential political actor whose goals should go 
well beyond the simple coordination of sectoral demands.  
Feliú’s agenda gave rise to political debates that would be key for the 
consolidation of the CPC. These debates started in August 1986, in the city of Viña del 
Mar, in a three-day meeting that gathered together the most outstanding leaders of the 
																																																								
24 “Elecciones: ¿En busca de un líder empresarial?”, El Mercurio, June 11, 1986.  
25 “Próximas elecciones. La Confederación y su líder vistos por los empresarios”, El Mercurio, July 16, 
1986; “Dirigente empresarial Manuel Feliú: ‘Si los políticos nos respetan seremos interlocutores’”, 
Revista Análisis, August 26, 1986.	 
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business sector. In the meeting these leaders agreed that the traditional business forum 
ENADE should leave aside its conventional focus on economic subjects and instead 
privilege politico-ideological issues (or, as they put it, issues related to the “fundamental 
bases” of society)26. Thus ENADE 1986 became one of the most significant political 
events of Chilean businesspeople (Campero, 1995). Entitled “The entrepreneur: engine 
of progress”, the 1986 version of ENADE was the “most political” version of this 
traditional forum. Unlike its previous versions, the thousands of talks, presentations, 
and workshops of ENADE 1986 revolved around non-economic issues such as 
“Business and society”, “Business and labor”, and “Business initiative in Chile’s 
future”. One of these even included a lecture given by the conservative historian 
Gonzalo Vial, who repeatedly reminded the audience how Chilean entrepreneurs’ 
“ideological weakness” ended up in historical defeats such as the Agrarian Reform and 
the expropriations occurred during the Allende administration (ENADE, 1986, pp. 35-
41). These reflections on politico-ideological issues were complemented by 
unprecedented discussions on employers’ individual behavior, which gave rise to a 
“conduct code” that established that individual employers should promote social justice, 
institute a saving spirit, and “defend private property”. It also stated that employers 
should avoid showing unconditional support for specific political regime and making 
use of business associations to self-interested or political goals27.   
																																																								
26 “Afirma presidente de la Producción y del Comercio: ‘Estamos dispuestos a colaborar en la búsqueda 
de la paz social’”, La Tercera, August 31, 1986’; “Manuel Feliú: ‘La unidad está muy cerca’, Revista 
Hoy, November 17, 1986.   
27 “Conclusiones ENADE 86: Manuel Feliú entregó futuro ‘código de conducta’ del empresariado 
chileno”, La Segunda, December 4, 1986.	 
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In ENADE 1986 business leaders also reflected on the role business associations 
should play in the post-dictatorial society. The orientations on these matters were 
vividly expressed in Manuel Feliú’s speech where he argued that in democratic regimes 
the development of an “entrepreneurial spirit” required powerful associations to make 
people “respect and recognize business”. According to him, these associations should 
be politically independent “but not indifferent”, as well as “uncompromising” in the 
defense and promotion of private initiative, economic freedom, and private property 
(ENADE, 1986, pp. 17-23). Similar ideas were reaffirmed a year later, in Feliú’s 
ENADE 1987 speech, where in anticipating the potential challenges from democracy he 
contended: “How can we want the electorate to respect us, if they don’t know the costs 
of having a society without business? It is easy to be against business, unless there is 
awareness that we’re necessary. Time has come to get out to defend and communicate 
our reality, the utility of what we are and what we do… That’s what business 
associations are for” (ENADE, 1987, pp. 11-17).  
To this end, throughout the last years of the dictatorial period (1986-1989) the 
CPC focused on winning what employers called “the battle of ideas”. To do so, the CPC 
organized massive meetings, seminars, and workshops where businessmen committed 
themselves to the promotion of entrepreneurial principles by influencing the mass 
media, public opinion, academic circles, etc. (Campero, 1995; Gárate, 2012; Undurraga, 
2012). This commitment was clearly expressed by Feliú in his speech of ENADE 1988, 
which took place two months after the defeat of Pinochet in the plebiscite. There the 
CPC president analyzed the role organized business should play given the political 
context, and said: “[1989] is not going to be a year for cowards and lazy people… we 
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must commit ourselves to doing things that we were, perhaps for too long, reluctant to 
do, which imply taking the initiative and winning the battle of ideas” (ENADE, 1988, 
pp. 242-248).  
The definition of these ideological principles and the specific instruments to 
defend them (business associations) provided business with strong resources to face the 
challenges from democratization. For instance, it allowed business to continue to 
support Pinochet without depending on the results of the plebiscite that eventually 
implied his defeat. In effect, although the CPC endorsed the “yes” option in the 
plebiscite, several times Feliú claimed that the real goal of organized business was to 
win the “war” against its “real” adversaries: underdevelopment, statism and its 
“bureaucratic mentality”, and Marxism. Moreover, he even contended that democracy 
was “the best” regime where entrepreneurial initiative could develop28. In addition, 
business leaders’ work helped them ensure the unity of the business sector vis-à-vis the 
political opposition to the dictatorship. Under the leadership of the CPC, employers 
successfully faced opposition parties’ attempts to take advantage of the divisions 
between large and small employers. These parties tried to exploit employer intra-class 
divisions by emphasizing how the government’s abandonment of small business 
contrasted with its close relations with economic groups. They even promoted the 
formation of a coalition of businessmen—“Businessmen for the No option” 
(Agrupación de Empresarios por el No)—to show that the business sector was not 
																																																								
28 “Manuel Feliú, presidente de la Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio: ‘Los empresarios están 
haciendo proyecciones más allá del 89’”, La Época, April 19, 1987; “Afirmó Manuel Feliú: ‘Llegaron los 
tiempos de las mejoras reales’, El Mercurio, June 11, 1988  
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totally aligned with the dictatorship29. However, initiatives like this were largely 
irrelevant as the CPC succeeded in integrating the most representative confederations of 
small employers—many of which had participated in the “entrepreneurial revolt” of the 
early 1980s— into an informal coalition called the “Group of Entrepreneurs for 
Development” (Agrupación de Empresarios por el Desarrollo). Although this coalition 
had the broad goal of “promoting entrepreneurial values” in the post-authoritarian 
regime, CPC leaders drew upon narratives based on threats to business (e.g. the arrival 
of a socialist post-authoritarian government) to emphasize the need to achieve unity 
across all the business sectors. While accepting the right of opposition parties to 
propose alternative political regimes, since the mid 1980s the CPC had emphasized that 
the transition to democracy should exclude the political sectors that “long for the 
Agrarian Reform” and “threat property rights”30. This time the references to historical 
traumas proved to be successful as the most important small business organizations 
openly argued that they joined Entrepreneurs for Development because they did not 
want to “revive past epochs” in reference, once again, to the Allende government31.  
Finally, employers’ organizing efforts enabled them to accept (unwillingly) the 
democratization of the country without compromising their defense of the dictatorship’s 
foundational work. For example, as soon as the moderate opposition started to propose 
																																																								
29 “Empresarios por el No”, Revista Cauce, September 12, 1988. See also the pinion piece by opposition 
leader Sergio Bitar: “Empresarios y democracia”, Fortín Mapocho, July 7, 1986.  
30 See, for example, Jorge Fontaine’s speech in the 1985 version of ENADE (1985, pp. 5-9). See also 
“Jorge Fontaine: Un manifiesto empresarial”, Revista Hoy, December 1, 1985.  
31 “Comienza campaña de los empresarios por el desarrollo”, El Mercurio, June 9, 1988. Statements like 
these made opposition media argue that “Entrepreneurs for Development” was a new expression of 
Chilean business’ anti-democratic values already observed, in the early 1970s, in the Comando de Acción 
Gremial that led the campaign to overthrow Salvador Allende. See “Multigremial empresarial. La historia 
vuelve a repetirse”, Revista Cauce, June 13, 1988.  
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the construction of a broad “social concertation” as the axis of the post-dictatorial 
democratic regime, the CPC claimed to be totally supportive of the idea of a “pact” 
between employers and workers. To show its commitment with this idea, the CPC even 
organized regular (mostly symbolic) bipartite meetings with non-Marxist labor 
confederations such as the Central Democrática de Trabajadores. Yet despite these 
initiatives, employers always insisted that labor-capital concertation should in no way 
lead to the establishment of industry-wide bargaining systems, and that the pacts 
proposed by CPC were meant to take place only at the firm level32. According to 
Manuel Feliú, business would never support the establishment of corporatist-like 
industrial relation systems because “that would bring about a series of problems we had 
to face in the past”. Thus by the end of the dictatorship he usually insisted the new 
democratic government could improve, but never change, the labor law, and that the 
CPC would be willing to revise the economic model, including the labor legislation, “as 
long the bases of the system remain intact”33. 
 
8.2. Organized business during the democratic period  
 The arrival of center-left democratic administrations proved to be much less 
detrimental capitalists than business leaders thought. At least between 1990 and 2010, 																																																								
32 “Manuel Feliú: ‘Ninguna familia puede vivir con 20 mil pesos’”, Revista Análisis, July 20, 1987; 
“Empresarios y trabajadores”, Las Últimas Noticias, May 22, 1987; “Feliú pidió indulto para sindicalistas 
relegados”, El Mercurio, December 20, 1988; “Empresarios y trabajadores acuerdan procedimiento para 
trabajar en la ‘integración social’”, La Segunda, January 9, 1989; “Empresarios-CTCh resaltan avances 
en acuerdo social”, El Mercurio, December 30, 1989.  
33 “Manuel Feliú, el "No" y la Constitución: ‘Apoyaremos los cambios si la mayoría lo decide’, Revista 
Análisis, April 4, 1988; “Manuel Valdés, presidente de la Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio: 
‘Jarpa representa valores muy importantes’”, La Época, February 7, 1989; “Manuel Feliú: ‘Lo peor sería 
alterar la ley laboral’”, El Mercurio, December 10, 1989. 	 
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the consensual, pro-business orientation of the Concertación governments created fertile 
conditions for business to modernize, internationalize, and consolidate its economic 
power (Montero, 1997; Nazer, 2013; Schurman, 1996; Undurraga, 2014). These 
conditions also allowed capitalists to secure its privilege access to policymaking 
(Álvarez, 2015; Schneider, 2004; E. Silva, 1996), and reinforced its ideological 
commitment to market economy through an intense investment in cultural spaces such 
as think tanks, universities, research and policymaking centers, etc.) (Arriagada, 2004; 
Gárate, 2012; Undurraga, 2014). Thus, the transition to democracy facilitated in many 
respects the finalization of the economic, political, and ideological processes started by 
business associations in the early 1970s. In what follows, I show that both the outcome 
of these processes and the way they shaped the power of the CPC depended largely on 
the type of relations established between business and the state, and on the way that 
organized business responded to threats from the state and from “below” (i.e. from the 
mobilization by labor unions or other social groups). After showing how organized 
business has interacted with the state and responded to these threats, I examine how in 
the course of these processes the CPC has managed to maintain business unity as its 
most important source of collective power.  
 
8.2.1. From distrust to cooperation: business-state relations between 1990 and 2010 
 Despite the first democratic administration had to deal with a conciliatory leader 
such as Feliú, he usually insisted that “statism” and its “defenders” had not been 
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defeated, so the CPC would continue to work hard to win the “war” against them34. 
Declarations like this were more frequent after the “hardliner” leader and former CChC 
president José Antonio Guzmán became president of the CPC in December 199035. 
Under the leadership of Guzmán, the CPC insisted that the Concertación should show a 
“real commitment” to market economy by both promoting the privatization of public 
companies that had not been touched during the dictatorship and avoiding reformist 
agendas that might endanger the neoliberal development (CPC-empr90-93, 20, 22). 
Based on these principles, the CPC strongly opposed, as I showed in Chapter 3, workers 
demand for the repealing of the Labor Plan. The CPC did so remarking not only the 
potential economic effects of these policy changes, but also how they would lead to 
“old”, tripartite, corporatist-like industrial relation systems. In addition to undermining 
private freedom and give power to union “unrepresentative” union bureaucracies, these 
legislative changes would be, according to business leaders, outdated to deal with the 
“new times” of industrial relations characterized by low levels of conflict and strike 
activity, low unionization rates, and a widespread preference for individualized 
employer-employee interactions36.  
																																																								
34 “Con discurso político, Manuel Feliú dejó ayer la dirigencia del empresariado”, La Época, December 
28, 1990. 
35 After his election, the CUT president Manuel Bustos said he was “worried” because the CPC could 
take hardline stances that would lead to the failure of the CPC. “What worries me most”, Bustos said, 
“are Mr. Guzmán’s partners, concretely the SOFOFA”, in reference to the manufacturer associations 
which in the early 1990s was usually depicted as the most uncompromising member of the CPC. See 
“Primer ‘pulseo’ del líder empresarial José Antonio Guzmán y la cabeza de la CUT, Manuel Bustos con 
‘La Segunda’”, La Segunda, December 28, 1990.  
36 “No queremos centrales sindicales al estilo argentino”, La Época, November 6, 1990; “Legislación 
laboral: No al tripartismo”, Opinion piece by J.A. Guzmán, La Tercera, November 22, 1992; “Exposición 
del Presidente de la Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio, José Antonio Guzmán Matta” in 
ENADE (1993, pp. 254-263); ‘La CUT está atrasada 40 o 50 años’, La Segunda, July 4, 1994.  
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 Despite the CPC usually criticized the new democratic administrations for 
pursuing “unnecessary” reforms, business-government became less confrontational, and 
a stable pattern of business-state collaboration was established. Two factors facilitated 
this pattern. First, from the business side, the CPC strategically decided to distance itself 
from the farthest-right stances represented by the UDI. Several times Guzmán claimed 
that business associations were totally separated from party politics, regardless of the 
fact that some leaders could be, as individuals, members of political parties. While 
recognizing that most businessmen supported right parties, Guzmán contended that, as 
members of associations, they would always be open to talk to “everyone”. Second, 
from the government side, the CPC strategic flexibility was supplemented by the 
Concertación administrations’ committed support to market economy. By the end of the 
Aylwin administration, this commitment proved to be real, and was praised even by 
hardliners such as Guzmán who noted the “responsible” stances of Aylwin and “the 
willingness to dialogue” of key state officers such as Alejandro Foxley37. In this 
context, business’ fears to the transition to democracy tended to become less and less 
pronounced. Confident that free market had “reached a point of no return” in the 
country, business leaders faced the first presidential election of the democratic period 
believing that, whatever its results, the electoral process would not endanger the 
foundations market economy38.   																																																								
37 “José Antonio Guzamán, presidente de la Confderación de la Producción y el Comercio: ‘Es importante 
que se conserven los equilibrios políticos’”, Revista Caras, April 19, 1993; “Exposición del Presidente de 
la Confederacioón de la Producción y el Comercio, José Antonio Guzmán Matta” in ENADE (1994, pp. 
187-194). 
 
38 See, for example, José A. Guzmán’s opinion piece “Cuadro de estabilidad”, La Tercera, December 19, 
1993. See also: “‘Empresarios y gobierno debemos trabajar juntos’”, La Tercera, December 23, 1993.  
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 The friendly business-state relations turned business associations into key actor 
in the bold internationalization agenda pursued by President Frei in the mid 1990s. 
However, the relations became strained in the late 1990s as a result of the Asian Crisis. 
As soon as its effects on the Chilean economy became evident, the CPC launch a 
document with more than forty measures to overcome the crisis. The measures 
included, among other things, the liberalization of the exchange rate, the reduction of 
public expenditure, and the withdrawal of the bills on labor and tax reforms that the 
government had introduced into Congress. State officers and Concertación leaders—
including President Frei—strongly rejected the document arguing not only that its 
proposals were “extremely ideological” (i.e. extremely pro free-markets), but also that 
they were, in reality, a “list of demands” that the government would not accept39. Since 
then and for the rest of the Frei administration, business-state relations continued to be 
strained. Nor did they improve in first two years of the third Concertación 
administration led by the Socialist Ricardo Lagos. According to the CPC leader Ricardo 
Ariztía, Lagos’ reformist orientation—observed between 2000 and 2001 in several law 
projects that aimed to reform the Labor Plan and create the first insurance 
unemployment system—was the real cause of the country’s slow economic recovery. 
Ariztía asserted that the government’s “harassment” of business and the “anti-business 
bias” of some state officers forced employers to “defend themselves” and focus more on 
“reaction” than on “creation”. The confrontations with the government were so high 
that in his ENADE 2001 speech (which was indeed entitled “From reaction to 																																																								
39 “Empresarios ‘cerraron filas’ en torno al presidente de la CPC, Walter Riesco”, El Diario, February 4, 
1998; “’Vivimos el momento más complejo desde el inicio de los años noventa’”, El Diario, March 30, 
1998.	 
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creation”), and in front of an audience full of businessmen and political leaders 
(President Ricardo Lagos included), Ariztía asserted: “Mr. President, please, let us work 
in peace. We propose a pact of honor to finish with this absurd war of trenches” 
(ENADE, 2002, pp. 113-120).  
Ariztía’s speech marked the break of the relations between the CPC officialdom 
and President Lagos. They were reestablished only after Juan Claro was elected as CPC 
President in 2002. This meant a significant point of departure for the business-state 
interactions, and the final consolidation of the cooperative relations between the CPC 
and the Concertación governments. Juan Claro was less confrontational and politically 
conservative than Ariztía, and he openly criticized business leaders’ endorsement of 
right parties. Also, as former SOFOFA president, Claro was always closer to Lagos. 
Because of its strong sectoral power and its participation in consultation initiatives with 
the government, since the 1990s SOFOFA leaders enjoyed direct contact with the 
executive. Drawing on these resources, since his arrival to the presidency of the CPC, 
Claro worked to privilege “creative” over “reactive” stances. Thus, for example, he was 
an active sponsor of the program for economic recovery drafted by SOFOFA and 
known as “Pro-growth Agenda” (Agenda Pro crecimiento). The program was 
enthusiastically received by Lagos, and by 2003 two out of three proposals included in 
it were either passed or kept under discussion in Congress (SOFOFA, 2003)40.  
The Claro presidency meant a keystone for the strengthening of pragmatic, 
consensual, and “modernizer” leaderships within the CPC (Álvarez, 2015). According 
																																																								
40 See also: “Las prisas pasan”, Revista Capital, November 22 – December 5, 2002; “Encantador de 
serpientes”, Revista Capital, July 4 – 17, 2003.  
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to Revista Capital the influence of these leaderships became majoritarian once the 
business community finally convinced itself, during Ricardo Lagos’ term, that the 
Concertación was not a threat to market economy41. Along with Claro, the modernizer 
leaders were represented by figures such as Felipe Lamarca and Bruno Phillipi from 
SOFOFA, and Hernán Somerville from ABIF (who became CPC president after Claro 
ended his term in 2004). These businessmen were the nucleus that between 2002 and 
2010 facilitated the consolidation cooperative interactions between business and 
Concertación government and the moderation of the far-right sectors within business 
associations that still distrusted the Concertación. A good example of these 
exceptionally good business-state relations occurred at the end of Lagos’ term, when the 
CPC president Hernán Somerville summarized the success of the third Concertación 
administration by simply stating: “Businesspeople love Lagos”. Business’ love was 
“confirmed” in the speech given by the SOFOFA president Bruno Phillipi during the 
SOFOFA annual dinner. Considered as the most important business event, Chilean 
presidents frequently attended the event as a way to show their interest in business 
demands. In the 2005 version of the SOFOFA dinner, Phillipi gave a speech in which, 
instead of expressing what employers wanted from the government, he spent most of his 
time enumerating all the achievements of the Lagos administration42.   
																																																								
41 “Los empresarios y la elección”, Revista Capital, June 3 – 16, 2005.  
42 “Confirmado: los grandes empresarios aman a Lagos”, Revista Capital, November 4 – 16, 2005. 
Another example of the friendly relations between Concertación officers and organized business occurred 
during Michelle Bachelet’s first government, in early 2007, when in alliance with the CPC the 
government introduced an accelerated depreciation bill that would give tax benefits to the companies 
investing between 2007 and 2008. The project did not pass because right parties (the UDI and RN) vetoed 
it, arguing that it would not help small and medium-sized firms. Right parties also criticized the 
government business leaders (including some CPC officers) for the way they lobbied to pass the bill. 
According to UDI leaders, the lobby demonstrated the existence of an “alliance” between big business 
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8.2.2. Return to strained relations with the state, and the reemergence of threats from 
below 
 By the late 2000s, the macroeconomic stability of the country and the now 
unquestionable free-market orientation of the Concertación created a sense of calmness 
within organized business that had never been seen before. In contrast to the early 
1990s where business leaders argued that their main role was to be the “guardians” 
market economy, now some of them even argued that there was less need to organize in 
associations because business’ and government’s policy orientations were essentially 
the same43. However, business’ calmness was disturbed in 2007 by subcontracted 
workers’ strikes that took place in strategic sectors of the economy such as mining, 
forestry, and fish production. As Chapter 7 showed, in 2007 these workers carried out 
massive strikes that in some cases ended up in industry-wide bargaining processes 
which, despite being extra-legal, resulted in significant gains for them44. In rejecting the 
“extremely high” levels of radicalism exhibited by workers, the CPC accused the 
government of being “too permissive” with the strikers and their “illegal” actions45. 
During strike organized by workers of the state-owned copper company CODELCO, 
the CPC demanded the government not to sit in the bargaining table with workers. 
																																																																																																																																																																		
and the government, and that they would never endorse such alliances at the expenses of “common 
people”. See: “Presidente de la UDI a Alfredo Ovalle: ‘dejó de ser un interlocutor válido’”, Diario 
Financiero, April 27, 2007; “Pugna entre dirigentes de la UDI y líder de la CPC sigue sin tregua”, Diario 
Financiero, April 30, 2007.  
43 “Felipe Lamarca: ‘La época de oro de las entidades gremiales ya pasó’”, Diario Financiero, June 1, 
2007.	 
44 See “Las razones del histórico triunfo de los trabajadores forestales”, El Siglo, May 11, 2007; “Crónica 
de una huelga decisiva”, El Siglo, July 6, 2007; “La hora de los sindicatos”, Revista Capital, No 211, 
August 24, 2007. 
45 “CPC golpea la mesa por caso Codelco y pide al gobierno mantener orden publico”, Diario Financiero, 
July 12, 2007; “La hora de los sindicatos”, Revista Capital, No 211, August 24, 2007;  
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Employers argued that an action like that would set a “dangerous precedent” already 
observed, months earlier, in the government’s endorsement of a multi-firm agreement 
signed by the federation of forestry workers USINFA (which had also led a long 
“illegal” industry-wide strike) and the firms grouped in the Bosques Arauco holding46. 
The government did not listen to business demands and eventually negotiated with the 
strikers. This brought strong critiques from businessmen who contended that state 
officers from the Ministry of Labor were “sympathetic” with workers’ demands, and 
aimed to use the strikes as an excuse to introduce a labor reform project. Although some 
state officers did propose to “start a debate” on a reform to the labor code, minister of 
labor Osvaldo Andrade denied that there were serious intentions of reforming the 
collective bargaining system. After a meeting with Andrade, the CPC president Alfredo 
Ovalle showed his satisfaction saying: “What is more important now is that inter-firm 
bargaining is not in the agenda of the Ministry of Labor. We want to make that clear in 
order to finish forever with the ghost of inter-firm bargaining”. Similar to periods of 
labor reform, he pointed out that the CPC would always be willing to look for 
improvements to collective bargaining within firms47.  
In early 2014, similar events occurred when longshoremen and dockworkers 
grouped in the Unión Portuaria de Chile (UPCh) called for a strike that shut down the 
ports throughout Chile’s shore. Like in 2007, the CPC called government and the 
sectoral business association (CAMPORT) not to engage in industry-wide bargaining, 
																																																								
46 “Las lecciones del conflicto laboral en Codelco”, Diario Financiero, July 24, 2007; “Eliodoro Matte: 
‘Hay claras intenciones de volver a esquemas del pasado’”, Diario Financiero, August 1, 2007. 
47 “La CPC pidió claridad en sus dichos a ministro del trabajo Osvaldo Andrade”, Diario Financiero, 
August 1, 2007.  
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arguing that both the strike and the bargaining process were illegal, and that the simple 
fact of recognizing a confederation such as the UPCh—i.e. a confederation without the 
legal right to engage in sectoral agreements—would be a dangerous precedent48. Also, 
similar to 2007, the CPC’s calls were unsuccessful as workers’ high disruptive power 
forced the employers affected by the strikes to give into their demands.  
Along with the reemergence of the “labor threat”, significant menaces emerged 
in 2011 after the country was shaken by the most significant protests and mobilizations 
since the end of the dictatorship. These protests were the expression of social unrest 
against the way in which the transition to democracy privileged inter-elite agreements, 
closed-door politics, and the continuity of the neoliberal regime imposed during the 
dictatorship at the expense of democratic participation and redistributive agendas (Atria 
et al., 2013; Joignant, Morales, & Fuentes, 2017; Mayol, 2012; Ruiz & Boccardo, 
2015). The radical discourse of the movements leading these protests—which ranged 
from the student movement to unions and environmental organizations—was 
strengthened not only by the unresponsiveness of the right-wing Piñera administration 
but also, since 2010, by several corruption scandals in which important businessmen 
and companies were involved. At first, the scandals seemed isolated; they were related 
to unilateral debt renegotiations by an important retail company (La Polar) and to price 
collusions in highly concentrated industries such as retail drug store and poultry 
processing. Yet in 2015 four executives of one of the most important financial groups of 
Chile, PENTA group, were taken into custody for charges of, among other things, tax 
																																																								
48 “Otros cinco puertos del norte se suman al paro y empresariado alerta sobre graves efectos”, Diario 
Financiero, January 8, 2014; “Lecciones del paro portuario”, Diario Financiero, January 17, 2014;  
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fraud, money laundering, and illegal financing of the electoral campaigns of the right-
wing party UDI49. Months later, the tissue company CMPC was involved in a new case 
of price collusion. Unlike the 2010-2011 cases of collusion, the implications for 
business associations were higher, not only because two CMPC executive managers 
were active members of SOFOFA but also because their implication in the collusion 
scandal created serious tensions within the association as CMPC operated through a 
holding controlled by Eliodoro Matte, a prominent businessman who was one of the 
main financier of SOFOFA50.  
 According to some commentators, these scandals finally “undressed” business 
“factual power” that since the return to democracy had allowed employers to influence 
state decisions without being held accountable by citizens51. These scandals had a huge 
impact on business legitimacy vis-à-vis the public opinion. As Figure 6 suggests, 
Chileans’ trusts in business has declined over the last years (especially after 2010), and 
by 2015 the levels of trust in business in Chile were the lowest among all the countries 
included in the chart. The decline in the trust of Chileans became a central 
preoccupation for business associations, and led the CPC to propose different measures, 
including firms’ expulsion from associations, to punish unethical behavior52.  																																																								
49 See “Executives are jailed in Chile finance scandal”, The New York Times, March 7, 2015. Retrieved 
from:  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/world/americas/executives-are-jailed-in-chile-finance-
scandal.html 
50 “Caso Colusión genera quiebre en el núcleo duro de la Sofofa y gremio enfrenta su consejo más tenso 
de los últimos años”, El Mercurio, November 15, 2016. 
51 See report by Héctor Soto: “Los últimos estertores del Chile fáctico”, La Tercera Reportajes, 
December 27, 2015. For a sociological account of the notion of “factual powers” in Chile see Garretón 
(2000). 
52 Despite some leaders’ efforts, the implementation of concrete measures to solve these problems proved 
to be difficult. Sectoral associations had different interpretations of the real implications of the CPC’s 
proposals. While for some of them they implied deep reforms of the bylaws, for others they simply meant 
focusing on the enforcement of the existing bylaws. Similarly, whereas CPC leaders tried to overcome the 
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Figure 6. Trust in business (%). Selected countries (2001-2015) 
Source: author’s elaboration on the basis of data from Latinobarómetro survey. Data represent the 
percentage of respondents who declared to have “a lot” and “some” trust in private business.  
 
 
In addition to creating what employers defined as an “anti-business” 
environment, the protests and mobilizations brought about important political changes. 
They led Concertación leaders to move to the left, and include the Communist Party 
and other small left parties (Izquierda Ciudadana and Movimiento Amplio Social) into a 
coalition, now renamed Nueva Mayoría, that brought Bachelet back to office in 2014. 
As shown in chapter 4, Bachelet attempted to respond to social movements’ demands 
by proposing a reformist agenda that was the most ambitious since the return to 																																																																																																																																																																		
disagreement by encouraging the creation of “ethics committees” to promote “good practices” on 
business behavior, their implementation was, at least until late 2016, put on hold due to more “pressing” 
issues such as the labor reform carried out by the Bachelet government and whose legislative process 
started in early 2015. See: “CPC acuerda que ramas expulsarán a empresas o personas condenadas por 
delitos”, El Mercurio, March 11, 2015; “Cambio de estatutos para sancionar faltas a la ética complica a 
ramas de la CPC”, El Mercurio, April 7, 2015; “Hemos sido más rápidos que la clase político para asumir 
las malas prácticas”, La Tercera Reportajes, December 27, 2015. 
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democracy. Not only did it include reforms to the private system of education, the tax 
system and of course the Labor Plan, but it also established the bases for a 
Constitutional change. This political change also had significant implications for 
organized business. Along with the threats derived from the reforms themselves, the 
government’s stances toward business were much less “consensus-oriented” than that 
observed throughout the Concertación administrations (including Bachelet’s first term). 
During Bachelet’s second administration, business leaders thought their participation in 
policy-making (for example, in the drafting of the labor reform) was weaker than ever, 
and that since the beginning of the labor reform debate the government simply did not 
listen to their demands53. Bachelet herself made public gestures that showed her 
distance to the business sector. In 2015, for example, she did not attend the SOFOFA 
Industrial Annual Dinner. Despite the government claimed Bachelet’s absence was due 
to “schedule conflicts”, reports suggested that she did so because she was not willing to 
repeat the occurrences of the 2014 Dinner, where the SOFOFA president Hermann Von 
Mühlenbrock gave a speech full of critiques to the tax reform proposed by the 
government54. 
Another equally important factor that reinforced the tensions between business 
and government during Bachelet’s second term had to do with role played by 
government officers such as the first Minster of Finance Alberto Arenas. Unlike his 
predecessors, Arenas was much more autonomous from business, and businesspeople 
did not see him as an “ally”. Throughout the 2014 tax reform employers frequently 
																																																								
53 Interview with Pablo Bobic, CPC legal advisor, May 8, 2015.  
54 “La vía institucional que Bachelet trazó con el empresariado”, La Tercera Negocios, October 25, 2015.  
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complained that Arenas adopted “inflexible” stances that put him away from the 
traditional “moderator role” of previous ministers. This explains why important 
business leaders openly demanded his removal and why they enthusiastically applauded 
the appointment of the “moderate” Rodrigo Valdés, after the cabinet reshuffle of May 
201555. Despite the appointment of Valdés was undoubtedly closer to business, 
employers’ critiques to the government continued to increase in 2016, especially after 
the passing of the labor reform and the announcement of a constitutional reform. A 
good example of these critiques were the declarations by government the CPC past-
president Andrés Santa Cruz, who analyzed the government reformist agenda and 
asserted that the government “will go down in history not for the changes it made, but 
rather for leading the country to mediocrity”. In response to these types of critiques, 
Valdés asserted that business should “work more” and “whine less” 56. 
 
8.2.3. The challenge of maintaining unity  
Throughout the democratic period, the CPC has worked hard to respond to these 
types of threats and, at the same time, maintain business unity. To do so, business 
leaders have carefully managed to overcome several intra-business disputes observed 
since the return to democracy. In the 1990s, one of the main problems that put business 
unity at risk derived from the potential effects of economic internationalization on the 																																																								
55 José Antonio Guzmán analiza el escenario económico y gremial: ‘Si lo que busca el gobierno es 
recuperar la confianza de los empresarios, el ministro Alberto Arenas debe ser removido ahora’”, El 
Mercurio, January 18, 2015; “Entrevista: ‘Necesitamos hechos: que el diálogo público-privado no sea un 
diálogo de sordos’”, La Tercera Negocios, May 17, 2015. 
56 “Andrés Santa Cruz, Ex presidente de la CPC: ‘En vez de pasar a la historia como un gobierno 
transformador, lo hará como uno que condujo al país a la mediocridad’”, La Tercera, June 11, 2016; “La 
dura respuesta del empresariado al emplazamiento de Valdés”, La Tercera, July 20, 2016. 
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agricultural sector. In 1991 this conflict was expressed in the dispute between 
SONAMI’s enthusiastic endorsement of the signing of a free trade agreement with 
Argentina, and SNA’s strong rejection of it57. By the mid 1990s, the SNA 
“protectionist” stances escalated and had repercussions on CPC as a whole. In contrast 
to the CPC’s enthusiastic support of the Frei administration’s internationalization 
agenda, agricultural employers openly demanded state protections to confront the 
effects of free trade agreements. While noting that agriculture employers’ actions 
“injured” business unity, the CPC president José A. Guzmán never compromised 
business free-market orientations, and asserted that the CPC would never support 
demands for state subsidies. “If this is about asking for subsidies, we’re not going to 
support (SNA’s demands). We’re not willing to compromise our principles, which are 
very important for us, and took a long time for us to settle them in the country”, he 
concluded58.  
Throughout this conflict, all the non-agriculture associations supported 
Guzmán’s stance as they saw the costs of economic internationalization largely as 
inevitable. Amid the negotiations on Chile’s entrance to NAFTA, in July 1995 the CPC 
president asserted that agricultural employers had to accept “once and for all” that 
certain products such as wheat, milk, etc., “would simply not be competitive anymore”. 
Keeping this in mind, the CPC proposed a series of measures to address agricultural 
																																																								
57 “Cumbre empresarial: No viene el lobo”, Revista Análisis, September 16, 1991. 
58 “Guzmán: ‘La Confederación ha ayudado a los agricultores, pero no transará principios’”, La Segunda, 
December 16, 1994. See also “Molestia en la CPC por críticas de la SNA”, La Época, December 24, 
1994. 
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employers’ demands (none of which included subsidies)59. Months later (March 1996), 
in the middle of the debate on Chile’s entrance to MERCOSUR (Southern Common 
Market), the CPC held the same stance vis-à-vis the SNA. This time the CPC had the 
public support of state officers such as Minister of Economy Alvaro García, who argued 
that the SNA’s demands were “outdated”60. 
 In the early 2000s, the conflicts between the SNA and the CPC persisted. 
Although high-rank SNA leaders had abandoned their hardline defense of protectionist 
measures, important sectors of the SNA grouped in confederations of small and 
medium-sized agricultural employers from southern Chile continued to push for state 
protections to solve the “agriculture crisis”. These protectionist demands were clearly 
observed in the Roundtable for Agricultural Dialogue (Mesa de Diálogo Agrícola) put 
together by the Lagos administration in July 2000 to find “long-term solutions” for the 
agricultural sector. In contrast to the position of the CPC, small business confederations 
actively supported the demands of the southerner landowners because they were making 
similar demands to help their industries recover from the Asian crisis. The 
Confederation of Truck Owners, for example, demanded diesel fuel subsidies, loan 
payment flexibility, and other types of state funds, and in October 2000 it even called 
for a stoppage to force the government to give into its demands. Although the truck 
																																																								
59 See: “José Antonio Guzmán. Presidente de los empresarios”, Revista Hoy, April 16, 1995. The CPC’s 
proposal included other measures such as: strengthening the exchange rate and setting interest rates at an 
internationally competitive level; setting “prudent time limits” for agricultural employers to adapt to the 
new economic environment; ending over-taxation on products such as tobacco and wine; and 
modernizing the Comisión de Distorciones (which was in charge of investigating distortions in the price 
of imported goods) to facilitate farmers’ denounce against unfair foreign competition. On this, see: 
“Cúpula empresarial apoya a agricultores”, La Tercera, August 31, 1995. 
60 “Ante acuerdo Mercosur: Empresariado impulsará plan para agricultura”, El Mercurio, March 20, 
1996. 
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owners’ call had important political repercussions, the CPC president (Walter Riesco) 
decried it under the argument that he was “strongly opposed” to any protectionist 
demand, whether coming from agricultural employers or truck owners61.   
The orientations of the CPC did not change even after the former SNA president 
Ricardo Ariztía became the new president of peak association in November 2000. In 
taking office, he insisted that his affiliation with the agriculture industry did not mean 
that he defended protectionism: “I am pro-internationalization, and I have always been 
that way. Maybe that explains the conflicts I’ve had within my (sectoral) association”, 
he contended62. Ariztía’s free-market ideology was openly endorsed by most of the 
CPC leaders who also valued his capacity modernize the agricultural sector and the 
SNA, as well his focus on “long-term” issues. This focus on “long-term issues” played a 
key role within the SNA. After years of internal disputes, most of its leaders ended up 
accepting that the transformation of the agricultural sector was “a country-level issue 
(un tema país) that inevitably required the adaptation of all businesspeople”63.  
Another important menace to the unity of the business sector derived from the 
late Asian Crisis and the way it increased the conflicts between SOFOFA and CPC. 
Unlike the early 1980s crisis, these conflicts were not as much about the associations’ 
approach to economic policy as about how to push the government to find solutions to 
																																																								
61 “Marcha gremial a Santiago (transportistas y agricultores)”, El Mercurio, August 1, 2000; “Paro 
indefinido. Camionneros inician bloqueo de carreteras”, October 17, 2000; “Riesco se despide”, El 
Mercurio, November 17, 2000.   
62 “La coronación de Ricardo I. Del campo a la mayor entidad empresarial de Chile”, El Mercurio, 
November 24, 2000.  
63 Interview with Juan Pablo Matte, SNA General Secretary, July 21, 2015. On Ariztía’s leadership skills 
see: “Presidente de la SNA. Ricardo Ariztía”, Revista Capital, December 1998 (Edición Anuario 1998).	 
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the crisis64. These conflicts were exacerbated by divergences in the leadership styles of 
presidents of CPC and SOFOFA. According to some businesspeople, the CPC President 
Walter Riesco represented an “extremely ideological” segment of business, “too 
influenced” by the conservative agenda of the UDI and uninterested in finding 
“concrete” solutions to the crisis. According to these sectors, the leadership style of the 
SOFOFA president Felipe Lamarca was better suited to unstable times; “more practical-
oriented” and “executive”, and (when necessary) less politically ideological, it was a 
better to deal with the government. Riesco and Lamarca also differed in their views of 
what the CPC should look like. Unlike Riesco, Lamarca contended that the CPC should 
act only as a “coordinator body”, so every sectoral association should have “its own 
voice” vis-à-vis government65. Similar to other 1990s SOFOFA leaders, Lamarca 
defended this approach by noting that SOFOFA was a powerful association whose 
broad representational scope allowed it to represent more than 17% of the country’s 
GDP66.  
																																																								
64 In effect, in contrast to the “protectionist” proposals from medium-sized employer associations such as 
ASEXMA, both CPC and SOFOFA defended rather radical pro-market solutions to crisis, which in a 
“anti-crisis plan” presented in late September 1998 included budget cuts, lowering tariffs, and the 
privatization of literally “all” the state-owned companies. See “Walter Riesco: ‘La paciencia se va 
terminando’”, Revista Hoy, April 27, 1998; “Plan anticrisis: empresarios piden privatizarlo todo”, La 
Tercera, September 29, 1998. 
65 “Molestia empresarial”, La Tercera, September 20, 1998; “Impasse CPC-SOFOFA: un problema de 
roles”, La Tercera, September 23, 1998; “La rotación del poder”, El Mercurio, October 4, 1998. 
66 This power was also seen in statements from SOFOFA presidents who frequently emphasized that, 
unlike other associations affiliated to the CPC, SOFOFA enjoyed direct communication channels with the 
government. Amid the CPC-SNA conflict, for example, in early 1995 the SOFOFA leader Pedro Lizana 
argued that agricultural employers’ “real problem” was not that the CPC did not listen to their demands, 
but rather that they lack sectoral strength. Regarding this, Lizana asserted: “If we have a problem or if 
there’s a discrepancy… we solve it ourselves. We don’t rely on the Confederation’s strength, because we 
have our own”. See: “Consejo ampliado de la CPC: Un ‘new look’ para el empresariado”, El Mercurio, 
January 7, 1995; “Elecciones en la CPC: Búsqueda frenética”, El Mercurio, July 28, 1996.  
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Based on this, he pushed the SOFOFA to pursue his own agenda, separate from 
the CPC, and between the second half of 1998 and 2000 SOFOFA refused to participate 
in several CPC-government meetings to discuss solutions for the crisis. In early 2000, 
the SOFOFA broke its relationship with the CPC after Lamarca denounced Walter 
Riesco for not implementing several changes in the CPC bylaws. These changes had 
long been demanded by SOFOFA and Riesco himself had promised to implement them 
after his reelection in December 199867. The bylaw changes would give more autonomy 
to the sectoral associations and put limits to the power of the CPC president, and 
according to SOFOFA they were “urgent” because they would prevent the CPC 
president from making “un-consulted” statements on behalf business as a whole, such 
as those observed amid the Asian Crisis—which ended up in the CPC’s official 
endorsement of the plan for economic recovery proposed by the Frei government. The 
SOFOFA’s pressure had an immediate impact on the CPC; by the end of April 2000, 
the CPC finally implemented the changes demanded. Thus, the system of rotating vice-
presidencies was officially included in the statuses, the members of the CPC Executive 
Council was reduced to eight (the six presidents of sectoral associations plus the current 
and the last presidents), and the Managers Committee (Comité de Gerentes) was 
officially recognized as a middle-level body, made up of representatives from the six 
sectoral associations, in charge of passing information from the “bottom” to the 
Executive Council. The SOFOFA had a very positive reception of these changes. Days 
																																																								
67 “Lamarca no asistió a reunión de la CPC”, La Hora, September 22, 1998; “Presidencia de CPC podría 
rotarse entre sus ramas cada seis meses”, La Segunda, September 24, 1998; “Unidad primó en elección de 
la CPC: reelecto Riesco por dos años más”, La Tercera, December 12, 1998; “Sofofa congela vínculos 
con la CPC”, El Mercurio, April 15, 2000.  
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after they were announced, Lamarca said that the impasse with the CPC was totally 
overcome68.  
 Finally, another source of conflict, which has been recurrent throughout all the 
democratic period, is the one observed in strategic disputes between “hardline” and 
“soft-line” leaderships. In the early 1990s, this conflict was seen in the disagreements 
between the CPC president Manuel Feliú and hardline sectors represented at that time 
by businessmen such as Fernando Agüero from SOFOFA. These sectors frequently 
criticized Feliú’s endorsement of the new democratic administration—particularly his 
support of the Framework Agreements—contending that it was a sign of weakness 
business should not afford to show.  In the mid-1990s, the hardliners-soft-liners conflict 
was also observed in the disputes between the Walter Riesco, who defined himself as 
“follower” of José A. Guzmán’s hardline stances, and SOFOFA leaders such as Pedro 
Lizana who developed a less confrontational style vis-à-vis the Concertación 
governments, and even had personal contacts with important PS and DC leaders69.  
 By the mid and late 2000s, the hardliner sectors strongly criticized the soft-
liners, which since beginning of the Lagos administration (2000 – 2006) had become 
more and more influential. Worried by the 20007 subcontracting workers’ strikes, for 
example, the hardliners argued that the conciliatory stances of leaders such as Juan 
Claro and Hernán Sommerville had weakened the CPC’s capacity to defend business 
interests. They also noted that the CPC’ extremely friendly relation with the 																																																								
68 “Consejo nacional de CPC aprobó reformas de estatutos”, El Mercurio, April 28, 2000; “Lamarca, 
después de  la guerra fría”, El Mercurio, April 30, 2000.   
69 See, for example, “Manuel Feliú Justiniano, presidente de la CPC: ‘Este es el momento de definirse sin 
vacilaciones ni silencios’”, Revista Cosas, July 10, 1990; “Un ‘liberal’ frente a un ‘continuista’”, La 
Nación, October 13, 1996.  
		
341 
Concertación had ended up in constant friction with their “natural allies”, right parties70. 
Similar to the early 1990s, these hardliners were grouped around SOFOFA, and during 
Bachelet’s second term (2014 – 2018) they strengthened their positions vis-à-vis the 
moderates, especially after the reformist threat reemerged with Bachelet’s introduction 
of tax and labor reform bills in 2014. A good example of this occurred when Bachelet 
announced the introduction of the labor reform bill and, in contrast to the critiques from 
business associations the ABIF president Jorge Awad endorsed the government 
proposal. Awad contended that employers decried a reform to the labor code simply 
because they would never trust in a government coalition that, like the Nueva Mayoría, 
was endorsed by the Communist Party. In so doing, he called on businesspeople to have 
a “long term vision” and realize that the only company that “survives” is the “citizen 
company”, i.e. the one that “fulfills an economic, social, and environmental role”71. 
Business leaders’ response was strong. Not only did they call into question the 
“representativeness” of Awad’s leadership, but also repudiated the way that the ABIF 
associates “let” their president make that type of “personal comments”72. These 
critiques ended up with several ABIF officers demanding early elections to remove 
Awad from office, which eventually implied, after sudden changes in the ABIF bylaws, 
																																																								
70 “El distanciamiento entre Bachelet y los empresarios”, Diario Financiero, August 6, 2007; “Los 
nuevos ejes labrorales”, Revista Capital, October 19 – November 1, 2007.  
71“Awad: ‘Hay gran diferencia entre lo que dicen y lo que deciden los empresarios’”, El Mercurio, 
December 31, 2014.  
72 This description is based on the account given by a CPC staff member during an informal conversation 
after an interview. The interview took place a couple of months after Awad’s statements.  
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the election of Segismundo Schulin-Zeuthen as the new president of the bankers’ 
association73.        
During this period, tensions between moderates and hardliners also affected the 
CPC leadership. Its president Alberto Salas was several times criticized for his “soft” 
defense of business and his conciliatory stance towards the government74. At the 
beginning of his term, businesspeople saw Salas’ closeness with government officials as 
a positive asset. However, the government’s distant relation with the CPC throughout 
2015 quickly weakened the position of the moderates. Although understanding these 
reactions, Salas always defended the need to avoid confrontation: “It’s the 21st century. 
You either convince (your counterpart) or you’re done, because they (the government) 
can easily close the doors, and stop talking to you”, he pointed out75. Throughout 
Bachelet’s second term, the hard-liners’ stances were reinforced by the emergence of 
business activist within small and medium-sized associations such as the CONAPYME 
and especially ASECH, which between 2014-2016 decided to confront government’s 
reforms independently from the CPC. To do so, in 2014 these associations formed the 
																																																								
73 “Gremio de Bancos acelera cambios y nombra a Segismundo Schulin-Zeuthen como presidente”, El 
Mercurio, January 23, 2015. A similar type of conflict occurred during the 2015 SOFOFA’s electoral 
process. While Hermann Von Mühlenbrock sought his reelection by appealing to the more conservative 
sectors of the manufacturer association, his competitor Andrés Navarro showed himself as a liberal leader 
aiming to renovate the SOFOFA. In pursuing his renovation ideals, he demanded the SOFOFA to be 
more “open” and “participatory”, and even claimed to support one of the most pro-labor measures of the 
labor reform bill—the norms that would limit employers’ ability to replace striking workers— contending 
that “a strike that does not paralyze (the company) is not a strike”. Despite Navarro had the support from 
important “liberal” SOFOFA leaders such as Rafael Guilisasti, his renovation strategy failed to catch the 
attention from manufacturers, and Von Mühlenbrock was reelected as president with 75% of the votes. 
See: “Navarro confirma postulación a Sofofa y elección será la más reñida desde 2001”, Diario 
Financiero, March 4, 2015; “Por qué ganó Von Mühlenbrock y por qué perdió Navarro”, El Mercurio, 
April 30, 2015.   
74 “Alfredo Ovalle: ‘A Salas le pediría una actitud más rígida’”, La Segunda, August 7, 2015. This type of 
critiques was also recurrent in interviews with employers affiliated to the CChC, the SNA, and SOFOFA.  
75 Interview with Alberto Salas, June 30, 2015.       
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Multigremial Nacional de Emprendedores to mobilize against the tax reform, and in a 
year later the “Anti-reform front” to confront—in alliance with CPC affiliates such as 
SOFOFA, CNC, and CChC—the labor reform76.  
The formation of the Anti-reform front in 2015 was unprecedented because it 
was, as shown in Chapter 4, the first time that business confronted a labor reform 
process through two separate organizations. The formation of this front certainly 
suggested that strong conservative sectors of business did not agree with the 
conciliatory stances adopted by the CPC since the mid 2000s. Unsurprisingly, CPC 
officers criticized its formation by contenting that this type of initiatives would only 
worsen the relation with the executive. They also decried the Anti-reform front because 
they saw it as a result of SOFOFA’s “restless desire” to appear publicly as an 
association “more influential and dynamic than the CPC”77.  
Regardless of these critiques, the Anti-reform front succeeded in catching the 
attention from different sectors that had been demanding not only a more “active” 
stance vis-à-vis the “anti-business” discourses that took over the agenda since 2011, but 
also the generation of a “business’ block” able to integrate big and small employers into 
the same umbrella78. The interviews conducted in the course of this research indicate 
that the demands from these sectors represented the most important preoccupations of 
																																																								
76 “Se constituye legalmente la primera multigremial nacional de emprendedores de Chile”, September 8, 
2014. Retrieved from ASECH website (https://www.asech.cl/noticias/se-constituye-legalmente-la-
primera-multigremial-nacional-de-emprendedores-en-chile/). Accessed on June 15, 2016; “Reforma 
laboral: empresarios unen fuerzas y crean comisión negociadora para pedir cambios”, Diario Financiero, 
April 16, 2015.	
77 This account is based on a personal conversation with a CPC’s staff member in June 2015.   
78 “Cónclave y video de empresarios anti reforma laboral es sólo el primer paso de varias acciones”, La 
Tercera, April 16, 2015; “Alfredo Ovalle: ‘A Salas le pediría una actitud más rígida’”, La Segunda, 
August 7, 2015. 
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employers in current Chilean society. Regardless of their size, economic sector, and 
degree of involvement with business associations, the huge majority of businessmen 
interviewed believed that proliferation of protests and demands “from below” were the 
orchestration by leftist political activists who, taking advantage of “reasonable 
demands”, have been able to “revive” anti-free market and anti-business discourses 
which have been exploited by “populist” leaders to pursue reformist agendas. Again, the 
comparisons with the Allende government were a frequent resource the interviewees 
drew upon to explain the “disastrous” consequences of that type of discourses79.  
The appearance of coalitions such as the Anti-reform front had important 
consequences for organized business as it showed that the early 1990s-like 
confrontational stances of business leaders had not disappear. Yet in contrast to 
workers’ “alternative coalitions” (which were against the CUT’s strategies), these 
alterative business coalitions did not mean the de-legitimization of the CPC. Neither the 
Multigremial de Emprendedores de Chile nor the Anti-reform front were formed to 
question the legitimacy of the CPC, let alone to “replace” its role. In what follows I 
suggest that this difference with respect to organized labor lies in the way in which 
since its renaissance in the 1980s CPC successfully overcome all the disputes that might 
have endangered business unity.  
 																																																								
79 The importance of historical comparisons like this was vividly observed in an interview with a young 
employer, member of the third generation of large family-controlled corporation in the manufacturing 
sector (conducted in November 2015). At the very beginning of the interview (which was supposed to be 
about his opinion on the 2015 labor reform), he started the conversation by saying: “You know, it is 
always difficult to me to talk about these things because, you know, I’m not against unions at all, but you 
know what happened decades ago in the country. I hadn’t even been born in the 1970s, I’m younger, but 
my dad and uncles always tell me stories about how all the firms in this industrial neighborhood 
(comuna) were took over by workers”.        
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8.3. Explaining the strength of CPC and the power of organized business 
 The previous sections show that although intra-business disputes are frequent, 
they have not undermined the CPC’s legitimacy vis-à-vis its affiliates or its capacity to 
unify the interests of the sectorial associations affiliated to it. Why, unlike the CUT, has 
the CPC been able to maintain its organizational strength and, in doing so, facilitate 
business unity and employers’ capacity to influence as a class the policy-making 
process? The evidence at hand suggests that two sets of factors are at play here. While 
the first set of factors refers to ideological and political mechanisms, the second one 
refers to the CPC’s “sectoral-consensual” logic of organization.  
 
8.3.1. Ideological and political factors 	
Threats and historical memories  
Based on what has been shown throughout this chapter, it is possible to argue 
that one of the main factors that strengthen the overcoming of inter-sectoral conflicts 
refers to the impact of threats. Particularly, it refers to the way in which the CPC 
associate these threats to the historical memory of the Allende government to achieve 
unity. Whether from a reformist government or from mobilizations from “below”, this 
type of associations was recurrent during the 1990s and 2000s, i.e. even in contexts 
where the Concertación governments made significant efforts to show their pro-
business orientation. They were also recurrent in times of labor reform, mobilizations 
from below (e.g. 2007 subcontracted workers’ strikes and the 2011 protests), and in 
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moments in which the government adopted more distant stances towards organized 
business (e.g. during Bachelet’s second administration). In line with previous research 
(cf. Álvarez, 2015; Arriagada, 2004; Campero, 1995; Frieden, 1991; Schmitter & 
Streeck, 1999; Undurraga, 2014), this suggests that perception of threats is important 
not only for explaining the formation of business associations and their persistence, but 
also as a source of unity. In effect, the recurrent references to the Allende government 
suggests that, regardless of whether the threats are real or not, they act as a powerful 
mechanism for unity when, like in Chile, there exist a concrete historical example (in 
this case, a socialist government) that associations and leaders can draw upon to 
reinforce unity.  
In addition to these types of political threats, the CPC’s power was also 
reinforced by economic uncertainties. Especially in the early 1980s, economic crisis 
forced employers establish the organizational mechanisms to coordinate their interests 
and overcome inter-sectoral disputes.    
 
State support 
 The case of the CPC indicates that the importance of threats and historical 
memories does mean that other political factors noted in the literature—e.g. state 
support for encompassing associations (cf. Martin & Swank, 2012; Schneider, 2004)—
do not hold. Regarding this, the story of CPC in the 1990s and early 2000s is 
illustrative. Throughout these years, business leaders insisted that an active defense of 
Pinochet’s legacy was the only way to confront the potential promotion of socialism by 
a center-left coalition, which until the mid 2000s still did not prove its total commitment 
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to market economy. This permanent state of alert strengthened the encompassing (cross-
sectoral) power of the CPC. Yet, that power was consolidated at the same time through 
the action of Concertación’s officers who decidedly adopted market economy and, in 
doing so, turned the CPC into a key actor of development by granting it with privileged 
access to the policymaking process. 
 
Ideological cohesion  
Finally, the CPC’s ability to maintain business cohesion throughout the labor 
reform periods was also an effect of its own politico-ideological work started in the 
1970s and consolidated in the 1990s. In line with the literature on Chilean business (cf. 
Álvarez, 2015; Arriagada, 2004; Montero, 1997; Undurraga, 2014) this chapter showed 
that one of the main successes of the CPC was its ideological work expressed in the 
creation of a “new mentality” among employers based on the principles of free-market 
ideology. This ideology proved to be an efficient alternative to “socialist”, “corporatist”, 
and “statist” approaches to industrial relations, and has also helped businesspeople 
ameliorate the leadership disputes between hardliners and soft-liners. Both in the early 
1990s and the late 2010s, these disputes have revolved around the strategies to confront 
the government. Although important, in no case these disputes have undermined class-
wide agreements on basic aspects of socioeconomic policy such as the “subsidiary” role 
of the state. Regarding labor law, these basic agreements have been observed in 
employers’ strong rejection to both industry-wide collective bargaining and any 
measure that would improve unions’ bargaining power at the firm level. The ideological 
cohesion resulting from the successful work of the CPC has also been important for the 
		
348 
defeat of “protectionist” discourses that up until the early 2000s were still present 
within some sectors business community (e.g. the SNA). This ideological work was 
also important because it provided employers with liberal discourses they could draw 
upon to adapt themselves to the new democratic conditions. Such adaptation was in no 
way easy, and succeeded only after the center-left administrations proved their full 
commitment to market economy and, consequently, business leaders stopped seeing 
themselves as “guardians” of neoliberal regime.  
In addition to this, business ideological cohesion was facilitated by the way in 
which international market-oriented conglomerates became dominant players in the 
CPC. As I showed, these conglomerates favored market reforms since the 1970s largely 
because they believed they could adjust to a more competitive environment. Thus, in 
gaining influence on business associations they became key for marginalizing the 
opposition from less competitive, domestic-oriented sectors (Durand & Silva, 1998; E. 
Silva, 1998).  
 
8.3.2. The CPC’s sectoral-consensual logic of organization   
All the factors mentioned above have been important only because within the 
CPC itself there are representation and conflict settlement mechanisms that have 
facilitated class-wide agreements. These internal mechanisms are based on a sectoral-
consensual logic of organization in which the instruments to both represent interests 
(e.g. to elect leadership positions) and solve potential disputes are rooted in the 
promotion of inter-sectoral agreements. Based on this, the CPC has successfully 
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represented and shaped employer’ interests, while preventing the proliferation non-
economic (say, political or ideological) disputes. This does not mean that political 
conflicts do not exist within the CPC, but rather that they are processed in such a way 
that they have not endangered business unity.   
The CPC’s sectoral logic of organization is not unique. Most business 
associations base their domain demarcation on the representation economic sectors 
(Traxler et al., 2001, pp. 48-51). However, in the case of the CPC, this logic of 
organization has been successful to mobilize power because it has been reinforced by 
three particular mechanisms.  
 
The CPC Executive Committee  
The first of these mechanisms refers to the CPC’s system of inter-sectoral 
coordination and decision-making centered largely on its Executive Committee. Formed 
by seven members (the CPC president and the presidents of each of the six sectoral 
associations)80, the Executive Committee is in charge of implementing the general 
guidelines proposed by the National Council (which is also formed by representatives of 
all sectoral associations). In practice, the Executive Committee meets every fifteen days 
with the explicit goal of dealing with “broad” (class-wide) problems, under the 
understanding that each sectoral association has the right to address its own sectoral 
issues vis-à-vis the government when the need arises81. Perhaps the most interesting 
feature of the Executive Committee lies in its relatively simply (bur very important) 																																																								
80 In some cases, the Executive Committee has only six members because the CPC president is, at the 
same time, the head of one of the sectoral associations.  
81 Interview with Alberto Salas, CPC past-president, June 30, 2015.   
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role. In sustaining its agreements on the consensual decisions reached by a few sectoral 
leaders representing numerous economic sectors and subsectors, it is a coordination 
instrument that has become the organizational engine of the CPC’s class-wide 
orientation. In periods of crisis it has proven to be effective to resolve inter-sectoral 
disputes. Amid the early 1980s crisis, for example, the CPC drew on the same logic to 
allow, in cases of internal disagreements, sectoral associations to lobby on their own 
without affecting the cross-sectoral agreements reached at the peak the CPC (E. Silva, 
1998, p. 230). Throughout the democratic period, this mechanism has also consolidated 
the CPC’s capacity to build cross-sectoral consensus by emphasizing the Executive 
Committee’s exclusive focus on inter-sectoral matters.  
This class-wide focus has been frequently cited as the most important role of the 
CPC (Álvarez, 2015; Arriagada, 2004; Schneider, 2004), and a member of the CPC 
staff described it in the following terms: “The CPC is like a big elephant that makes few 
but strong steps, because every step is always backed by the absolute agreement 
between the six ramas (sectoral associations). Whenever there is no consensus, the CPC 
abstains from acting publicly and the sectoral associations present their demands 
individually. In doing so, we prevent the CPC from making statements that are against 
the interests of any of its affiliates… We take consensus seriously because that’s the 
only source of the CPC’s strength”82.  
 
 
 																																																								
82 Interview with Pablo Bobic, CPC legal advisor, May 8, 2015. 
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Hierarchical structure and indirect affiliation  
Closely related to this, a second mechanism that reinforces the CPC’s unitary 
capacities is its hierarchical structure based on the indirect affiliation of lower-level 
confederations (i.e. confederations representing sub-sectors of particular industries) and 
individual firms. This allows the CPC to indirectly represent a wide variety of economic 
activities without compromising or “over-exhausting” its internal decision-making 
structures. This facilitates not only consensus and coordination within the Executive 
Committee, but also its capacities to “govern” its members. The literature on business 
associations contends that governability problems are frequent in employers’ 
organizations because larger firms can, as a result of their economic power, easily 
pursue their interests via individual means or, in some cases, by influencing the 
associations at the expense of common goals (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999; Streeck, 
1998; Traxler et al., 2001). In the case of the CPC, its indirect relation with firms has 
been helpful to protect it from this type of distortions. In effect, the only way larger 
firms can exercise such their influence is via their concerted action through the sectoral 
association they belong to, which in no way guarantees that this association’s voice 
would be listened to in the Executive Committee. Both the CPC’s independence and its 
class-wide orientation of its actions are formally sheltered through bylaws that prohibit 
the CPC from intervening in individual firms’ disputes. In a similar way, the regulations 
that require absolute consensus of the Executive Committee’s decision-making process 
sheltered the CPC from potential unilateral decisions by its sectoral associations83. The 
isolation from firms’ day-to-day demands and associations’ sectoral interest is, in the 																																																								
83 Interview with Pablo Bobic, CPC legal advisor, May 8, 2015.  
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end, the main source of power that enables the CPC to maintain its class-wide 
orientation despite its economic and technical resources are way more limited than 
those of its affiliates.  
The CPC’s inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms and its indirect affiliation 
structure have given rise to the still unresolved debate over whether to accept the 
affiliation of a seventh sectoral association. In the late 1990s, this debate was recurrent 
after Federation of Private Institutions of Social Provision, Health, and Insurance 
(Federación Gremial de Instituciones Privadas de Seguridad Social, Salud y Seguros, 
also known as FIS) requested membership to the CPC. Although important leaders such 
as José A. Guzmán and Walter Riesco originally endorsed the request arguing that the 
CPC had to broaden its representational domain to new industries, the majority of the 
associations opposed it. They contended that a new member in the Executive Council 
would make inter-sectoral agreements more difficult and that most of the economic 
activities represented by FIS were already represented in the CPC through the ABIF. 
Based on these arguments, the CPC turned down the request and even Walter Riesco 
(who in those years was president of the CPC) argued against the affiliation of FIS84. 
Recently, the Association of Private Pension Funds Companies (Asociación de AFP de 
Chile) made a similar request, an although in the last years the CPC agreed to discuss 
the issue, its incorporation seems unlike because the CPC bylaws state that the direct 
																																																								
84 “Gremios empresariales: conflictos en familia”, El Mercurio, April 6, 1997; “CPC rechazó ingreso de 
nueva rama”, El Mercurio, September 10, 1997. 
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affiliation of a new association has to be unanimously approved by the current six 
members of the Executive Committee85.   
 
Sector-based electoral system  
Finally, a third factor that strengthens the CPC’s ability to overcome the threats 
to the unity of the business sector is its electoral system and, particularly, the way in 
which it helps business leaders increase inter-sectoral consensus. Although the electoral 
process has suffered some minor modifications (e.g. in the early 2000 the reelection of 
the president was not allowed anymore), its main features have remained intact since at 
least the renaissance of the CPC in the 1980s. The presidential race starts with the 
nomination of candidates by sectoral associations. These associations usually work hard 
to reach an agreement before the official ballots take place, and in most of the cases 
inter-sectoral consensus prevails. Thus the CPC president is elected in symbolic ballots, 
where he runs alone, and receive the total support of the around 70 delegates with right 
to vote86. In other words, competitive elections are a rare occurrence. Important 
exceptions to this were the elections held 1996, 2004, and 2006. In all these cases, the 
pre-electoral agreement could not be achieved largely because of the strong differences 
between the candidates’ leadership styles. In 1996, for example, there were marked 
differences between the hardliner Manuel Riesco and his contender Pedro Lizana, 
whose moderation towards the Frei administration so evident that state officers openly 
																																																								
85 Interview CPC past-president Alberto Salas, June 30, 2015.   
86 The number of delegates varies from election to election, but in all cases it includes 10 representatives 
of each of the six sectoral associations affiliated to the CPC plus a dozen of CPC-past presidents.  
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endorsed his candidacy87. Similar events took place in 2004 and 2008 in the elections of 
Hernán Sommerville and Alfredo Ovalle88. However, since 2008 until the election of 
Alfredo Moreno in March 2017, the consensual nomination of candidates has been the 
norm.   
 
8.4. Conclusion  
 This chapter shows that the CPC’s successful defense of the Labor Plan is the 
result of a slow and careful work by business leaders that started at the very beginning 
of the Pinochet dictatorship. Through this activist work, business leaders used business 
associations as instruments to modernize employers’ ideologies and worldviews. They 
did so both to overcome historical intra-business divisions (which according to them 
were the main reason that ended up in the arrival of socialism) and to participate more 
actively in the formation of the new society devised by the authoritarian regime. Even 
though the CPC was a channel through this activist work was developed, it soon turned 
into an end in itself. By the end of the 1970s, and especially after the early 1980s crisis, 
employers realized that the strengthening of the CPC and its class-wide functions was 
the necessary precondition for the political and ideological unity of the business sector. 
The consolidation of this unity was, in turn, the main source of collective power 																																																								
87 “J. Antonio Guzmán reitera que gobierno intervino en proceso electoral de la CPC”, Estrategia, 
December 3, 1996; “Walter Riesco elegido presidente de empresarios por 41 de 75 votos emitidos”, La 
Segunda, December 5, 1996; “Gobierno desestima ‘endurecimiento’ de empresarios”, La Segunda, 
December 6, 1996. 
88 “Hernán Somerville es elegido nuevo presidente de la CPC”, El Mercurio Online, December 7, 2004. 
Retrieved from: http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2004/12/07/166172/hernan-somerville-es-
elegido-nuevo-presidente-de-la-cpc.html, Accessed on April 25, 2017; “Alfredo Ovalle fue elegido como 
nuevo presidente de la CPC”, Cooperativa Online, Retrieved from: 
http://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/economia/retail/comercio/alfredo-ovalle-fue-elegido-como-nuevo-
presidente-de-la-cpc/2006-12-12/131756.html, Accessed on April 25, 2017.  
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businesspeople forged to face the threats from the center-left post-dictatorial 
governments observed, for instance, in reforms attempting to change or dismantle the 
sociopolitical and institutional legacies of the dictatorship.  
 In relation to the literature on business collective action, the implications of the 
analysis developed here are three. First, the CPC’s supra-sectoral character, its indirect 
relation to firms and lower-level associations, and the inexistence of corporatist-like 
regulations in Chile implies that the CPC’s organizational strength does not derive, like 
in corporatist societies, from the selective incentives it provides to its members 
(Behrens, 2004; Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980; Traxler, 2010). Such strength rests, rather, 
on its political role and particularly, as suggested by Schneider (2004) on its capacity to 
promote consensus and unity.  
 Second, in contrast to Offe and Wiesenthal’s (1980) “two logics” of collective 
action thesis, the evidence presented in this chapter coincides with the investigations 
that show that business unity is neither automatic nor easy to achieve. In rejecting this 
argument, these investigations have suggested that capitalist collective action does not 
follow an instrumental-monological logic of organization (as argued by Offe and 
Wiesenthal), and that the employers’ coordination parallels in several respects the 
collective action problems faced by workers (cf. Haydu, 1999; Lawrence, 2014; Roy & 
Parker-Gwin, 1999). For the case of the CPC, the collective action problems faced by 
businesspeople refereed mostly to the historical inter-sectoral disputes expressed in the 
conflicts between the associations affiliated to the CPC. Thus, the CPC could emerge as 
a powerful encompassing organization only after employers realized, through decades 
of dialogical work facilitated by business leaders, that cross-sectoral unity was in itself 
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an asset that, as source of power, that should be preserved through the action of the 
CPC.  
 Third, the story of the CPC has important implications to understand the impact 
of encompassing business associations on individual employers’ orientations and 
preferences. In their studies of business associations in the developed world, Martin and 
Swank (2012) and Swenson (2002) contend that when encompassing associations are 
strong, employers are more likely to endorse “progressive” reforms as a way to advance 
their long term interests. Martin and Swank (2012) explain this by arguing that stronger 
encompassing associations are more able to adjudicate among the demands of diverse 
industrial sectors and bind members to negotiated decisions. This in turn leads a broader 
cross section of business to comply with the associations’ broader goals. The case of 
Chile indicates that business-state collaboration can certainly be facilitated by the 
existence of encompassing associations such as the CPC. In the early 1990s, for 
instance, CPC leaders such as Manuel Feliú played a key role in moderating the 
demands from hardline sectors that strongly opposed tripartite consultation initiatives 
such as the Framework Agreements. However the role of the CPC throughout all the 
reform processes indicate that regardless of this declared willingness to cooperation, 
business attitudes towards labor policy reform have been mostly hostile. In other words, 
in line with Fairfield (2015) study of business influence on tax reforms, the case 
analyzed here suggests that business cross-sectoral unity can well be a source of power 
to resist rather than promote progressive reforms. This analysis also calls into question 
some optimistic views on the role of Chilean business in the 21st century (cf. Tironi, 
2013). According to these views, one of the main features of the newest generation of 
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businesspeople lies in the way in which they have adapted themselves to the democratic 
rules by modernizing their political views and abandoning their hardline stances 
towards center-left democratic governments. However, as recently remarked by Álvarez 
(2015), the evidence presented here demonstrates that, at least regarding labor policy, 
non-confrontational and cooperative attitudes towards policy changes are more the 
exception rather than the rule. 
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9. Conclusion: class relations, labor policy, and conflict  
In this dissertation I studied labor law as an outcome and as a mechanism 
shaping collective action and class relations. As an outcome of the interaction between 
the state and social forces (particularly organized labor and business), the first part of 
this dissertation explained the persistence of the 1979 Labor Plan by showing how the 
power imbalances between workers and capitalists is a common feature of all the 
reform processes carried out since the return to democracy. I also demonstrated that 
these power imbalances, observed in the contrast between the CPC’s and the CUT’s 
capacity to influence the policy making process, has been reinforced by several political 
mechanisms. In the early 1990s and 2000s, it was intensified through politico-
institutional and ideological authoritarian legacies—e.g. unelected Senators (Senadores 
Designados), consensual politics, and new rules’ “minimalist” (neoliberal) conceptions 
of industrial relations and economic development—that increased the veto power the 
political allies of business (especially right wing parties). In the last reform process 
these legacies were either no longer present or played a much less significant role. Thus 
business influence over policymaking was facilitated mainly by the divisions within the 
ruling coalition observed in the disputes between its pro-business and pro-labor sectors.  
 Part II shifted the focus to labor law as a mechanism for collective action, and 
aimed to explain the power imbalances between Chilean workers and employers. This 
focus on labor law was the basis of Chapter 7, where I showed how the effects of the 
Labor Plan on the labor movement (e.g. on its fragmentation and the economic 
precariousness of confederations) are reinforced by the CUT’s politico-partisan logic of 
organization. This organizational logic contrasts, I argued, with the way in which the
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CPC has successfully mobilized employers by solving, via what I called a sectoral-
consensual logic of organization, the challenges to the unity of the business sector. In 
contrast to Offe and Wiesenthal’s (1980) thesis, I suggested that both the weakness of 
the CUT and the strength of the CPC should not be seen as the result of an inherent 
logic of capitalist and worker collective action, but rather as the outcome of political 
processes. Particularly, they should be explained by the way in which union and 
business leaders understood the historical lessons from the ISI period (for example, 
their role during the Allende government and their relation with parties), how they 
confronted the threats from the dictatorship’s economic restructuring (and, for the case 
of workers, he dictatorial political repression), and by the manner in which workers and 
employers prepared themselves to face the opportunities and challenges of the new 
democratic regime. In all these aspects, employers were more successful than workers. 
Not only did businesspeople revive the then dormant CPC, but also—as part of the 
same process—they succeeded in unifying business interests, identities, and preferences 
through organizational structures that within the CPC facilitate inter-sectoral consensus.  
Three implications can be drawn from this dissertation’s conclusions. First, 
regarding the study of labor reforms, they suggest the importance of the business sector, 
its ideological orientations, and especially its power vis-à-vis the state. This may seem 
obvious and self-evident, but as shown in Chapter 2, research that systematically 
analyzes the role of organized business is scant compared to the large amount of 
investigations focused on the interaction between labor and government. In effect, in 
Chile (and probably in the rest of Latin America as well), most of the studies have 
relegated the role of business to general descriptions of employers’ obstructionist 
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stances, without explaining where these preferences come from and why (at least in the 
case of Chile) they are strongly defended by the huge majority of the business sectors. 
In theoretical terms, the introduction of labor and business into the analysis implies 
adopting recent recommendations by scholars who have emphasized the need to put 
class relations and power imbalances at the center of the explanations of policy change. 
Korpi (2006) has done so in order to suggest that the employer-centered approach’s 
critique to the “laborist” focus of the Power Resource Approach should not lead to 
analyses that only privilege the role of employers. The insights from this employer-
center approach would only be fruitful, Korpi contends, if they give rise to research 
agendas that, while including employers’ strategies and preferences, focus on their 
interactions with workers and on the changes in the relative position of power of labor 
and business. The study of the Chilean case indicates that a research like this is fruitful 
to understand the causes that explain the failure of labor reforms. More specifically, this 
focus on class relations and power imbalances is helpful for understanding labor’s 
persistent inability to fulfill its aspirations for an industry-wide collective bargaining 
system with real protections to the right to strike, business reluctance to make 
concessions, and the center-left coalitions’ incapacity (and sometimes unwillingness) to 
undertake that type of reforms.  
In light of the evidence presented here, it seems that a reform that aims at 
dismantling the Labor Plan would succeed only if the government’s efforts are clearly 
oriented towards that end—i.e. if the draft bill does not present “weird mix” of pro-
labor and pro-business clauses—and if these efforts count on the decided support of all 
the ruling parties. The labor movement (and more specifically the CUT) would also 
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play a role. Yet different from its stances during the reform processes, organized labor 
should endorse the reforms without dismissing mass mobilization strategies. These 
strategies can be, when necessary, a good tool to exercise workers’ instrumental power 
and defend the progressive aspects of reforms.  
The experiences from the 2007 – 2014 waves of strikes suggest that 
mobilization can bring important gains for workers. However, in a context of reform 
these strategies would only succeed if labor leaders, regardless of their political 
affiliations, agree to protect labor autonomy and, for the case of the CUT, improve the 
mechanisms for interest representation. The change of the electoral process (which 
according to the resolutions of the CUT 11th Congress of January 2017 should take 
place in 2020) is, if implemented, an important step. Yet this step is small compared to 
the deep organizational transformations the CUT must undertake. In addition to 
ensuring the participation of all sectors of the labor movement—including those 
unaffiliated to the CUT—these transformations should end with the CUT’s political-
partisan logic of organization, while leading to the establishment of new forms or 
coordination and interest representation. These should be based, among other things, on 
the representation of economic sectors, the strengthening confederations and 
federations, and the improvement of the communication channels between these and 
plant-level unions.  
It is difficult to assess whether these transformations will succeed. However they 
are imperative because they are the only way to strengthen the working class vis-à-vis 
the state and organized business. This is also imperative because, in light of the 
evidence presented here, business attitudes towards labor reforms is not likely to 
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change. And unless the government makes significant effort to get the support from, 
say, small employers, business obstructionist stance observed since the return to 
democracy will probably be as unified as before. From the business side, this stance 
could change only if associations stop considering labor reforms as threats that would 
inevitably lead the country to “old times”. However, business associations’ insistent 
references to the past suggest not only the continuing importance of threats as 
facilitators of collective action, but also that their attitudes towards reforms will persist 
no matter these threats actually exist.   
The second implication of this dissertation’s findings refers to the concept of 
class formation. As noted in Chapter 6, much of the literature on this emphasizes that a 
class turns into a collective actor when the members of that class are class conscious, 
i.e. when they construct a common identity that facilitate the awareness of their class 
interests (cf. Elster, 1985; Thompson, 1966; Wright, 1997). The results from this 
research suggest that the relationship between consciousness and action must be 
nuanced by the consideration of the institutional factors that set the rules of the game in 
which collective organizations such as unions build class identity and advance workers’ 
interests These rules are usually emphasized in the comparative literature on 
corporatism and industrial relation systems, and are key for explaining why higher 
levels of working class militancy in pluralist regimes does not necessarily lead to more 
powerful labor movements (cf. Crouch, 1993; Paloheimo, 1984; Rogers, 1990; 
Schmitter, 1981). Recently, Wright (2015, pp. 224-230) has also theorized about the 
importance of institutions by arguing that they represent historically variable 
arrangements that shape both working class associational power and the range of 
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possibilities for stable class compromises. For the case of Chile, the extremely liberal 
regulations of the Labor Plan help explain why the comparatively high levels of 
working class identity of Chilean workers are not necessarily translated into a more 
powerful labor movement, compared to countries such as Argentina where the 
relationship between identity and power seems to be opposite (Elbert & Pérez 
Ahumada, 2016).  
Another important implication for the study of class formation refers to the 
relational aspects involved in it. Therborn (1983) emphasized these aspects decades ago 
by noting that class formation must be understood as a concept that entails no only a 
class’ degree of self-identity but also the way in which its members organize vis-à-vis 
other classes. Following this reasoning, the historical evidence presented throughout 
this dissertation suggests that the patterns of working class formation started during the 
dictatorial period are inseparable from the processes through which capitalists organized 
to defend the institutional legacies of the dictatorship. More specifically, they indicate 
that the fragmentation and weakness of the labor movement is (at least in those aspects 
directly associated with the Labor Plan) the consequence of the cohesion and strength of 
organized business. Cohesion and collective strength are central aspects of capitalists’ 
capacity to block reforms that would potentially increase workers’ associational power.  
Finally, a third implication derived directly from these reflections revolves 
around the notion of social concertation. Since the return to democracy, political leaders 
and analysts referred to social concertation to stress the need to build broad cross-class 
agreements to sustain democracy. In the mid 1990s, some scholars suggested that unlike 
most Latin American countries, Chile exhibited stable rates of economic growth, a solid 
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party system, and an overall stable transition to democracy that would have facilitated 
concertation through the establishment of societal corporatist arrangements (Durand & 
Silva, 1998; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995). Durand and Silva (1998, pp. 36-37) warned, 
however, that these type arrangements would be unlikely if the labor actor was weak 
and if, moreover, organized business remained reluctant to accept workers’ 
organization. Reflecting on similar issues, from a Marxist perspective Wright (2015) 
has recently contended that even assuming the existence of antagonistic interests 
between workers and capitalists, the prospects for positive class compromises—i.e. 
agreements based on the cooperation and a non-zero-sum game between opposing 
classes—need the existence high levels of workers’ associational power. Although such 
forms of compromise would remain within the institutional margins of capitalism (so 
they should not represent a threat to business interests), they seem unlikely to succeed 
in Chile. In contrast to the most optimistic views on the political renovation of Chilean 
business, this dissertation has shown that by the end of the 2010s employers continue to 
perceive organized labor as a menace to their interests.
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Glossary 
 
ABIF Asociación de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (Association of 
Banks and Financial Institutions) 
ANEF Agrupación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales (National 
Association of Public Employees) 
ASECH Asociación de Emprendedores de Chile (Association of 
Entrepreneurs of Chile) 
ASIMET Asociación de Industriales Metalúrgicos y Metalmecánicos 
(Association of Metallurgic and Metalworking Industrialists) 
CAMPORT Cámara Marítima y Portuaria de Chile (Maritime and Port 
Chamber of Chile) 
CAT Central Autónoma de Trabajadores (Autonomous Workers 
Central)  
CChC Cámara Chilena de la Construcción (Chilean Chamber of 
Construction) 
CDS Consejo de Diálogo Social (Council for Social Dialogue) 
CDT Central Democrática de Trabajadores (Workers Democratic 
Central) 
CEPCh Confederación de empleados particulares de Chile 
(Confederation of Private-Sector White-collar employees) 
CEXCUT Comité en el Exterior de la Central Única de Trabajadores 
(Exterior Committee of the Workers Sole Central Confederation) 
CGT (1930s) Confederación General del Trabajo (General Confederation of 
Labor) 
CGT (current) Confederación General de Trabajadores (General Confederation 
of Workers) 
CIUS Comité de Iniciativa Unidad Sindical (Labor Unity Initiative 
Committee) 
CLAT Confederación Latinoamericana de Trabajadores (Latin American 
Workers Confederation)  
CMPC Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones (Paper and 
Cardboard Manufacturing Company) 
CNC Cámara Nacional de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo (National 
Chamber of Commerce, Services, and Tourism) 
CNS (1930s) Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos (National Confederation 
of Labor Unions) 
CNS (1980s) Coordinadora Nacional Sindical (National Labor Union 
Coordinator)  
CNT Comando Nacional de Trabajadores (National Commando of 
Workers) 
CODELCO Corporación Nacional del Cobre (National Copper Corporation of 
Chile) 
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CONAPYME Confederación Nacional de la Micro, Pequeña y Mediana 
Empresa de Chile (National Confederation of Micro, Small and 
Medium-Sized Business of Chile) 
CONFENATS Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Salud (National 
Confederation of Healthcare Workers) 
CONUPIA Confederación Nacional Unida de la Mediana, Pequeña y Micro 
Empresa, Servicios y Artesanado de Chile (United National 
Confederation of Small and Medium-Sized Business, Services, 
and Self-Employed Craft Producers of Chile) 
Coparmex Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana (Employers 
Confederation of the Mexican Republic) 
CORA Corporación de la Reforma Agraria (Agrarian Reform 
Corporation) 
CORFO Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (Production 
Development Corporation) 
CPC Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio (Confederation 
of Production and Commerce) 
CTC (old) Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (Confederation of 
Copper Workers) 
CTC (current) Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (Confederation of 
Copper Workers) 
CTCh (1930s) Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (Confederation of 
Chilean Workers) 
CTCh (1980s) Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (Confederation of 
Chilean Workers) 
COTRAPORCHI Confederación de Trabajadores Portuarios de Chile 
(Confederation of Chilean Port Workers) 
CUT (old) Central Única de Trabajadores (Workers Sole Central) 
CUT (current) Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Workers Unitary Central) 
DC Democracia Cristiana (Christian Democracy, also named Partido 
Demócrata Cristiano).   
ENADE Encuentro Nacional de la Empresa (National Business 
Conference) 
FETRAFORMA Federación Nacional de Trabajadores del Transporte 
Forestal (National Federation of Forestry Transportation 
Workers) 
FIESP Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Federation of 
Industry of the State of São Paulo) 
FIS Federación Gremial de Instituciones Privadas de Seguridad 
Social, Salud y Seguros (Federation of Social Security, 
Healthcare, and Insurance Institutions) 
FOCh Federación Obrera de Chile (Chilean Federation of Workers) 
FONACC Federación Obrera Nacional del Cuero y del Calzado (National 
Federation of Leather and Footwear Industry Workers) 
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ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions  
ISI Import Substitution Industrialization  
MAPU Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (Popular Unitary Action 
Movement) 
MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market) 
MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left 
Movement)  
MOSICAM Movimiento Sindical por los Cambios (Labor Union Movement 
for Changes) 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NHO Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon (Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise) 
NM Nueva Mayoría (New Majority) 
PAC Political Action Committee 
PC Partido Comunista de Chile (Communist Party of Chile) 
PROTRAC Sistema de Protección al Trabajador Cesante (Unemployed 
Worker Protection System) 
PS Partido Socialista de Chile (Socialist Party of Chile) 
PYME Pequeñas y medianas empresas (Small and medium-sized 
business) 
RN Renovación Nacional (National Renewal) 
SINTEC Sindicato Interempresa Nacional de Trabajadores de 
Construcción, Montaje, Industrial y Afines (Inter-firm National 
Union of Construction Workers and Industrial Assembly 
Activities) 
SNA Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (National Agricultural Society) 
SOFOFA Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Society for Manufacturing 
Promotion) 
SONAMI Sociedad Nacional de Minería (National Mining Society) 
UDI Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic 
Union) 
UDT Unión Democrática de Trabajadores (Workers Democratic 
Union) 
UNT Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (Workers National Union)  
UNTRACH Unión de Trabajadores de Chile (Chile’s Workers Union) 
UPCh Unión Portuaria de Chile (Dockworker Union of Chile) 
USINFA Unión de Sindicatos Forestales de Arauco (Coalition of Forestry 
Unions of Arauco) 
UTM Unidad Tributaria Mensual (Monthly Tax Unit) 
WCL World Confederation of Labour 
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions 
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